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**DOCUMENTS ON
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1936**

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DOCUMENTS ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

1936

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PREFACE

LOOKING back on the events of 1936 there seems little reason for wishing to revise the statement made in the Preface to the 1935 volume that of all the years since the War the year 1935 was the most significant. If the year 1935 was significant in that in it were sown the seeds of some of the troubles to come, the year 1936 was certainly critical in that during it the process of reaping the harvest began—a process which continued in 1937.

In view of all that happened during the year it is not surprising that *Documents on International Affairs, 1936*, should be as substantial a volume as it is. Indeed it would have burst all bounds if a number of important sections and documents had not been held over for inclusion in subsequent volumes.

While this decision was largely dictated by exigencies of space, it has also definite advantages in that it will allow the documents thus withheld to be grouped with others dealing with the same subjects and of later date.

It will be seen that the Spanish situation and the Mediterranean (with the exception of the Straits Convention), the Far East, and the Near and Middle East (with the exception of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty) are not covered in this volume.

At first sight it may appear surprising that the first of these was omitted in view of the fact that events in Spain dominated the European situation in the latter part of 1936. But Spain and the Mediterranean continued to exercise a first claim on European diplomacy in 1937. It was decided, therefore, both in view of the importance of the documents and the mass of material available, to make a complete collection of the essential documents on Spain and on Non-intervention for publication in a separate volume, as in the case of the Italo-Abyssinian Dispute.

In the case of the Far East it appeared to be desirable to follow a similar course, though it is to be hoped that the Sino-Japanese conflict will not assume such proportions as to render necessary another separate volume.

The same considerations also apply to the section dealing with the Near and Middle East. In spite of the signature during 1936 of the Franco-Syrian and the Franco-Lebanese Treaties, and also of Treaties between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Egypt, there seemed to be some justification for holding these over until next year, for inclusion in a section which would also include the documents relative

to Palestine and the Alexandretta settlement, and the so-called Asiatic Pact between Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan.

Apart from these omissions, it may be added that the documents dealing with Anglo-Italian relations and leading up to the Gentleman's Agreement of January 2, 1937, will be printed next year together with further relevant papers of later date.

On the other hand, and in contrast to these several legacies to future volumes, it may be noted that the present volume includes certain documents falling within the year 1937. It was clearly desirable that the documentation of the change of Belgium's international status should be carried down to the Anglo-French declaration of April, 1937, and that the London Naval Treaty of 1936 should be completed by the inclusion of the Anglo-German and Anglo-Russian Naval Agreements of July, 1937.

In editing the Western European part of the present volume I have been fortunate enough, in spite of his absence in the United States, in being able to rely upon the help and advice of Mr. John Wheeler-Bennett. I am also grateful to him for writing the introductory notes dealing with the German re-occupation of the Rhineland, subsequent negotiations, and the international status of Belgium.

In connexion with these same three sections, I should like to make acknowledgement to Dr. F. J. Berber for the use made of some of the documents printed in his book *Locarno*.

With the ever-growing mass of documents to be collected, sorted, and arranged, the Editor's task is becoming increasingly heavy. That it has been accomplished is, in the greatest measure, due to the efforts of Mrs. P. E. Baker. Rarely is an Editor blessed with a colleague upon whom he can rely with such confidence, whether in the sorting of original material, or the sub-editing or proof-reading of the documents themselves.

I am also indebted to Dr. Toynbee and Miss V. M. Boulter for much helpful advice, to Mr. Struan Robertson for many of the translations, and to Mr. Dennis Routh for his help with the section dealing with the Straits Convention.

Finally, I should like to express my thanks to all those who have helped me to obtain documents, and particularly to the Foreign Ministries, Embassies and Legations who have furnished them.

As in previous years, the Chronology of Treaties and International Agreements at the end of the Volume has been compiled by Miss Katherine Duff.

STEPHEN HEALD

CHATHAM HOUSE, November 9, 1937.

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NOTE

According to the editorial rule which has been adopted, documents are printed in English or in French, the official languages of the League of Nations. Where equally authentic texts in both languages are available, the English text is printed; where only an official French text is available, that text, and not an unofficial English translation of it, is used. Documents in other languages are given in an English translation, unless an official French translation is available.

A. EUROPE

I. GERMANY, THE RHINELAND, AND LOCARNO¹

THE year 1935 was distinguished for the conspicuous advance achieved by the National-Socialist régime in its policy of unilateral revision of the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. This policy had been initiated in the first year of Herr Hitler's rule with the withdrawal of Germany from Geneva in October 1933.² This was followed in February and March 1935, respectively, by the statements that Germany proposed to build an air fleet and to introduce compulsory military service, both in defiance of the provisions of Part V of the Treaty of Versailles.³

Herr Hitler, in a speech delivered on May 21, 1935,⁴ expressed his willingness to enter a Western Air Pact to meet the new situation created by the appearance of Germany as an air Power, but all the efforts of the British Government to negotiate such an agreement—negotiations which continued from February 1935 to March 1936—proved fruitless, and their failure is recorded in two despatches from the Foreign Secretary to the British Ambassador in Berlin.⁵

A new, and really important, factor was introduced into European relations by the signature, on May 2 and 16, 1935, respectively, of Treaties of Mutual Assistance by France and Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union.⁶ The ratifications of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact were exchanged in Moscow on June 8, 1935, but with the provision that it should not become operative until the French agreement had entered into force and that the obligation of mutual assistance should arise only 'in so far as assistance may be rendered by France to the Party victim of the aggression'.

The French agreement was the subject of intermittent debate in the Chamber from February 9 to 27, 1936, and was described by M. Henri Torrès, the *rapporteur*, as a treaty of 'purely Genevese inspiration'. His Report⁷ made it clear that the Pact under discussion would only apply to unprovoked attack on the territory of one of the signatories by a European State and involved no action which might expose one of them to international sanctions. The Pact, it was emphasized, was less 'automatic' than the Locarno Treaties.

In the course of the debate, on February 20, M. Herriot made a fervent defence of the new agreement,⁸ declaring that it was entirely compatible with the Locarno Agreements and claiming that this fact had been recognized, though with certain reservations, by the German Government in its Note of May 25, 1935, delivered twenty days after the signature of the Pact in Paris.⁹ Of this statement the German Foreign Office issued a vehement denial on the following day (February 21).¹⁰ A severe warning

¹ See *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, Part III (i).

² See *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*, p. 285.

³ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, pp. 58–68.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 173.

⁵ See below, pp. 6, 10.

⁶ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, pp. 116 and 138.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

⁸ See below, p. 15.

⁹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 264.

¹⁰ See below, p. 19.

to France of the evils and dangers inherent in the agreement was conveyed by Herr Hitler in an interview granted to M. Bertrand de Jouvenel for the *Paris-Midi*, on February 21, which was published on February 28.¹

The French Government, however, continued to press for ratification and the debate in the Chamber was wound up by the Foreign Minister, M. Pierre Flandin, on February 25.² The Soviet Pact, he declared, was in conformity with the whole trend of French post-War policy, and all idea of an alliance on the pre-War model had been carefully avoided. The Pact itself was complementary to the Covenant; it imposed no new obligations upon France, but only made a more exact definition of her action in certain circumstances. Should there linger any doubt, after the explanations given, that the Pact was contrary in any way to the Locarno Treaty, the French Government would willingly submit the matter to the Permanent Court of International Justice for judgment as a dispute regarding the interpretation of treaties.

The Franco-Soviet Pact was finally ratified by the Chamber on February 27, 1936, by 353 votes to 164.³

The reply of Herr Hitler to the ratification was dramatic and forceful. On March 7 the German Government communicated to the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy a Note denouncing the Locarno Rhineland Pact on the ground that it had been violated in spirit by the Franco-Soviet Agreement, which 'it is an undisputed fact . . . is directed against Germany'.⁴ An hour later he repeated, in a long speech to a specially summoned session of the Reichstag, that Germany was no longer bound by the Locarno Treaties 'which had practically ceased to be'.⁵ While he was speaking German troops were entering the Demilitarized Zone of the Rhineland, where they occupied, amid scenes of the wildest enthusiasm, the cities of Düsseldorf, Cologne, Mainz, Coblenz, and Frankfurt. At one stroke the *Führer* had repudiated the Locarno Agreements and violated the provisions of Articles 42-3 of the Treaty of Versailles which provided the territorial basis for the Rhineland Pact.⁶

In his Memorandum to the Powers Herr Hitler made certain proposals for attaining his 'unchangeable longing for a real pacification of Europe'. These he later repeated in his speech to the Reichstag. They consisted of a seven-point programme including an offer of a non-aggression pact between Germany, France, and Belgium for a duration of twenty-five years; the desire to include Great Britain and Italy as guaranteeing Powers; willingness to include the Netherlands if she so desired, and to negotiate an air pact to prevent the danger of foreign attacks; repetition of offers of non-aggression to all neighbouring States, not, as hitherto, excepting Lithuania; readiness to re-enter the League of Nations, 'Germany's equality of rights and the restoration of her full sovereignty over the entire territory of the German Reich having been finally attained'.

¹ See below, p. 20.

² See below, p. 22.

³ The Senate ratified it on March 12, by 231 votes to 52.

⁴ See below, p. 41.

⁵ See below, p. 35.

⁶ The position of the Locarno Treaties had in effect been in some uncertainty ever since the withdrawal of Germany from the League of Nations, for her membership therein had been a fundamental and essential point in the negotiation of the Treaties in 1925.

The hectic days which followed the German 'bomb-shell' were filled with conferences and discussions. The Council of the League of Nations was at once seized of the question by the French and Belgian Governments in telegrams dated March 8, requesting the summoning of an extraordinary session as soon as possible.¹ In the meantime the French Premier, M. Albert Sarraut, broadcasting on the same day, made reply to allegations contained in the *Führer's* speech and Memorandum of March 7. He also recalled the fact that Herr Hitler, speaking on May 21, 1935 (eighteen days after the signature of the Franco-Soviet Pact) had declared that the Reich Government 'saw in the respect for the demilitarized zone a contribution to the pacification of Europe'. France would refuse to consider the German proposals for fresh agreements, because the double example given within a year of repudiation of solemn engagements gave no confidence in new proposals.²

On the following day (March 9) in the House of Commons, however, Mr. Anthony Eden, in reviewing the situation, did not reject the German proposals so flatly. The League Council, which would meet on March 13, was the proper body to discuss the position, he declared, and, while the German action had profoundly shaken confidence in the trustworthiness of any future obligations which Germany might undertake, her proposals would nevertheless be studied objectively to see whether they contained any possible chance of rebuilding the shaken peace structure. In order to remove any misunderstanding of the British Government's position the Foreign Secretary added the important declaration that, in the event of an actual attack on France or Belgium, notwithstanding the German repudiation of the Locarno Treaty, 'His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would regard themselves in honour bound to come in the manner provided in the Treaty [Article 2] to the assistance of the country attacked'.³

A conference of the Locarno Powers, less Germany, held at the Quai d'Orsay on March 10, announced their decision in two *communiqués* to call a further meeting in London and thereafter to hold the Council of the League of Nations there.⁴ On the afternoon of the same day the French Government issued a statement to Parliament.⁵ Retreating slightly from the position adopted on March 8, that consideration of the German proposals was impossible, M. Sarraut asserted the willingness of France to negotiate with Germany 'when respect for international law had once more been assured'. He claimed as a right in this struggle for peace the support of those who had pledged themselves to it in the Rhineland Treaty and looked for the help of the League, declaring that the violation of the Rhineland Zone was not only a threat to French security, but in a much greater degree to the future of European peace and the destinies of collective security and of the League. Finally he stated: 'We declare solemnly to the German people that we have never wished, nor shall ever wish, to attack their liberty or their honour.'

Before the Belgian Chamber on March 11 M. van Zeeland complained that Belgium had not even provided Germany with the excuse of a Soviet Pact to justify the occupation of her frontier zone. In an assurance

¹ See below, pp. 45, 46.

² See below, p. 46.

³ See below, p. 52.

⁴ See below, pp. 56-7.

⁵ See below, p. 61.

to the Reich, he added that the 1920 Agreement between the Belgian and French General Staffs had in no way constituted a military alliance and was only maintained with the object of carrying out the obligations of the Locarno Treaties.¹

Further elucidation of the German 'peace proposals' was provided on March 10 and 12. On the first of these dates Herr Hitler granted an interview to Mr. Ward Price of the *Daily Mail*, in the course of which he stated *inter alia* that Czechoslovakia also came within the scope of his proposed pact of non-aggression, and that Germany had no intention of building up an offensive zone in the Rhineland.²

Two days later the German Government issued an official statement³ repeating the case for the remilitarization of the Rhineland, and issuing a warning that should the German offer of a twenty-five years' non-aggression pact not meet with the approval of the other Powers, the German Government would withdraw their proposals, and 'rather choose from now on an honourable isolation than live as a nation discriminated against in the community of the others'.

The conference of the remaining Locarno Powers, which, together with conversations between the French Foreign Minister and the Soviet and Polish Ambassadors, had taken place on March 10,⁴ had adjourned until March 12 when it reassembled in London two days prior to the special meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. On the same day the German Ambassador in London made the reply of his Government to the request conveyed to him by Mr. Eden on March 11 for 'a spontaneous contribution' on the part of Germany to the solution of the problem under discussion. Germany refused to take part in the deliberations, but it was repeated that her occupation of the Rhineland was at present only of a symbolic character. The strength of the occupying force would not be increased, nor would the troops themselves be moved nearer to the French or Belgian frontiers during the period of negotiations. It was assumed that a similar attitude would be observed by France and Belgium.⁵

The Locarno Powers unanimously decided on March 12 that 'the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone by Germany contributed a clear violation of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Treaty of Locarno. It will be for the Council of the League . . . to pronounce upon this point.'⁶ On the following day (March 13) they adopted a report (not published) drafted by M. van Zeeland, of Belgium, embodying three conclusions: first, the unanimous recognition of the violation by Germany of her freely accepted Treaty obligations; secondly, the unanimous agreement between the delegations that the present crisis must not become a step on the road to war; and, thirdly, that the question of the British contribution towards the security of the Western Powers should be considered.⁷ The Powers concerned then handed over the matter to the Council of the League and themselves engaged in discussions relative to proposals designed to effect a solution of the crisis.

The Council of the League met in extraordinary session in St. James's Palace on March 14, and was presided over by the Australian delegate,

¹ See below, p. 69.

² See below, p. 57.

³ See below, p. 77.

⁴ See below, pp. 56-7.

⁵ See below, p. 81.

⁶ See below, p. 81.

⁷ See *The Times*, March 14, 1936.

the Rt. Hon. Stanley Bruce, High Commissioner for the Commonwealth in London. At the opening meeting it was agreed that Germany should be invited to attend as a vitally interested party,¹ but in the meantime the case for the Locarno Powers was put by the delegates of France and Belgium on whose initiative the special session of the League had been convened. M. Flandin called upon the Council to pronounce that a breach of Article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles had been committed and to instruct the Secretary-General to notify the signatories of the Locarno Treaties accordingly. Such notification would enable the guarantor Powers (Great Britain and Italy) to discharge their obligations, and it would be for the Council to consider how such fulfilment could be supported by collective action on the part of the Members of the League.²

M. van Zeeland declared that Belgium was determined to play her full part in all international collective action, and called for a formal pronouncement by the Council that a breach of the Treaties of Versailles and of Locarno had been committed, and for consequent action by the signatory Powers.³

The Council adjourned for the week-end and reassembled on Monday, March 16, to find the reply of the German Government to the Council's invitation of March 14. Germany would be represented, telegraphed Baron von Neurath, on two conditions, namely, full equality and the assurance given that the Powers concerned were prepared to enter 'forth-with' into negotiations in regard to the German proposals.⁴ This second condition was regarded in London as 'unhelpful' and M. Flandin informed the press that, rather than discuss anything else than a violation of the Locarno Treaties, he would leave London and even the Council. Later it was decided that a further communication should be addressed to the German Government agreeing to a footing of complete equality for any representative of the Reich, but adding that it was not for the Council to give the assurance desired by Germany in her second condition.⁵ This second invitation had the desired effect, for on the following day Baron von Neurath replied that Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, Herr Hitler's Ambassador-at-Large, would represent the German Government.⁶

On the same day (March 17) the German Government telegraphed to London their expectation that the British Government 'will do their utmost in the circumstances of the case to bring about at the proper time a discussion with the interested Powers of our proposals'. To this Mr. Eden, after consultation with the French and Belgian Ambassadors, replied that everything possible was being, and would continue to be, done but that no more explicit assurance could be given at the moment.⁷

During March 17 and 18 the Council debated a draft resolution sponsored by France and Belgium, implementing their joint request for the pronouncing of Germany as a violator of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno, and for consequent action.⁸ M. Litvinov permitted himself 'complete frankness because of the way in which Mr. Hitler was accus-

¹ See below, p. 87.

² See below, p. 82.

³ See below, p. 85.

⁴ See below, p. 88. It was later understood that the word *alsbald* ('forth-with') should be interpreted as meaning 'as soon as possible'.

⁵ See below, p. 89.

⁶ See below, p. 89.

⁷ See below, p. 90.

⁸ See below, p. 90.

tomed to speak of the U.S.S.R.'. Signor Grandi, on behalf of Italy, said that while his Government remained entirely loyal to its undertakings as a guarantor Power, it was evident that Italy could not be expected to apply measures which would be incompatible with the position in which the States applying sanctions had placed her. Don Augustin Edwards, of Chile, speaking as the representative of a State which had been signatory to neither the Versailles nor the Locarno Treaties, proposed that, before the Council was called upon to take a final decision, the whole question of breach of treaty obligations should be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague for an advisory opinion. There was little support for this suggestion.¹

At the morning session on March 19 Herr von Ribbentrop took his seat at the Council table and made a lengthy and carefully prepared *exposé* of the German case, including a detailed recapitulation of the various 'offers' which Germany had made for achievement of armament limitation and European pacification since Herr Hitler assumed power in January 1933.²

At the afternoon session the Council, after listening to views of its President, speaking as the representative of Australia,³ proceeded to take a vote on the Franco-Belgian resolution. This resulted in thirteen votes (those of the Argentine Republic, Denmark, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Turkey, the U.S.S.R., Australia, the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, and France) in favour of the resolution; one negative vote, Germany; one abstention, Chile; and one absentee, Ecuador.

Don Augustin Edwards explained his abstention from voting by declaring his preference for the alternative course he had already proposed, namely, reference to the Permanent Court as a necessary preliminary.⁴

Herr von Ribbentrop entered a formal protest against the resolution on behalf of the German Government.⁵ 'It is not Germany who has broken the Treaty of Locarno,' he declared, 'it is France, by concluding a military alliance with the Soviet Union.' M. Flandin, in reply, repeated the willingness of France, if Germany was also desirous, to have the whole question of the compatibility of the Franco-Soviet Treaty with the Treaty of Locarno referred for settlement to the Permanent Court of International Justice,⁶ but to this offer the German representative did not respond.

1. NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND GREAT BRITAIN REGARDING AN AIR PACT

(i) *Despatch from the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the British Ambassador at Berlin, March 6, 1936.*⁷

Sir,

I asked the German Ambassador to come and see me to-day, when I reminded him of our conversation on February 27, in which we had spoken in general terms of relations between the French, United Kingdom, and German Governments. Since that date there had

¹ See below, p. 97.

² See below, p. 108.

³ See below, p. 117.

⁴ See below, p. 119.

⁵ See below, p. 120.

⁶ See below, p. 120.

⁷ British Blue Book, Cmd. 5143, No. 57.

been one development in that the German Government had agreed to enter into negotiations for a bilateral naval agreement with us. His Majesty's Government greatly welcomed this decision, and we hoped that the negotiations would be successful. The Ambassador replied that he shared this hope.

2. I told the Ambassador that my purpose in asking for this conversation was to develop the more general part of our last conversation. I had been reflecting for some time upon the relations of the three Great Powers of Western Europe, and there were certain features of the situation about which I wished to talk frankly to his Excellency.

3. First, no observer could help being struck by the number of statements which had been made recently, and some of the most important of these had come from the Chancellor himself, expressing hopes for a betterment of international relations in Western Europe. More particularly I recalled Herr von Ribbentrop's statement during the Naval Conference, when he said that Herr Hitler had reached the conclusion that 'only an adjustment of the vital interests of our two countries and a common realistic attitude towards the great European problems can produce a solution of these problems, and, in particular, a Franco-German settlement'. It seemed to me that the time had now come when we must make a real effort to translate these hopes into facts, and to attempt to achieve a real improvement in the relations of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

4. I told the Ambassador that I wanted to illustrate to him the grievances and fears which constituted a part of our problem. Take, for instance, the subject of armaments. Representatives of both our countries had frequently expressed their desire to avoid an increase in armaments if we could, and at all costs to prevent anything in the nature of an arms race in Western Europe. And yet what was happening? It was quite true that the United Kingdom and Germany had a naval agreement between them. But in other spheres increased expenditure on armaments was taking place. And in both our countries and in France there was growing fear of attack from the air. It had been to calm these apprehensions that an Air Pact and air limitation had originally been proposed. On the other hand, in Germany much was being said and written at this time about the fear of encirclement. It had even been suggested that we were at the back of the Franco-Soviet Pact. The Ambassador would know from what I had told him in previous interviews between us that there was no truth whatever in this suggestion. On the other hand, it was true that public opinion in the country was preoccupied at

Germany's absence from the League, with the result that contacts were more difficult to establish, and co-operation more difficult to obtain. It might be that it was not possible now for Germany to return to the League, but could we not examine whether progress could not be achieved in some other sphere which would result in an increase of confidence in Western Europe? I had a vivid recollection of how, at my first meeting with Herr Hitler, the latter had deprecated attempts to settle the problem of armaments in all its spheres at once. He had implied that this was a mistake, and that, had our ambitions been more modest, they had been more likely to be realized.

5. All of these considerations had led me to ask the Ambassador to communicate with Herr Hitler again as to the possibility of the opening of serious discussions on the question of the Air Pact. The Air Pact touched what was in some respects a point of junction, and a sensitive point of junction, of the relations of the three Great Western Powers, and I would like the conclusion of such a pact to constitute an important stabilizing element in our relations in the West.

6. The Ambassador knew that limitation in the air also made a great appeal to His Majesty's Government and to the British people. I would not conceal from the Ambassador the fact that I should like to make an attempt to secure such limitation also, but I had noted the difficulties which Herr Hitler had anticipated in this matter—difficulties which I understood did not apply equally to the question of the Air Pact. The Ambassador agreed with the distinction which I drew in the Chancellor's objections.

7. I then told the Ambassador that I would like him to bring to Herr Hitler's notice the earnest desire of His Majesty's Government to open at least with Germany and France and Belgium, and with Italy also if possible, discussions on the Air Pact through the diplomatic channel, it being understood that one of the matters for discussion would be bilateral arrangements between the parties to the conversations. The Ambassador remarked that I would recall that it was these bilateral arrangements that had always constituted the first difficulty in the way of progress. Herr Hitler had not been, and was not, opposed to a pact as such, but these bilateral agreements which the French were anxious should be directed against Germany were an unwelcome complication. I replied that we must see whether this difficulty could not be overcome. I saw no reason why the contents of these bilateral arrangements, the conclusion of which we knew would be a source of great satisfaction to French

opinion, should not be discussed like the Pact itself between all five parties to the discussions. Nor did I see why any of the contents of these bilateral arrangements should be secret. On the contrary, I thought that they should be published as annexes to the Pact itself. The Ambassador already knew that His Majesty's Government would not consent to the conclusion of any of these bilateral arrangements in such a form as would upset the balance of Locarno or would render impossible the conclusion of a similar agreement between any one of a group of two Powers and a third Power.

8. If the Chancellor were able to agree to this proposal there would be a number of principles on which it would probably be best that the five Powers should reach agreement through the diplomatic channel before there was any attempt to produce a common draft for the Pact. These general principles were as follows:

- (1) Which of the proposed signatories would give guarantees and which would receive them?
- (2) What were the circumstances in which the guarantees could operate?
- (3) What reference was possible in the Air Pact to the desirability of the prohibition of indiscriminate bombing?
- (4) Would the guarantees apply to territory only or to fleets and merchant shipping on the high seas?
- (5) What would be the exact nature and contents of the bilateral arrangements, which would, no doubt, have to be annexed to the Pact itself?

9. I said that I would be very glad if the Ambassador would put this proposal before the German Chancellor. I did not feel that it was really impossible to negotiate such a pact even while the situation was complicated by the Italo-Abyssinian War. The Ambassador would recall that he had raised this difficulty at the last meeting. I fully admitted that it might complicate the task of reaching agreement upon air limitation, but that point would become clearer as the discussions proceeded. I added that I hoped that in his reply the Chancellor would not hesitate to raise any point on which he was not clear, and which seemed to him important in connexion with the Air Pact. I knew that the Ambassador would appreciate that I was speaking to him thus frankly because His Majesty's Government were genuinely anxious to convert into practical results the sentiments so often expressed in speeches.

10. Finally, I gave the Ambassador some account in general terms of recent happenings at Geneva. The Ambassador remarked

that he had seen what he supposed were extremely accurate accounts in *The Times* already, but that, in so far as my message in respect of the Air Pact and air limitation was concerned, he would certainly transmit what I had to say to his Government, and he repeated that there was no opposition in principle on the Chancellor's part to an Air Pact.

11. As he left the Ambassador remarked that he had received warning from Berlin that a special messenger was on his way to London with an important declaration for me from the Chancellor. He therefore asked for an interview in order to deliver to me that message on March 7.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

(ii) *Extract from Despatch from the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the British Ambassador at Berlin, March 26, 1936.*¹

. . . IV. *Negotiations for an Air Pact and Air Limitation, February 1935 to March 1936.*

12. The first proposal for an Air Pact was made at the Anglo-French meeting in London on February 3, 1935. The Declaration² agreed at that meeting was communicated to the German Government; and on February 14 they proposed that British Ministers should visit Berlin to discuss particularly the Air Pact.³ His Majesty's Government pointed out that any such discussion must review all the matters mentioned in the London Declaration. On this understanding the visit of British Ministers to Berlin took place on March 25 and 26, 1935; and Herr Hitler expressed the willingness, and, indeed, eagerness, of Germany to conclude an Air Pact at once without burdening the proposal with difficult and complicated conditions such as limitation of air forces and the other parts of the London Declaration. In the Chancellor's view there ought to be first an Air Pact and the fixation of parity in the air between the signatories to the pact. Sir John Simon reminded him that His Majesty's Government thought of the Air Pact not as being an agreement that could be reached quite apart from other agreements, but as forming a portion of that more general settlement which was the object of the Anglo-French Declaration. In the Berlin conversations

¹ British Blue Book, Cmd. 5143, No. 59. For first §§ of the Despatch (Eastern and Franco-Soviet Pacts) see *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 274.

² See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 25.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

Herr Hitler also stated that his object was parity with the French air force in France and North Africa provided that developments in Russia did not necessitate a raising of this figure.

13. At Stresa the British, French, and Italian Governments 'agreed to continue actively the study of the Air Pact . . . and of any bilateral agreements which might accompany it'. The question of the Air Pact was taken up with the German Government once more on May 10, when Sir John Simon told the German Ambassador that he would be glad to learn more definitely the views of the German Government. Herr von Hoesch, in reply, communicated to the Foreign Office on May 29, 1935, a German draft of the Air Pact. The German Government said that this draft might be communicated to the other Locarno Powers; and subsequently, on July 9, Herr von Hoesch suggested that there should be circulated in one document to all five Powers the German and British and French drafts which he understood existed. On July 23 the German Embassy was informed orally that it was thought that it would only complicate the situation to circulate drafts at that stage. It would be better to agree first on general principles and then try to secure a common draft. Such preliminary drafts as had been prepared were therefore never circulated or discussed, and it is felt that no useful purpose would be served by making them public now.

14. The months of June and July 1935 were spent in an attempt to secure the consent of the French Government to the opening of diplomatic negotiations between the five Powers, the purpose of which would be to agree upon the general principles on which an Air Pact should be based. Once that agreement had been reached, the jurists could meet and prepare a common draft. On July 29, 1935, the French Government agreed to the opening of these discussions, on the understanding that His Majesty's Government would secure the agreement of the German Government to the principle of the accompaniment of the Air Pact by such arrangements between any two parties as those two parties might judge necessary to render it effective; and provided that the question of the final conclusion of the Air Pact and of an air limitation agreement, independently of the other matters mentioned in the London Declaration, would be reserved. •

15. Sir S. Hoare saw the German Ambassador on August 1 and explained to him the French Government's position. He told him that His Majesty's Government would not contemplate bilateral arrangements save upon the understanding that they were based upon the spirit and principle of Locarno, and that they would not

allow such arrangements to interfere with the Locarno equilibrium or to be used to the disadvantage of the Locarno Powers. Subsequently, on December 13, the nature of the arrangements was explained again to the Chancellor himself and Baron von Neurath by your Excellency.

16. On August 23, 1935, the Foreign Office asked the German Embassy when the German Government's reply might be expected to Sir S. Hoare's communication of August 1. No reply could ever be obtained to this inquiry. On November 21 the French Ambassador in Berlin saw Herr Hitler and emphasized the importance which the French Government attached to the continuance of the negotiations for the Air Pact. He was told that progress was impossible during the continuance of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute. On December 13 your Excellency urged the Chancellor to continue the negotiations for the Air Pact. The Chancellor referred to the difficulties created by the Franco-Russian Treaty; and when in January Baron von Neurath admitted that that Treaty did not affect the Air Pact itself, but only air limitation, he informed your Excellency that to the negotiation of the Air Pact the Italo-Abyssinian difficulty was the obstacle. My disappointment at the check to the Air Pact negotiations was expressed to the Chancellor by your Excellency, through Baron von Neurath, on January 14, 1936; and in interviews with the German Ambassador on February 27, and again on March 6, I pressed yet again for the resumption of negotiations.

V. Attempts at Resumption of Negotiations with Germany, November 1935 to March 1936.

17. Herr Hitler's speech of May 21, 1935,¹ had contained references to the importance which he attached to good German relations with Great Britain and France. 'The German Government', he said, 'sincerely intend to do everything to bring about and maintain such relations with the British people and State as will for ever prevent a repetition of the only war which there has as yet been between the two nations.' As regards France, he said: 'We are prepared to do everything on our part to arrive at a true peace and a real friendship with the French nation.' Herr von Ribbentrop, in the course of the naval negotiations in the summer of 1935, had gone even farther, and stated that the corner-stone of the political conceptions of the German Chancellor was 'that ultimately, only an adjustment of the vital interests of our two countries, and a common realistic attitude

¹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 159.

towards the great European problems can produce a solution of these problems, and in particular a Franco-German settlement which the German people desires and without which Europe will not come to rest'.

18. When the question of the Franco-Soviet Pact was about to come up in the French Chambers, M. Laval informed the German Ambassador in Paris on November 15 that the French Government would welcome a decision by the German Government to resume conversations for collective security on the basis of the London Declaration of February 1935.

19. Your Excellency had an interview with Herr Hitler on December 13. After explaining that His Majesty's Government would be glad to learn the Chancellor's views on the possibility of further conversations respecting the London Declaration of February 3, and particularly the question of the Air Pact and air limitation, you pointed out the importance which the French Government attached to the accompaniment of the Air Pact by bilateral arrangements for its execution. You added that the arrangements which we contemplated would be based upon the spirit and principles of Locarno and would not interfere with the Locarno equilibrium. Herr Hitler expressed strong objection to the bilateral arrangements, though later, on January 17, you were informed by Baron von Neurath that bilateral pacts, if discussed at all, must be discussed by all five Powers. Herr Hitler further stated that no air limitation agreement which did not allow him to take into account Russia's enormous strength in the air was possible. He made objection to the Franco-Soviet Treaty; and though from a subsequent interview on January 14, 1936, between your Excellency and Baron von Neurath it was clear that the Chancellor did not object in principle to the conclusion of an Air Pact between the Locarno Powers, it became evident from subsequent interviews between your Excellency and Baron von Neurath that the German Government considered the moment inopportune for the discussion of an Air Pact, owing to the strained relations between Italy and Great Britain.

20. On January 8, 1936, a further approach was made to the German Government. I instructed you to let the Chancellor know 'that I share the views which he has so often expressed regarding the importance of a close and confident understanding and collaboration between Great Britain, France, and Germany, and that I hope that our two Governments will keep this objective closely in view notwithstanding the difficulties which Herr Hitler, to my regret, at present sees in the way of any immediate progress along the lines

which our two Governments discussed in the early part of last year'. Your Excellency made this communication through Baron von Neurath on January 14.

21. On January 27 Baron von Neurath saw me in London, where he had come to attend the Royal Funeral. He stated on this occasion that the German Government fully intended to respect the Treaty of Locarno. All that they asked was that others should observe it in the spirit as well as the letter. The opportunity was taken by me to tell Baron von Neurath that I still hoped that an Air Pact and an agreement for air limitation might be negotiated.

22. On February 19 Lord Cranborne asked the German *Chargé d'Affaires* to come to the Foreign Office, and emphasized to him my view that close collaboration between the three Western Powers was essential to European peace. So far as His Majesty's Government were concerned, it had been made abundantly clear on many occasions that the Franco-Soviet Pact did not affect Great Britain in any way, and that it did not affect the Treaty of Locarno. To this Treaty His Majesty's Government still fully subscribed. Lord Cranborne assured the German *Chargé d'Affaires* that I was most anxious in every way to collaborate both with the French and the German Governments for the preservation of general peace. He gave to Prince Bismarck in this connexion an extract from the message sent through your Excellency to Herr Hitler on January 8, already quoted in paragraph 20. Prince Bismarck said that he thought it would be important that this statement should be reaffirmed and he would communicate it to his Government.

23. On February 27 I saw the German Ambassador, who referred to Prince Bismarck's interview with Lord Cranborne on February 19. The Ambassador asked me whether I saw any prospect of making any progress in the improvement of relations between the Western European Powers. I replied that I was particularly anxious to make progress with an Air Pact and air limitation, and had said so more than once. It remained to be considered whether there was any means of doing this in present conditions. The Ambassador, in reply, pointed out the complication created by the Italo-Abyssinian War. How could Italy enter an air limitation agreement at this moment? I replied that these were just the problems which we had to consider. It would not be satisfactory if we merely registered the difficulties and made no attempt to overcome them. I should be seeing M. Flandin in Geneva next week, and no doubt the relations of the Western European Powers would form one of the subjects of conversation between us. I would take an early opportunity of giving

the Ambassador an account of what had passed between us when I returned to London.

24. On February 28 the *Paris-Midi* published an interview given to M. Bertrand de Jouvenel by the German Chancellor.¹ In this interview Herr Hitler emphasized the importance which he attached to Franco-German reconciliation, whilst drawing attention to the manner in which the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Treaty was likely to complicate the situation. He stated that the people of France would do well to reflect seriously on his efforts to secure an understanding. No German leader had ever made such overtures.

25. On March 2 the French Ambassador in Berlin saw Herr Hitler and inquired whether the interview which he had given to the *Paris-Midi* implied that he had definite proposals to make to the French Government. If so, the latter would be very glad to know what they were and would carefully consider them. The Chancellor is understood to have asked for time in which to consider the French Ambassador's observations.

26. On March 6 I myself again sent for the German Ambassador in London, and the important conversation took place which is summarized in my despatch to your Excellency of March 6. As will be seen, I emphasized to the Ambassador the importance which I attached to an improvement in the relations of the three great Western Powers. It was as a concrete means of improving these relations that I proposed to him the immediate opening of serious discussions on the question of the Air Pact.

27. On the following day the German Ambassador called at the Foreign Office and informed me of the German Government's decision to denounce the Treaty of Locarno and to reoccupy the demilitarized zone.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

2. RATIFICATION OF THE FRANCO-SOVIET PACT

(i) *Extracts from Speech by M. Herriot, Minister without Portfolio, February 20, 1936.*²

... Les Soviets sont venus à Genève en septembre 1934. Personne n'en doute: cet événement a marqué un changement dans leur politique, qui, jusque là, avait été une politique purement révolutionnaire,

¹ See below, p. 20.

² In the *Chambre des Députés. Journal Officiel, Chambre des Députés, February 21, 1936, pp. 495-9.*

une politique, pour ainsi dire, de déclaration de guerre à tout l'ordre européen. Nous le savons bien. Personne, sur ce point, ne peut nous apporter de révélation bien saisissante. Cela a été en même temps, je le rappellerai tout à l'heure et je vous prie d'y réfléchir, une mutation, dont je n'ai pas à chercher trop longuement les raisons, dans leurs dispositions qui, jusque là favorables à l'Allemagne, sont devenues, à partir de ce moment, favorables à la France.

Je sais bien qu'ils ne sont pas venus à Genève sans faire des objections. M. Paul-Boncour le sait bien, lui qui a travaillé à vaincre tant de difficultés. M. Barthou, lui aussi, l'avait bien su. Je l'ai bien su moi-même.

Donc, les Soviets se laissent convaincre. Ils viennent à Genève en septembre 1934. Autant l'honnêteté oblige à se montrer réservé sur certains sujets, autant je crois pouvoir dire, sans contestation possible, que, depuis que les Soviets sont à Genève, leur attitude a été exemplaire. . . .

Ainsi, depuis septembre 1934 — personne ne peut le contester — la France a trouvé constamment la Russie à côté d'elle à Genève. Elle l'a rencontrée dans les incidents particuliers. Elle a constaté son accord avec elle sur la doctrine générale. Et le pacte qui nous est aujourd'hui proposé est la suite naturelle de cette collaboration qui s'est instituée à Genève.

Messieurs, ce traité est donc, de toute évidence, en accord avec le pacte de la Société des nations.

On s'est demandé, au cours du débat, s'il est en accord avec le pacte de Locarno.

Je crois que la question n'a pas besoin d'être longuement débattue : que le traité soit en accord avec le pacte de Locarno, en droit, l'article 2 du protocole le prouve surabondamment, puisque la France, en signant ce traité, déclare qu'elle ne veut manquer à aucun des engagements conventionnels qu'elle a souscrits déjà. . . .

Non seulement le pacte franco-soviétique couvre Locarno en droit, mais il l'a couvert en fait.

Il faut qu'on sache que la France ne s'est pas bornée à inscrire dans le protocole l'article 2. Depuis le 2 mai 1935, où le pacte a été signé par M. Pierre Laval, il y a eu une série d'échanges de vues entre les chancelleries.

Il appartiendra à M. le ministre des affaires étrangères, quand il interviendra à cette tribune, d'extraire de ces notes ce qu'il lui conviendra de présenter à la Chambre.

Mais, je puis dire que, le 25 mai 1935, vingt-trois jours après la signature du pacte, il y a eu une note de l'Allemagne qui, tout en

reconnaissant que le pacte de Locarno n'était pas touché par le nouveau projet de traité franco-soviétique, a fait tout naturellement quelques réserves. La Grande-Bretagne a été consultée. Les Soviets ont été renseignés. L'Italie a été abordée.

Il y a eu des notes qui sont du 14 juin, pour l'Italie, 17 juin pour les Soviets, 18 juin 1935 pour la Grande-Bretagne.

Je dois dire d'abord que, dans la note allemande, une phrase est à retenir, car elle a une grande importance historique. L'Allemagne déclare qu'elle n'attaquera pas la Russie. C'est une affirmation dont, à mon avis, il faut prendre acte.

Les notes italienne et britannique établissent un accord complet avec le gouvernement français sur la conformité du pacte franco-soviétique avec les accords de Locarno. La réponse française à l'Allemagne, en date du 25 juin, tient compte de ces négociations.

Je crois qu'on peut résumer la discussion, sur ce point, en disant: ce qui est notre grande sauvegarde, c'est que, le traité franco-soviétique étant conforme au pacte de la Société des nations, en accord avec celui de Locarno, il est bien entendu que la France garde, à tout moment et surtout au dernier moment, sa souveraineté, sa liberté d'interprétation des faits.

Voici, maintenant, messieurs, une partie de la discussion sur laquelle j'appelle toute votre attention, car elle contient, selon moi, l'argument le plus décisif. Vous allez en juger.

J'ai entendu certains orateurs raisonner ici de ce traité franco-soviétique, comme si vraiment nous pouvions nous enfermer dans une sorte d'égoïsme sacré entre nos frontières, comme si nous pouvions nous désintéresser de l'Est et du Sud-Est de l'Europe, comme si nous pouvions dire: 'Adviennne que pourra! Nous veillerons de notre mieux; mais nous nous cantonnerons sur notre territoire, à l'abri de nos fortifications.'

Si l'on fait ce raisonnement, quelle erreur et quelle imprudence!...

Nous avons un traité avec les Roumains; il est du 19 juin 1926. Nous avons un traité avec les Yougoslaves; il est du 11 novembre 1927. Ce sont, me direz-vous, des traités de consultation. C'est vrai. Ils nous obligent, en cas d'agression non provoquée, à nous concerter sans délai avec ces pays sur notre action respective. Mais, quel est celui qui soutiendra que la France puisse se désintéresser d'une agression contre la Yougoslavie ou contre la Roumanie?

Il y a plus. Quand on parle des accords de Locarno, on oublie souvent... que, dans les accords de Locarno, il y a inclus un traité entre la France et la Pologne.

Voici ce qu'il dit, sous la date du 16 octobre 1925 :

‘ Dans le cas où le conseil de la Société des nations, statuant sur une question portée devant lui, conformément à des engagements, n'aurait pu réussir à faire accepter son rapport par tous ses membres autres que les représentants des parties au différend et où la Pologne ou la France se verrait attaquer sans l'avoir provoqué, la France ou, réciproquement, la Pologne, agissant par application de l'article 15, paragraphe 7, du pacte de la Société des nations, lui prêterait immédiatement aide et assistance. ’

J'appelle plus précisément encore votre attention sur le traité, exactement de même forme, passé par la France, le 16 octobre 1925, avec la Tchécoslovaquie. Dans les cas qui viennent d'être définis, la France s'est engagée à prêter immédiatement à cette nation aide et assistance.

Ces engagements, celui du pacte franco-polonais comme celui du pacte franco-tchèque, nous lient dès maintenant.

Or, que fait la Tchécoslovaquie ? Je ne parle pas de la Pologne, à dessein : je ne voudrais rien dire dans ce débat, alors qu'on sait que la Pologne n'a pas adhéré au projet de pacte de l'Est, qui pût être désagréable à nos amis polonais. Je voudrais ne rien dire qui ne soit dans le sens général de la conciliation. Mais je prends l'exemple des Tchèques.

Les Tchèques ont signé — M. Torrès nous en a rappelé la date dans son rapport : 16 mai 1935 — un traité avec l'Union soviétique, traité qui d'ailleurs ne devient définitif que s'il y a un accord des Soviets et de la France.

Par conséquent — et c'est l'argument le plus fort de tous, car il me paraît ne laisser que bien peu de place à l'interprétation — dès maintenant, en vertu de sa politique du lendemain de la paix, par laquelle la France a voulu se porter garante de la sécurité des nations, petites ou grandes, nées de son sacrifice, notre pays a de très lourdes responsabilités.

Pour assumer ces responsabilités sans trop de danger, je crois utile d'avoir l'appui, l'appui défensif, vous m'entendez bien, de la Russie soviétique. . . .

Si vous trouvez un moyen d'assurer le respect des engagements de la France touchant la sécurité des États que je viens de dire, Petite-Entente, Pologne, dites-le, expliquez-le à cette tribune. Mais, puisque ces engagements sont pris, je ne vois pas comment on pourrait nier qu'un accord avec la Russie soviétique, à la condition d'être purement défensif, apporte à la France un soulagement. . . .

Je crois que ce rapprochement de la Russie soviétique et de la

France marque une importante contribution à l'organisation de la paix. Si j'avais trouvé, dans le projet qui nous est soumis, quoi que ce fut d'agressif, je ne le voterais pas, parce que, avant tout, je suis un pacifiste. Mais comme, en dépit d'une analyse approfondie, je n'y ai rien trouvé qui ne fût pas strictement défensif et comme je crois qu'il est du droit et du devoir de tous les peuples de se défendre, je le voterai.

Je demande que l'on vote un traité qui ne lèse personne, qui ne menace personne, qui s'est inscrit dans le cadre de la Société des nations, qui s'accorde avec Locarno, qui nous soulage dans des engagements déjà pris et qui, en favorisant le rapprochement de deux grands peuples, marque une étape nouvelle dans l'organisation de la sécurité collective, c'est-à-dire de la paix.

(ii) *Communiqué issued by the German Government, February 21, 1936.*¹

In yesterday's debate in the French Chamber on the Franco-Soviet Pact of Alliance, M. Herriot stated that in its Note of May 25, 1935, that is to say, twenty-three days after the signature of the Pact, the German Government had recognized, although with certain reservations, that the Treaty of Locarno was not affected by the new pact of alliance.

We are informed by the competent authorities that this assertion is in direct conflict with the facts.

The German Government's Memorandum of May 25, which was communicated to the Powers signatory to the Treaty of Locarno, discusses exhaustively the question whether the obligations which France undertakes by the new Pact with the Soviet Union come within the limits laid down by the Treaty of Locarno and reaches the clear conclusion that, in the view of the German Government, this is not the case.

Of primary importance in reaching this decision is, as the German Memorandum points out, the provision of the protocol to the Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance, under which the two partners, while undertaking to apply to the Council of the League before proceeding to any such action such as they could base upon the well-known Article 16 of the Covenant of the League, have, none the less, to carry out the obligation of assistance agreed upon between them if for some reason or other the Council fails to give a recommendation in this sense or is unable to reach a unanimous decision.

France thus claims freedom in the case of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union to proceed militarily against Germany

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5143.

on the basis of Article 16 of the Covenant even though she is unable to base her action on a recommendation or on some other decision of the Council of the League, but rather decides unilaterally for herself the question of the aggressor.

Furthermore, the terms of the Franco-Soviet Protocol are in conflict with the provisions of the Covenant, according to which Article 16 can be applied to a non-member State like Germany only after a special preliminary procedure before the Council of the League.

The German Memorandum of May 25 emphasizes that any military action which is started under such circumstances would be, in the view of the German Government, outside the scope of Article 16 of the Covenant, and therefore would constitute a flagrant violation of the Treaty of Locarno.

Still clearer than the legal violation of the Locarno Treaty by the new Pact, which is alone discussed in the German Memorandum, is the incompatibility of the two treaties from the general political point of view which has from the beginning been emphasized by the German Government.

It is well known to the other Powers signatory to the Treaty of Locarno that the German Government maintained this point of view in the discussion which arose of its Memorandum and maintains it still to-day.

Under these circumstances the statements of M. Herriot referred to above can only be explained on the assumption that he is not correctly informed of the contents of the German Memorandum and of the point of view adopted by the German Government in the discussions which followed it.

(iii) *Statement by Herr Hitler, February 21, 1936.*¹

Paris, February 28. The *Paris-Midi* publishes to-day an interview granted to the celebrated French writer, Bertrand de Jouvenel, by the *Führer* and Chancellor some days ago, and therefore before the ratification of the Franco-Soviet Assistance Pact by the French Chamber took place. In this interview the *Führer* and Chancellor stated: 'I know what you think. You are thinking, Hitler makes declarations of peace to us, but is he really being sincere? Would it not be better, however, instead of trying to solve psychological puzzles to apply the celebrated French logic? Would it not be

¹ In an interview granted to M. Bertrand de Jouvenel. Issued by *The Deutsches Nachrichten Büro*, February 29, 1936, translated by Dr. F. J. Berber in *Locarno: a Collection of Documents*, 1936, p. 181.

disastrous for the two countries to meet again on the field of battle? Is it not mere logic that I should strive to attain what is most advantageous for my country? And is not peace the most advantageous thing for my country?’

In the course of further discussion with M. Bertrand de Jouvenel, the *Führer* proceeded to discuss what he described as the ‘enigma’ by which he had become the *Führer* of the German people. As a solution of this enigma, he indicated, *inter alia*, the fact that he had simplified the apparently extremely complicated problems which the professional politicians could not solve. In this connexion he cited the problem of class war also. Precisely as he had proved to the German people by an appeal to reason that class war was an absurdity, he was now directing an appeal to reason in the international sphere.

The *Führer* said: ‘I wish to prove to my people that the idea of hereditary enmity between France and Germany is an absurdity. The German people has understood this. I have been successful in a far more difficult task of reconciliation, the reconciliation of Germany and Poland.’

After the *Führer* had said this, M. de Jouvenel came to the topic of the repeated protestations of peace by the *Führer*, and said: ‘We Frenchmen certainly read your declarations of peace with great pleasure, but we are nevertheless disturbed on account of other, less encouraging things. For instance, you have said very bad things about France in your book *Mein Kampf*. Now, this book is regarded throughout Germany as a kind of political Bible. It is sold without the successive editions being in any way subjected to revision as regards the passages dealing with France.’

The *Führer* replied: ‘When I wrote this book, I was in prison. It was the time when the French troops were occupying the Ruhr. It was at the moment of greatest tension between our two countries. . . . Yes, we were enemies, and I stood for my country, as is fitting, against yours; just as I stood for my country for four and a half years in the trenches. I should despise myself if I were not first of all a German in the moment of a conflict. But to-day there is no longer any cause for a conflict. You want me to correct my book, like a man of letters bringing out a new and revised edition of his works. But I am not a man of letters. I am a politician. I undertake my corrections in my foreign policy, which aims at an understanding with France. If I succeed in bringing about the Franco-German rapprochement, that will be a correction which will be worthy to be made. I enter my correction in the great book of history!’

In the further course of the conversation, M. de Jouvenel asked

what was Germany's attitude towards the Franco-Soviet Assistance Pact, which would undoubtedly be a big strain on the chances of the Franco-German understanding.

The *Führer* replied: 'My own personal efforts towards such an understanding will always continue. Nevertheless, in actual fact, this worse than deplorable fact would create a new situation. Do you realize in France what you are doing? You are allowing yourselves to be caught in the diplomatic toils of a Power whose only aim is to stir up the great European peoples into a disorder from which it alone will benefit. It should never be forgotten that Soviet Russia is a political factor which has at its disposal an explosive revolutionary idea and gigantic armaments. As a German, it is my duty to take account of such a situation. Bolshevism has no prospect of infecting us, but there are other great nations which are less immune to the bacillus of Bolshevism than we.'

The *Führer* then came back once more to the question of the Franco-German relations, declaring that he was speaking for the whole German people when he said, addressing himself to France, that France herself, if she only wished, could put an end for ever to that 'German peril', because the German people had the fullest confidence in its Leader, and this Leader desired the friendship of France.

(iv) *Extracts from Speech by M. Flandin, Minister for Foreign Affairs, February 25, 1936.*¹

Messieurs, le maintien de la paix par l'organisation de la sécurité collective, tel est le but que se sont assigné les États en souscrivant au pacte de la Société des nations. Nul pays n'est resté plus fidèle à cet engagement que la France, dont tout l'effort politique, depuis 1920, n'a jamais cessé de s'employer à faire de l'action collective une réalité vivante au service de la paix et dont tous les gouvernements successifs, sans aucune exception, ont toujours trouvé, pour atteindre ce but, l'appui unanime de l'opinion et du Parlement.

C'est en effet, je veux le rappeler, principalement à des initiatives françaises que revient aussi bien le mérite du projet de traité d'assistance mutuelle de 1923 que celui du protocole de 1924. Malheureusement, ces actes, qui s'inspiraient du même principe d'universalité que le pacte de la Société des nations, ont été abandonnés. Le système des engagements généraux, illimités dans leur champ d'application, a rencontré une opposition si forte qu'il a fallu rechercher dans un

¹ In the Chambre des Députés. *Journal Officiel, Chambre des Députés*, February 26, 1936, pp. 578-83.

cadre géographiquement plus modeste un renforcement des garanties de la paix et c'est alors qu'on s'orienta vers des solutions régionales.

Ce fut Locarno, à la fois traité d'assistance mutuelle et traité de garantie. Ce devait être, plus tard, le projet d'union européenne, présenté à Genève par M. Aristide Briand.

Mais, dans l'esprit de ses initiateurs, Locarno ne devait être qu'un point de départ et c'est, en effet, au lendemain de Locarno, je veux le rappeler à la Chambre, que l'Assemblée de la Société des nations, où, désormais et jusqu'en 1933, siégera l'Allemagne, recommande avec insistance, pour l'affermissement de la sécurité collective, la conclusion d'accords régionaux.

En 1927, l'Assemblée précise le but à atteindre :

'Il faut, dit la résolution, que chaque État, assuré de n'avoir pas à pourvoir seul au soin de sa sécurité par le moyen de ses armements particuliers, puisse la faire reposer également sur l'action collective organisée par la Société des nations.'

Et, définissant les moyens en même temps que les principes, elle préconise 'les ententes qu'il serait loisible aux États membres de la Société des nations, sans préjudice des obligations du pacte, de conclure entre eux, à l'effet de proportionner leurs engagements à la solidarité géographique ou autre plus ou moins grande qui les lierait à d'autres États'.

En 1928, l'Assemblée précise de nouveau que 'la conclusion entre les États appartenant à la même région de traités de non-agression et d'assistance mutuelle constitue un des moyens les plus pratiques qui puissent actuellement être recommandés aux États qui recherchent des garanties plus efficaces de sécurité'.

Messieurs, c'est en conformité même avec cette politique que le gouvernement français et le gouvernement soviétique ont conclu, dès novembre 1932, un pacte de non-agression.

Puis, le gouvernement soviétique signe, en juillet 1933, vous ne l'avez pas oublié, avec ses voisins occidentaux et avec la Petite Entente, un pacte qui avait pour objet de définir l'agresseur.¹

La même année, mais à l'automne, le gouvernement de Moscou donne officiellement au quai d'Orsay l'indication qu'on y serait disposé à s'associer à une politique de consolidation de la paix en Europe et à conclure éventuellement un accord d'assistance mutuelle avec la France. De là va naître le traité qui est soumis à vos délibérations.

Mais tant de commentaires, au cours de quatre séances déjà — celle-ci, n'est-il pas vrai, est la cinquième — l'ont accompagné, pour ne parler même que de vos délibérations, qu'il me semble nécessaire de

¹ See *Documents for 1933*, p. 230.

préciser en détail les origines et l'histoire des négociations diplomatiques qui devaient conduire à la signature du pacte franco-soviétique.

Donc, je viens de le rappeler, à l'automne 1933, proposition soviétique officieuse. Elle rentre dans le cadre de l'organisation de cette sécurité collective que nous avons toujours recherchée à Genève et par Genève. Il est donc normal que, du côté français, on soit prêt à accueillir la collaboration soviétique en vue de mener à bien l'œuvre de la consolidation de la paix.

Mais il ne pouvait s'agir, dans notre pensée, de conclure un accord pur et simple d'assistance mutuelle générale qui, sur le plan politique, aurait engagé la France même en Extrême-Orient au delà de ses moyens et, sur le plan juridique, aurait risqué de se montrer incompatible avec le jeu des clauses du pacte rhénan de Locarno.

Nous désirions, d'ailleurs, faire bénéficier les pays de l'Europe orientale, notamment la Pologne, des garanties de sécurité que le nouvel instrument diplomatique serait susceptible de fournir.

Les conversations franco-soviétiques qui se sont poursuivies à Paris dès le début de 1934 et qui ont abouti aux entretiens entre M. Barthou et M. Litvinov, à Genève, en mai 1934, ont eu pour objet de préciser les conditions et la portée des conventions qui pourraient être conclues entre la France et l'Union des républiques soviétiques. Ces conditions étaient les suivantes :

- 1° L'assistance ne jouera que pour les territoires européens ;
- 2° L'accord franco-soviétique constituera l'un des éléments d'une série de conventions de même nature devant lier les uns aux autres les divers pays de l'Est européen, ainsi que l'Allemagne ;
- 3° Les conventions ne pourront se situer que dans le cadre de la Société des nations.

C'est ainsi que l'entrée de l'Union des républiques soviétiques dans l'organisme de Genève constituait la donnée primordiale et nécessaire du système de garanties envisagé.

M. Litvinov ayant donné à M. Barthou son assentiment sur ces bases de négociations, un premier schéma¹ est alors établi, qui prévoit essentiellement : d'abord, un traité d'assistance régionale comportant l'engagement réciproque de non-agression et d'assistance mutuelle contre le contractant agresseur. Les signataires prévus étaient l'Allemagne, les pays baltes, la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie et l'Union des républiques soviétiques.

Ensuite, un traité franco-soviétique, par lequel la France s'engage, dans les limites des accords de Locarno ainsi que des articles 15 et 16 du pacte de la Société des nations, à prêter assistance à la Russie, si

¹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 252.

elle était victime d'un manquement au traité régional. La Russie, comme contre-partie, s'engageait à prêter assistance à la France dans le cadre des accords de Locarno, des engagements d'assistance correspondants devant être pris par les deux contractants à l'égard de l'Allemagne.

Enfin, un acte général, soulignant la portée pacifique de ces traités et leur compatibilité absolue avec les obligations du pacte de la Société des nations.

Accepté par M. Litvinov au début de juin 1934 et soumis aussitôt aux puissances intéressées, ce plan rencontrait, de leur part, un accueil assez différent.

La Tchécoslovaquie et, après elle, toute la Petite Entente donnait sa pleine approbation.

L'Angleterre, rassurée, au cours de la suite du voyage de M. Barthou à Londres — juillet 1934 — sur la possibilité pour l'Allemagne d'obtenir, si elle le désirait, des garanties identiques à celles prévues pour la France et l'U.R.S.S., nous donnait son accord et s'engageait même à appuyer, avec l'Italie, notre projet à Berlin et à Varsovie.¹

Quant aux États baltes, si leur situation particulière ne leur permettait pas de donner une adhésion définitive avant que les autres États intéressés aient pris position, ils devaient marquer à plusieurs reprises et notamment le 9 mars 1935, par une démarche officielle, l'intérêt porté par leurs gouvernements respectifs à la réalisation d'un pacte régional d'assistance mutuelle.

L'Allemagne adoptait par contre une position négative. Nous étions encore, je me permets de vous rappeler cette date, en 1934. L'objection essentielle, formulée par une note du 3 septembre 1934, portait sur le système même du pacte, considéré par l'Allemagne comme contenant un danger du fait d'une assistance devant jouer automatiquement dans des circonstances difficiles à prévoir. Le gouvernement du Reich marquait en outre sa préférence pour le système des accords bilatéraux.²

D'autre part, l'attitude de la Pologne, pour être moins formellement négative, était dilatoire. Outre certaines objections de détail : participation de la Tchécoslovaquie et de la Lithuanie au pacte, concordance du pacte avec des accords antérieurement conclus par Varsovie, M. Beck indiquait qu'il ne pourrait, pour des raisons d'équilibre politique, donner une réponse définitive tant que l'adhésion de l'Allemagne ne serait pas assurée.

La tâche essentielle de la diplomatie française consistera donc,

¹ See *Documents* for 1934, p. 175.

² See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 253.

à partir de juillet 1934, à fournir toutes les explications, toutes les précisions susceptibles de vaincre les appréhensions de Berlin et de Varsovie. Puis, dans les premiers mois de 1935, soucieuse de faire disparaître les répugnances marquées dans ces deux capitales à l'égard de l'obligation d'assistance mutuelle, elle a même envisagé de modifier le plan primitif et de limiter l'engagement des signataires du traité régional à la non-agression, à la non-assistance à l'agresseur et à la consultation. Un article nouveau aurait seulement précisé que chacun des contractants aurait la faculté de s'engager à prêter son assistance aux autres contractants.

Pendant toute cette période, les efforts de la France ont bénéficié de l'approbation et de l'appui du Foreign Office. Il me suffit de rappeler à ce sujet la déclaration franco-britannique du 3 février 1935¹ et en même temps, d'ailleurs, notre collaboration dans cet effort de conciliation rencontrait un appui de la part du gouvernement de Moscou.

Notre collaboration avec Moscou était même à ce point intime dans cette recherche qu'elle avait conduit M. Laval et M. Litvinov à signer, le 5 décembre 1934,² à Genève, un protocole affirmant :

- 1° Que les gouvernements français et soviétique ne se prêteraient pas à la conclusion d'accords susceptibles de compromettre la préparation et la signature d'un pacte régional de l'Est ;
- 2° Que les deux gouvernements s'informeront réciproquement de toute proposition susceptible d'avoir une telle portée.

Ces engagements étaient valables pour la durée de la négociation et même de toute autre qui pourrait lui être substituée.

Ils avaient été communiqués aux gouvernements intéressés et avaient, en outre, recueilli l'adhésion notamment de M. Bénès.

Le 16 mars 1935, un événement d'une portée considérable s'est produit en Europe : la promulgation par le gouvernement du Reich d'une loi instituant le service militaire obligatoire.³

Il ne vous échappera pas que cet événement, d'une portée vraiment considérable sur le rapport des forces en Europe, rendait plus urgente l'organisation de la sécurité collective en Europe orientale.

Par ailleurs, et à peu près à la même époque, les informations recueillies par sir John Simon et M. Eden à Berlin, et par M. Eden seul à Varsovie, Moscou et Prague, témoignaient à la fois de l'esprit pacifique des dirigeants soviétiques et des réserves continues de l'Allemagne, qui se refusait à entrer dans un système collectif de sécurité, auquel seraient adjoints des accords d'assistance mutuelle.

¹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 25.

² See *Documents for 1934*, p. 184.

³ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 64.

C'est dans ces conditions que le cabinet britannique s'était déclaré prêt à envisager favorablement néanmoins l'éventualité d'un traité d'assistance mutuelle entre la France et le gouvernement des Soviets et que M. Laval acceptait de se rendre à Moscou à la fin de mars 1935.

Le gouvernement allemand a marqué à ce moment un certain progrès sur ses propositions précédentes et il a indiqué qu'il serait peut-être prêt à accepter un pacte collectif de non-agression comportant l'obligation d'une consultation en cas d'agression, des accords bilatéraux devant assurer par ailleurs un règlement pacifique des différends éventuels entre chacun des contractants ; mais il continuait d'écarter par là même toute idée de pacte d'assistance ayant un lien avec de semblables accords.¹

C'est alors que la conférence de Stresa eut lieu, que l'organisation de la sécurité collective en Europe y fut étudiée de très près par les trois gouvernements représentés — ceux de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie — qui déclarèrent, au contraire, dans une communication officielle, qu'il convenait de poursuivre les négociations tendant au développement de la sécurité collective en Europe orientale.²

Dans ces circonstances et avec la préoccupation de ne pas compromettre les possibilités d'organisation collective de la paix, le gouvernement français a poursuivi, aussitôt après la conférence de Stresa, les négociations directes avec l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes.

Dès le début — je tiens à le marquer parce que cela répond en même temps à certaines observations qui ont été présentées à cette tribune — la conception d'une alliance analogue à celle d'avant la guerre avait été résolument écartée.

Le gouvernement français estimait, en effet, que l'assistance devait jouer dans les seuls cas où le pacte de la Société des nations et les accords de Locarno laissaient aux puissances signataires leur liberté d'action. C'est en partant également de ce point de vue que toute définition de l'agresseur fut écartée des textes envisagés. Car, n'étant pas nécessairement admise de toutes les puissances signataires de Locarno, une telle définition aurait pu mettre certains États en désaccord entre eux.

Donc, tenant compte de ces considérations, les négociateurs, M. Laval et M. Litvinov, acceptèrent les directives suivantes :

L'assistance ne devra jouer que dans le cadre de la Société des nations. Rien, dans le texte du pacte envisagé, ne pourra être interprété comme contraire à la mission de la Société des nations et aux

¹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 82.

² *Ibid.*, p. 80.

engagements internationaux précédemment souscrits par les contractants.

Il sera précisé que l'accord ne doit pas constituer un instrument diplomatique fermé, mais qu'il doit réaliser la première étape d'une organisation générale de la sécurité dans l'Est européen.

Bien que n'étant pas lié par les mêmes obligations que la France, et notamment par le pacte de Locarno, l'Union des républiques soviétiques socialistes admettait sans réserve ces principes, et ce sont ces principes, messieurs, qu'enregistre le traité franco-soviétique signé à Paris le 2 mai 1935.¹ . . .

Le désir de faire de cet accord, comme je l'ai rappelé il y a un instant, une des bases de l'organisation de la sécurité en Europe orientale, la volonté de poursuivre les négociations en vue de la conclusion d'un pacte de l'Est, étaient solennellement affirmés à plusieurs reprises, et encore au cours du voyage de M. Laval à Moscou, au mois de mai 1935.

En outre, pour entrer précisément dans ce cadre de la sécurité collective, au mois de juin, il était conclu à Moscou un accord entre le gouvernement tchécoslovaque et le gouvernement soviétique, sur des bases analogues à celles de l'accord franco-soviétique, qui, vous le savez, est déjà ratifié par les deux pays à la date d'aujourd'hui.²

Le nouveau traité, signé au mois de mai 1935, fut accueilli avec faveur par la généralité des États intéressés. A Varsovie même, M. Beck admettait, en présence de M. Laval, la parfaite compatibilité de ces accords avec l'alliance franco-polonaise.

Toutefois — la Chambre me rendra cette justice que, dans cet historique, je ne veux rien laisser dans l'ombre —, le gouvernement du Reich entamait aussitôt une campagne, tant sur le plan juridique que sur le plan politique, contre cet instrument diplomatique.

Sur le plan juridique, le gouvernement allemand remettait, les 25 mai et 1^{er} juin, aux États signataires du pacte de Locarno, un mémorandum de protestation contre les prétendues incompatibilités existant entre le traité franco-soviétique et les engagements de Locarno.³

Nous avons répondu, le 25 juin, à ce mémorandum, par une note qui réfute point par point les objections de la Wilhelmstrasse et je souligne que le texte de cette note avait été préalablement remis aux signataires du pacte rhénan et même remanié suivant leurs observations.⁴

De son côté, le 5 juillet, le gouvernement britannique avait marqué, et cela est important, directement à Berlin, qu'il considérait que rien

¹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 116.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

² *Ibid.*, p. 138.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

dans le pacte n'était en contradiction avec les engagements de Londres ou ne venait les modifier.¹

Sur le plan politique, le *Reichsführer* attaquait, dans son discours du 21 mai 1935, le nouvel accord.²

Il se déclarait, d'abord, hostile aux pactes plurilatéraux. Il subordonnait, en outre, la conclusion des pactes de non-agression par le Reich avec ses voisins, à la double condition qu'aucun engagement d'assistance mutuelle ne serait joint à ce système de pactes et que le Reich ne souscrirait pas d'engagement le liant avec la Russie.

Par ailleurs, je dois noter qu'aucune réponse allemande ne devait être donnée au mémorandum remis le 3 juin par le Quai d'Orsay, acceptant comme base de négociation les suggestions faites par M. von Neurath au moment de Stresa et proposant un examen en commun de ces suggestions.

Messieurs, c'est dans ces conditions que le projet de loi portant approbation du pacte franco-soviétique a été déposé sur le bureau de cette Assemblée le 27 juin ; M. Torrès, nommé rapporteur, a, si je ne m'abuse, publié son rapport le 10 décembre.³ . . .

Telles sont, messieurs, fidèlement relatées, les circonstances qui ont accompagné la conclusion du pacte franco-soviétique. . . .

Le pacte a donc été négocié. Mais — j'y insiste encore — les négociateurs ont nettement marqué leur volonté de préparer et de conclure, selon les termes mêmes du préambule, 'un accord européen visant à maintenir la sécurité nationale, l'intégrité territoriale, l'indépendance politique des États et, en attendant, de contribuer à l'application efficace des dispositions du pacte de Genève'.

Ainsi se trouvait exactement réalisé le but même défini dans les projets de traités d'assistance mutuelle élaborés à Genève. Et je rappelle encore que le protocole de signature prévoit expressément que 'lorsque l'accord régional recherché deviendra possible, les engagements et accords qui interviendraient se substitueraient à ceux qui résultent du traité franco-soviétique'.

Messieurs, sans doute un texte est toujours ouvert à la critique. Mais il est au moins deux reproches qu'on ne saurait véritablement adresser au pacte franco-soviétique.

Personne ne peut lui reprocher de n'être pas dans la ligne d'une politique que la France a constamment suivie depuis quinze ans.

Personne ne peut lui reprocher d'être conclu pour isoler l'Allemagne, puisqu'il a été préparé avec le regret de son abstention et dans l'espoir de son adhésion ultérieure. . . .

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 270.

² *Ibid.*, p. 159.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

Personne ne peut nier, en effet, que le traité franco-soviétique d'assistance mutuelle ne soit un complément du pacte général de la Société des nations. . . .

Sans m'y arrêter plus longtemps, je veux examiner tout de suite l'étendue et le jeu des obligations d'assistance qui nous incomberont après l'entrée en vigueur du traité franco-soviétique. Je désire donner sur ce point certaines précisions, que je considère comme indispensables.

Dès maintenant, aux termes du pacte de la Société des nations, du fait que la Russie est membre de la Société des nations, et par le jeu de l'article 17, nous sommes déjà tenus, d'une manière générale, de maintenir contre toute agression extérieure, comme dit l'article 10, 'l'intégrité territoriale et l'indépendance politique' de ce pays.

Plus spécialement, nous avons à prendre les mesures prévues à l'article 1^{er} de l'article 16, mesures communément appelées 'sanctions économiques'.

Nous avons, en outre, l'obligation de prêter un mutuel appui pour résister à toutes mesures spéciales qui seraient dirigées par le pays agresseur contre un membre de la Société des nations en raison de l'application de ces sanctions.

Mais là s'arrêtent nos obligations du fait du pacte de la Société des nations.

Sans doute, le conseil de la Société des nations a le devoir de recommander aux divers gouvernements intéressés des mesures d'assistance militaire. Mais il s'agit là, je le rappelle, d'une recommandation qui ne crée pas une obligation aux membres de la Société.

D'autre part, l'article 15 suppose que les deux États en conflit ont recouru aux procédures qu'institue le pacte de Genève pour le règlement de leur différend. Si la solution recommandée par le conseil réunit l'unanimité de ses membres, le vote des parties ne comptant pas, nous sommes tenus de ne pas recourir à la guerre contre la partie qui se conforme aux conclusions du conseil. S'il n'y a pas unanimité, nous demeurons libres d'agir comme nous le jugerons nécessaire pour maintenir, ainsi que le précise le pacte, le droit et la justice.

C'est cette liberté, si je ne me trompe, que M. Montigny notamment a craint de nous voir aliéner par le traité en discussion.

J'examinerai tout à l'heure dans quelle mesure cette critique est fondée. Mais je voudrais tout d'abord préciser les obligations complémentaires que comporte pour nous le traité franco-soviétique.

Il n'y a pas lieu d'insister sur celle que nous ferait l'article 1^{er} du pacte, de procéder, en cas de menace ou d'un danger d'agression, à une consultation mutuelle immédiate. Cette procédure, on en con-

viendra, n'a que des avantages, même si d'une telle consultation on ne peut attendre tous les avantages qu'aurait la consultation collective que prévoyait le projet de pacte de l'Est, dont le gouvernement allemand, comme je l'ai déjà dit, reste saisi.

Par l'article 2, nous nous engageons à user de la liberté que nous laisserait l'article 15, alinéa 7, du pacte de Genève pour prêter assistance à la Russie au cas où elle serait l'objet d'une agression non provoquée.

Il convient de remarquer qu'en pareil cas il faut déjà supposer qu'un différend aura été porté devant le conseil, que celui-ci n'aura pas pu aboutir à une recommandation unanime sur la solution du différend, que le délai de trois mois après la recommandation prescrite par le pacte aura été respecté et qu'après l'expiration de ce délai une agression non provoquée a été commise contre la Russie.

A défaut de cette procédure et de ce délai, ce serait dans les conditions de l'article 16 du pacte de la Société des nations et en vertu de l'article 3 du traité franco-soviétique que nous aurions à prêter assistance à la Russie.

En pareil cas, nous sommes tenus d'agir de concert d'abord pour obtenir que le conseil de la Société des nations énonce ses recommandations avec toute la rapidité qu'exigeront les circonstances.

Ces recommandations énoncées, et il s'agit évidemment de recommandations d'ordre militaire, nous avons l'obligation, et non plus la faculté, de nous y conformer.

En outre, si le conseil n'a pas pu arriver à une recommandation, par exemple par défaut d'unanimité, notre obligation d'assistance subsiste, prolongeant celle qui, de toutes manières et pour tous les membres de la Société des nations, résulte en matière économique et financière de l'alinéa 1^{er} de l'article 16.

Mais, pour que joue notre engagement d'assistance, il ne suffit pas que les conditions qui viennent d'être exposées soient remplies. D'autres encore doivent être réunies, qu'il appartient au gouvernement français d'apprécier en toute loyauté, mais aussi en toute souveraineté.

Notre assistance n'est due que s'il y a agression non provoquée. Elle n'est applicable que si elle ne nous expose pas à des sanctions de caractère international, c'est-à-dire au jeu des garanties contenues dans le pacte rhénan de Locarno.

Nous aurions donc à rechercher tout d'abord s'il y a agression, et quel est l'agresseur; puis, ces points établis, à nous assurer que l'agression n'a pas été provoquée, car on peut concevoir qu'en cas de recours à la force tous les torts ne soient pas du côté de celui qui y a

eu recours. L'examen des faits et des circonstances dont elle s'entoure permet seul d'apprécier pleinement le caractère de l'agression.

Dans une telle hypothèse, dois-je rappeler que le conseil de la Société des nations aura été nécessairement saisi ? Les gouvernements qui y sont représentés auront à se former une opinion à cet égard. Le gouvernement français aura pu y trouver les plus utiles éléments pour sa propre appréciation sans qu'il y ait eu lieu à une consultation spéciale. Il sera ainsi à même de se rendre compte du sentiment des autres gouvernements et, notamment, des garants du traité de Locarno.

Il est ainsi en mesure de s'assurer, par leur appréciation, du caractère de l'agression, que l'assistance prévue par le traité avec l'Union soviétique n'est pas jugée incompatible avec ses propres obligations aux termes du traité rhénan et ne l'expose pas au jeu des garanties prévues par cet acte.

Dans la négative, les dispositions du traité franco-soviétique n'auront pas à recevoir application.

C'est donc dans l'appréciation la plus complète de la situation internationale, en pleine connaissance des sentiments des membres de la Société des nations, en toute conformité avec les principes de la sécurité collective, dans le respect de tous ces engagements enfin, qu'auraient à jouer éventuellement les dispositions du traité qui est actuellement soumis à votre approbation. . . .

Comme, tout de même, ces faits ne pouvaient pas être ignorés de ceux qui sont montés à cette tribune pour critiquer le pacte franco-soviétique, je dois comprendre alors autrement la critique dominante qui, à propos de ce nouveau traité d'assistance mutuelle, était entendue dans les discours que vous avez écoutés.

Cette critique dominante doit, à mon avis, s'énoncer ainsi : Pourquoi la France s'est-elle engagée par tous ces pactes d'assistance mutuelle, hier et aujourd'hui, dans un engrenage où elle peut se trouver mêlée à des conflits à l'écart desquels elle aurait pu rester prudemment ?

Cela se relie d'ailleurs à une autre propagande, celle qui a consisté à minimiser la valeur pratique du pacte général de Genève, à en diminuer les obligations et à en émasculer les textes.

Ne nous y trompons pas, c'est le point crucial du débat.

Le vrai débat est, entre ceux qui ont gardé la foi dans la paix garantie par l'organisation de la sécurité collective et qui, pour en acquérir le bénéfice, acceptent ses obligations et ceux qui, pour éviter la menace de la guerre, sont prêts à céder devant la force en sacrifiant la sécurité des autres aux garanties personnelles que la force daignera leur concéder, au moins provisoirement.

On nous a dit : 'Laissez le pangermanisme et le panslavisme s'affronter ; repliez-vous derrière votre ligne fortifiée par Maginot et marquez les coups!' . . .

Paroles impies et qui pourraient causer en Europe des ravages profonds si elles étaient acceptées comme l'opinion de la France.

Ainsi, nous serions ceux qui, maintenant, défendrions cette thèse de l'isolement contre laquelle nous avons tant lutté et qu'heureusement l'histoire a déjà condamnée ?

Aurions-nous déjà oublié qu'en juillet 1914 la guerre mondiale est née d'un incident auquel nous étions aussi étrangers qu'à n'importe quel incident qui pourrait naître demain en Europe ? Aurions-nous déjà oublié que si la thèse de l'égoïste isolement avait prévalu, ni l'Angleterre, ni l'Italie, ni surtout l'Amérique ne se seraient rangées à nos côtés ?

Aurions-nous déjà oublié que le premier traité d'assistance mutuelle qui ait été établi dans le cadre de la Société des nations l'a été à notre profit et qu'il s'appelle Locarno ?

Mais, m'a-t-on objecté, vous allez justement compromettre Locarno par ce nouveau traité d'assistance mutuelle avec la Russie. Les avertissements ne vous ont pas manqué. Écoutez ceux qui vous viennent de l'autre côté du Rhin.

Messieurs, mes prédécesseurs et moi-même n'avons pas négligé ces avertissements. J'ai donné lecture aux commissions compétentes des notes échangées, auxquelles je faisais allusion à l'instant, entre les signataires de Locarno. Le gouvernement allemand, comme je l'ai rappelé, ayant formulé, en mai 1935, des réserves sur le pacte franco-soviétique, la réponse française établie par M. Laval a été communiquée aux puissances signataires du pacte de Locarno et approuvée par elles avant d'être remise au gouvernement allemand.

Au surplus, je veux démontrer une fois encore, et à cette tribune, que le traité franco-soviétique procède directement de la conception des traités conclus en 1925 sur les bords du lac Majeur. Dans son préambule, il enregistre la décision des contractants de contribuer, en attendant la conclusion d'un accord plus large, à l'application des dispositions du pacte de la Société des nations. Dans son article 4, il est dit que rien n'en sera interprété comme restreignant la mission de celle-ci de prendre des mesures propres à sauvegarder efficacement la paix du monde.

Le protocole enfin, qui y est joint, dans son alinéa 2, constate l'intention commune des deux gouvernements de ne contredire en rien les engagements précédemment assumés par les contractants envers des États tiers.

Il y a donc là la confirmation, si elle était nécessaire, de l'engagement pris à Locarno par la France de ne se livrer à aucune agression contre l'Allemagne et de l'engagement analogue que comporte, à l'égard de l'Allemagne, le traité signé par la Russie, à Berlin, en 1926, et renouvelé par elle en 1933.

Le traité de Locarno interdit le recours à la guerre et, en dehors de la légitime défense, n'admet à cette interdiction aucune exception sauf s'il s'agit, en application du pacte de Genève, de prêter assistance à un tiers contre une agression.

Le traité franco-soviétique n'a lui-même d'autre objet que de prêter assistance contre une agression. Le protocole de ce nouveau traité rappelle les dispositions contenues dans le traité franco-soviétique de 1932 et, parmi ces dispositions, il est bon de signaler celles qui prévoient la dénonciation immédiate de l'engagement de non-agression franco-soviétique au cas où la France ou les Soviets se livreraient à une agression contre un tiers.

Au surplus, le paragraphe 4 du protocole rappelle que, si les signataires continuent de considérer comme désirable la conclusion d'un accord par lequel la France s'engagerait à prêter assistance à l'Allemagne si elle était attaquée par la Russie, et à la Russie si celle-ci était attaquée par l'Allemagne, le traité actuellement soumis à la Chambre n'a pour objet que la résistance à l'agression. C'est le sens, c'est l'esprit même des accords de Locarno.

Je doute donc, connaissant la rigueur de la science juridique allemande, qu'il puisse être affirmé, après les éclaircissements ainsi donnés, après la mise au point faite par mon éminent prédécesseur, que le pacte franco-soviétique soit, de quelque manière, contraire même à l'esprit de Locarno.

Mais si cela était, néanmoins, le gouvernement s'en remettrait volontiers à la Cour permanente de justice internationale pour que fût arbitré un différend né d'une interprétation divergente des traités.

Ce que personne, par contre, ne pourrait accepter — et je me permets de faire observer à quelques-uns des orateurs qui m'ont précédé à cette tribune la dangereuse légèreté de leurs propos — ce serait que pût intervenir une répudiation unilatérale d'un traité comme celui de Locarno dont la dénonciation fait l'objet de stipulations très précises.

M. le président du conseil, dans sa déclaration ministérielle, a évoqué en termes clairs et explicites notre désir de rechercher avec l'Allemagne une collaboration sincère dans la paix.

Cette collaboration se rattache aux principes énoncés dans la déclaration commune franco-britannique du 3 février 1935, que

j'avais eu l'honneur, comme chef du gouvernement français, d'établir et de contresigner à Londres.

Ce serait faire une injure gratuite au gouvernement allemand que de lui attribuer des desseins qui provoqueraient un grave conflit non seulement avec la France, mais avec les autres signataires du traité de Locarno, dans un moment où ses chefs responsables ont exprimé, au contraire, leur volonté de paix et de coopération européenne.

Pour nous, il n'y a pas d'autre limite à notre volonté de collaboration que le respect des principes sur lesquels s'édifie progressivement le droit nouveau des peuples.

Notre vœu le plus ardent est de voir une grande nation, dont les services qu'elle a rendus à la civilisation humaine sont incontestables et incontestés, reprendre sa place sur un pied d'égalité autour de la table de Genève et travailler avec tous à la construction d'un monde meilleur d'où le chômage, la misère et la guerre seraient bannis par la bonne entente générale.

Tôt ou tard, les nations européennes s'apercevront que la ruineuse course aux armements les conduit inexorablement à la ruine économique et au désordre social.

Tôt ou tard, elles reconnaîtront que la paix est une et indivisible. . .

3. THE GERMAN MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 7, 1936.

(i) *Extract from Speech by Herr Hitler, March 7, 1936.*¹

. . . Seeing that the outside world often speaks of a 'German Question', it would be worth while for us to try to gain an objective and clear understanding as to the nature of this. For quite a large number of people this 'question' is to be found in the present German régime, in the difference between the German régime and other régimes—which difference is not understood at all—in the so-called 'Rearmament', which is felt as a pressing menace, and in everything else that is conjured up by fervid imaginations as to the results of this rearmament. For many other people the question lies in the alleged militarist intentions of the German people, in their latent desire for aggression, or in the satanic efficiency which they are capable of in getting the better of their opponents.

No, . . . the German question is something quite different.

Here sixty-seven millions of people are living in a very restricted area of the earth and on land which is not everywhere very fertile. This means that we have about 136 persons to each square kilometre.

¹ In the Reichstag. From *Völkischer Beobachter*, March 8, 1936, translated by Dr. F. J. Berber in *Locarno*, 1936, pp. 198-221.

These people are not less industrious than the other European peoples, but their vital needs are not smaller or fewer. They are not less intelligent, but their will to live is also not a whit less strong and they are no more ready than the Englishman or Frenchman to allow themselves to be shot down as heroes for the sake of some dream or other. But they are not less courageous and by no means less honourable than the members of other European nations . . .

Furthermore, another phase of the German question arises out of the fact that the unreasoning line of conduct adopted towards the German people was developed into a system wherein measures and agitations inspired by hatred made the German struggle for life still more difficult, although it was hard enough already. And all this was done, not merely against the dictates of nature, but also against the dictates of common sense. And it was against common sense for the reason that the rest of the world reaped no benefit whatsoever from the penalties which Germany was made to bear.

Comparing the German nation with the Russian in regard to territory, the Russians have eighteen times more land for each member of the population than the Germans have. Manifestly this fact alone renders the daily struggle for life difficult. Without the ability and industry of the German peasant and the organizing capacity of the German nation, existence would hardly be conceivable for these sixty-seven millions. . . . And this is one of the German questions. And the world may be interested only in seeing that this question of assuring the livelihood of the German people from year to year should be successfully solved. In like manner I wish that the German people should also understand and appreciate that it lies in their own innermost interests to have the same vital questions successfully solved in the case of other peoples. . . .

As a result of exceptionally unfavourable conditions, the struggle for economic existence among the German people is extremely difficult; but their intelligence, industry, and consequently the standard of life natural to them, are very high. Therefore an exceptional effort on the part of all the forces of the nation is necessary in order to master this first German problem. But such an effort can be made only if the German nation feels itself on a footing of political equality with other nations, and thus politically secure. It is impossible to hold together a nation which has a high sense of honour and courage if that nation be treated permanently as the world's slave and, under such conditions, it would be impossible to govern it. There is no better proof of the German love for peace than the fact that, despite its ability and its courage, which can scarcely be

called in question by its opponents, and in spite of its numbers, the German nation has secured for itself only quite a modest share of the world's space and the world's goods. But it is just this very internalized character of the German nature which makes it impossible for the Germans to bear humiliation and ill-treatment.

The unfortunate Peace Treaty of Versailles was historically unique by reason of the fact that it officially perpetuated, in the moral sense, the conditions that existed as the immediate result of the war. Thus it created that German question which constitutes a fatal burden for Europe as long as it remains unsolved and on the solution of which the freedom of Europe depends.

. . . Fellow Members of the Reichstag: You are familiar with the content and meaning of this treaty [of Locarno]. It was intended to prevent for all future time the employment of force between Belgium and France on the one side, and Germany on the other. Unfortunately the treaties of alliance that had already been made by France were the first obstacles laid in the practical path of this Pact, namely, the Rhine Pact of Locarno. To this Pact Germany made a contribution which represented the greatest sacrifice; because while France fortified her frontier with steel and concrete and armament, and garrisoned it heavily, a condition of complete defencelessness was imposed upon us on our western frontier. Nevertheless, we abided by that obligation in the hope that we might serve the cause of European peace and advance international understanding by making a sacrifice which meant so much for a great Power.

The agreement concluded between France and Russia last year,¹ and already signed and accepted by the French Chamber,² is in open contradiction to this Pact. This new Franco-Soviet Agreement introduces the threatening military power of a mighty Empire into the centre of Europe by the roundabout way of Czechoslovakia, the latter country having also signed an agreement with Russia. Such being the state of affairs, it is impossible that these two countries should undertake in their agreement to decide the question of guilt, in the event of an Eastern European conflict, according to their own judgment, and accordingly to regard the obligation of mutual assistance as having arisen or not, entirely irrespective of an already existing or pending decision on the part of the League of Nations Council.

It has been asserted that in this Pact the first obligation need not necessarily apply because it is restricted by a certain condition attached to the text; but this assertion is incomprehensible. I cannot

¹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 116.

² See above, p. 15.

state that a certain course of action is expressly a breach of an obligation otherwise valid and therewith considered as binding, and then, in a further paragraph, declare that no action shall be taken which would be contrary to these other obligations. In this case the first obligation would be unreasonable and therefore incomprehensible.

This problem is first and foremost a political one and must be considered as such in all its serious implications.

France has not concluded this Treaty with one or other of the European Powers. Even before the Rhine Pact came into existence France already had treaties of assistance with Czechoslovakia and with Poland. Germany made no objection to this, not only because these pacts, unlike the Franco-Soviet Pact, were subject to the provisions laid down by the League of Nations but because at that time Czechoslovakia, and more particularly Poland, were in the habit of following a policy in keeping with their own national interests. Germany has no desire to attack these States, and does not believe that it is in their interests to attack her. Above all, however, Poland will remain Poland and France will remain France. But Soviet Russia is the exponent of a revolutionary political and philosophical system organized in the form of a State. Its political creed is the confession of faith in the world revolution. It cannot be foreseen whether this philosophy will not be victorious to-morrow or the next day in France as well. But should this happen—and I as a German statesman must count on such a possibility—then it is certain that this new Bolshevik State would be a section of the Bolshevik International, which means that the decision as to aggression or non-aggression would not be made by two different States according to their own independent and objective judgments, but orders would be issued from one head-quarters. Should such a development take place these head-quarters would not be in Paris but in Moscow.

For purely territorial reasons alone, Germany is not in a position to attack Russia; but Russia could at any time bring about a conflict with Germany by the indirect way of her own advanced positions. In such an event the definition of the aggressor may well be called a foregone conclusion, because it would be independent of the decision of the League Council. To object or assert that France and Russia would do nothing which might expose them to the infliction of sanctions on the part of England or Italy is immaterial here; because it is impossible to imagine what kind of effective sanctions could be found against such an overwhelming combination welded together by its world outlook and its united military forces.

For years past we have issued warnings against such a development, not because we need to be more afraid of it than others, but because one day it may entail terrible consequences for all Europe. An attempt has been made to brush aside our very grave apprehensions by referring to the unreadiness of Russia as a war instrument, by referring also to its unwieldy character and its unfitness for a European war. We have also opposed this view, not because we are convinced that the Germans would be inferior in quality, but because we all know that sheer force of numbers is of supreme importance. We are all the more grateful for the information which M. Herriot conveyed to the French in the French Chamber on Russia's importance from the standpoint of military aggression. We know that M. Herriot received this information from the Soviet Government themselves, and we are convinced that the Soviet Government cannot have furnished the spiritual inspirer of this new alliance in France with false information. Nor do we doubt that M. Herriot reported his information truly. Now, according to this information it is established in the first place that the Russian Army has a peace strength of 1,350,000 men, and secondly, that its war strength and reserves amount to 17·5 million men. Thirdly, we are informed it has the largest tank force in the world and, fourthly, that it has the largest air force in the world. This most powerful military factor has been described as excellent in regard to mobility and leadership and ready for action at any time. Its introduction into Central Europe would destroy the European equilibrium existing there. Furthermore, we are absolutely unable to make any possible estimate of the means of defence on land and in the air for the European States concerned and especially for Germany, which has been singled out as the sole opponent.

This gigantic mobilization of the East against Central Europe is opposed not only to the letter but above all to the spirit of the Locarno Pact. Not only do we feel this as the party chiefly concerned, but the same feeling is agitating the minds of intelligent men in all the nations and has been openly expressed everywhere by publicists and political writers and speakers.

On February 21 a French journalist came to me and asked me to grant him an interview. I was informed that he was one of those Frenchmen who try just as hard as we do to find a way towards an understanding between the two nations, and so I did not like to refuse him, especially as my refusal might immediately be interpreted as a sign of disrespect towards French journalism. I gave him the information he desired, just as I had given it hundreds and

thousands of times in Germany, and I tried once more to approach the French people with the request for an understanding on which we have set our hearts and which we would like to see carried into effect. Furthermore, I expressed my deep regret about the menace of the development arising in France from the conclusion of a pact for which we are convinced that there is no conceivable necessity, but which would create a new situation in Europe if ever it should be brought to realization. This interview, as you are aware, was held back for reasons unknown to us and was not published until the day after the ratification of the Pact in the French Chamber.

In accordance with the declarations which I made at that interview, I am still ready and shall always and sincerely be ready in the future to help the cause of this Franco-German understanding; for I look upon it as a necessary element in securing Europe against dangers that are incalculable, and because I am unable to see what possible advantage could come to either nation from any other attitude, which indeed would involve the gravest general and international dangers. But when the knowledge of the final conclusion of this Pact came to me I was forced to analyse the new situation that had arisen from it and from this analysis to draw the necessary conclusions.

These are conclusions which are very grave and fill us and myself personally with a deep regret. Yet I am obliged, not only to make sacrifices for the sake of a European understanding, but I am obliged also to bow to the interests of my own nation. So long as a sacrifice is accepted with appreciation and understanding on the other side I will gladly stand by that sacrifice and will recommend the German people to do the same. At the moment, however, when it is certain that the other party no longer takes these sacrifices into account or ceases to appreciate them, a one-sided burden is laid upon Germany and therewith a discrimination which is intolerable for us.

In this historic hour and place I should like to repeat what I said in my first important Reichstag speech, which was delivered in May 1933. I then said that the German people would rather accept distress and affliction than renounce the call of honour and the will to freedom and equality of rights.

If the German nation is to be of some value for European collaboration, it can have this value only as a partner who has equal rights with all the others and is devoted to the principles of honour. As soon as it ceases to possess this characteristic value it loses everything that is of essential worth. I should not like to deceive either ourselves or the rest of the world with a nation which would then have

no further value because it would be lacking in that sense of honour which is the most natural part of a nation's character. But I also believe that in the hour of such bitter recognition and grave decision, in spite of everything we ought not to fail, particularly at such a time, to play our part in European co-operation and I believe that we should now more than ever seek new ways which might make possible a solution of those questions in a way that would be advantageous to all.

I have therefore endeavoured to express the feeling of the German people by making concrete proposals. This people is anxious for its own security and is prepared to make every sacrifice for its freedom, and is at every moment ready to enter into a sincere and honest European co-operation on the basis of equal rights for all.

After a hard inner struggle with myself I therefore decided, on behalf of the German Government of the Reich, to hand the following Memorandum to the French Government to-day and to the other signatories of the Locarno Pact.

(ii) *Memorandum by the German Government respecting the Franco-Soviet Treaty, the Treaty of Locarno, and the Demilitarized Zone in the Rhineland, March 7, 1936.*¹

Immediately after being informed of the Pact between France and the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, concluded on May 2, 1935, the German Government drew the attention of the other signatory Powers of the Locarno Rhine Pact to the fact that the obligations, which France has undertaken in the new Pact, are not compatible with her obligations arising out of the Rhine Pact. The German Government then explained their point of view in full detail and in both its legal and political aspects—in its legal aspect in the German Memorandum of May 25, 1935,² in its political aspect in the many diplomatic conversations which followed on that Memorandum. It is also known to the Governments concerned that neither their written replies to the German Memorandum, nor the arguments brought forward by them through the diplomatic channel or in public declarations, were able to invalidate the German Government's point of view.

In fact, all the diplomatic and public discussions which have taken place since May 1935 regarding these questions have only been able

¹ Communicated to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs by the German Ambassador at London. British White Paper, Cmd. 5118.

² See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 264.

to confirm on all points the view expressed by the German Government at the outset.

1. It is an undisputed fact that the Franco-Soviet Pact is exclusively directed against Germany.

2. It is an undisputed fact that in the Pact France undertakes, in the event of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union, obligations which go far beyond her duty as laid down in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and which compel her to take military action against Germany even when she cannot appeal either to a recommendation or to an actual decision of the Council of the League.

3. It is an undisputed fact that France, in such a case, claims for herself the right to decide on her own judgment who is the aggressor.

4. It is thereby established that France has undertaken towards the Soviet Union obligations which practically amount to undertaking in a given case to act as if neither the Covenant of the League of Nations, nor the Rhine Pact, which refers to the Covenant, were valid.

This result of the Franco-Soviet Pact is not removed by the fact that France, in the Pact, makes the reservation that she does not wish to be bound to take military action against Germany if by such action she would expose herself to a sanction on the part of the guarantor Powers, Italy and Great Britain. As regard this reservation, the decisive fact remains that the Rhine Pact is not based only on the obligations of Great Britain and Italy as guarantor Powers, but primarily on the obligations established in the relations between France and Germany. Therefore it matters only whether France, in undertaking these treaty obligations, has kept herself within the limits imposed on her so far as Germany is concerned by the Rhine Pact.

This, however, the German Government must deny.

The Rhine Pact was intended to achieve the object of securing peace in Western Europe by providing that Germany on the one hand, and France and Belgium on the other hand, in their relation to one another, should renounce for all future time the use of military force. If at the time of the conclusion of the Pact certain exceptions to this renunciation of war going beyond the right of self-defence were admitted, the political reason for this, as is generally known, lay solely in the fact that France had already undertaken certain obligations towards Poland and Czechoslovakia, which she did not wish to sacrifice to the conception of absolute security in the West. Germany, with her own clear conscience in regard to the matter, at the time accepted these limitations on the renunciation of war. She

did not raise objections to the treaties with Poland and Czechoslovakia, laid by France on the table at Locarno, solely on the obvious condition that these treaties were in conformity with the construction of the Rhine Pact, and contained no sort of provisions regarding the application of Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, such as those contained in the new Franco-Soviet agreements. The contents of these special agreements, as then notified to the German Government, fulfilled this condition. The exceptions admitted in the Rhine Pact were not, it is true, specifically confined to Poland and Czechoslovakia, but were formulated as an abstract principle. Nevertheless, the intention of all the negotiations relating to these questions was merely to find a compromise between the renunciation of war by Germany and France, and the wish of France to maintain the obligations which she had already undertaken towards her allies. If, therefore, France now utilizes the abstract provisions of the Rhine Pact, which permit the possibility of war, in order to conclude a fresh alliance against Germany with a Power highly armed in a military sense; if she thus further, and in so decisive a manner, restricts the scope of the renunciation of war agreed upon with Germany; and if in this connexion, as shown above, she does not even observe the fixed formal legal limits, she has created an entirely new situation, and has destroyed the political system of the Rhine Pact, not only in theory but also in fact.

The latest debates and decisions of the French Parliament have shown that France, in spite of the German representations, is determined to put the Pact with the Soviet Union definitely into force. A diplomatic conversation has even revealed that France already regards herself as bound by her signature of this Pact on May 2, 1935. In the face of such a development of European politics, the German Government, if they do not wish to neglect or to abandon the interests of the German people which they have the duty of safeguarding, cannot remain inactive.

The German Government have continually emphasized during the negotiations of the last years their readiness to observe and fulfil all the obligations arising from the Rhine Pact as long as the other contracting parties were ready on their side to maintain the pact. This obvious and essential condition can no longer be regarded as being fulfilled by France. France has replied to the repeated friendly offers and peaceful assurances made by Germany by infringing the Rhine Pact through a military alliance with the Soviet Union exclusively directed against Germany. In this manner, however, the Locarno Rhine Pact has lost its inner meaning and ceased in practice

to exist. Consequently, Germany regards herself for her part as no longer bound by this dissolved treaty. The German Government are now constrained to face the new situation created by this alliance, a situation which is rendered more acute by the fact that the Franco-Soviet Treaty has been supplemented by a Treaty of Alliance between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union exactly parallel in form. In accordance with the fundamental right of a nation to secure its frontiers and ensure its possibilities of defence, the German Government have to-day restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

In order, however, to avoid any misinterpretation of their intentions and to establish beyond doubt the purely defensive character of these measures, as well as to express their unchangeable longing for a real pacification of Europe between States which are equals in rights and equally respected, the German Government declare themselves ready to conclude new agreements for the creation of a system of peaceful security for Europe on the basis of the following proposals:

- (1) The German Government declare themselves ready to enter at once into negotiations with France and Belgium with regard to the creation of a zone demilitarized on both sides, and to give their agreement in advance to any suggestion regarding the depth and nature thereof on the basis of full parity.
- (2) The German Government propose, for the purpose of ensuring the sanctity and inviolability of the boundaries in the West, the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between Germany, France, and Belgium, the duration of which they are ready to fix at twenty-five years.
- (3) The German Government desire to invite Great Britain and Italy to sign this treaty as guarantor Powers.
- (4) The German Government agree, in case the Netherlands Government should so desire and the other Contracting Parties consider it appropriate, to bring the Netherlands into this treaty system.
- (5) The German Government are prepared, in order to strengthen further these security agreements between the Western Powers, to conclude an air pact calculated to prevent in an automatic and effective manner the danger of sudden air attacks.
- (6) The German Government repeat their offer to conclude with the States bordering Germany in the East non-aggression pacts similar to that with Poland. As the Lithuanian Government have in the last few months corrected their attitude towards the Memel Territory to a certain extent, the German

Government withdraw the exception which they once made regarding Lithuania and declare their readiness, on condition that the guaranteed autonomy of the Memel Territory is effectively developed, to sign a non-aggression pact of this with Lithuania also.

- (7) Now that Germany's equality of rights and the restoration of her full sovereignty over the entire territory of the German Reich have finally been attained, the German Government consider the chief reason for their withdrawal from the League of Nations to be removed. They are therefore willing to re-enter the League of Nations. In this connexion they express the expectation that in the course of a reasonable period the question of colonial equality of rights and that of the separation of the League Covenant from its Versailles setting may be clarified through friendly negotiations.

(iii) *Telegram from the French Government to the Secretary-General of the League, March 8, 1936.*¹

By Article 1 of the Treaty negotiated at Locarno to which Belgium, France, the British Empire, and Italy are parties with Germany, Germany confirmed, *inter alia*, her intention to observe the stipulations of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, which provide for the demilitarization of the German territory on the left bank of the Rhine and on the right bank of the zone situated between that river and a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east.

In virtue of Article 8 of the Treaty of Locarno, that Treaty cannot cease to have effect otherwise than by a decision of the Council of the League of Nations voting by a two-thirds majority.

Notwithstanding these explicit provisions, the Government of the Reich, by a communication made yesterday to the representatives in Berlin of the signatory Powers, has just repudiated this Treaty by a unilateral act.

Moreover, in reply to a question put by the French Ambassador when this notification was made to him, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Reich announced that the German Government proposed to send small detachments into the demilitarized zone as a symbolical act.

In fact, the appearance of considerable military forces is already reported in several localities in the zone.

The German Government has thus expressly violated Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and Article 1 of the Treaty of Locarno.

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 312.

Consequently, in conformity with Article 4 of the last-named Treaty, the French Government has the honour to seize the Council of the League of Nations of the violation thus committed.

In view of the urgency of the matter, I should be obliged if you would take all necessary measures for the Council to meet as soon as possible.

(Signed) PIERRE-ÉTIENNE FLANDIN.

(iv) *Telegram from the Belgian Government to the Secretary-General of the League, March 8, 1936.*¹

By a communication made on March 7 to the Belgian Government, the German Government gave notice that it no longer considered itself bound by the Treaty of Guarantee of Locarno and that German troops were entering the demilitarized zone. This fact constituting a violation of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Belgian Government has the honour, in conformity with Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Treaty of Guarantee of Locarno, to lay the question immediately before the Council of the League of Nations. I should be grateful if you would take the necessary measures in order that the Council may be convened as soon as possible.

(Signed) PAUL VAN ZEELAND.

(v) *Broadcast by M. Sarraut, March 8, 1936.*²

Le peuple français, auquel le chef du gouvernement adresse ce message, et l'opinion internationale qui doit en recueillir le fidèle écho, ont besoin, en cet instant, qu'une parole loyale, calme, mesurée, dont l'objectivité contraste avec les accents passionnés qui retentissaient hier à la tribune du Reichstag, souligne l'extrême gravité et récuse l'insoutenable prétexte de la double décision par laquelle, au mépris de ses propres et libres engagements, l'Allemagne vient de dénoncer le traité de Locarno et de violer avec ses armes le territoire de la zone démilitarisée du Rhin.

Un bref rappel des faits de l'histoire d'hier doit, à la fois, éclairer et étayer cette démonstration.

Lorsque, au lendemain de la guerre et de la victoire, on voulut mettre la France à l'abri d'une nouvelle invasion, plusieurs voies s'ouvraient. On pouvait, suivant la méthode commune, donner à notre pays, par des annexions territoriales, de solides frontières; mais c'eût été violenter le caractère de populations qui, allemandes, avaient le droit de vouloir demeurer allemandes. On pouvait, par

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 312.

² *Le Temps*, March 10, 1936.

une occupation permanente, créer en avant des frontières un solide glacis qui mettrait le territoire national hors de l'atteinte d'un adversaire ; on écarta également ce système qui aurait imposé aux populations rhénanes des charges pénibles.

On se borna donc à décider que les territoires allemands de la rive gauche du Rhin, et une zone de 50 kilomètres sur la rive droite, seraient démilitarisés ; l'Allemagne n'y entretiendrait pas de troupes, elle n'y construirait pas de fortifications.

Il fut, d'autre part, convenu que, pour assurer l'exécution du traité pendant quinze ans, c'est-à-dire jusqu'en 1935, les troupes alliées occuperaient la région rhénane, la zone occupée étant d'ailleurs progressivement réduite.

Le régime de l'occupation était, à maints égards, pénible aux Rhénans ; il était clair que dès le moment où serait obtenue une amélioration durable des relations franco-allemandes l'occupation disparaîtrait.

Et ce fut précisément pour améliorer les relations franco-allemandes que le gouvernement allemand prit lui-même l'initiative des propositions qui aboutirent, en 1925, au pacte rhénan de Locarno.

Par ce traité, dont la préparation fit l'objet de longues négociations entre Français, Allemands, Anglais, Belges et Italiens, la France et la Belgique d'un côté, l'Allemagne de l'autre, s'interdirent tout acte d'agression. En même temps, l'Allemagne renouvela son engagement de respecter la zone démilitarisée. Toute une procédure fut élaborée pour régler, par des voies de conciliation et d'arbitrage, les différends qui viendraient à s'élever soit entre la France et l'Allemagne, soit entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne, et le respect des obligations ainsi contractées fut placé sous la garantie de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie, qui s'engagèrent, sous réserve des décisions du conseil de la Société des nations — lequel devait être saisi en cas de violation — à prêter leur assistance à l'État au détriment de qui les traités se trouveraient violés, notamment en cas de violation de la zone démilitarisée.

La conclusion du pacte de Locarno fut saluée dans toute l'Europe comme le début d'une ère nouvelle dans les relations franco-allemandes ; progressivement, la libération anticipée des territoires occupés de la Rhénanie se trouva hâtée. Prévue pour durer jusqu'en 1935, l'occupation prit fin dès 1930. Le traité de Locarno suffisait à tout.

En se prêtant à cette évacuation anticipée, la France avait donné la preuve la plus éclatante de son désir de voir améliorer les relations entre les deux pays.

C'était cependant l'époque où le gouvernement allemand se

déclarait incapable de faire face aux engagements des réparations qu'il avait contractés, laissant ainsi à notre charge la plus large part des dépenses de reconstruction des régions dévastées.

Mais les plaies de la guerre se cicatrisaient peu à peu. On oubliait, et les anciens combattants étaient les premiers à prêcher généreusement l'oubli du passé.

Les Allemands se sont plaints, néanmoins, que l'on n'ait pas toujours fait de leurs avances tout le cas qu'ils attendaient. C'est que l'expérience rend prudent et le peuple de notre pays a été trop souvent victime de déceptions. Au surplus, au cours de ces dernières années, les actes de l'Allemagne étaient en contraste singulier avec ses paroles. L'Allemagne se déclarait animée des intentions les plus pacifiques et, cependant, elle quittait à grand bruit la conférence du désarmement et rompait avec la Société des nations. L'année suivante, elle rétablissait le service militaire obligatoire et, aux prix d'un effort gigantesque et des sacrifices les plus lourds, reconstituait dans les délais les plus courts une grande armée.

En vain, lui offrons-nous de prendre sa place dans des systèmes de sécurité collective en Europe. En vain, depuis six mois, pressait-on le gouvernement de se prêter à la négociation d'un pacte aérien. Que les ouvertures fussent faites par Paris ou Londres, Berlin se déroba.

L'opinion gardait pourtant confiance. L'Allemagne n'affirmait-elle pas sa volonté de se conformer au traité de Locarno et de respecter la zone démilitarisée ?

Or, le respect de la zone démilitarisée, cela veut dire que le jour où une attaque brusquée se trouverait déclenchée contre nous, cette attaque pourrait être repoussée à la frontière même. C'est l'intégrité du territoire national assurée.

Depuis la fin de janvier dernier, le gouvernement que je préside avait, comme celui qui l'avait précédé, donné des preuves certaines de son souci d'engager avec l'Allemagne une négociation générale pour tenter de liquider les différends accumulés.

Devant la Chambre, le ministre des affaires étrangères avait donné à ce souci une expression publique.

Le 28 février, un journal parisien publiait une interview du chef de l'État allemand, contenant un appel pathétique à la réconciliation des deux pays.¹ Bien qu'elle fût de caractère assez vague, cette manifestation retint aussitôt toute l'attention du gouvernement. Dès le lendemain, le samedi 29 février, l'instruction était envoyée à l'ambassadeur de France à Berlin de demander d'urgence une audience au chancelier et de le prier de préciser sur quelles bases il voyait la

¹ See above, p. 20.

possibilité de ménager un rapprochement que la France souhaitait autant que l'Allemagne.

M. François-Poncet s'acquitta immédiatement de ces instructions. Reçu le 2 mars par le chancelier Hitler, en présence de M. de Neurath, il lui fut répondu qu'une étude allait être faite en vue de saisir à bref délai le gouvernement français de propositions de caractère précis.

Pour faciliter la négociation, le gouvernement allemand demandait que le secret fût provisoirement gardé sur la visite de l'ambassadeur de France. Satisfaction fut donnée à ce désir: c'est hier seulement, pour la première fois, que la nouvelle a été rendue publique.

Nous attendions donc à bref délai des propositions nettes, qui auraient permis enfin d'apprécier les possibilités d'un rapprochement des deux pays et de déterminer la mieux adaptée à sa réalisation.

C'est dans cette situation que, convoqué par le ministre des affaires étrangères du Reich, l'ambassadeur de France a reçu hier matin communication d'un mémorandum par lequel le gouvernement allemand répudie unilatéralement le traité de Locarno et annonce son intention de donner des suites immédiates à sa décision.¹ Pour expliquer son attitude, il invoque la conclusion du traité franco-soviétique, dont il donne une interprétation entièrement inexacte, déjà maintes fois réfutée par la France, en le déclarant incompatible avec le traité de Locarno. Ce qui prouve qu'il n'y a là qu'un vain prétexte pour le gouvernement allemand, c'est qu'au lendemain même de la conclusion de ce traité, signé par M. Laval, le 2 mai 1935, le chancelier Hitler, dans un discours du 21 mai 1935,² déclarait que le gouvernement allemand 'voyait dans le respect de la zone démilitarisée une contribution à l'apaisement de l'Europe'. Peu important à ses yeux les explications que, depuis près d'un an, le gouvernement français a fournies, avec la pleine approbation des autres signataires du traité qui, consultés au mois de mai dernier par l'Allemagne, ont été unanimes à déclarer que les engagements du traité franco-soviétique ne violaient en aucune manière les obligations du pacte rhénan. Comme M. l'ambassadeur François-Poncet demandait si le mémorandum répudiant un traité aussi solennel constituait bien la réponse promise lundi dernier pour jeter les bases d'un accord franco-allemand, il lui a été répondu que ce document énonçait bien les bases sur lesquelles les échanges de vues ultérieurs pourraient être fructueux et que la réponse à la demande française s'y trouvait en effet contenue.

¹ See above, p. 41.

² See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 159.

En même temps, joignant l'acte aux paroles, des détachements armés, qui atteignent déjà la valeur de plusieurs divisions, entrent en Rhénanie.

Voilà la situation devant laquelle le gouvernement allemand a entendu nous placer. L'Allemagne a librement contracté, en 1925, des engagements solennels; elle a renouvelé les promesses du traité de paix concernant la démilitarisation de la zone rhénane. Engagements et promesses sont aujourd'hui répudiés.

Je l'ai déjà dit, la raison que l'on invoque n'est nullement fondée. Même si elle l'était, le gouvernement allemand ne serait en aucune manière autorisé à se faire justice lui-même. Le traité de Locarno prévoit que, si entre les deux pays un différend s'élève, sur lequel ils ne peuvent s'accorder, ils auront le devoir d'en référer à des juges ou à une commission de conciliation. Le gouvernement allemand pouvait saisir la Cour de la Haye. Nous avons déjà déclaré publiquement,¹ il y a quinze jours, que nous étions prêts à nous soumettre à l'arbitrage de cette juridiction. Il pouvait s'adresser à une commission de conciliation. Il ne l'a pas fait. Là encore, il a manqué à ses engagements.

Personne ne se persuadera que les circonstances aient exigé une hâte particulière; personne, ni même l'Allemagne; au surplus, l'existence d'une zone démilitarisée n'est pas un déshonneur; pendant soixante-sept ans, la France a connu la démilitarisation de la Savoie. Elle ne s'en est libérée que par des négociations.

Il est vrai que, dans le document remis hier à l'ambassadeur de France, le gouvernement allemand propose, ayant violé ses engagements, d'en contracter de nouveaux. Je n'examinerai pas ses propositions, pour deux raisons. D'abord parce que le double exemple qu'à un an de distance le gouvernement allemand nous donne de répudiation unilatérale d'engagements solennels ne saurait nous mettre en confiance envers sa nouvelle proposition. La seconde raison est encore plus claire: au mépris du droit le plus certain, le gouvernement allemand a fait entrer dans la zone démilitarisée des forces importantes, et cela sans avoir au préalable manifesté son intention de s'affranchir de ses obligations, sans même avoir cherché à entrer en négociations à ce sujet. Nous sommes mis en présence du fait accompli sous sa forme la plus brutale. Il n'y a plus de paix en Europe, il n'y a plus de relations internationales si cette méthode se généralise. En nous y opposant, nous servons les intérêts de la communauté européenne. Le gouvernement français, pour sa part, est bien résolu à ne pas négocier sous la menace. Le seul fait qu'au

¹ See above, p. 34.

mépris d'engagements solennels des soldats allemands sont maintenant installés sur les bords du Rhin interdit pour le moment la négociation.

Ayant mûrement examiné la situation, au nom du gouvernement français, je déclare que nous entendons voir maintenue cette garantie essentielle de la sécurité française et de la sécurité belge que constitue, contresigné par les gouvernements anglais et italien, le traité de Locarno. Nous ne sommes pas disposés à laisser placer Strasbourg sous le feu de canons allemands.

Le traité de Locarno a stipulé qu'en cas de violation de ses clauses, le conseil de la Société des nations doit être saisi. Nous saisissons donc le conseil. Il est, d'autre part, indispensable que des échanges de vues aient lieu entre les signataires du traité mis brusquement en présence de la dénonciation allemande. Il va être procédé sans délai à ces échanges de vues.

Notre cause est juste et forte. En la défendant, nous avons conscience de défendre, avec notre destin, un élément essentiel de la paix européenne. Le peuple français s'en rend compte; oubliant toutes vaines querelles, il est, nous le savons, et il restera unanime pour appuyer l'action du gouvernement.

Au vrai, et c'est bien là ce qui fait plus amplement justice du fallacieux prétexte invoqué, le gouvernement allemand a cru avoir bien choisi son heure pour son coup de force. Non pas l'heure du vote du pacte franco-soviétique qui, soumis encore à l'examen du Sénat, ne peut pas encore fournir au *Führer* le fait de ratification dont il se réclame, mais l'heure de la période électorale qui est, en France, virtuellement ouverte. Le gouvernement allemand a escompté le climat ou, pour mieux dire, l'effet des discordes, des troubles, des discussions intérieures que le conflit des partis politiques dans la compétition législative pouvait provoquer au sein de la nation. Le désarroi national issu de nos luttes intestines, voilà la véritable explication de la décision brusquée du gouvernement allemand. Il oublie, une fois de plus, qu'à toute heure grave de notre histoire de tels désarrois se sont effacés dans l'union immédiate des énergies françaises, des volontés de tous les partis pour la défense de l'indépendance nationale et de sa sécurité. Aucun Français ne peut mériter l'injure qu'on fait outre-Rhin à certains de nos concitoyens en les supposant capables de trouver une apparence d'excuse à l'acte de force germanique. Le peuple français reste prêt, en toute conjoncture, à faire la preuve que l'on ne saurait compter sur ses divisions pour espérer son abdication et préparer son asservissement.

(vi) *Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, March 9, 1936.*¹

On March 6 I asked the German Ambassador to come and see me at the Foreign Office, and I made to him a proposal which His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin had made to the German Chancellor on December 13 last that the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Locarno should proceed with the negotiation of an Air Pact. The House will recall that such a pact was suggested during the course of the Anglo-French conversations held in London in February 1935.² On this occasion I reminded His Excellency of the hopes which Herr Hitler himself has expressed for the betterment of international relations in Western Europe, and I told him that it seemed to me the time had now come when a real effort must be made to translate these hopes into facts, and attempt to achieve a real improvement in the relations of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany.

I pointed out to the Ambassador that the Air Pact touched what was in some respects a point of junction, and a sensitive point of junction, in the relations of the three great Western Powers, and His Majesty's Government considered that the conclusion of such a pact would constitute a stabilizing element in our relations in the West. I did not feel that it was impossible to negotiate such a pact even while the situation was complicated by the Italo-Abyssinian War, and I asked the Ambassador to communicate with his Government at once in this sense. I added that His Majesty's Government were genuinely anxious to convert into practical resolutions the sentiments so often expressed in speeches.

The German Ambassador came to see me on the morning of March 7 and informed me that he had a communication of very great importance to make. He then handed to me a Memorandum of which he read a translation.³ I do not propose to give the House a full account of this Memorandum, but I should like to draw attention to certain salient points in it. The Memorandum falls into two parts. In the first part the German Government have developed at considerable length their objections to the Franco-Soviet Pact and the reasons why, in their view, the intention of the French Government to conclude this pact has created an entirely new situation and destroyed the political system of the Locarno Treaty. The German Govern-

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, March 9, 1936, coll. 1812-7.

² See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, pp. 27-9.

³ See above, p. 41.

ment hold that for these reasons the Locarno Treaty has ceased in practice to exist, and that Germany consequently regards herself for her part as no longer bound by this no longer valid Treaty. The Memorandum then announces that the German Government has restored the full and unrestricted sovereignty of Germany in the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland.

The second part of the Memorandum contains a series of proposals which are described as being designed to promote the establishment of a system of peaceful security for Europe. These proposals are, first, that a demilitarized zone should be created on both sides of the Franco-German and Belgian-German frontiers; secondly, that non-aggression pacts for 25 years should be concluded between Germany, France, and Belgium, and that Great Britain and Italy should guarantee these pacts; thirdly, that the Netherlands might be invited to join this Treaty system; fourthly, that these security arrangements should be supplemented by an air pact; fifthly, that non-aggression pacts should be concluded between Germany and the States bordering Germany on the East similar to the agreement between Germany and Poland, the exception previously made in regard to Lithuania being conditionally withdrawn. Finally, it is stated that Germany is willing to re-enter the League of Nations now that equality of rights and the restoration of her full sovereignty over the entire German territory has been attained. In this latter connexion the German Government express the expectation that in the course of a reasonable period the question of colonial equality of rights and of the separation of the League Covenant from the Treaty of Versailles may be settled through friendly negotiation.

On receiving this communication from the German Ambassador I told His Excellency that he could not expect me to make any detailed observations on a document of this importance until I had had an opportunity to study it and to consult my colleagues on the situation which it created. At the same time I told His Excellency that there was one observation which I must make at once. I deeply regretted the information which the Ambassador had given me about the action which the German Government was taking in respect of the demilitarized zone. The Ambassador would appreciate that this amounted to the unilateral repudiation of a treaty freely negotiated and freely signed.

I had a clear recollection of the statement that the Chancellor had made to me at our first meeting in Berlin on the subject of the Treaty of Locarno, when he had drawn a clear distinction between that Treaty and the Treaty of Versailles and emphasized that Germany

had freely signed the Treaty of Locarno. I was aware—I said to the Ambassador—of the view of the German Government as to the effect of the French-Soviet Pact on the Locarno Treaty. That view was not, however, shared by the other signatories of the Treaty, and if the German Government, despite the opinions of the other signatories, still maintained their own conclusion, then there was the proper arbitration procedure available for their use. I feared that the effect of the unilateral repudiation of this Treaty upon His Majesty's Government and upon British public opinion must inevitably be deplorable.

As to the later parts of the Ambassador's communication, I said that His Majesty's Government would have carefully to consider these, but clearly the declaration in respect of Germany's attitude towards the League was most important. The Ambassador at this point informed me that the German Government's decision in regard to the League was to a large extent due to their desire to meet the views frequently expressed by the Prime Minister and myself when we emphasized that the policy of His Majesty's Government was based upon the League and upon collective security. Germany, he said, was willing to share in such a policy and there were no conditions attached to her return to the League; Germany was willing to re-enter the League of Nations. While the German Government expected that in due time the Covenant would be divorced from the Treaty of Versailles and the question of colonial equality of rights would be settled, these were not conditions but matter for negotiation subsequent to Germany's return to the League. I do not need to emphasize the importance of the communication from the German Government of which I have given the House an account. Similar memoranda have been communicated to the other signatories of the Locarno Treaty, namely, France, Italy, and Belgium.

Before passing on to observations of a more general nature, it may be well for me to inform the House of the steps which are to be taken in the immediate future. The French and Belgian Governments, with the full knowledge and agreement of His Majesty's Government, have asked that the Council of the League of Nations may be summoned as soon as possible to consider the situation. I must emphasize that the Council of the League is the proper body for this purpose. The Council will, it is understood, meet on Friday next, and no decision can, of course, be reached in advance of that meeting, but an exchange of views will take place in Paris to-morrow between the representatives of the four Locarno Powers, other than Germany, and these conversations will be resumed at Geneva on the following

day. His Majesty's Government will be represented at these conversations by the Lord Privy Seal and myself. I have now given the House an account of recent events, together with some comment upon them. I have also given the House such details as are in my possession of the procedure to be followed in the immediate future.

But hon. Members will no doubt expect to receive some immediate indication of the ideas and intentions with which the representatives of His Majesty's Government must approach at Geneva a problem the development of which is as yet in some important respects obscure. It is clearly desirable to do this, for no one can fail to realize the stabilizing force of a clear-sighted and united British opinion in the affairs of Europe at this juncture. Let us not delude ourselves. The course taken by the German Government in unilaterally repudiating obligations into which they have freely entered, and in simultaneously acting as if they did not exist, both complicates and aggravates the international situation. The abrogation of the Locarno Treaty and the occupation of the demilitarized zone have profoundly shaken confidence in any engagement into which the Government of Germany may in future enter. There can be no one in this House or this country who would wish to condone or excuse such a step. It strikes a severe blow at that principle of the sanctity of Treaties which underlies the whole structure of international relations.

There is, I am thankful to say, no reason to suppose that the present German action implies a threat of hostilities. The German Government speak in their Memorandum of their 'unchangeable longing for a real pacification of Europe' and express their willingness to conclude a non-aggression pact with France and Belgium. But in case there should be any misunderstanding about our position as a signatory of the Locarno Treaty, His Majesty's Government think it necessary to say that, should there take place during the period which will be necessary for the consideration of the new situation which has arisen any actual attack upon France or Belgium which would constitute a violation of Article 2 of Locarno, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, notwithstanding the German repudiation of the Treaty, would regard themselves as in honour bound to come in the manner provided in the Treaty to the assistance of the country attacked.

It must be obvious to all that in existing circumstances the transition from a bad past to a better future will be an arduous and hazardous enterprise. At the same time, we are not merely con-

cerned with the past or the present; we are concerned also with the future. One of the main foundations of the peace of Western Europe has been cut away, and if peace is to be secured there is a manifest duty to rebuild. It is in that spirit that we must approach the new proposals of the German Chancellor. His Majesty's Government will examine them clear-sightedly and objectively, with a view to finding out to what extent they represent a means by which the shaken structure of peace can again be strengthened. In the present grave condition of international affairs His Majesty's Government feel that no opportunity must be missed which offers any hope of amelioration. In the anxious circumstances of the present time I feel justified in asking all sections of opinion in this House for their support in the exacting and arduous task which now confronts the combined wisdom and statesmanship of the world.

(vii) *Communiqués issued by the Locarno Powers, Paris, March 10, 1936.*¹

I

Ce matin se sont réunis, à 10 h. 30, au ministère des affaires étrangères, les représentants des puissances signataires et garantes de Locarno.

La Grande-Bretagne était représentée par M. Eden, ministre des affaires étrangères, lord Halifax, lord du sceau privé, et sir George Clerk, ambassadeur d'Angleterre; l'Italie, par M. Cerruti, ambassadeur à Paris; la Belgique, par M. van Zeeland, président du conseil, ministre des affaires étrangères, et le comte de Kerchove de Denterghem, ambassadeur à Paris; la France, par M. P.-E. Flandin, ministre des affaires étrangères, et M. Paul-Boncour, ministre d'État.

En ouvrant la séance M. P.-E. Flandin a souhaité la bienvenue aux délégués des puissances signataires et garantes de Locarno, et il a tenu à préciser que la réunion avait pour but d'échanger des informations et de préciser la situation, mais qu'il ne serait proposé aucune résolution ni pris aucune décision avant la réunion du conseil de la Société des nations.

La procédure ayant été ainsi définie, les différents délégués ont exposé leur point de vue.

Cet échange de vues sera continué peut-être à Paris dès ce soir et, en tout cas, à Genève, où les délégués doivent se retrouver dès demain.

¹ *Le Temps*, March 11, 1936.

II¹

Une nouvelle réunion des représentants des puissances signataires et garantes du traité de Locarno s'est tenue au ministère des affaires étrangères, à 19 h. 30.

D'un commun accord il a été décidé que les conversations se poursuivraient à Londres dès jeudi.

D'autre part, le gouvernement britannique a invité le président du conseil de la Société des nations à tenir également à Londres sa prochaine réunion, qui suivrait immédiatement la réunion des puissances signataires du pacte de Locarno.

(viii) *Statement by Herr Hitler, March 10, 1936.*²

The first question which I put to the *Führer* was: 'Does your offer of a pact of non-aggression to all States along Germany's eastern frontier include Austria and Czechoslovakia?'

His reply was: 'My proposal for the conclusion of non-aggression pacts on the east and west of Germany was meant as a universal one. There is certainly no exception intended to it. It applies equally to Czechoslovakia and Austria.'

'Is your Excellency', I then asked, 'prepared to lead Germany back into the League of Nations immediately, so that the proposals you have made may be discussed by the League with Germany taking her part in the discussions as a member of the Council of the League?'

Herr Hitler's answer was as follows:

'I have announced Germany's readiness to enter the League immediately, while proclaiming her expectation that within a reasonable period the questions of equal treatment in the matter of colonies and of the separation of the Covenant of the League from the so-called peace treaties will be settled.

'My feeling is that the conclusion of the non-aggression pacts which have been proposed by the German Government could be most efficiently negotiated by direct dealings between the Governments concerned.

'I mean that in the case of the pacts for the security of the frontiers between Germany on the one side and France, Belgium, and, maybe, Holland on the other, this should be a matter for the Governments of those countries and of the two Powers which would be invited to sign as sureties—Britain and Italy.

¹ *Le Temps*, March 12, 1936.

² In an interview granted to Mr. G. Ward Price. *Daily Mail*, March 11, 1936.

'It might perhaps be desirable that the Powers to be guaranteed by these pacts should first talk the matter over with their future guarantors.

'In the same way non-aggression pacts could be negotiated with the other border-States, as was done between Poland and Germany—in every case by direct dealings between their respective Governments.

'Germany, however, would certainly be only too glad if some other Power—Britain, for instance—would come forward as "honest broker" with practical propositions for the solution of these matters.'

My third question was in these terms: 'It is probable that no French Government, even if it would, could agree to discuss your proposals until after the French general elections have been held next month.

'Is Germany prepared to maintain her offer until then? Will she undertake to do nothing more meanwhile to alter the situation as it exists at this moment?'

Herr Hitler's reply to this was:

'The German Government will do nothing more on its side to alter the existing situation.

'We have re-established the sovereignty of the Reich and have brought back one of the oldest parts of Germany under the protection of the entire nation. We have therefore no reason to fix any time-limit to the proposals that have been made.

'However, I should like to add just one thing. If these proposals, like so many that have gone before them, are again rejected or simply ignored, the German Government will not importune Europe with further overtures.'

Question Four: 'Having thus established Germany's complete sovereignty throughout her territory, will you limit the number of troops in the Rhineland of your own free will to a force manifestly insufficient for offensive action against France?'

Herr Hitler's reply was:

'The so-called "demilitarized zone" has been reoccupied, not because there exists any intention to undertake aggressive action against France but because the continuance of so vast a sacrifice on the part of a nation is only conceivable and justifiable when the other parties to the treaty disclose a corresponding comprehension and consideration in material and political matters.

'It is not Germany which is the treaty-breaker. Ever since the Armistice was accepted on the basis of the Fourteen Points of President Wilson, the following practice has established itself in Europe:

'When a victorious and a defeated Power make a treaty, the defeated Power is required to observe it, whereas the victor can establish and interpret his attitude as he pleases.

'You will not contest the fact that the Wilsonian Fourteen Points and their three emendations were not observed, and you will not deny that the undertaking on the part of the victors to carry out universal disarmament was also not fulfilled.

'In the same way, the Locarno Pact has not only a literal but also an equitable political purpose.

'If the Franco-Russian Pact, which has signed on May 2, 1935, had been in existence when the Locarno Pact was drafted, the Rhineland clauses of the latter Treaty would never have been signed.

'It is evident that one cannot make a subsequent alteration in the interpretation of a pact or change its tenor. In the case under consideration, not only the spirit but the letter of the Locarno Pact has been disregarded.

'The conclusion of a military alliance between France and Soviet Russia creates a situation for Germany which obliges her to draw certain conclusions on her part also. I have drawn those conclusions, and no others.

'The purport of these conclusions is that if France goes in for such military alliances, then it is certain that so densely populated and economically valuable a border-zone of the German Reich cannot be left unarmed and defenceless.

'That is the most elementary reaction to such a development.

'I doubt whether every one in England is aware that what has hitherto been known as the "Demilitarized Zone" has almost the same number of inhabitants as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia.

'To this area garrisons on a peace-time basis have now been restored, exactly as in the whole of the rest of the country, no more and no less.

'It follows that there can be no question of the concentration of armed forces for offensive purposes because:

1. Germany has no further claims to make from France, nor will she make any;
2. Germany has herself proposed the conclusion of non-aggression pacts, with the desire that they should be guaranteed by England and Italy; and
3. Such a concentration of troops as is suggested in the question would be, from the military point of view alone, not only unnecessary but also unreasonable.

'Moreover, the task of the future is to see to it that neither Germany nor France feels herself threatened one by the other.

'When M. Sarraut declares that he cannot bear the idea of the fortress of Strasburg being menaced by German guns, it should be realized that neither does Germany want to see her open cities, such as Frankfurt, Freiburg, and Karlsruhe, menaced by the cannon of the French fortifications.

'The best way to eliminate this state of menace would be for both sides to solve the question of a demilitarized zone on a reciprocal basis.'

Final question: 'Will you tell the world why you chose this particular way of achieving your purpose? If you had made your proposals first and demanded the remilitarization of the Rhineland as a counterpart, the world, in my view, would have accepted those with enthusiasm. What was the reason for your Excellency's action?'

Herr Hitler's reply: 'I dealt thoroughly with this matter in my Reichstag speech. I would therefore only touch on your remark that my proposals would have been received with enthusiasm if I had not linked them with the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone.

'What you say may be true. Unfortunately it is not relevant.

'For instance, I once proposed an army limited to 300,000 men. I think that this was, at the time, a very reasonable proposal.

'It was a firm offer, and would certainly have contributed to relieve the strain in Europe. Beyond all doubt it was also approved by very many people. Indeed, the British and Italian Governments adopted it. Nevertheless, it was rejected.

'If, therefore, I was to restore German parity in armaments—the moral right to which could never be contested—and thus eliminate a burning European problem, I was obliged, whether I liked it or not, to act on my own responsibility.

'In this case, too, it would have been exactly the same. Supposing I had begun by laying these proposals of mine before the world, coupled with a demand for the restoration of all sovereign rights in the demilitarized zone.

'I dare say they would have received the world's appreciative approval. But, after my experience in the past, I do not believe that we should ever have reached the conference table with them.

'It is not possible for one part to a treaty to transgress the sense and letter of the bond without the other party in consequence liberating himself from his engagements. That is what I have done.

'Moreover, if, for example, a British or French statesman had ever been, or should ever be, so unfortunate as to find his country

in so tragic a condition as I found mine, I am certain that he would have acted, or will act, in precisely the same way under similar circumstances.

‘Contemporary judgment seldom does full justice to an historical deed. The verdict of posterity, however, will not contest that it was more honourable and right to make an end of a state of tension which had become intolerable, in order finally and definitely to clear the way for a reasonable development desired by the whole world, rather than to persist in maintaining an unbearable state of affairs, for whatever reason, very much against one’s own conscience and common sense.

‘I believe that if the German Government proposals are accepted it will consequently be realized that they have rendered great service to Europe and to the cause of peace.’

(ix) *Statement by the French Government, March 10, 1936.*¹

Un événement s’est produit dont vous avez déjà mesuré la gravité dans l’ordre international et les conséquences pour la sécurité de la France. Le gouvernement devait au pays de l’éclairer dès le premier jour. A ses représentants maintenant réunis il a le devoir d’exposer la situation sous tous ses aspects.

Il y a plus de dix ans, par un traité solennel dont la conclusion justifiait les plus ardents espoirs de paix, la France, la Belgique et l’Allemagne, avec la garantie de l’Angleterre et de l’Italie, s’interdisaient réciproquement de recourir à la guerre. L’Allemagne s’engageait en même temps à maintenir le régime de démilitarisation qui déjà, dans un intérêt de sécurité générale, avait été instauré dans la zone rhénane par le traité de paix.

Il y a trois jours, à la date du 7 mars, par une communication aux autres gouvernements signataires du pacte rhénan, le gouvernement du Reich répudiait ce traité auquel il était convenu que seule une décision du conseil de la Société des nations pouvait un jour mettre fin. En même temps, il annonçait son intention d’envoyer dans la zone interdite, ‘à titre symbolique’, de petits détachements de l’armée nationale allemande. En fait, dès le lendemain, plus de trente bataillons d’infanterie ou groupes d’artillerie, d’après ses propres déclarations, étaient installés dans les différentes villes de la zone.

Dans le mémorandum remis aux gouvernements signataires, puis dans un discours du chancelier au Reichstag, le gouvernement du Reich a tenté de justifier un acte qu’aucune nation ne saurait ad-

¹ Read by M. Sarraut in the Chambre des Députés, and by M. Flandin in the Senate. *Le Temps*, March 11, 1936.

mettre, aussi longtemps qu'il y aura un droit des gens, incompatible avec les doctrines de force qui tendent à placer le fait accompli au-dessus du respect des engagements librement consentis.

Le motif immédiat allégué est la conclusion récente par la France d'un traité qui serait incompatible avec le traité rhénan de Locarno. Le gouvernement allemand avait émis des doutes au sujet de cette compatibilité. Le gouvernement français les a examinés avec un soin scrupuleux. Il croit y avoir, depuis longtemps, pleinement répondu, puisque aussi bien sa réponse a rencontré l'avis concordant des gouvernements qui, pour l'Allemagne comme pour la France, sont les garants du pacte rhénan, dans son esprit comme dans sa lettre. Il a tenu en même temps à affirmer toute la valeur, toute l'autorité qu'il attachait à cet acte.

En vain le gouvernement allemand soutiendrait-il aujourd'hui que le traité franco-soviétique fût dirigé exclusivement contre l'Allemagne. Son texte même établit qu'il a pour seul objet l'assistance contre un État agresseur, et l'Allemagne n'y est pas visée en elle-même, puisque les deux contractants renouvellent l'engagement de poursuivre la conclusion d'un traité plus large, où leur assistance serait assurée à l'Allemagne si cette dernière venait à être attaquée. Tout aussi inexacte est l'affirmation que la France assumerait à l'égard de la Russie des engagements allant au delà de l'assistance que, comme membre de la Société des nations, elle est en droit de prêter à un autre membre de la Société. Inexacte enfin l'affirmation que la France s'attribuerait le droit de décider de la seule appréciation quel est l'agresseur. Il suffit, en effet, que le conseil de la Société des nations reconnaisse l'agresseur, pour que cette appréciation s'impose à la France, de même que la recommandation du conseil constitue la limite de son engagement. Aucun engagement, enfin, ne peut l'amener à agir comme si le pacte de la Société des nations ni le pacte rhénan n'étaient en vigueur, puisqu'elle ne saurait agir à l'encontre d'une décision du conseil, ni à l'encontre de l'appréciation des garants du traité de Locarno.

Dix mois bientôt se seront écoulés au cours desquels le gouvernement français a fourni au gouvernement allemand toute occasion de dissiper ses doutes, au cours desquels le gouvernement allemand pouvait recourir à une instance impartiale, suggérée encore récemment par le gouvernement français. Le gouvernement du Reich a préféré se faire seul juge de la cause, pour dénoncer librement le pacte rhénan et nous placer devant le fait accompli.

Répudiant ses engagements librement consentis, le gouvernement du Reich voudrait pouvoir exciper d'une inobservation par la France

du pacte rhénan ; il allègue que le gouvernement français se serait fait, de cet acte, une conception contraire à son véritable esprit. Si une exception a été faite — prétend-il — à l'interdiction réciproque de toute action militaire, ce serait uniquement pour un motif politique et au seul bénéfice d'alliances déjà conclues entre la France et la Pologne, entre la France et la Tchécoslovaquie. Il doit être fait justice d'une telle allégation, contraire non seulement aux faits, mais aux principes de justice et de droit auxquels la France est et demeure attachée.

La seule exception faite par le pacte rhénan à l'interdiction de la guerre l'a été, non pas en raison de certains traités — qui, au surplus, conformes au pacte de la Société des nations ne sont pas des 'alliances' — non pas pour des intérêts politiques particuliers, mais pour des motifs supérieurs de morale internationale, parce qu'il y a une morale entre nations, parce qu'il y a une Société des nations fondée sur le principe que l'assistance est due à la victime d'une agression, parce qu'il y a un pacte qui contient des dispositions à cet égard, et qu'aucun autre traité ne peut s'opposer à l'observation de ces dispositions imprescriptibles. Ce n'est que sous réserve de ce principe de justice internationale que des traités particuliers peuvent être conclus, comme c'est en vertu de ce seul principe que des traités d'assistance ont pu être librement consentis.

Messieurs, s'il y avait opposition entre l'esprit des traités d'assistance conclus par la France et l'esprit du traité de Locarno, c'est qu'il y aurait opposition entre le pacte de la Société des nations et le traité signé à Locarno.

Par le traité de Locarno du 16 octobre 1925, la France et la Belgique d'une part, l'Allemagne d'autre part, se sont réciproquement reconnu l'inviolabilité de leurs frontières communes. L'Allemagne y a explicitement et librement confirmé son adhésion sans réserve aux dispositions du traité de paix instituant la zone rhénane démilitarisée. L'inviolabilité de ces frontières était en outre garantie tant en faveur du Reich qu'en faveur de la France et de la Belgique, par la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie.

Il était en même temps prévu que toute méconnaissance des engagements pris en vertu du traité de Locarno (et, parmi ces engagements, ceux concernant la zone rhénane démilitarisée étaient expressément spécifiés) serait soumise aussitôt au conseil de la Société des nations, et que, dès que celui-ci aurait constaté une telle violation, avis en serait donné aux puissances signataires appelées à prêter leur assistance immédiate.

A ce traité de garantie étaient jointes des conventions d'arbitrage,

notamment entre la France, la Belgique et l'Allemagne, dans le même souci d'assurer le règlement pacifique de toute question susceptible de troubler la paix.

Pour apprécier l'acte de Locarno, il importe de se souvenir de ce qu'a été l'action de la diplomatie française depuis les traités de paix.

Après la guerre qui a laissé une profonde impression d'horreur au peuple français, celui-ci, qui n'a jamais cessé de pouvoir librement s'exprimer dans le cadre toujours maintenu de libres institutions démocratiques, a ratifié sans réserve l'effort d'organisation de la paix générale contenu dans le pacte de la Société des nations.

Ce pacte se proposait d'établir, à la base des relations internationales, le respect des traités, de tous les traités, sans distinction entre la puissance et la faiblesse des États signataires. C'était le régime du droit substitué à celui de la force.

Il ne comporte, d'ailleurs, aucune consolidation obligatoire et statique des États, dans l'évolution historique de la civilisation humaine. Mais il prohibe formellement toute révision unilatérale sous l'empire de la force.

Toute proposition intéressant un meilleur aménagement des relations politiques ou économiques des nations entre elles est incontestablement recevable dans le cadre de la Société des nations, où elle doit être discutée et librement réglée, selon les lois d'une communauté qui n'a exclu entre ses membres que les abus de la force et la guerre.

Il n'a pas dépendu de nous que certains États n'aient pas adhéré à la Société des nations ou, ce qui est pire, qu'après y avoir adhéré, ils s'en soient retirés.

Mais nous sommes toujours restés fidèles, quelles qu'aient pu être certaines de nos déceptions, au pacte de Genève.

Récemment même et dans des circonstances qui troublaient nos sentiments d'amitié à l'égard d'une grande puissance voisine, nous avons accompli, non sans réaction douloureuse pour nous, notre devoir de sociétaire fidèle.

Récemment aussi, lorsqu'un traité, le pacte franco-soviétique, conclu par nous, a été critiqué dans son esprit et dans sa lettre par l'Allemagne, nous n'avons pas hésité à accepter par avance l'arbitrage de la Cour permanente de justice internationale,¹ montrant par là notre respect et notre confiance dans le droit et la justice, suprême sauvegarde de paix pour les peuples, comme pour les individus.

Là ne s'est pas bornée notre contribution au maintien et à l'organisation de bonnes relations avec l'Allemagne. Est-il nécessaire de

¹ See above, p. 34.

rappeler les conditions dans lesquelles a été réglée la question si délicate et si grave du territoire de la Sarre ?

Ce règlement s'est effectué sans incidents, sans désordre, sans que le monde entier qui l'attendait avec anxiété ait vu apparaître de menaces pour la paix. Le gouvernement français, fidèle à ses traditions, porta le problème devant le tribunal des nations ; il proposa lui-même l'envoi d'une police internationale en Sarre, il s'offrit à examiner avec le gouvernement allemand, et sous l'égide de gouvernements étrangers, toutes les possibilités que pouvait offrir l'avenir et, dans le calme de réunions diplomatiques, loin de toute pression, ce grave problème fut réglé sans heurt, comme sans amertume. C'est un exemple parfait et, pour nous, précieux d'un règlement dans le cadre de la légalité internationale. Nous espérons ainsi que tous nos différends, tous nos désaccords avec l'Allemagne pourraient être réglés sur la même base.

Le chancelier lui-même, dans un discours prononcé le 15 janvier 1935, avait affirmé son désir de collaborer à l'établissement d'une solidarité européenne.¹ Il avait déclaré que sa volonté d'obtenir la reconnaissance de l'égalité des droits ne le rendait pas sourd aux appels de cette solidarité. On en pouvait déduire qu'il n'opposerait pas une résistance absolue à la proposition d'entrer dans l'examen et la négociation des pactes élaborés. Mais, peu après, il s'élevait contre le système des pactes. En condamnant ces accords, dont il estimait difficile de mesurer les conséquences lointaines, il a paru faire aussi peu de cas du pacte danubien que du pacte oriental ; il l'a laissé entendre au cours de diverses interviews, disant qu'il hésiterait longtemps avant de les signer, — puis, qu'il ne les signerait jamais.

Messieurs, vous vous rappelez la suite historique de ces événements, encore si proches. Deux mois après le règlement pacifique de la question sarroise,² qui, d'après le chancelier lui-même, était le dernier différend important susceptible d'opposer la France à l'Allemagne, le Reich dénonçait unilatéralement les clauses du traité de Versailles qui limitaient ses armements.

A la suite de cette dénonciation, la conférence de Stresa se réunissait et le conseil de la Société des nations condamnait toute répudiation unilatérale d'un traité.

Spontanément, à Stresa, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie avaient tenu à réaffirmer le traité de Locarno.

Cependant, et passant outre à la réserve que la décision de l'Allemagne aurait pu lui inspirer, le gouvernement français n'a négligé

¹ See *Documents for 1934*, p. 65.

² See *Documents for 1934*. Part A. I. 1.

aucune occasion de poursuivre une œuvre de rapprochement avec le gouvernement allemand.

Je tiens ici à affirmer que notre gouvernement, et la correspondance de M. François-Poncet en fait foi, n'a négligé aucune occasion de provoquer des explications précises et de faire passer la discussion franco-allemande du plan général où étaient limitées les déclarations publiques des dirigeants allemands au plan concret des réalisations.

Une fois de plus, la réponse nous est venue du haut de la tribune du Reichstag, substituant à la négociation le fait unilatéral accompli.

Alors que le gouvernement britannique et le gouvernement français, avec l'adhésion du gouvernement italien, avaient saisi le gouvernement allemand, dès le 3 février 1935, d'un programme de règlement général, à conclure par de libres négociations, en vue d'organiser la sécurité en Europe par une limitation générale des armements dans un régime d'égalité de droits, et par la collaboration active de l'Allemagne à la Société des nations ;¹

Alors que ces négociations restaient ouvertes, ainsi qu'en témoignent les entretiens qu'eurent en novembre les ambassadeurs d'Angleterre et de France à Berlin avec le chancelier Hitler ;

Alors que, sur une simple interview accordée à un journaliste français,² notre gouvernement envoyait immédiatement notre ambassadeur demander à nouveau au chancelier Hitler de préciser une base de conversation, il nous a été répondu par la répudiation d'un traité qui avait été maintes fois proclamé la base librement négociée et consentie des rapports franco-allemands ; il nous a été répondu par la réoccupation soudaine et brutale de la zone démilitarisée, alors que le chancelier Hitler avait déclaré, dans un discours du 21 mai 1935, postérieur donc à la signature de l'accord franco-soviétique, que le gouvernement allemand voyait dans le respect de cette zone démilitarisée une contribution à l'apaisement de l'Europe.³

Si l'on nous impute des torts, et toutes les fois que l'on nous imputerait des torts, la France sera toujours prête à se soumettre à l'arbitrage de la loi internationale.

Mais c'en serait fait du droit des peuples, et par là même de la paix commune, si chacun prétendait se faire justice soi-même, déterminer ses droits en fonction de ses ambitions, et, pour tout dire, substituer la violence du fait accompli à la loi internationale des parties.

Aussi, Messieurs, la France ne se place pas, dans le conflit actuel, sur la position d'un égoïsme blessé ou de garanties perdues de sa propre sécurité.

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, pp. 25-7.

² See above, p. 20.

³ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 172.

Non. Elle pose le problème de la valeur réelle des traités, de la garantie générale du pacte de la Société des nations pour ses adhérents, de la fidélité des sociétaires à leurs engagements ; elle pose le problème angoissant de la force du droit devant les droits que s'arroge la force.

Sans doute, la violation de la zone démilitarisée atteint notre sécurité propre ; mais, à notre avis, elle met en cause beaucoup plus gravement l'avenir de la paix européenne, les destinées de l'organisation de la sécurité collective, et ceux de la Société des nations.

Personne en Europe, sans doute, ne s'y trompe. Mais, en le rappelant, nous éclairons la position que nous avons prise.

Nous nous sommes placés dans le cadre de la Société des nations, parce que c'est son sort qui va se jouer dans un futur proche.

Nous avons sollicité les signataires et garants du traité de Locarno parce que c'est la valeur même des traités dans les rapports internationaux qui se joue.

Qui donc conserverait, en effet, la moindre foi dans les effets d'un traité, s'il suffisait pour les détruire de la volonté du plus fort ?

Alors, il faudrait en revenir résolument aux alliances militaires, au surarmement, et, reconnaissons-le, à la guerre, déclenchée par le ou les plus forts au moment le plus favorable.

Si certains s'y résignent, qu'ils le disent clairement et nous en tirerons les conclusions utiles. Pour nous, nous mettrons toutes nos forces matérielles et morales à la disposition de la Société des nations afin d'éviter ce malheur irréparable pour la civilisation européenne, sous la seule condition que nous soyons accompagnés dans ce combat pour la paix par ceux qui s'y sont formellement engagés par le pacte rhénan et avec le ferme espoir que tous les signataires du pacte de la Société des nations, selon leurs moyens, et conformément à leurs obligations, lutteront à nos côtés pour un idéal dont ils se sont déclarés solidaires.

Le chancelier Hitler, en prétendant parler au peuple français, par dessus la tête de son gouvernement, comme si un gouvernement français issu de la représentation populaire et qui gouverne sans contrainte pouvait ne pas incarner la souveraineté populaire, nous a, par là même, ouvert la voie pour nous adresser, à notre tour, au peuple allemand.

Nous lui demandons, au nom de sa culture et des vertus de sa race, de réfléchir aux responsabilités nouvelles que certains veulent lui faire assumer devant l'histoire.

Nous lui déclarons solennellement que nous n'avons jamais voulu et que nous ne voudrons jamais attenter à sa liberté ni à son honneur.

Nous n'avons pas davantage pensé, ni ne voulons penser qu'il puisse être traité d'une façon plus défavorable que les autres peuples. Nous sommes d'accord, avec le gouvernement allemand, pour proclamer que le peuple français n'a aucun avantage à tirer de la misère du peuple allemand. Nous acceptons parfaitement de collaborer à la recherche des moyens d'assurer l'existence, sur un sol pauvre, comme l'a dit le chancelier Hitler, de 66 millions d'habitants.

Nous lui demandons, en quoi la réoccupation de la zone démilitarisée pourra aider à la solution de ces problèmes.

Nous lui demandons comment la confiance qui est à la base de toute collaboration peut être maintenue, ou surtout même développée comme cela serait souhaitable, s'il est admis que non seulement un traité solennel comme celui de Locarno, puisse être dénoncé par la seule volonté d'une des parties, mais que, sans attendre aucun accord nouveau, des actes militaires soient commis que l'on s'était formellement engagé à éviter.

Le peuple allemand aurait-il confiance dans le gouvernement français pour discuter et signer de nouveaux traités si celui-ci venait de déchirer lui-même les traités anciens ?

Comment voudrait-il que le peuple français ait donc confiance pour entamer les nouvelles négociations auxquelles le convie le gouvernement allemand ?

Négocier maintenant, dans la situation présente ? Sur quoi faire fond, Messieurs, je vous le demande ? Sur quoi construire ? Avec les ruines écroulées et sur quel fondement ? Les fondations mêmes de l'édifice seraient à reprendre.

Le gouvernement français ne repousse pas les négociations qui pourraient consolider la paix future et améliorer les relations franco-allemandes dans le cadre d'une Europe tranquille et pacifique ; mais la France ne peut pas négocier sous l'empire de la violence et du reniement des signatures librement échangées.

Il a saisi le conseil de la Société des nations dans les termes que vous connaissez. Il a consulté les puissances signataires et garantes du traité de Locarno.

Il est résolu, en ce qui le concerne, je le répète, à joindre dans le cadre de la Société des nations toutes ses forces à celles des autres sociétaires pour répondre à un véritable attentat à la confiance internationale, à la foi des traités, à la sécurité collective, à l'organisation de la paix.

Il reste prêt à négocier avec l'Allemagne une fois que le respect de la loi internationale aura été de nouveau assuré.

Il veut garder sa foi dans la valeur réelle des engagements inter-

nationaux, du traité de Locarno comme du pacte de la Société des nations.

Il luttera pour défendre l'ordre nouveau dans les relations internationales qu'avait apporté l'organisation collective de la sécurité et de la paix dans le cadre de la Société des nations.

Pour lui permettre de mener à bien cette tâche, le gouvernement s'adresse à la représentation nationale qui exprime la souveraineté populaire.

Il compte sur son dévouement aux intérêts sacrés de la nation, sur son amour de la patrie, d'une patrie qui n'exclut aucun parti, aucune religion, aucune race, pour lui apporter, aujourd'hui et demain, au-dessus des polémiques partisans, un concours aussi ferme qu'est résolue sa propre volonté.

L'avenir de la paix européenne va se jouer. La France, fidèle à ses traditions et à son idéal, doit rester unanime dans son action pour la sauvegarde de cette paix.

(x) *Extracts from Statement by M. van Zeeland, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, March 11, 1936.*¹

Notre pays se trouve une fois de plus placé devant de lourdes responsabilités.

La violation du traité de Locarno et la réoccupation militaire de la Rhénanie sont des coups rudes pour tous les peuples pacifiques, plus particulièrement pour les voisins de l'Allemagne et, avant tout, pour notre pays. C'est la Belgique qui, proportionnellement à l'étendue de son territoire, a, avec l'Allemagne, la frontière commune la plus longue et aussi la plus exposée, car cette frontière est sans défenses naturelles. L'existence d'une zone démilitarisée le long de cette frontière constituait un glacis derrière lequel nous nous sentions moins exposés.

D'autre part, s'il est vrai de dire qu'aucun pays au monde, quelle que soit sa puissance, ne peut asseoir sa sécurité sur la force seule, c'est pour les petits pays que le respect du droit, le maintien d'une structure internationale basée sur la justice et l'exécution des engagements pris, revêtent l'importance la plus haute.

Nos forces matérielles, quelle que soit notre volonté de les tendre à l'extrême pour la défense de notre droit, restent faibles par comparaison avec celles des grands pays entre lesquels la destinée nous a placés.

Le traité de Locarno — combien de fois ne l'a-t-on pas répété à

¹ In the Chambre des Représentants. *Chambre des Représentants, Annales Parlementaires*, March 11, 1936, pp. 789-91.

cette tribune ? — était la base même, l'élément essentiel de notre statut international. Il avait été accepté ici dans une atmosphère d'unanime approbation.

L'acte de l'Allemagne nous atteint donc plus gravement et plus durement que quiconque.

Et pourtant, une fois de plus, nous pouvons garder la tête haute, et affirmer à la face du monde que rien, dans notre attitude, dans nos actes, dans nos paroles, n'a pu offrir à aucun des cosignataires de Locarno, je ne dis pas un motif, mais même l'ombre d'un prétexte pour nous adresser un reproche.

Comme pour tous nos engagements internationaux, nous avons appliqué ceux que contenait le traité de Locarno avec une scrupuleuse exactitude.

Tout d'abord, le prétexte — car ce n'est qu'un prétexte — invoqué dans le mémorandum du gouvernement allemand et basé sur la conclusion du pacte franco-soviétique, ne nous concerne évidemment ni de près ni de loin. Le pacte franco-soviétique est resté pour nous une *res inter alios acta*. Nous n'y sommes pour rien, il ne nous intéresse en rien, il ne peut entraîner pour nous aucune conséquence, il ne peut exercer aucune influence sur nos propres engagements. Qu'il en soit ainsi, nul n'en doute. Mais nous avons eu soin de le proclamer publiquement, de manière à prévenir toute confusion. Dans mon discours du 29 mai, au Sénat, j'ai déclaré textuellement :

'Nous ne sommes pas partie au pacte franco-russe. Ni directement, ni indirectement, celui-ci ne saurait étendre ou modifier nos engagements.'

Ainsi donc, vis-à-vis de nous, qui sommes les premiers et les principaux intéressés, la violation des engagements les plus précis reste sans l'ombre d'une excuse, sans même qu'on ait tenté d'y trouver une excuse.

Mais si l'on avait cherché cette excuse, on ne l'aurait pas trouvée.

Notre politique étrangère est restée depuis la guerre dominée par quelques principes simples et nets, tels que : l'indépendance, le réalisme, la fidélité à nos engagements et à nos amitiés, l'équilibre dans toutes les directions.

Ce gouvernement a suivi les mêmes grandes lignes, en portant l'accent sur certaines idées, et en se préoccupant de renforcer le pays dans tous les domaines.

Plus que jamais, il a pris soin d'éviter — pour reprendre une expression imagée mais juste — que notre attitude internationale donnât l'impression d'une tour penchée. C'est une tour droite, elle l'a toujours été, et elle le restera.

Sans sacrifier aucune de nos amitiés antérieures, précieuses, indispensables, forgées au cours d'épreuves dont les événements d'aujourd'hui ravivent singulièrement le souvenir, nous avons eu le souci d'en étendre le cercle et même de n'en exclure aucun pays de droite volonté.

Cela nous permet d'affirmer aujourd'hui, sans crainte d'être démentis, que nous avons appliqué les traités de Locarno non seulement dans leur lettre, mais encore dans leur esprit.

Une fois de plus, dans la crise actuelle, notre position internationale est absolument nette et loyale ; nous avons le bon droit pour nous à 100 pour cent.

Mais il y a plus. J'en puis donner aujourd'hui une preuve nouvelle qui, mieux qu'aucun autre témoignage, montre l'esprit dans lequel se trouvaient et entendaient demeurer deux des puissances signataires de Locarno, à savoir la Belgique et la France.

Il s'agit de la solution définitive du problème posé dans une partie de l'opinion belge par les confusions créées autour de l'accord franco-belge de 1920.

Dans le fond même, il n'y avait, bien entendu, aucune difficulté. Les déclarations parfaitement claires et complètes faites en 1931 par M. Hymans et confirmées depuis lors à plusieurs reprises par les dirigeants de notre politique extérieure, avaient mis les choses au point. Mais dans certains esprits la persistance avec laquelle on maintenait le secret qui entourait le texte de cet accord éveillait des suspicions ; à l'étranger, d'aucuns se demandaient si la réalité couverte par le secret ne dépassait pas les déclarations — pourtant autorisées — des hommes d'État belges.

Lorsque je pris connaissance de ce fameux texte, je ne vous cacherais pas que je fus surpris. La plupart de ses dispositions se référaient à la période durant laquelle les troupes alliées devaient occuper la Rhénanie. Inutile d'ajouter qu'elles étaient complètement périmées ; de tout l'accord, il ne restait qu'un point, le seul, à vrai dire, véritablement important, à savoir le contact entre états-majors pour étudier les conditions dans lesquelles les parties contractantes exécuteraient éventuellement les engagements internationaux qui leur incombent en vertu de pactes plurilatéraux.

La solution à apporter à la difficulté paraissait simple. Elle devait tenir compte de trois considérations.

La première, c'est que les contacts entre états-majors, qui constituent une condition de l'efficacité des garanties d'assistance formulées dans les accords internationaux, sont un élément capital de notre sécurité ; ils doivent donc être soigneusement maintenus ; sur ce point,

il va sans dire que ce gouvernement, dont la préoccupation majeure a été et reste d'accroître dans tous les domaines les forces du pays, n'eût jamais accepté, pour quelque raison que ce fût, d'écarter ou de diminuer l'un des éléments de la sécurité militaire du pays, pour le cas d'agression non provoquée.

D'ailleurs, sur ce point, l'opinion est unanime ; les personnalités les plus éminentes parmi celles qui réclamaient avec insistance une solution des questions posées à l'occasion de l'accord franco-belge n'ont jamais manqué de souligner combien il demeurerait nécessaire, à leurs yeux, de garder cet élément de sécurité au bénéfice du pays.

En second lieu, il s'agissait de se débarrasser du poids mort de clauses périmées et, par conséquent, plutôt nuisibles qu'utiles.

Enfin, il fallait, en supprimant le secret dont s'entourait cet accord, supprimer du même coup toutes les sources de confusion où d'équivoque, même pour les esprits avertis.

Avant d'entrer officiellement en contact avec nos amis français pour régler cette question, nous savions, par des faits précis, que nous trouverions auprès d'eux la plus large compréhension des aspects proprement belges de ce problème ; et en même temps, plus que de la compréhension, je dirai même un désir spontané, de tenir compte, dans la solution du problème, des préoccupations de caractère international qui pouvaient s'y rattacher. Nous nous mîmes donc rapidement d'accord ; c'est dans une atmosphère de parfaite cordialité que nous décidâmes — le gouvernement français et le gouvernement belge — d'échanger des lettres remplaçant celles qui furent échangées en 1920.

Je vais vous lire la lettre qui m'a été adressée par l'ambassadeur de France à Bruxelles, agissant au nom du gouvernement français :

'Ambassade de France
en Belgique.

Bruxelles, le 6 mars 1936.

'A Son Excellence M. van Zeeland, premier ministre, ministre
des affaires étrangères et du commerce extérieur,

'Monsieur le Ministre,

'Par les lettres échangées les 10 et 15 septembre 1920 entre le Président du Conseil, ministre des affaires étrangères de France, et le premier ministre de Belgique, le gouvernement de la République et le gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi des Belges ont donné leur approbation à l'accord militaire signé le sept septembre 1920.

'L'accord de 1920 avait pour objet, aux termes des lettres échangées en 1920 par les deux gouvernements et enregistrées à Genève,

de renforcer les garanties de paix et de sûreté résultant du pacte de la Société des Nations. Il assurait les conditions techniques d'une coopération militaire entre la France et la Belgique dans le cas d'une agression non provoquée de l'Allemagne. En 1925 est intervenu à Locarno un traité réalisant d'une manière plus complète et plus précise les garanties prévues en 1920, traité conclu par M. le Président de la République et approuvé par les Chambres. Ce traité constitue l'un des éléments essentiels du statut international de la Belgique ; les engagements qu'il définit sont, avec ceux du Pacte de la Société des Nations, les seuls qui, en matière de garantie et d'assistance, lient la France et la Belgique. Il va sans dire que les deux gouvernements sont plus résolus que jamais à y demeurer fidèles.

'Au point de vue militaire, l'accord de 1920 contient, en même temps que des dispositions générales comportant un contact entre états-majors, des dispositions particulières visant l'occupation commune de la rive gauche du Rhin.

'Les deux gouvernements, constatant tout ce qu'il y a de périmé dans cet arrangement, ont reconnu l'intérêt de n'en retenir que le seul élément aujourd'hui valable, à savoir l'accord existant entre eux et qu'ils tiennent aujourd'hui à confirmer, quant au maintien d'un contact entre états-majors ayant pour objet l'exécution des engagements définis par le Traité rhénan de Locarno, ainsi que l'étude des conditions techniques d'une application éventuelle des dits engagements. Il demeure entendu que semblable contact ne peut engendrer aucun engagement d'ordre politique ni aucune obligation quant à l'organisation de la défense nationale pour l'une ou l'autre des parties intéressées.

'J'ai l'honneur de confirmer à Votre Excellence l'accord du gouvernement français sur ce qui précède.

'Je saisis cette occasion, Monsieur le Ministre, de renouveler à Votre Excellence l'assurance de ma très haute considération.

(Signé) LAROCHE.'

J'ai confirmé, dans les mêmes termes, l'accord du gouvernement belge. . . .

Il en résulte que l'accord franco-belge de 1920, avec les clauses périmées qui l'encombraient et le caractère de mystère dont il s'entourait, n'existe plus ; mais que, par contre, dans une parfaite clarté et dans des textes complets en eux-mêmes et d'une précision indiscutable en tous leurs termes, Belges et Français confirment l'accord existant entre eux, quant au maintien des contacts entre états-majors,

ayant pour objet l'exécution des engagements définis par les traités de Locarno.

Il me semble que le texte même de la lettre est tellement clair qu'il y aurait danger de l'affaiblir en l'entourant de commentaires. Toutefois, désireux de rendre à l'avenir toute confusion impossible pour un homme de bonne foi, je répète que 'semblable contact entre états-majors ne peut engendrer aucun engagement d'ordre politique et aucune obligation quant à l'organisation de la défense nationale, pour l'une ou l'autre des parties intéressées'.

En conséquence, les études d'états-majors ne peuvent servir que dans l'éventualité où les deux gouvernements prennent, dans la plénitude de leur indépendance politique et dans le cadre précis du pacte rhénan, la décision d'adopter telle ou telle attitude.

Et enfin, je redis encore que chacun des deux gouvernements garde toute sa liberté d'organiser comme il l'entend sa défense nationale, qu'il s'agisse des effectifs, des armements ou des fortifications. . . .

Le hasard — un hasard saisissant — a voulu que cet accord des volontés, réalisé depuis quelque temps déjà, trouvât son expression formelle dans des lettres qui furent échangées le 6 mars, c'est-à-dire la veille du jour où le Reich viola le traité de Locarno.

Permettez-moi de vous rappeler ici le passage de notre lettre où nous nous référions une fois de plus à ce que Locarno représentait aux yeux des Français et des Belges :

' . . . Ce traité constitue l'un des éléments essentiels du statut international de la Belgique : les engagements qu'il définit sont, avec ceux du pacte de la Société des nations, les seuls qui, en matière de garantie et d'assistance, lient la Belgique et la France. Il va sans dire que les deux gouvernements sont plus résolus que jamais à y demeurer fidèles.'

Pourrait-on trouver preuve plus éclatante et plus manifeste de la correction de notre attitude, de notre entière bonne foi, du souci que nous apportons, les uns et les autres, à appliquer dans la lettre et dans l'esprit ce que nous considérons — et que nous considérons encore — comme le devoir qui prime tous les autres : le respect des engagements pris ?

La Chambre attend à coup sûr du gouvernement qu'il lui décrive les principes sur lesquels il compte, au cours de cette période difficile, baser son attitude.

Je vais essayer de la faire le plus clairement possible. Cependant, vous comprendrez que, au milieu d'une négociation dont l'issue est capitale, je dois m'imposer une grande réserve, de façon à ne com-

promettre aucune des possibilités d'action qui se présenteraient, à un moment donné, devant nous.

Avant tout, nous devons répéter ce que nous avons inscrit dans notre déclaration d'hier : 'Aucune raison ne saurait justifier la répudiation d'un traité librement signé.'

Pourrait-on imaginer un traité qui se présentât d'une façon plus favorable que celui de Locarno, qui réunit d'une façon plus complète les conditions propres à rendre un traité inviolable ? Il ne s'agit pas ici d'un document au bas duquel un État a été contraint, par la violence morale résultant de la défaite, à apposer sa signature ; il ne s'agit pas ici d'un *Diktat*. Les traités de Locarno ont été librement négociés. Je crois même ne pas trop m'avancer en disant qu'ils l'ont été quasi à l'initiative et en tout cas sur la suggestion de l'Allemagne. Ils ont été librement acceptés par tous les signataires. Tous y sont placés sur le plan de l'assistance mutuelle, les droits comme les obligations étant réciproques. À diverses reprises, ces traités ont été spontanément confirmés par le Reich ; et je me souviens — il y a moins d'un an — d'avoir encore fait état devant vous des paroles prononcées le 21 mai par le chancelier Hitler lui-même.

Deux des plus grandes puissances du monde avaient été appelées à garantir ce traité, aussi bien à l'avantage de l'Allemagne qu'à l'avantage des autres signataires ; et pour son exécution, de même que pour y mettre éventuellement fin, on avait fait intervenir la plus haute autorité internationale : le conseil de la Société des Nations.

Il serait impossible d'imaginer — et je crois bien qu'à l'avenir on ne pourra pas trouver — une formule de traité qui, dans le plan juridique, concentre en elle plus d'éléments d'inviolabilité. Ceux qui sont convaincus qu'aucune organisation internationale ne peut être basée sur la force brutale, mais doit et devra toujours reposer sur des engagements pris et tenus, ceux-là, c'est-à-dire tous les Belges et l'immense majorité des hommes qui, dans le monde, aspirent à la paix et à la justice, ceux-là ne pourront se défendre d'un sentiment de profonde tristesse devant tout ce que ruine, pour des générations, le geste de l'Allemagne. . . .

Mais enfin, quoi qu'il en soit, nous devons faire face à la situation. Nous l'envisageons avec calme, avec la volonté d'en tirer tout ce qu'il est possible d'en tirer de bien.

Nous efforçant d'avoir une vue réaliste du problème, il nous semble qu'on peut y distinguer deux aspects : la remilitarisation de la Rhénanie comme telle, abstraction faite de son caractère juridique, et ensuite la répudiation unilatérale des traités de Locarno en elle-même.

La remilitarisation de la zone rhénane, même faite contractuellement, resterait pour nous, en toute hypothèse, un événement grave, un changement redoutable dans l'ensemble des éléments qui forment notre sécurité.

Certes, nous n'avons jamais pensé que la situation créée en Rhénanie par le Traité de Versailles pût être considérée comme définitive, bien qu'il ne faille pas contester l'utilité et la bienfaisance de certaines servitudes internationales établies dans l'intérêt général de l'Europe.

Nous avons à maintes reprises déclaré que les pactes devraient être conçus dans un esprit réaliste et constructif, comme un élément de la vie internationale et non pas comme un facteur de paralysie ou de stérilité. Nous croyons que, dans la légalité, les systèmes juridiques internationaux doivent être appliqués avec assez de souplesse pour permettre, en temps voulu, les adaptations nécessaires à des circonstances nouvelles ou à l'évolution des événements ; mais cela — et nous n'avons cessé de le répéter — doit se faire dans l'ordre et la justice, par de libres négociations.

Dans notre esprit, le statut de la Rhénanie figurait parmi les problèmes qu'il faudrait un jour ou l'autre aborder. Mais la question qui se posait à nous était celle-ci : comment remplacer cet élément dans le système de notre sécurité ? Notre droit à compensation, nul n'eût pu songer à le contester. Dans les suggestions faites par le chancelier Hitler, il y a des idées qui ont un caractère constructif, qui présentent pour nous un intérêt. Toutefois, ces suggestions resteraient évidemment incomplètes, même si l'on réalisait effectivement toutes les possibilités qu'elles contiennent. D'autres devraient s'y ajouter, faciles à concevoir, si l'on veut retrouver des compensations suffisantes, équitables, pour la diminution de sécurité qu'entraînerait la présence permanente de soldats allemands dans la zone jusqu'ici démilitarisée.

Mais le problème qui eût été non pas facile à résoudre, mais susceptible d'un règlement s'il s'était présenté dans le plan d'une libre négociation, se trouve singulièrement compliqué du fait qu'il est posé par un coup de force. . . .

La préoccupation dominante des hommes d'État, dans des moments comme ceux-ci, doit être de tout faire pour diminuer, pour éliminer le risque de guerre, non seulement dans le présent, mais encore dans l'avenir.

La première condition à réaliser, c'est que chacun garde son calme, et plus particulièrement tous ceux de qui l'opinion publique attend et reçoit, dans des circonstances troublées, des indications.

Nous avons insisté déjà, au cours des négociations qui viennent d'avoir lieu, et nous continuerons à le faire avec une conviction pro-

fonde, sur la nécessité absolue et primordiale d'établir et de maintenir entre toutes les puissances signataires de Locarno et respectueuses de la parole donnée une unité d'action complète, un front commun, ferme et inébranlable. . . .

Quant à nous, nous sommes décidés — et nous l'avons déclaré — à prendre notre part, toute notre part, sans réserve aucune, dans toute action collective, dans toute démarche, dans toute attitude qui soit commune aux signataires de Locarno, et plus particulièrement à la France et à l'Angleterre. . . .

En attendant, nous demeurons sur le terrain du pacte de Locarno, aussi longtemps qu'il n'aura pas été remplacé par une autre construction, avec l'accord de toutes les parties intéressées.

De tels accords sont précisément destinés à assurer les signataires fidèles contre l'éventuelle infidélité de l'un d'eux.

Tel est, messieurs, le terrain sur lequel nous nous sommes placés. Je crois que l'on ne peut imaginer, du point de vue du droit, du point de vue de l'équité, du point de vue des réalités, une position plus nette, plus claire, plus solide que la nôtre. Forts de notre droit, sûrs de nos amis, espérant malgré tout dans le sens des réalités de tous sans exception, nous envisageons l'avenir avec gravité, certes, mais avec calme, et je crois même pouvoir ajouter, avec un certain espoir. . . .

Nous, Belges, nous ferons, cela va sans dire, toute notre part. Nous sommes les premiers intéressés à ce que l'ordre soit rétabli et assuré. Dans des circonstances comme celles-ci, il importe que le pays tout entier déploie une fois de plus, aux yeux du monde particulièrement attentif à nos réactions, les qualités de sang-froid, de bon sens et de froide résolution qui caractérisent notre race. . . .

(xi) *Statement by the German Government, March 12, 1936.*¹

(1) France had already, before the Locarno Pact, concluded the following military alliances, which were to become operative in the event of an attack by Germany on France: (a) With Belgium; (b) with Czechoslovakia; (c) with Poland. As, according to information received from the French and other Governments, these alliances were of a defensive nature, and Germany had no aggressive intentions against France or these other States, they were not looked on as being incompatible with the Treaty of Locarno and were therefore accepted by Germany without further ado.

(2) Since the conclusion of peace France has concentrated on the German frontier an immense number of troops. The French frontier

¹ Published by *The Deutsches Nachrichten Büro*, March 12, 1936. *The Times*, March 13, 1936.

has, furthermore, been provided with the most tremendous defence fortifications ever known. The military authorities of all States are agreed that an attack directed against this fortification system would be, so far as can be humanly estimated, of no avail. As Germany has no aggressive designs against France she did not, and does not, make any objections.

(3) France has now concluded a further military alliance with Soviet Russia, but the functioning of this alliance is no longer dependent on an agreed decision by the League of Nations but on conditions to be taken on their own account by the contracting parties. This new alliance receives its particular character from the undisputed fact that the spiritual system of the present régime in Russia, not only theoretically, but also in fact, propagates the world revolution, that is, it wittingly proclaims an imperialistic and aggressive creed.

Before the conclusion of this alliance France had as guarantors for its invulnerability: (a) Herself, with nearly 100,000,000 people in the motherland and colonies; (b) Great Britain; (c) Belgium; (d) Poland; (e) Czechoslovakia. By the Treaty of Locarno Italy was also finally added as a guarantor Power.

(4) To this historically unprecedented guarantee of inviolability, France thought it necessary also to attach to herself the aid of the mighty Soviet Russian empire of over 175,000,000 people.

In this connexion it must be declared: That from the German side at no time was the least cause given which could lead France to think she was being threatened; that Germany raised no objections to the defensive securities which France considered it necessary to make for her own protection, as aggressive intentions were entirely lacking on her part and therefore she had no misgivings as regards these French measures of security.

If France, for any reason, believed, after the conclusion of the Locarno Pact, in the necessity of a new guarantee, then the French Government should at least have informed the Powers signatory to the Locarno Pact beforehand, in order to endeavour to obtain this new security as part of the Locarno Pact itself or at least to bring it into harmony with that Pact.

When, in the spring of 1935, the first reports about military agreements between France and Soviet Russia were heard, they were at first denied. When M. Archimbaud declared in the French Chamber that Russia had undertaken to place her whole army at the disposal of France, this was a second time said to be incorrect and not to correspond to the facts. Finally, however, it became known that

such a military agreement had been reached, and the world was eventually informed of the fact.

This alliance, as distinct from the French-Polish and French-Czechoslovak special agreements, took such a form that, without regard to decisions of the League Council or the Locarno Powers, decisions regarding the aggressor and mutual assistance could be taken by the partners to the agreement on their own account.

The following situation results:

France has, for the protection of the independence which she considers threatened, (1) constructed on the German frontier the greatest network of fortifications ever known; (2) has legally bound guarantors of her inviolability: Great Britain, with her entire fighting forces on land and sea, Italy, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Russia, with more than 17,000,000 soldiers, and France herself. These States have a peace strength of over 3,000,000 men; a war strength of approximately 30,000,000 men.

In spite of these, from an historical point of view, equally mighty and unprecedented guarantees, France declares that she still needs outside the largest ring of fortifications in the world a demilitarized zone in Germany, which is open to every kind of attack. She further declares, after Germany, provoked thereto by the last action of France, announced that the Locarno Pact had been invalidated and once again exercised her rights of sovereignty in her own territory, that the nineteen battalions which have re-entered that territory are a threat to the French security guaranteed by half the world.

The Reich Government makes the following declaration in regard to this:

Germany undertook this occupation of her own territory only on an insignificant scale, in order to eliminate any chance of French fear that Germany was putting her under any kind of pressure, and in this way forcing her to negotiations under undignified circumstances.

In addition Germany has made the most magnanimous offer for the peace of Europe which is in any way possible. This offer has its especial importance in the fact that it emanates from a national German Government which has the complete confidence of its people and therewith acts on the highest commission for its people. It receives its historical value only by the actual supposition that it must be the first general European agreement to be concluded since the Treaty of Versailles without force on the part of any of the participants and containing no discrimination against any State. But this is the first and unalterable condition for a successful and therewith fruitful realization of this offer.

For Germany could also, of course, have gone another road. She might have declared invalid for Germany the Locarno Pact, which was practically invalidated by the Franco-Soviet Treaty, in order, while declining directly to occupy militarily the Rhineland, but appealing to and relying on her own national defence, to withdraw from all further European collaboration. But the German Government refused to enter upon a path which would have led only to a further negative dismembership of Europe, and endeavoured instead to put forward a great constructive plan for the final pacification of this Continent.

Germany wishes, therefore, nothing more ardently than to enter into sincere negotiations with France and the other European Powers for a realization of this plan, and for that reason and in order to relieve the French national soul of even the semblance of an oppressive *fait accompli* or threat, she accomplished the remilitarization of her own territory at first in a form which is in fact to be appraised as merely symbolic.

She is further ready, if this should be felt useful, to declare for the period of the negotiations that she will allow no alteration to take place in this, on condition that the French and Belgian Governments adopt a similar attitude.

She would, however, in no circumstances renounce any sovereign rights, in the conviction that therewith the future pacification of Europe would be based again on the enforced renunciations and moral discriminations which contain the seeds of gnawing disgrace on the one hand and therewith of latent discontent on the other.

What the German Government is striving for is not the conclusion of treaties which, through their being bound up with moral burdens for an honour-loving and decent people, inwardly and outwardly remain incredible, but the bringing about of a real and actual pacification of Europe for the next quarter of a century; in fact, a peace which has in itself the character of an unconditional European legal order, based on the free decisions of European nations and States with equal rights. And only what has been signed on such assumptions can, in consequence of its agreement with the ideas of the honour of nations, and will, so far as Germany is concerned, be kept honourably.

Should this attitude not meet with the consent of the other Powers, then the German Government will naturally withdraw their proposals, and, building on the trustworthiness, the loyalty, and the historic self-sacrificing courage of the German people, rather choose from now on an honourable isolation than live as a nation discriminated against in the community of the others.

(xii) *Declaration by the German Government, March 12, 1936.*¹

The German Government cannot enter into a discussion with regard to a lasting or provisional limitation of the German sovereignty in the Rhineland territory. The German Chancellor wishes, however, in order to facilitate for the French Government the acceptance of the German proposals, to explain in the following way his intention, which he has declared from the beginning, to give to the re-establishment of the German sovereignty in the Rhineland at present only a symbolic character.

The strength of the troops which have been stationed in certain garrisons in the Rhineland on a peace-time basis has been already communicated to the British and the French military *attachés* in Berlin. This strength will not be increased at present. It is equally not intended at present to station these troops nearer to the French or the Belgian frontier. This restriction of the military occupation of the Rhineland will be observed for the duration of the pending negotiations. It is, however, assumed that a similar attitude will be observed by France and Belgium.

(xiii) *Communiqué issued by the Locarno Powers, London, March 12, 1936.*²

A meeting of the delegates of the signatory Powers to the Treaty of Locarno was held at the Foreign Office at 5 o'clock. The following were present: Great Britain: Mr. Eden, Lord Halifax, and Sir Robert Vansittart; France: M. Flandin and M. Corbin; Belgium: M. van Zeeland and Baron de Cartier de Marchienne (the Belgian Ambassador); Italy: Signor Grandi. Mr. Eden presided.

It was unanimously recognized by the representatives of these Powers that the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone by Germany constituted a clear violation of Article 42 and Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Treaty of Locarno. It will be for the Council of the League of Nations, to whom France and Belgium had referred the matter, to pronounce upon this point.

In order to facilitate a more detailed study of the situation, the

¹ *The Times*, March 13, 1936. This declaration was communicated by the German Ambassador at London in reply to the request made to him by Mr. Eden on March 11 for 'a spontaneous contribution' by Herr Hitler towards a settlement. Mr. Eden had suggested that to illustrate the sincerity of their desires the German Government might withdraw all but a symbolical number of troops from the Rhineland, not increase their number, and undertake not to fortify the zone at least for a period necessary for the pacts to be negotiated and for the international situation to be regularized.

² *The Times*, March 13, 1936.

first delegates of Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy thereafter met in small committee. This committee will meet again at 11.30 to-morrow (Friday) morning.

4. NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

(i) *Extracts from Statements at the Ninety-first (Extraordinary) Session of the League Council, March 14, 1936.*

(a) *Statement by M. Flandin (France).*¹

The facts which have given occasion for this special meeting of the Council are too well known for it to be necessary for me to recapitulate them at any length. A week ago to-day, the diplomatic representatives at Berlin of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Locarno with Germany were successively received by the German Chancellor and were told that Germany proclaimed that Treaty to have lapsed and henceforward regarded herself as discharged from its obligations. In order that there might be no misapprehension as to the reality of that decision, troops entered the demilitarized zone on the same day. These were not, as was first stated, a few 'symbolical' detachments, but large forces consisting of over 30,000 regular troops, to mention only those officially reckoned by the German Government.

In bringing these facts before the Council and in denouncing the breach of Article 2 and Article 8 of the Locarno Treaty, the French Government has not so much exercised a right as performed a duty. If it were only a question of rights, the text of the Locarno Treaty would authorize the French Government to take strong and decisive measures forthwith. Being anxious, for its part, not to add any disturbing factor to the European situation, it voluntarily refrained from such action, thus giving expression in its fullest sense to the respect which it pays, and which it hopes all will pay, to international law as the essential means of maintaining peace.

In virtue of Article 4, it was France's duty, as a contracting party, to bring the question immediately before the Council of the League of Nations. She has done so, confident in the Council's impartiality in establishing the fact of a breach and recommending such steps as may be considered desirable, confident also in the readiness of the guarantor Powers to perform the duties devolving on them as a result of that finding, and resolved, finally, to place at the League's disposal all her forces, both material and moral, to help it to over-

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 312.

come one of the most serious crises in the history of peace and of its collective organization.

To justify her action, Germany has invoked the approval by the French Chamber of Deputies of the Franco-Soviet Pact concluded ten months previously, regarding which there had been an exchange of notes last May and June between the Government of the Reich, the French Government, and the Governments guarantors of the Locarno Treaty.¹ In these notes, the legal arguments advanced on the German side were amply refuted. The German Government gave no reply.

But, even if the German Government was not satisfied, it was bound, in virtue of the Arbitration Convention concluded at the same time as the Rhineland Pact, to refer the matter to arbitration. It has not even attempted to do so. Despite the statement I myself made in the Chamber of Deputies² before Germany's unilateral denunciation of the Treaties of Locarno and Versailles, to the effect that we would accept the arbitration of The Hague Court of Justice, the German Government has not attempted to initiate such proceedings; nor has it attempted to bring about any common discussion of the problem at a meeting of the Powers signatories of the Locarno Pact. It has preferred to repudiate a treaty which Chancellor Hitler has repeatedly recognized to have been freely agreed to and on which the signatories intended to confer particular stability, since the contracting parties forwent the right of denunciation and may only ask the Council of the League of Nations to terminate the Treaty if it finds that the League of Nations otherwise provides sufficient guarantees.

That this decision taken by Germany had been prepared long beforehand, and that the argument put forward was merely a pretext, chosen from among several others which had previously been considered, there can be no doubt. But that matters little. I repeat that the French Government is prepared to let the Permanent Court at The Hague decide whether the Treaty of May 2, 1935, is incompatible with the Treaty of Locarno.

But not only is there repudiation of a treaty. There is also a definite breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, which Article 44 describes as a hostile act.

It is not without good reason that, at Locarno, respect for frontiers and respect for the measures intended to provide a necessary safeguard for Belgium and for France were placed upon the same footing.

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, pp. 264-72.

² See above, p. 34.

There is no doubt that no one could have intended to place a derogation from the principles of demilitarization on a point of detail on the same footing as the violation of a frontier. But the statements of the authors of the Treaty show that it was not intended to make any difference between an attack on national territory and a deliberate and large-scale violation of the zone. In asking that the violation should be recognized, the French Government simply asks that the law should be applied. Once this has been done, it will be for the guarantors to furnish France and Belgium with the assistance provided for in the Treaty.

But France's rights and her own interests are not alone at stake, nor are the duties of the guarantors alone involved. It is a question—and here I am speaking particularly to the Members of the Council who are not signatories of the Locarno Treaty—of the interests of general peace and, I might say, of the very existence of the League of Nations. The question at issue is whether the practice of the *fait accompli*, the unilateral repudiation of undertakings freely and solemnly accepted, are going to be set up in Europe as a political system; whether treaties are going to be considered as at any moment and immediately capable of modification at the will of their signatories, and whether a government, in the exercise of its own power, may go back to-day on its promises of yesterday. I ask how such a method can be reconciled with the existence of the League of Nations, whose Covenant states that, in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security, it is necessary to observe strictly all the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, together with a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations.

Is such a method compatible with the very notion of collective security, an expression which is meaningless if it does not express the confidence of each member in the undertakings entered into by the others, and the conviction that all the members will contribute to defend each one of them against the breach of its undertakings by another State? Is it likely to encourage the conclusion of fresh international agreements?

The Council gauged these dangers so well that, a year ago, on April 17, 1935,¹ when condemning the use which Germany had already made of this method, it recognized that, in future, the Members of the League of Nations must oppose by all appropriate means the repudiation of undertakings affecting the security of the nations of Europe and the maintenance of peace.

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 98.

If, having recognized that necessity a year ago, the Council, which to-day has still more serious facts before it, were to go back on its own decision, I fear that the authority of the League of Nations would suffer irreparable injury in the minds of all peoples.

Such are the facts and such, briefly, are the observations to which they give rise, and which the Council will no doubt desire to consider.

I ask the Council to pronounce that a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been committed by Germany, and to request the Secretary-General to notify the Powers signatories of the Locarno Treaty in accordance with Article 4 of that Treaty. This notification will enable the guarantor Governments to discharge their obligations of assistance. For its part, the Council will have to consider how it can support that action by recommendations addressed to the Members of the League of Nations.

(b) *Extracts from Statement by M. van Zeeland (Belgium).*¹

The French representative has brought out very clearly the general aspects of the problem with which we are faced, and the consequences it may involve for the whole world. For my part, I shall confine myself to putting before you some of the aspects of this formidable problem which more particularly concern my country.

The representative of the United Kingdom used just now an expression which impressed me. He said that his country shared the anxieties of France and Belgium. Anxiety, indeed! but you will realize that that anxiety is being experienced by no country more acutely than by Belgium. No country is more affected by Germany's action than Belgium. We are affected both by the remilitarization of the Rhineland and by the unilateral denunciation of the Treaty of Locarno.

The demilitarization of the Rhineland constituted one of the essential elements of the system for our security, for, in proportion to the forces of the various countries, Belgium has the longest and most exposed common frontier with Germany.

Moreover, the Treaty of Locarno was, with the Covenant of the League of Nations, the very foundation of our international status. What exactly is now our position? I shall endeavour in a moment to define our attitude, but you will understand how profoundly we have been shaken. While it is true that no country, however powerful, can rely entirely on its own strength for its security, it is infinitely more true that, for small countries, respect for justice, an international organization based on law, are of vital importance. It is we, there-

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 314.

fore, who are the most seriously affected. And yet nothing in our attitude can ever have justified the slightest reproach on the part of any of the signatories of the multilateral pacts to which we are a party. In particular, in the present case, we have, from the outset, observed the Locarno Pact, in the spirit and the letter, with the most scrupulous care. The pretext given by Germany to justify the denunciation of the Locarno Treaty is quite obviously no concern of ours. The Franco-Soviet Pact is for us a *res inter alios acta*. Certainly, when we were asked for our opinion on the compatibility of this Pact with the Locarno Pact, we expressed our opinion: to us, as to all the other signatories of the Rhineland Pact, this compatibility appeared to be undoubted. However that may be, the Franco-Soviet Pact is of no interest to us; it does not concern us. It does not and cannot modify our international obligations in any way, and we long ago took care to state this officially. I myself made an express declaration to this effect in my country's Senate many months ago. . . .

If we attach such importance to Locarno, it is because the conditions surrounding that Treaty might, I think, be described as unique. I cannot conceive of any international instrument which could combine more characteristics of, more reasons for, inviolability. This was no instrument bearing a signature which could be claimed as having been fixed under the kind of moral pressure involved, for example, by defeat. It was a freely negotiated, freely accepted act, spontaneously confirmed on several occasions. Two of the greatest Powers of the world were called upon to act as guarantors. The obligations, rights, and advantages of this Treaty were placed, as regards some of them, on the basis of reciprocity.

The guarantor Powers were guarantors, not only for our benefit, but also for that of Germany.

Lastly, the Treaty was placed under the auspices of the highest international authority, under your own, Gentlemen, since you must intervene in various circumstances, and, in particular, if the Pact were to be terminated.

I need hardly say that in our eyes the Locarno Pact is still in being. We maintain the obligations and assurances which it involves for the signatories, and particularly for us. The purpose of pacts of this kind is precisely to protect those of its signatories which remain faithful against those which may be unfaithful. Consequently, we continue to apply it, and our presence here is evidence of the scrupulous manner in which we are applying it.

I hope you will have noted, Gentlemen, that, in the course of this

brief outline, I have striven to remain strictly on the plane of reason and to eschew that of sentiment. You will realize, nevertheless, the effort we must make to restrain our emotions in the face of a situation like that in which we are placed. You will understand how vividly the past is still present to us. But I wish to remain on the plane of reason, because I desire my country to contribute to the full in all efforts at reconstruction. In spite of all, we know well that, in the future, pacts will again have to be concluded, signatures exchanged and an international structure re-established on the basis of law and respect for accepted obligations. But I cannot close my eyes to the fact—and I hope that no one else does—that the attitude which has just been adopted deals a heavy blow at these methods and that, for a long time to come, the moral value of any effort to build up a better international structure, based on law and reason, will be heavily mortgaged in the eyes of future generations, and that this weakening of the value of law will have to be compensated in some way or other; these compensations will impose on humanity, perhaps for a long time to come, supplementary efforts and fresh burdens which it could so easily have been spared.

Be that as it may, we are determined to play, in the future as in the past, our full part in all international collective action.

You will not be surprised if I say that it was with feelings of deep sadness and bitterness that my country found itself obliged to appeal to the Council of the League of Nations.

On behalf of Belgium, it is to-day my sad duty to ask the Council to take note, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Locarno, of the fact that a breach of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been committed, and at once to notify the Powers signatories of the Locarno Treaty and, in particular, the guarantor Powers.

(ii) *Exchange of Telegrams and Notes between the German Government and the League, March 14–17, 1936.*

(a) *Note from the Secretary-General of the League to the German Government, March 14, 1936.*¹

Referring to the telegram² which I sent to the German Government on March 8, the Council of the League of Nations invites the German

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 316.

² The relevant sentence read as follows: 'Should the German Government, as contracting party to the Treaty mentioned above, wish to take part in the examination of this question by the Council, I should be grateful if you would inform me.'

Government, as contracting party to the Locarno Treaty, to take part in the examination by the Council of the question of the communication from the French and Belgian Governments. The Council will meet at Saint James's Palace on Monday, March 16, at 3.30 p.m.

(Signed) AVENOL, *Secretary-General*.

(b) Reply of the German Government, March 15, 1936.¹

I beg to acknowledge receipt of your telegram of March 14, in which you inform me that the Council of the League of Nations invites the German Government to take part in the examination of the question submitted to the Council by the Belgian and French Governments. The German Government is, in principle, prepared to accept the Council's invitation. It assumes in this connexion that its representative will take part on equal terms with the representatives of the Powers represented on the Council in the discussions and decisions of the Council. I should be obliged if you would confirm this assumption.

The German Government must further draw attention to the following fundamental consideration. The German Government's action, which has been the occasion of the summoning of the Council by the Belgian and French Governments, does not consist merely in the restoration of German sovereignty in the Rhineland zone, but is bound up also with comprehensive concrete proposals to give a new assurance of peace in Europe. The German Government regards the political action which it has taken as a whole, the component parts of which cannot be separated from one another. For this reason, the German Government can participate in the Council's proceedings only if it is assured that the Powers concerned are prepared to enter into negotiations forthwith in regard to the German proposals.² The German Government will, with this object, place itself in touch with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, under whose presidency the Powers concerned in the Rhine Pact of Locarno are met together for discussion in London.

(Signed) BARON VON NEURATH, *Minister of the Reich for Foreign Affairs*.

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 316.

² 'Aus diesem Grunde kann sie an den Verhandlungen des Rates nur teilnehmen, wenn sie die Gewissheit erhält, dass die in Frage kommenden Mächte bereit sind, alsbald über die deutschen Vorschläge in Verhandlungen einzutreten.'

(c) Reply of the Secretary-General of the League, March 16, 1936.¹

I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency the reply of the Council to your telegram of March 15. Germany will participate in the examination by the Council of the question submitted by the Belgian and French Governments on the same terms as the representatives of the other guaranteed Powers whose situation under the Treaty is the same as that of Germany—that is, with full right of discussion, the votes of the three Powers not being counted in calculating unanimity. In regard to the second question, it is not for the Council to give to the German Government the assurance which it desires.

(Signed) AVENOL, *Secretary-General.*

(d) Reply of the German Government, March 17, 1936.²

I acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your telegram of March 16 and have the honour to inform you that Ambassador von Ribbentrop will represent the German Government in the Council of the League of Nations in the examination of the question raised by the Belgian and French Governments. He will be available in London from Thursday morning onwards.

(Signed) BARON VON NEURATH, *Minister of the Reich for Foreign Affairs.*

(e) Note from the German Ambassador at London to the President of the League Council, March 17, 1936.³

I have been in communication with my Government and have explained the position as you asked me to do.

My Government have again examined whether it would be technically possible for the German delegation to arrive in London in time for the meeting of the Council to-morrow at 3.30 p.m. Unfortunately, they have come to the conclusion that this was not possible. The delegation will leave Berlin to-morrow by aeroplane in the early afternoon and arrive at Croydon in the early evening. The German representative will be at the disposal of the Council on Thursday morning.

I have equally transmitted to Berlin your invitation addressed to me to sit in the meantime at the Council either as a full delegate or as an observer. My Government think that, as the arrival of the official German delegate is imminent, it would be advisable to abstain from appointing a substitute for one meeting only.

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 317.

² *Ibid.*, p. 318.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 325.

Lastly, I have informed Berlin that the Council proposes to continue the negotiations in the way you indicated to me, but will not take a vote before the arrival of the German delegation.

(Signed) VON HOESCH.

(f) *Reply of the President of the League Council to the German Ambassador at London, March 18, 1936.*¹

I desire to acknowledge with thanks the receipt of your letter of March 17, in which you inform me that it is technically impossible for the German delegation to reach London in time for the meeting of the Council this afternoon and that it is not proposed to appoint you to act as substitute pending the arrival of your delegation.

I am arranging for this information to be communicated immediately to Members of the Council and to the representative of the Belgian Government.

(Signed) S. M. BRUCE.

(iii) *Exchange of telegrams between the German and British Governments, March 17, 1936.*²

(a) *Telegram from the German Government.*

The German Government expect that His Majesty's Government will do their utmost in the circumstances of the case to bring about at the proper time a discussion with the interested Powers of our proposals.

(b) *Reply of the British Government.*

His Majesty's Government are doing and will continue to do their utmost to find a means of bringing about a peaceful and satisfactory settlement of the present difficulties. It is clear to His Majesty's Government that the proposals of the Chancellor, as well as any proposals made by other parties concerned, must be discussed at the proper time. The German Government will appreciate, however, that it is not possible for His Majesty's Government to give any more explicit assurance at this stage.

(iv) *Procedure at the Ninety-first (Extraordinary) Session of the League Council, March 17-19, 1936.*

(a) *Extract from Statement by M. Rüstü Aras (Turkey), March 17, 1936.*³

. . . The violation of the Rhine Pact of Locarno having been laid before the Council, it is the latter's duty, in virtue of the stipulations

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 326.

² *The Times*, March 18, 1936.

³ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 319.

of that Pact, to act as arbitrator. This is an indisputable fact. But the Council's role is not confined to this. In virtue of its constitution, it has two other functions which are inherent in its nature and which were well known to the signatories of Locarno when they entrusted to it the function of arbitrator by virtue of which we have now met together.

These functions are those of mediator in international disputes and of guarantor of security.

In the debate which is now in progress, there is no question of mediation, which would, perhaps, be undesirable before the Council has given full satisfaction to France and Belgium in connexion with the draft resolution submitted.¹ But, if there had to be mediation, I should prefer that of the Council to any other arrangement.

In my opinion, the Council cannot divest itself of these two essential functions and confine itself to that of arbitrator assigned to it by the Rhine Pact.

The Council can fulfil its duty under these two heads independently of the decision which, in any case, we have to take as regards the resolution on the breach of the Rhine Pact. This duty would, in my opinion, consist, not only in associating ourselves with the Locarno guarantors, without of course relieving them of any part of their obligations, but also in giving them our help and assistance, thus complying with the spirit and the letter of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

In this way the Council would have discharged its whole duty in this very important question concerning the relations of three great European countries, the settlement of which is the keystone of European security.

(b) *Extracts from Statement by M. Litvinov (U.S.S.R.), March 17, 1936.*²

This is the third time, in the short period of eighteen months during which the Soviet Union has been a Member of the League of Nations, that its representative on the Council of the League has had to speak on the subject of a breach of international obligations.

The first time was in connexion with the infringement by Germany of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty. The second time was on the occasion of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict. The third, to-day, is in consequence of the unilateral infringement by Germany of both the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno Pact.

¹ For text of this Resolution, see below, p. 119.

² *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 319.

In all three cases the Soviet Union was either formally disinterested because it took no part in the treaties which had been infringed, as in the case of those of Versailles and Locarno, or, as in the case of the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, its own interests were not in the least affected.

These circumstances have not in the past prevented, and will not in the present case prevent, the representative of the Soviet Union from taking his place among those members of the Council who register in the most decisive manner their indignation at a breach of international obligations, condemn it, and support the most effective measures to avert similar infringements in the future. . . .

The responsibility of the League of Nations and of its directing body, the Council, is all the greater, the more simple the breach of international obligations under discussion. The characteristic feature of all the three cases I have just mentioned is their simplicity—simplicity in the sense that the establishment of the very fact of a breach of international obligations represented no difficulty and could arouse no disputes and differences. When I speak of the absence of disputes and differences, I do not, of course, have in mind the particular State which is accused of breaking treaties. Such a State will naturally always either deny the breach or, at any rate, invent all kinds of arguments to justify its action. One cannot conceive of a case in which such a State would openly declare that it has no justification and that it alone is to blame, and no one else.

The question under discussion at the present session of the Council even surpasses the preceding cases by its simplicity, in the sense I have indicated. Here we find, not only a substantial infringement of treaties, but the ignoring of a particular clause in a treaty, providing a method of settling disputes which may arise in the event of an alleged or actual infringement of the treaty.

Before drawing final conclusions as to the German Government's actions, I think it only just to take into account all that has been said by Mr. Hitler in justification of these actions, or in deprecation of their significance.

The German Government asserts that France was the first to break the Locarno Treaty in the spirit and the letter, by concluding a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union. It applied for an explanation to the other Locarno Powers—namely, Great Britain and Italy. One must imagine that, if these Powers had agreed with the German thesis that the Franco-Soviet Pact is incompatible with the Locarno Treaty, Germany would have utilized their conclusions to the utmost. But, as these Powers came to a different conclusion, Germany peremptorily declares that France, Great Britain, Belgium,

and Italy—i.e. the other Locarno Powers—are interpreting the Locarno Treaty incorrectly, and that the only correct interpretation is her own. Without doubt this is an extremely convenient method of resolving disputed international questions—when a country, convinced of the injustice of its case, confers upon itself, first the functions of a judge in its own cause, and then those of sheriff's officer.

That the German assertion of the incompatibility of the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Locarno Treaty will not hold water follows with absolute clarity from the entirely defensive character of the Pact. The whole world knows that neither the Soviet Union nor France has any claims to German territory, and that they are not striving to change the frontiers of Germany. If Germany undertakes no aggression against either France or the Soviet Union, the Pact will not begin to operate. But if the Soviet Union becomes the victim of an attack by Germany, the Locarno Treaty gives France, as any other Member of the League, the unquestionable right to come to the assistance of the Soviet Union. In this event, an unmistakable definition of the aggressor is facilitated by the absence of a common frontier between Germany and the Soviet Union. If the German armed forces cross the boundaries of their own country, and pass through the States and the seas dividing the two countries in order to invade the territory of the Soviet Union, the German aggression will be quite apparent, and vice versa.

This is perfectly obvious to the German Government too, and therefore it hastens to call to its assistance a far-reaching hypothesis of the possibility of a change of the social system in France. This hypothesis, brought into play by the German Government, only confirms the artificial and forced character of the German line of argument as to the incompatibility of the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Locarno Treaty.

But the German Government does not place particular reliance on the force and persuasiveness of this line of argument, and itself puts forward another justification for its actions. It declares that the demilitarization of the Rhineland is itself unjust, contradicts the principle of the equality of States, and imperils the integrity of the German frontier. This argument sounds apparently more convincing, and in any case more sincere, than the sophistry about the Franco-Soviet Pact. In order to discuss this argument in detail, I would have to repeat here what I said in the League Council on April 17, 1935,¹ during the examination of the French Government's complaint against the German Government for the latter's breach of its inter-

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 105.

national obligations regarding armaments. The League of Nations, as a political institution setting before itself the object of organizing and reinforcing peace, cannot settle questions, and still less justify a breach of international obligations, by an appeal to abstract principles. The criterion for the League's decisions must be, primarily, the degree to which the particular decision meets the requirements of the best possible organization of peace. A considerable number of Members of the League, among whom the Soviet Union at that time was not to be found, thought, in 1919 and 1925, that the demilitarization of the Rhineland zone answered these requirements. I do not think that the changes which have since then taken place in the ideology and foreign policy of Germany would permit one to assert that peace in Europe at the present time would gain from the remilitarization of the Rhineland zone, the less so if it is carried out unilaterally, in breach of obligations voluntarily undertaken by Germany. Neither the foreign policy of the present German Government nor the preaching of aggression and international hatred and the glorification of the spirit of war, initiated and ceaselessly maintained in Germany during the last three years, permits us to make such an assertion.

I shall not take up your time with the appropriate quotations from German periodicals, German text-books, German scientific works, or German song-books. I will permit myself merely to remind you of the political testament of the present ruler of Germany, Herr Hitler, which you will find on page 754 of volume ii of the 1934 Munich edition of his book, *My Struggle*:

'The political testament to the German nation for its external activity will, and must always, proclaim: Never permit two continental powers to arise in Europe. In every attempt to organize a second military power on the German frontier, even though it be by the formation of a State capable of becoming a military power, you must see an attack on Germany, and you must consider it not only your right, but your duty, to prevent such a State coming into existence by all possible means, including the use of force of arms, and if such a State has already come into being, it must once again be shattered.'

These, gentlemen, are the purposes for which Germany requires the remilitarization of the Rhineland zone bordering on France. It is a question of setting up the hegemony of Germany over the whole European continent, and I ask you, Must and shall the League of Nations condone the promotion of this objective? . . .

As for the defence of Germany, if there is one State in the world which is threatened by no external danger it is Germany. I know of not a single country which makes any territorial claims on Germany, and I know of no literature preaching an attack on Germany. Attacks on a State do not and cannot take place without preliminary preparations, without the preliminary presentation of territorial or other claims, without an attempt to justify these claims and to train up the people in the spirit of making them good. No such preparations are going on in a single country, and therefore there is not, and cannot be, any idea of encircling Germany. . . .

I have examined both the arguments put forward by the German Government in justification of the breach of international obligations which it has committed. The German Government, however, has not confined itself to these arguments. Apparently it is not itself certain that they carry conviction, and realizes itself that it has caused a breach in the existing system for the organization of peace. The German Government is therefore trying to create the impression of readiness to put right the wrong it has committed by proposing a new scheme, supposedly for a still better organization of peace. . . .

I know that there are people who really do see a particular expression of Germany's love for peace in the offer to France and Belgium of a pact of non-aggression for twenty-five years, to be guaranteed by Great Britain and Italy. These people forget that the Locarno Treaty which Germany has just torn up represented just such a pact of non-aggression, with the same guarantees, and its validity was not for twenty-five years, but for an indefinite period. The other difference was that the Locarno Treaty included supplementary guarantees for France and Belgium, in the shape of a demilitarized zone in the Rhineland. Thus the alleged new proposal made by Germany amounts to the maintenance of that same Locarno Treaty, but with a reduction in its period of validity, and with a diminution of the guarantees for Belgium and France which they enjoyed in virtue of the old Locarno Treaty. But these limited guarantees which Mr. Hitler is now proposing might be offered to France and Belgium by the guarantors of Locarno, if they so desire, even without Germany's consent and participation. Thus, Mr. Hitler's proposal amounts to this: that, while depriving France and Belgium of certain guarantees with which they were provided by the Locarno Treaty, he wants to retain for Germany all the benefits of that treaty in their totality.

But Mr. Hitler's 'love of peace' does not stop at this. He is ready to sign pacts of non-aggression, not only with France and Belgium, but

with his other neighbours—true, without anybody else's guarantee. The Soviet Union has itself signed pacts of non-aggression with all its neighbours (excepting Japan, which rejects such a pact up to this day). But the Soviet Union has always attached great importance to the point that these pacts should not facilitate aggression against third parties. We therefore always included in these pacts a special clause, freeing either of the contracting parties from any obligations under the pact if the other party commits an act of aggression against a third State. Such a clause, however, will be absent from the pacts proposed by Mr. Hitler, according to the model which he has indicated. And, without such a clause, the proposed system of pacts reduces itself to the principle of localization of war which is preached by Mr. Hitler. Every State which has signed such a pact with Germany is immobilized by her in the event of Germany attacking a third State.

This proposal of Mr. Hitler's gives me the impression that we are faced with a new attempt to divide Europe into two or more parts, with the object of guaranteeing non-aggression for one part of Europe in order to acquire a free hand for dealing with other parts. As I have already had to point out at Geneva, such a system of pacts can only increase the security of the aggressor and not the security of peace-loving nations. . . .

Analysing the sum total of Mr. Hitler's proposals, I come to the conclusion that they not only would represent no compensation for the harm done to the organization of peace by condonation of his breach of international treaties, but would themselves strike a blow at the organization of peace, and in the first instance at the League of Nations.

I have permitted myself to express my views with complete frankness. It was easier for me to do so than for my colleagues on the Council, because the manner in which Mr. Hitler allows himself to speak in public of the State I represent liberates me from the necessity of resorting to circumlocution and diplomatic niceties. I have all the more right to do so because the whole sense of Mr. Hitler's statements, and of his proposals in the sphere of international political relations, amounts to the organization of a campaign against the peoples of the State I represent, and to the formation of a coalition against them of the whole of Europe—if possible, the whole of the world. His aggression may, in fact, aim at other countries in the immediate future. His attacks on the Soviet Union may, so far, serve merely as a smoke-screen for aggression which is being prepared against other States; but the very fact that he selects the Soviet

Union for this purpose, as the target of his incessant attacks, and that he has done this again in connexion with his breach of the Locarno Treaty, gives me the right to speak openly and with especial energy of the inward essence of Mr. Hitler's aggressive foreign policy. In doing so I express my firm confidence that his proposals, which follow from such a foreign policy, will, as they now stand, never become the basis of an agreement between other Members of the League.

Before concluding, let me express the hope that I shall not be misunderstood, and that the conclusion will not be drawn from what I have said that the Soviet Union is proposing only registration, condemnation, severe measures and nothing else; that it declares itself against negotiations and a peaceful settlement of the serious dispute which has arisen. Such a conclusion would present a completely false picture of our conception. We are not less, but, on the contrary, more, interested than others in the maintenance of peace, both to-day and for decades to come, and not only in one area of Europe, but throughout the whole of Europe and all over the world. We are resolutely against anything that might bring a war nearer by even a single month. . . .

But, at whatever new international agreements we might desire to arrive, we must first of all ensure their loyal fulfilment by all those who participate in them, and the Council of the League must declare its attitude towards unilateral infringements of such agreements, and how it intends and is able to react against them. From this standpoint the greatest possible satisfaction of the complaint made by the French and Belgian Governments becomes of exceptional importance. Taking cognizance of this, I declare in the name of my Government its readiness to take part in all measures which may be proposed to the Council of the League by the Locarno Powers and will be acceptable to the other members of the Council.

(c) *Extracts from Statement by Señor Edwards (Chile), March 17, 1936.*¹

I find myself compelled to intervene in this debate to explain my Government's position in the serious and delicate question with which we are now concerned. . . .

The Powers that signed the Locarno Treaty had thought it necessary to embody the legal system of Locarno in that of the League of Nations in order to supplement the guarantees of security given to them by the Covenant of the League by means of those which

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 323.

they had just given to each other. Germany's entry into the League of Nations being necessary for this purpose, it was stipulated that the Locarno Treaty would only come into force after the Reich's admission at Geneva.

At the same time, the Locarno negotiators had contemplated the intervention of the Council of the League of Nations in two cases: first, in order to put an end to the Treaty; secondly, in order to establish, if necessary, the fact of a breach of its provisions and to set in motion the guarantees provided for.

Certain States thus assigned to the Council of the League of Nations, on October 16, 1925, additional obligations and powers which are not embodied in the Covenant of the League and which it had not solicited.

In the course of the ensuing years, a new factor intervened—Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations. The legal system of Locarno was thus thrown out of gear and the Council's possible intervention was deprived of an important element—Germany's voice. It might have been thought, not without reason, that the Treaty of Locarno had ceased to exist. Nevertheless, the Powers concerned made solemn declarations to inform the rest of the world that the Treaty remained in force.

The Council of the League of Nations is now meeting, at the request of the Belgian and French Governments, on the basis of the provisions of the Treaty of Locarno. . . .

The Council's competence is therefore derived, in the case before us, from the stipulations of the Treaty of Locarno and the request of two of the signatories.

It is useful to recall that no article of the Covenant of the League of Nations has been invoked by the Governments of France and Belgium, from which we might think that those Powers had no other purpose, in referring the matter to the Council, than to obtain from that organ a pronouncement to the effect that the Treaty of Locarno has been infringed.

I should now like to state Chile's position with regard to this question.

My country is not bound by the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno. As far as the Treaty of Locarno is concerned, we are not obliged to act, in the Council, on the basis of its provisions. . . . We are only bound by the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations to which we have given our signature. . . .

Any breach of a treaty disturbs international relations and imperils the peace of the world. It is, in consequence, a matter of concern to

the Members of the League of Nations, which is based on scrupulous respect for international obligations.

Chile is the more sensitive to breaches of treaties inasmuch as she has made full respect for treaties the corner-stone of her international policy. The Council can therefore be sure of my Government's full and unreserved respect for treaties, and it can be certain that, if the violation of the Treaty of Locarno is duly established, it will fulfil without hesitation its duties as a member of the Council.

In our opinion, the breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles, as it is not disputed by Germany, does not give rise to the same legal doubts.

The situation, so far as we are concerned, is, nevertheless, different as regards the breach of the Treaty of Locarno which has been reported. . . .

There are, therefore, differences of opinion between the three signatories to the Locarno Treaty as regards the interpretation of the duties imposed by this instrument on the parties directly concerned.

In these circumstances, my Government is of opinion that, before giving a decision on a question of a legal character, the Council might ask the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague for an advisory opinion, in accordance with Article 14 of the Covenant.

This will enable us to pronounce judgment with a full knowledge of the facts as regards the violation of the Locarno Treaty, and to reinforce that judgment with the indisputable and undisputed authority of the highest Court in the world. . . .

(d) *Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden (United Kingdom), March 18, 1936.*¹

The Council is being asked to fulfil the duty laid upon it by Article 4 (2) of the Treaty of Locarno—namely, to satisfy itself whether or not a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed. The case has been laid before us by the representatives of France and Belgium in speeches which have deeply impressed the members of the Council.

I have already stated before the Council the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that a patent and incontestable breach of the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles relating to the demilitarized zone has been committed. It would, therefore, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be right for the Council to

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 326.

come to a similar conclusion, and to notify this finding to the Powers signatory of the Locarno Treaty.

In the view of His Majesty's Government, this is far from being the only function which the Council has to perform in the present case. The provisions of the Treaty of Locarno fall within the framework of the Covenant, and Article 7 of the Treaty is as follows:

'The present Treaty, which is designed to ensure the maintenance of peace, and is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.'

Our duty is not merely to declare that a breach has been committed. We must keep steadily before us our ultimate aim and our supreme responsibility, which is to preserve peace and to establish good understanding among the nations of Europe upon a firm and enduring foundation.

What was the object of the Locarno Treaty? It was two-fold. First, it aimed at preserving peace and, secondly, it aimed at creating international confidence by safeguarding the security of Western Europe. It is with the second object, I suggest, as much as the first, that we are to-day concerned.

The structure of security and confidence has been seriously shaken. How is it to be reconstructed?

Let us recognize this fundamental fact. The question before us does not concern a few Powers only. It is of concern to all who value the sanctity of treaty undertakings and the reign of law in international affairs. Nor is it only the structure of international law which we have to strengthen but something of which all international law is itself the indispensable foundation—namely, peace among the nations.

And in working for this end, we have to take account of all the complex and conflicting forces of thought that lie at the root of national action. If we are to win peace, it can only be through the winning of fuller understanding on the part of us all of the things that are foremost in the thought of each.

The German Government have emphasized again and again that their aim is peace and the restoration of confidence. But the German Government will surely recognize with other governments that confidence depends on belief in the sanctity of treaties, and that the unilateral repudiation of treaties can only nullify the object which they maintain they have in view. It was for this reason that His

Majesty's Government represented to the German Government that they should, pending negotiations, take such action in the demilitarized zone as would restore confidence among the nations.

What we wished to emphasize, and what we maintain, is that after a unilateral action of this character international confidence can only be restored if each nation that has the power to do so will make a constructive contribution to this end.

In approaching a task which is at once so delicate and fraught with consequences of such gravity for the future, we should also bear in mind that there are two elements in the present situation of which advantage may, we hope, be taken in the work of appeasement and reconstruction.

The first is that the breach, however plain, does not carry with it any imminent threat of hostilities, and has not involved that immediate action for which, in certain circumstances, the Treaty of Locarno provides. We happily have time in which to endow our action with the prudence, as well as the determination, which the situation requires.

In the second place, the situation, however grave, carries with it an opportunity. I welcome whole-heartedly the declaration of the Belgian Prime Minister, in the course of his wise and moving speech to the Council on Saturday, that, in spite of what has happened, treaties will be required in the future as in the past, and that an effort must be made to construct and reconstruct international life on the basis of undertakings above the signatures of those assuming them. I have said that the declaration of M. van Zeeland was wise. We should, I think, recognize, too, its courage.

If I have insisted on the role of the Council, it is because it is clear to me that, in the steps that will have to be taken towards our goal, the Council has an indispensable part to play.

The Council has the right and the duty to consider in all its aspects the situation before it, and to take for its guidance, in dealing with that situation, the provisions of the Covenant as a whole.

I sincerely hope, therefore, that my colleagues on the Council will give us the benefit of their co-operation on the grave issues with which we are confronted, and that the collective wisdom of its members may suggest the course which is best designed to secure the object we all earnestly desire to attain—namely, the maintenance of peace on the foundation of respect for law. It is essential, not merely that peace should be maintained, but that the spectre of war should be exorcised for the future. To that end, all lines of approach should be examined. Contribution to the restoration of international

confidence, which has been severely shaken, and to the creation of security, will be required from all, and more particularly from those of us who are the great Powers of Western Europe. I should like to-day to give an assurance that in any such examination, in the work of reconstruction, and, in particular, in the organization of security in Western Europe, His Majesty's Government will play their full part. They are willing and anxious to make their contribution to these ends.

(e) *Extract from Statement by Signor Grandi (Italy), March 18, 1936.*¹

At this grave juncture in European affairs, each of us is fully aware of the responsibility incumbent upon him to examine the situation with a sense of reality and with a firm determination to avoid the consequences which this redoubtable situation may involve for the whole world. It would be neither wise nor equitable to gloss over the seriousness of the problems before us. There is certainly no one who would wish to increase our difficulties, which would, moreover, be contrary to the interests of all.

On Saturday morning, I listened with the greatest attention and interest to the statements made in the Council by the French and Belgian representatives. We fully realize the legitimate emotion which recent events have aroused in the French and Belgian peoples. We must be grateful to M. van Zeeland, who, after setting before us in moving terms the special causes of the disquiet aroused in his country by the occupation of the demilitarized zone, reminded us that it is necessary, nevertheless, to remain on the plane of reason and eschew the plane of sentiment.

At the meeting of the four Powers signatories with Germany of the Locarno Treaty, these four Powers had to recognize that a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles had been committed. This conclusion has been the more painful inasmuch as it applied to a great Power whose co-operation is essential to the peace and prosperity of Europe.

Article 4 of the Treaty of Locarno and the responsibilities and obligations which it lays on the guarantor Powers are well known. I need hardly say that Italy is fully conscious of these responsibilities and will remain true to her obligations.

At the same time, it is obvious that, in view of the decisions and measures adopted at Geneva in connexion with the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, the States which have taken them cannot expect my country to apply measures which would be incompatible with the position

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 327.

in which these same States have placed Italy. I should be failing in my duty if I did not draw the Council's attention to the contradiction which exists between the position of a country subjected to sanctions and the duties of a guarantor Power incumbent upon it.

The obligations laid down by the Treaty of Locarno for the guarantor States are clear and definite. No doubt can exist in this connexion.

It is the duty of all of us, particularly at the present time, to give our countries the assurance that a Europe still more divided and weakened than it is to-day will not emerge from this crisis.

We can only perform this duty by taking care not to ignore or even to underestimate any of the factors and causes that have brought about the present situation, in which the Treaty of Locarno is called upon to fulfil its functions and prove its effectiveness.

Among these causes is one which, in my opinion, is self-evident—I mean the weakening of the political bases of the Treaty of Locarno as a result of the decisions and measures taken at Geneva in connexion with the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, the injustice of which has been keenly felt by the whole Italian people.

The Locarno Agreements spelt peace, co-operation, and confidence among the Western Powers, a peace on behalf of which the two guarantor Powers—giving an example which is perhaps unique in history—offered their firm and solid support without any counterpart.

It is regrettable that, during the last few months, the political foundations on which the Locarno guarantees rested have been so seriously shaken. During the last few months, the peace of Europe has been placed at the mercy of a colonial dispute which could and should have been kept within its right proportions and which has, on the contrary, been magnified to the point of profoundly disturbing the political and economic life of Europe.

Such are the facts to which I consider it my duty to call the attention of the Council. . . .

(f) *Extract from Statement by Colonel Beck (Poland), March 18, 1936.*¹

. . . On this occasion, I should like to make a few general remarks about the Locarno Agreements, which are at the root of the question with which we are now concerned. As is generally known, those agreements have not been sympathetically received in my country. But although, at the time, Polish public opinion objected to them on the ground that, inasmuch as they provided special safeguards

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 328.

for the political stability of the Rhine, they might give the impression that the security of Eastern Europe was being left on a more precarious footing, it has nevertheless been found possible, through the joint efforts of the French and Polish Governments, to maintain the Franco-Polish Alliance by incorporating it in the general system of the 1925 Agreements in the form of a treaty of mutual guarantee. Thanks to the joint action of the two Governments, the alliance which existed before the Locarno Agreements remained, and still remains, in force.

Belgium, the second country directly interested in the problem with which we are dealing, is not linked with Poland by any special political agreement. But the long-standing friendship between the two nations makes it our duty to give the most careful consideration to Belgian interests.

As regards Poland, the declarations exchanged between her and the German Reich in January 1934 improved the situation. Through those declarations, which were negotiated in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and were the outcome of a firm resolve on the part of both parties to ensure peace on their common frontier, relations bearing the stamp of mutual respect have been established between Poland and Germany. The passages dealing with Poland in the German Chancellor's recent speeches give evidence of the German Government's intention of upholding the obligations it has contracted towards us and indicate the spirit in which it intends to carry them out.

Recent events have given rise to lively discussions on the subject of the Franco-Soviet Pact. I wish to say that that Pact, concluded between France and the Soviet Union, to which, as to the Rhineland Pact, Poland is not a party, could not in any way modify the obligations and rights which Poland derives from her previous engagements.

As regards the Soviet Union, Poland's engagements have been formulated during the last few years in the Pact of Non-Aggression and in the London Protocol on the Definition of Aggression. Those two agreements, which were signed by my country in order to consolidate the security of Eastern Europe, still represent the expression of our resolve to maintain lasting relations of friendship with our eastern neighbour. . . .

(g) *Extracts from Statement by Señor Barcia (Spain), March 18, 1936.*¹

. . . Spain attaches great importance to respect for international undertakings. She regards it as the very foundation of international

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 330.

life. She views with anxiety the tendency of all States to seek security in armaments, then to insure themselves against the danger of armaments by means of pacts and alliances, and finally to break those pacts and alliances when they become a hindrance. She is convinced that the malady of our time is lack of confidence, but she believes that it cannot be cured by giving it a free rein through armaments, and that *faits accomplis* and unilateral interpretations of the undertakings entered into by governments can only aggravate it.

I feel bound to recall the Spanish Government's constant attitude in these matters. We look upon our obligations as a Member of the League as forming an indivisible whole with three aspects—legal, logical, and political.

Legally, we cannot consider ourselves absolutely bound by the collective security obligations laid down in Article 16, nor, *a fortiori*, by any new obligations, so long as the disarmament obligations specified in Article 8 are neglected, or, if you prefer it, suspended.

Logically, it is clear that those countries which bound themselves, by the Covenant of the League, to co-operate in maintaining the security of a country attacked did so on the assumption that the general disarmament contemplated in Article 8 would have made attacks much less likely and much less dangerous.

Politically, no government can undertake to assist, at the last moment, in clearing up a difficult situation with the origin and development of which it had nothing to do. . . .

It is in that spirit that, on behalf of my Government, I associate myself with the draft resolution submitted by the Belgian and French Governments.

(h) *Extracts from Statement by Señor Ruiz Guiñazú (Argentina), March 18, 1936.*¹

I desire to express my country's views on the draft resolution tabled by the representatives of France and Belgium.

Following the general lines of its national policy, and upholding the scrupulous observance of international engagements upon which the peace of the world depends, the Argentine Republic associates itself with every principle that is linked with the sanctity of treaties. . . .

The Argentine Government supports this draft resolution, more particularly because the principle to which I have just referred is in harmony with the tradition that it has on many occasions upheld at Geneva. This problem of the inviolability of treaties is doubly

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 330.

delicate, doubly disturbing, doubly threatening, during periods of transition such as the present.

We feel therefore, to-day more than ever before, that the aforesaid principle forms part of the very foundation of international law and is one of the conditions for the existence of a community of organized peoples—the expression used in the preamble to the Covenant of the League of which we are a Member.

(i) *Extracts from Statement by Hr. Munch (Denmark), March 18, 1936.*¹

The idea put forward by the representative of Chile—namely, that the Permanent Court should be asked for an advisory opinion on the Locarno Treaty dispute as a whole—seems to me to be an interesting one. That procedure might perhaps have been of value had the parties agreed to it; but, if I have understood aright, they do not look upon it with favour. That being so, I shall be able to vote for the resolution submitted by the representatives of France and Belgium—provided that it is put to the vote in its present form. . . .

None the less, before we vote, I want to give expression to the profound and increasing disquietude caused by the present trend of international politics in those countries that do not belong to any of the political groups into which Europe is divided. Year by year, the dissensions between nations grow more serious; mutual suspicion becomes more and more marked; the sense of insecurity that reigns throughout international life is paralysing economic relations; the armament race grows ever faster and more frenzied. If this disastrous tendency continues, it is difficult to see any chance of avoiding a general war which would be more terrible than any previous war. . . .

I hope that the negotiations between the States directly concerned, which will probably follow this Council session, may represent an important step towards that reconciliation which alone can establish a lasting peace and give the peoples that sense of security that they so ardently desire.

(j) *Extracts from Statement by M. Titulescu (Rumania), March 18, 1936.*²

The request of France and Belgium to the Council is a matter of the utmost concern to the States of the Little Entente. In the first place, we cannot be indifferent to French security, seeing that, as a result of the bonds which unite us, it forms part of our own security; secondly, in our view, the unilateral repudiation of treaties must of

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 331.

² *Ibid.*

necessity have international consequences without which, not only the diplomatic instrument with which we are at present concerned, but also the foundations of the vast majority of States, the basis of which is respect for the law, would be undermined. Since precedents once established are apt to be repeated, and since their repetition may take place in parts of Europe where the nations are not invested with the immense stability which comes from historic tradition, but do possess the great dynamic force of faith in the law, it may well happen that their reactions to infringements of treaties by which they are affected will be far more lively, and that peace will, in consequence, be seriously imperilled.

Finally, we are interested in the French and Belgian request because it affects the whole system of collective security. . . .

If, in the case of a treaty infringement so flagrant as that with which we are concerned; if, in the case of a treaty so important as the Treaty of Locarno, which concerns the security of the whole of Western Europe; if, in the case of two countries of such international significance as France and Belgium, the League of Nations merely legalizes the accomplished fact, what are less illustrious States bound to think of the effectiveness of the League as an instrument for safeguarding the peace of the world, and what audacious projects may not be conceived by those who make it their business to overthrow the existing international order?

I am never afraid of plain speaking. If the League of Nations emerges from the present crisis as the vanquished party, it will represent in future a noble ideal of the past rather than a living reality of the present.

That being so, the countries of the Little Entente have only one answer to give to the request of the French and Belgian Governments. The answer is: 'Yes! We hold that the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno have been infringed.' . . .

As regards the new security plan proposed by the German Government, the States of the Little Entente have no objection to its being discussed, since they have no objection to discussing any contribution to peace which may be made by any country; but the discussion must take place at the proper moment, and that means after the previous question raised by the French and Belgian Governments has been satisfactorily settled. . . .

Provided the request of the French and Belgian Governments is given a satisfactory solution, recognizing the rights of the applicants, and thereby eliminating the danger of establishing a precedent, both from the general standpoint and as regards Central and South-

Eastern Europe in particular, an understanding between all the Powers concerned and Germany with a view to the establishment of a lasting peace, one and indivisible, in all parts of Europe without distinction, would be welcomed by the States of the Little Entente.

I have the honour, on behalf of the States of the Little Entente, to give my vote in favour of the Franco-Belgian resolution before us.

(k) *Extracts from Statement by Senhor Monteiro (Portugal), March 18, 1936.*¹

My Government considers that the occupation of the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland by the German army is a unilateral breach of Articles 42 and 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and Article 2 of the Locarno Treaty.

For centuries past, my country has based its international activity upon respect for law and the inviolability of treaties. In our belief, neither order nor prosperity nor peace is possible unless those principles are observed. . . .

We associate ourselves with our fellow members of the Council in their desire for peace and justice—justice, not only in fundamental questions, but also in methods. We shall give our full and whole-hearted co-operation to those who undertake the arduous task of reconstructing the safeguards of peace in a formula of general conciliation which all can put into effect.

(l) *Statement by Herr von Ribbentrop (Germany), March 19, 1936.*²

The German Government has accepted the invitation of the Council of the League to its present session, in the endeavour to do its part towards clearing up the existing political situation. For this purpose, it has instructed me to present to the statesmen here assembled its views on the requests of the French and Belgian Governments concerning the Locarno Agreement, with which the Council has to deal at its present session. After long and careful consideration, the German Government has determined to lay aside the formal and comprehensible considerations arising from the fact that Germany is not at present a Member of the League of Nations, and from the fact that the agenda of the present session is based upon a Treaty which Germany must regard as no longer valid, and that through no fault of her own.

I personally have undertaken this mission with great satisfaction,

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 332.

² *Ibid.*, p. 334.

because I am convinced that no nation has ever presented a juster cause, in the highest sense of the word, before this council of nations; further, I earnestly hope that this first resumption of relations between my country and the League of Nations may mark a turning-point in the history of Europe, after the many errors and confusions of the unfortunate war and post-war periods.

The fundamental attitude of Germany to the problem of Locarno, which is under discussion here to-day, has been fully presented to the world in the speech of the German Chancellor of March 7.¹ Nevertheless, the fact that the French and Belgian Governments have felt obliged to present the requests that are under discussion here to-day makes it necessary that I should once more present the German view concisely to the Council, in order that, in coming to its final conclusion, the Council may be able to do full justice to the important considerations which compelled Germany to take the step which she took on March 7.

The purpose of the Rhine Pact of Locarno was to prevent for ever the resort to force between France and Belgium on the one side, and Germany on the other side. This agreement was guaranteed by England and Italy. It was confirmed that, in the event of a violation of this Treaty, the League of Nations should be called upon to decide which State was the aggressor.

It is well known that, even at that time, certain difficulties arose from the fact that treaties of alliance between France and Poland and France and Czechoslovakia already existed, which did not seem in themselves to fit into the framework of these clearly defined western peace arrangements. In the end, however, Germany accepted these alliances, because in their structure they adjusted themselves to the Locarno Agreement.

But this Locarno Agreement, which was endorsed by the new National-Socialist Government, placed a unilateral burden upon Germany, involving the extremely hard obligation to maintain the demilitarization of the Rhineland zone, as dictated in the Treaty of Versailles. One of the most important and densely populated regions of Germany, with fifteen million purely German inhabitants, was thus to remain without any military protection.

I believe that, from the standpoint of a higher justice, such a limitation of the most elementary sovereign rights alone would, in the long run, be almost more than could be borne by any nation. If the German people has nevertheless borne it for so many years, it did so in the expectation that in return the other parties to the Pact of

¹ See above, p. 35.

Locarno would fulfil their much lighter obligations, at least as loyally as Germany had fulfilled hers.

The German Chancellor has repeatedly given public expression to this feeling of the entire German nation since he took over the Government in 1933.

But what has happened ?

During the course of last year, one of the parties to the Locarno Agreement—France—began to develop ever closer relations with the Soviet Union. Then came the disturbing news of a Franco-Soviet military alliance and, at the same time, of a similar alliance between Soviet Russia and Czechoslovakia. For a long time this news was uncertain. It was denied, then admitted, then denied again, until one day, to the surprise of the other Powers—which, until then, had been kept in at least official ignorance—the new Franco-Soviet military alliance was made public.

The anxiety created by this alliance, and its effects for Germany, can be gathered from the following facts, the gravity of which is obvious:

- (1) This alliance represents the combination of two States which control over 275 million people—if one includes the colonial territories, which could be called upon for military assistance.
- (2) The two contracting parties are each regarded at present as the strongest military Powers in the world.
- (3) This alliance is directed exclusively against Germany.
- (4) Soviet Russia, which herself is separated from Germany by a considerable distance and, thus, could not be attacked by her, has indirectly pushed herself forward to the German frontier by an analogous military alliance with Czechoslovakia.
- (5) According to the terms of this alliance, France and Russia have made themselves the judges in their own cause, in that, under certain circumstances, they will decide for themselves who is the aggressor, even without a resolution or recommendation of the League of Nations, and can thus resort to war against Germany at their own discretion.

This strict obligation on the part of the two States arises clearly and unambiguously from No. 1 of the Protocol of Signature to the Treaty of Alliance.

That means that, in a given case, France can decide, at her own discretion, whether Germany or Soviet Russia is the aggressor. She makes the sole reservation that any military action in conformity with such decision taken on her own initiative should not make her

liable to the imposition of sanctions on the part of the guarantor Powers of the Locarno Pact: Great Britain and Italy.

From a legal and practical point of view, this objection is irrelevant.

Legally the situation is as follows: How will France, after deciding on her own who is the aggressor, be able to foresee the attitude which the guarantors of the Locarno Treaty, called upon to pronounce on the matter, will adopt towards the decision?

The reply to the question whether, in any given case, France might have to fear such sanctions depends, in practice, not only on the loyal fulfilment of the treaty stipulations by the guarantors, which the German Government has not the slightest intention of doubting, but also on a number of conditions of fact whose probability or improbability cannot be foreseen. Moreover, the view taken of the relationship between the new alliance and the Locarno Agreement cannot possibly be made dependent upon the contractual relations between France and Germany on the one hand, and the guarantor Powers on the other hand, but solely on the direct contractual relation between France and Germany themselves. Otherwise Germany would be expected to tolerate tacitly any violation of the Locarno Agreement by France, trusting that the guarantor Powers would look after her security. That was certainly not the meaning of the Locarno Agreement.

From the *political* point of view, the situation presents itself as follows: It is cold comfort for a State, which has been attacked by such an overwhelming military coalition as the result of a decision necessarily faulty because it is taken prematurely by a country which is judge and party in its own cause, to be put in the right through subsequent sanctions against its aggressors, adjudged as such by the Council of the League of Nations. Indeed, what sanctions could be enforced against so gigantic a coalition extending from the Far East to the Channel? These two States are such powerful and important Members of the League of Nations, and such determining factors from a military point of view, that for all practical purposes sanctions against them are at the very outset inconceivable.

It follows that this second limitation, which is based on the consideration of possible sanctions, is, from the practical point of view, quite irrelevant.

Now, however, I should like to ask the members of the Council to consider, not only the legal and the practical and political significance of this obligation, on the part of France, to take independent action, but also, and above all, to ask themselves whether it is probable that the German Government which signed the Locarno Agreements

would ever have done so if the Treaty had contained such one-sided burdens as are now found to be in it.

Germany and France, by virtue of the Locarno Agreements, had renounced any resort to armed force in their mutual relations. Germany, on her part, as already stated, tacitly accepted the fact of the existence of treaties of mutual assistance with Poland and Czechoslovakia adjusted to the Locarno Pact. But subsequently to interpret the Locarno Pact as leaving it open to one of the parties to contract, without restriction, new mutual assistance obligations of a military character against the other party, over and above those existing when the Pact was signed, is absolutely impossible, according to the firm conviction and legal opinion of the German Government, having regard to its political obligations towards the German nation. It would mean, in the long run, that, in any conflict between Germany and a third State, France would be entitled to intervene as she thought fit, with the result that Germany (who has herself entered into no military alliances with other States) would become subject, under the treaty, to conditions of so unequal a character that no State could reasonably be expected to accept them.

If, at the time when the Locarno Pact was concluded, such an interpretation had been agreed to, it would have been expressly noted in the agreement, in which each separate point is considered so thoroughly and in such detail. But, up to the time of the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Treaty, no attempt was ever made to give the text subsequently such an interpretation. In any case, the German Government, which in this matter is alone competent, must declare, so far as it is concerned, that, under such conditions, the Locarno Agreement would never have been signed; for, if such conceptions had existed at the time, it would have been the duty of the contracting parties to draw attention to them. This, however, was not done then nor at any other subsequent time until France gave the pact an extended interpretation and thereby destroyed its original meaning.

Over and above that, however, the alliance between France and Soviet Russia, according to the historical view of the German Government, has yet another significance: it involves a complete disturbance of the present European equilibrium, and therewith the destruction of the fundamental political and legal conditions under which the Locarno Agreement was signed.

The assertion of the French Government, that this new pact was necessary as a counterweight to German rearmament, is obviously due to a misconception, for the Locarno Agreement presupposed the

restoration of equality of rights in military matters between Germany and France, inasmuch as it confirmed, in its Final Protocol, the obligation of France and of other States to disarm as Germany had done. And it is only because France refused to establish equality of armaments in this way that Germany was compelled to take its own course to attain the goal of effective equilibrium as prescribed by the Locarno Pact itself.

It is not necessary for me to state here that Germany, on her part, has not entered into any kind of military alliance.

The German Government therefore takes the view that the Franco-Soviet Treaty, both in its letter and in its political meaning, is in contradiction to the Western-European security system of Locarno, and that, accordingly, the Rhine Pact of Locarno has been violated by the unilateral action of France and is thus, in point of fact, terminated.

As the members of the Council know, Germany took steps, immediately after the publication of the Franco-Soviet Treaty, to point out to the other signatory Powers of the Locarno Agreement the incompatibility of this alliance with the Pact of Locarno. Moreover, Germany maintained this standpoint in the diplomatic negotiations that followed. Nevertheless, France adhered to the established facts and finally proceeded with the ratification by its legislative bodies.

The German Chancellor could not indefinitely remain inactive in view of these developments. In the years since he became German Chancellor, he has again and again extended the hand of friendship towards France. He has made quite a number of peace offers to the world.

The offer for absolute disarmament: it was rejected.

The offer of a general equality on a basis of an army of 200,000 men: that too was rejected.

The offer of an army of 300,000 men: it also was rejected.

The offer of an air pact was rejected on the ground that such a pact could only be agreed to in combination with Germany's adhesion to an Eastern Pact.

The offer of a comprehensive European peace settlement of May 21, 1935, was simply ignored, with the exception of the proposal which subsequently led to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement.

Again and again the German Chancellor has put forward his peace proposals, and—I can here say—he and the whole of Germany hoped that the Franco-Soviet Agreement would not be ratified. When the French Chamber ratified the Franco-Soviet Pact, however, the German Chancellor, conscious of his obligations and his responsibility

for the destiny and the security of the people entrusted to him, drew the only possible conclusion from France's action. He re-established the full sovereignty of the Reich over the whole German territory. The determining factor in this decision of the German Government was the political consideration and its regard, in accordance with its actual duty, for the fact that:

- (1) The Pact of Locarno, through the unilateral action of France, has been stripped of its value and thus destroyed both in its letter and in its historical meaning.
- (2) In view of the new Franco-Russian military alliance, Germany must claim without further delay the most elementary right of a nation to take measures to secure its own territory.

The German Government must therefore reject, as unfounded and unjust, the reproach of a unilateral breach of the Locarno Treaty. It was no longer possible for it to break a treaty which, in point of fact, by the action taken by the other party, had ceased to exist.

Furthermore, it is inadmissible that one party should act against the letter and the spirit of a treaty while at the same time requiring the other to maintain the treaty in the same letter and spirit.

On March 7, Germany did nothing but draw the natural conclusions, as a great Power, from a state of affairs which had come about through no fault of her own. I am firmly convinced that every one of the responsible statesmen here present, who love their nation as the German Chancellor loves his, would have done exactly the same under similar circumstances.

At this juncture, I would like to make the following declaration on behalf of the German Government:

If one State suddenly concludes a military pact against another, such action constitutes just as much a new state of affairs as the consequent reaction on the part of the State against which the pact is directed, particularly if this reaction involves nothing but the restoration of full sovereignty within its own boundaries. If, therefore, the reproach of unilateral action is put forward, then, indeed, Germany must reject that reproach so long as it is not also put forward against France. The representatives of the French Government, have, it is true, pointed out, in this regard, that Germany had the possibility, indeed the duty, of bringing the question of the compatibility of the new military alliance with the Locarno Agreement in the first place before an international tribunal, and some members of the Council have again raised the question of the settlement of the dispute by arbitration. I am not going to dwell

upon the question why France, in presence of the German representations, did not take this course before the coming into force of the alliance. Neither am I going to dwell on the other important question whether it would be admissible at all to submit the scope of a provision like that of Article 16 of the Covenant—because this would be the article involved in the present case—to a judicial body for decision. It is sufficient, in my opinion, to refer to the decisive fact that we are here concerned with a problem which, besides its purely legal aspects, is of undoubted political importance of the first magnitude, and its proper clarification and solution cannot therefore be expected of a judicial body.

It would have been just as unlikely for the German Government—and I deeply regret to have to say this—to have obtained satisfaction by way of negotiations with the signatory Powers. After all the experiences of the last few years, and after the way in which things have developed—for which development the German Government is not to blame—it was clear to the German Government that this method would never have achieved practical results. The French Government and the Governments of the other signatory Powers have, in diplomatic discussions, ignored the German arguments for reasons which are unknown to us, and which are still incomprehensible to us to-day.

Two things were plain to the German Government:

- (1) France was no longer prepared to give up the Treaty with the Soviet Union; and
- (2) France would not have been prepared to grant Germany the only possible compensation for the coming into force of this alliance—namely, the restoration of Germany's sovereignty over the western provinces of the Reich.

It was hardly to be expected therefore, after the countless sad experiences which, as I have said, Germany has had, for years, with her numerous proposals, that these conditions would be accepted. Further, it is clear that, when a great Power like France can, as an act of sovereignty, decide to enter into military alliances of such a vast extent without considering existing treaties, another great Power like Germany possesses at least the right to assure the protection of the whole area of the Reich by restoring, within her own boundaries, the natural rights of sovereignty which are granted to all nations.

I have noted very carefully the observations made by the representatives of other Powers on the Council. But I regret to have to say that none of them has taken into account the German ideas which

I have just developed once more. I am glad, however, to note that the representatives of some other Powers have made far-reaching observations opening up new prospects for the future, and I am now going to deal with this constructive part of the problem.

Now that the restoration of the sovereignty of the Reich over its whole territory has been accomplished and the equality of rights ardently desired for so many years has thus at last been established, the German people are willing and ready to close the sad chapter of moral and legal confusions and misunderstandings in Europe, of which they have been the chief victim. With the termination of the Locarno Treaty, the last relic of those discriminating conditions, born of the spirit of hatred and imposed on a great people, has vanished too. A heavy moral and political burden has been removed from the German people, which now at last, after seventeen years, sees itself re-established in honour and freedom.

This German people has now only one sincere desire: to live in peace and friendship with its neighbours and from now onwards to co-operate to the best of its ability in the building up of a real European solidarity. Germany wishes in future to make her arrangements with the other States free and unhampered as a sovereign nation. In doing so, she wishes to terminate the long period of Franco-German tensions, crises and wars, and wishes finally, on her side, to pave the way for a better future of understanding and friendship between the two great nations. This is the wish which the German people cherish within their hearts.

The historical and unique offer which the German Chancellor made to the world for securing the peace of Europe was conceived in this spirit: an agreement guaranteeing the peace of Europe for twenty-five years—that is to say, a work of peace is to be created, stretching far beyond the generation of the men called upon by history to achieve this work to-day.

I am well aware that the Council is not the competent body for dealing with the suggestions, but I want nevertheless to call its attention at this stage to their secular importance. Together with the restoration of German sovereignty, they represent one political unit and can, therefore, not be left out of account by the Council in any endeavour to reach historically sound conclusions on the political character and the mentality underlying an action which, by removing the last remnants of discrimination among the great European nations, lays the foundation for a new great European community of the future. The indispensable condition for economic and social prosperity of this European family of nations is the consolidation

of peace which, in its beneficial effects, cannot be replaced by any aggressive action, however successful such action might be.

It is unnecessary for me to comment upon the substance and the importance of the German proposals. They are so wide and comprehensive that any statesman who really cares for the well-being of Europe must wish to see them realized soon in one shape or another.

In view of this situation, I wish to express the hope that the Council, forgetting the susceptibilities of the moment, will appreciate the importance of the historical decision it is called upon to take and which is to pave the way for a better future for our peaceless Europe.

(m) *Extract from Statement by the Rt. Hon. S. M. Bruce (Australia: President), March 19, 1936.*¹

Before the vote is taken on the resolution that has been submitted by the representative of France on behalf of France and Belgium, it is necessary that for a few moments I should dissociate myself from my position as President of the Council and express, as the representative of Australia, the views of my Government.

I listened this morning with great attention to the very full statement which was made by the German representative. It has, however, not altered my views as to the proper course which it is my duty to pursue in regard to the immediate issue that is before the Council. That issue arises out of the Locarno Agreements, to which some of us at this Council table were not parties. That fact, however, does not mean that we have not a very great interest and a great responsibility in regard to the situation which has arisen.

We have one immediate duty. That duty arises under Article 4 of the Treaty of Locarno, which reads:

‘If one of the High Contracting Parties alleges that a violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.

‘As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its finding without delay to the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. . . .’

The Governments of France and Belgium have brought to the notice of the Council of the League circumstances such as are con-

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 339.

templated in Article 4, and the representative of France, on behalf of France and Belgium, has submitted a resolution inviting the Council to declare that the German Government has committed a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Locarno Treaty.

Upon that resolution, it is now the duty of the Council to pronounce. On behalf of the Government of Australia, I declare that I propose to vote in favour of the resolution.

The duties of the Council, however, are not concluded by such a pronouncement and the notification of the decision of the Council to the signatories of the Treaty of Locarno. A further duty is imposed on the Council because the Treaty of Locarno was made part of the general system for the maintenance of security and world peace which is the basis of the Covenant of the League. Article 7 of the Treaty of Locarno stipulates:

‘The present Treaty, which is designed to ensure the maintenance of peace, and is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.’

The issue which confronts us to-day is fundamental to the whole system that it has been the endeavour of the nations to create since the termination of the world war. That system is based on the scrupulous observance of treaties and upon the fact that no Power can free itself from the obligations it has undertaken by unilateral action.

It is now for the Powers primarily concerned to take counsel with a view to resolving the situation which now confronts us.

During the period that must elapse while these important negotiations are proceeding, it is essential that all the Powers concerned should individually be prepared to make some contribution towards the maintenance of the situation until a satisfactory solution can be found. I am not without hope that such a measure of co-operation will be forthcoming. The statements made by the representatives of France and Belgium showed, under the most trying conditions, a restraint and a moderation that have impressed the world.

In many speeches, the German Chancellor has expressed his willingness and his desire to live in peace and friendship and to co-operate in creating a true European solidarity. That sentiment was again reiterated on behalf of the German people by their representative this morning.

Surely, in this atmosphere, it will be possible for a solution to be found.

But behind the immediate issue which confronts us is the wide question of the whole system for the maintenance of security and peace in the world. To the solution of that problem must be addressed the minds, not only of the Locarno Powers and the States Members of the League, but of all nations.

In the light of the experience of the years since the war, it is necessary that we should review the whole system of co-operation and common action for the maintenance of these great ideals.

In this task, it is the duty of the Council of the League to give a lead.

Unless as a result of that review we can so strengthen the system as to ensure the fulfilment of its obligations by every nation, it is idle to persist in an ideal which engenders a sense of false security and which creates incalculable dangers.

If there are no other observations, I now propose to proceed to the vote. . . .

(n) Resolution adopted by the League Council, March 19, 1936.¹

The Council of the League of Nations,

On the application of Belgium and France, made to it on March 8, 1936:

Finds that the German Government has committed a breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles by causing, on March 7, 1936, military forces to enter and establish themselves in the demilitarized zone referred to in Article 42 and the following articles of that Treaty, and in the Treaty of Locarno ;

Instructs the Secretary-General, in application of Article 4, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Locarno, to notify this finding of the Council without delay to the Powers signatories of that Treaty.

Note: A vote was taken by roll-call, with the following result: *For the resolution:* Argentine Republic, Denmark, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Turkey, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Australia, United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, France. *Against the resolution:* Germany. *Abstention:* Chile. *Absent:* Ecuador.

In recording his vote, M. Edwards, the Chilean representative, made the following declaration:

'As the resolution proposed establishes a close connexion between the violation of the Treaty of Versailles (which has not been disputed and is recognized by Chile as a fact, in respect of which she would be prepared to give an affirmative vote) and that of the Treaty of Locarno (which is

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 340.

disputed on legal grounds, with the result that Chile is unable to pronounce on the matter in the absence of an advisory opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice), and as Chile is not a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles and Locarno, I abstain from voting.'

(o) *Statement by Herr von Ribbentrop (Germany), March 19, 1936.*¹

The German Government is profoundly convinced that it must reject the Council's resolution and must enter a formal protest against it. It is not Germany which has broken the Treaty of Locarno; it is France, by concluding a military alliance with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Germany's act of March 7, by which she re-established her full sovereignty over her territory—the elementary right of a nation in the defence of its frontiers—is solely the consequence of France's act. This morning, I made a comprehensive statement of the German Government's views, from the juridical and political standpoint, and if the Council had had more time to study that statement, it would, I think, have arrived at a different resolution.

The German Government and the whole German nation are convinced that the resolution which the Council has adopted will not be ratified by history.

(p) *Statement by M. Flandin (France), March 19, 1936.*²

The representative of France would not have made any declaration if the representative of the German Government had not thought fit to do so. As it is, I must point out that, under international law, no one has the right to take the law into his own hands, and I solemnly repeat here the declaration I have already made to the effect that I, for my part, am ready, if the German Government so desires and requests, to have the dispute which the representative of the German Government has seen fit to raise again, settled by the highest international court—namely, the Permanent Court of International Justice, which is placed under the high authority of the League of Nations.

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), p. 340.

² *Ibid.*, p. 341.

II. PROPOSALS FOR A EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT¹

WHILE the League Council was considering the Franco-Belgian protest against Germany, the four Locarno Powers had been engaged in parallel discussions on the draft of a general agreement to repair the rifts in the structure of European peace which had been caused by the German action of March 7. The result of their labours was a series of proposals adopted on March 19.² The Powers reaffirmed to one another that nothing had occurred to free them as signatories of the Locarno Treaties from the obligations contained therein which continued to subsist in their entirety; further, it was agreed that the General Staffs should make contact to arrange the technical details for meeting an act of unprovoked aggression. Draft letters to be addressed by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Italy to Belgium and France on this point were annexed to the proposals.³ Germany was invited to submit her case against the Franco-Soviet Pact to the Permanent Court of International Justice and to agree to accept its decision; she was also urged to agree not to increase her regular troops or other forces in the Rhineland pending further negotiations, nor to build fortifications. An international force including British and Italian detachments should, it was proposed, be stationed temporarily in a zone twenty kilometres wide on the German side of the Rhine, the whole operation to be supervised by an international commission.

Should Germany agree to these proposals, she would be invited to take part in negotiations on the German offer of March 7 relative to a Western Air Pact and non-aggression agreement; the negotiations would also embrace the revision of the status of the Rhineland and the conclusion of mutual assistance agreements open to all signatories of Locarno.

The Four-Power Proposals also envisaged a recommendation to the Council of the League to invite all States concerned to a conference to deal with the limitation of armaments, the organization of collective security on 'a precise and effective basis', the extension and improvement of international economic and trade relations, the German proposals for a return to the League and their suggestions regarding Austria and Czechoslovakia.

These proposals were referred for consideration to the League Council together with a draft resolution embodying their import, and suggesting certain action to be taken by the League.⁴

The whole course of the negotiations and the decisions arrived at were reviewed on March 20 by Mr. Anthony Eden before the House of Commons,⁵ and by MM. Flandin and van Zeeland before the French⁶ and Belgian Chambers.⁷ Great satisfaction was evinced in Paris and Brussels at the British undertaking to afford immediate support in the event of unprovoked aggression, the Belgian Premier stating that for the first time in history Great Britain had made her decision with a given hypothesis in view before that hypothesis became a fact.

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part III (i).

² See below, p. 127.

³ See below, p. 132.

⁴ See below, p. 131.

⁵ See below, p. 133.

⁶ See below, p. 137.

⁷ See below, p. 143.

The proposals of the four Locarno Powers were communicated to the League Council on March 20. At once some uncertainty arose as to what action should be taken on them, most delegates preferring to have greater leisure to consider such important information. Signor Grandi reported that though the documents concerned had been despatched to Rome, the Italian Government had not yet pronounced upon them, and Colonel Beck argued vehemently against the presentation of European and even universal proposals by a restricted group of Powers. Poland, he added, must retain her absolute freedom of judgment.¹

The Council adjourned until Tuesday, March 24, on which date the Chairman stated his reasons for the Council doing no more than taking note of the Four-Power Proposals.² A resolution was adopted on the same day declaring that any further action by the Council 'should remain in abeyance for the present' in view of the conversations then being carried on.

The results of the Four-Power discussions had been communicated by Mr. Eden to Herr von Ribbentrop on March 19, and by the British Ambassador in Berlin to Baron von Neurath, with the express understanding that they were proposals and not final decisions, and that the German Government was at liberty to make counter-proposals. The preliminary reply from Berlin was brought by Herr von Ribbentrop on March 24.³ The German Government reaffirmed its previous position both as regards the breach of Locarno and the Council resolution regarding it and, on that basis, Germany rejected the proposals on all points which represented discrimination against Germany and impaired, or sought to impair, her equality of rights. Nevertheless, Germany would comply with the British suggestions by presenting new and detailed proposals on March 31. Further light on the German attitude was provided in an interview granted by Herr von Ribbentrop, after his conversation with Mr. Eden, to Mr. G. Ward Price, of the *Daily Mail*.⁴

Having been informed of the terms of the German Reply, the French Ambassador, M. Corbin, told Mr. Anthony Eden that, in the view of his Government, France had made important and valuable concessions and had a right to expect that the draft proposals would be considered by Herr Hitler as an indivisible whole.

Before the House of Commons on March 26 Mr. Eden gave a further and more detailed account of recent negotiations.⁵ He was at pains to emphasize that as between the four remaining Locarno Powers the obligations of Locarno still existed unaffected by the events of the past weeks—'I am not prepared', he said, 'to be the first British Foreign Secretary to go back on a British signature'—but, while the obligations still existed, they had not been increased by the Four-Power Proposals under consideration. Mr. Eden, to allay any anxiety that the Staff Conversations referred to therein should be in any way compared with those which took place between Great Britain and France prior to 1914, said that a paragraph would be inserted in the final text similar to that which had already existed in an agreement between France and Belgium, namely, 'It is understood that this contact [between the General Staffs]

¹ See below, p. 151.

² See below, p. 153.

³ See below, p. 154.

⁴ See below, p. 157.

⁵ See below, p. 159.

does not imply any political undertaking or any obligation as regards defence organization between the two parties.' Referring to the new negotiations which were about to open, the Foreign Secretary insisted that if they were to succeed Germany would have to help to make them possible. So far she had not done so, and he understood that she had refused to refrain from fortifying the Rhineland Zone.

Far more outspoken criticism of Germany came from M. Flandin when, on March 30, he addressed his constituents at Vézelay.¹ It was impossible to ignore the fact, he told them, that there existed a profound contradiction between the two concepts of life which to-day were opposed to one another; for Germany there was the rule of force, for the rest of the world the rule of law. What was the value of any future treaty if it could be repudiated in the name of 'eternal morality and the vital rights of the German people'? M. Flandin compared Herr Hitler's frequent protestations in the cause of peace with the actions of his Government and with the significant fact that, at moments when he was launching these pacific appeals, Nazi propaganda was increasing in Austria, Slesvig, Polish Silesia, and Czechoslovakia, and even in the German cantons of Switzerland.

When, on March 7, Herr Hitler proclaimed to the Reichstag the re-occupation of the Rhineland he also dissolved that body and appointed March 29 for the holding of new elections which should give the German people an opportunity to endorse his policy. Throughout the period, therefore, occupied by the discussions of the Locarno Powers and the League Council, the electoral campaign was in full swing. The purport of all the speeches made by the *Führer* and his principal lieutenants, General Göring and Dr. Goebbels, was the emphatic desire of Germany for peace and the efforts which her Government had made to achieve it.² Herr Hitler declared at Munich on March 15 that he chose something which was worth a thousand gestures by putting forward a scheme which would ensure the peace of Europe for a quarter of a century; on the other hand, the Four-Power Proposals were subjected to ridicule.

The elections, when held on March 29, recorded the remarkable fact that 99 per cent. of the electorate had gone to the poll and 98·8 per cent. of the votes cast were in favour of Herr Hitler.

Two days after this notable electoral success the *Führer*, as he had promised, despatched to London the German counter-proposals.³ They were accompanied by a covering memorandum in which was reiterated the determination of the German people 'to preserve under all circumstances their freedom, their independence, and at the same time their equality of status'. The draft proposals of the Four Powers were not deemed to be compatible with this determination, but were rather felt to be 'unilaterally onerous to Germany'. Particular exception was taken to the provision for contacts and conversations between the General Staffs, it being felt that 'such discussions would be seriously prejudicial if arrangements between General Staffs were reached before the conclusion of the new security pacts'.

Having thus disposed of the Four-Power Proposals, the German Memorandum proceeded to make concrete suggestions, but first it defined

¹ See below, p. 171.

² See below, pp. 178-82.

³ See below, p. 183.

the task confronting the statesmen of Europe as falling into three parts: first, a 'cooling-off' period for elucidating the procedure for negotiations to be initiated; secondly, a period of actual negotiation for securing the peace of Europe; and, thirdly, a later period for dealing with such questions as disarmament, economic and trade relations, &c. There followed a nineteen point programme whereby these aims were to be attained. In the main these consisted of the repeated offer of a twenty-five years non-aggression pact and of an air pact in the West, and of negotiations for non-aggression pacts with Germany's eastern and south-eastern neighbours; proposals for moral disarmament; an offer to return to the League of Nations with the 'expectation' that the questions of colonial equality and of the divorcing of the Covenant from the Treaty of Versailles would be cleared up; a proposal for the establishment of a special International Court of Arbitration; and, finally, a proposed 'exchange of views' on arms limitation, aerial warfare, and economic subjects to take place after the conclusion of the political agreements.

Mr. Eden described these proposals in the House of Commons on April 3¹ as 'most important and deserving of careful study'. At the same time he intimated that in certain respects they were not acceptable as a basis of discussion as they stood, and that, in respect of the interim period, the German Government had not been able to meet the special appeal of the British Government for a contribution. Mr. Eden repeated the intention of the British Government to give certain undertakings to France and Belgium if negotiations failed and to reaffirm the existing obligations under Locarno. Referring to the despatch to Belgium and France on April 1² of the Notes contemplated in the March proposals, the Foreign Secretary stated that conversations of a purely technical character between the General Staffs had now been authorized, strictly in relation to their obligations and involving no political commitments, and these conversations would be held in London. To all these points the French and Belgian Governments had agreed.³ Returning to the German proposals on April 6, Mr. Eden told the House that the Government could not agree to any conference of the Locarno Powers which might imply that conciliation had failed, but that he would take advantage of the forthcoming meeting of the Committee of Thirteen [Italo-Abyssinian dispute] at Geneva to have informal talks with the French and Belgian Foreign Ministers.⁴

The reply of the French Government to the German counter-proposals was to produce a peace plan of their own, which, together with a covering memorandum, was addressed to the British Government and communicated to the Belgian and Italian Governments on April 8. The memorandum was in the nature of a reply to the German proposals, with many of which it dealt in ironical tones.⁵ Having described the German Plan as a

¹ See below, p. 192.

² See below, p. 175. The notes were despatched by the British Government alone, the Italian Government declining to give a similar guarantee as long as sanctions were in operation.

³ On the same day the German Ambassador in London intimated that though Germany could not now postpone the fortification of the Rhineland, her attitude in that respect might be modified if the Staff Conversations were postponed.

⁴ See below, p. 194.

⁵ See below, p. 197.

contribution 'more apparent than real', the memorandum continued that the German attitude towards the question of fortifying the Rhineland Zone was the touchstone of Germany's intentions, which would decide whether she was really prepared to admit the principle of collective security. Failing this, France could regard the plan only as plainly inadequate. Some vital questions were then put to the German Government: 'Does the vital right of people authorize the unilateral cancellation of engagements? Does Germany unreservedly recognize as valid the present territorial and political statute of Europe? Does she admit that respect for this statute can be guaranteed by agreements concluded on the basis of mutual assistance?'

The French Plan consisted of twenty-five points, and reproduced many of the ideas contained in previous plans.¹ Collective security was to be achieved by mutual assistance and disarmament, or, failing this, by a system of regional pacts within the European framework, of which the organization would be in the hands of a European Commission within the framework of the League. Measures for economic co-operation would follow the establishment of the new system, and, in view of the double need for a common reservoir of raw materials and for territory for expansion of surplus European production, it was proposed that a lead should be given to the revision of certain colonial statutes, not under the heading of political sovereignty but from the point of view of equality of economic rights and co-operation of credit between European States.

As indicated by Mr. Eden in the House of Commons, the meeting of the Committee of Thirteen at Geneva provided an opportunity for discussion between the representatives of the four Locarno Powers. This took place on April 10, and resulted in the issuing of a *communiqué* which represented the outcome of consideration of the German and French proposals.² It was agreed that, though the German Plan was disappointing in that it made no contribution to the re-establishment of confidence indispensable for the negotiations of new treaties, it was desirable to explore all the opportunities for conciliation, and that consequently elucidation should be sought on a number of points in the German Memorandum, especially those to which attention had been drawn in the French Memorandum. The British Government was charged with this task. The date for the beginning of the Conversations between the General Staffs was fixed for April 15 in London, and it was further agreed to submit the French Plan to the League for examination and to request the consent of Germany for a similar submission of the German Plan. In the event of any changes occurring in the Rhineland Zone the representatives agreed to meet at once, and, in any case, during the session of the League Council which opened on May 11. The Italian representative reserved the attitude of his Government in view of the situation arising out of the application of sanctions.³

In the discharge of its task the British Government on May 6 duly despatched a *questionnaire* to Berlin,⁴ requesting elucidation of certain points in the German Plan which appeared vague and equivocal, and giving

¹ See *Documents* for 1932, pp. 160 and 217.

² See below, p. 210.

⁴ See below, p. 211.

³ See below, p. 211.

particular attention to the meaning attached by the German Government to the bilateral treaties which it proposed, and the way in which these treaties would fall into the framework of collective security or of the mutual assistance provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations. Did Germany now regard herself as in a position to conclude 'genuine treaties'? Other questions included an inquiry as to the exact meaning of Germany's declared willingness to conclude pacts of non-aggression with her south-eastern and north-eastern neighbours. Did these latter include the U.S.S.R., Latvia, and Estonia?

No reply had been received from Germany when the representatives met at Geneva on May 12, and it was agreed that all decisions should be postponed until a later meeting to be held after the German Government should have made known its reply. But Berlin remained silent¹, and the position was still further complicated by the virtual departure of Italy from the Locarno camp and the evolution in the autumn of 1936 of the 'Berlin-Rome axis'.

When the statesmen of Europe met again at Geneva for the League Assembly in July, it was agreed (on July 3) between the representatives of Great Britain, France, and Belgium that special meetings of the Locarno Powers should take place 'at an early date' to discuss the situation; the initiative was left in the hands of the Belgian Government.²

M. van Zeeland thereupon issued his invitation on July 8 for a conference in Brussels to be held at a date to be fixed later. Acceptances were received from Great Britain and France, but the Italian Government replied on July 11 that it had been 'obliged to take account of the existence of certain Mediterranean undertakings which form an obstacle to Italy's participation in the work of co-operation in which she is so earnestly interested'. It was also urged that Germany should be invited to the meeting.³

The members of the depleted Locarno group, now numbering three, consulted together and reached the conclusion, announced simultaneously from London, Paris, and Brussels on July 21, that their representatives should meet together in London two days later 'to examine the situation, and to consider how best to further the desire of the three Powers to consolidate the peace of Europe by means of a general settlement'. The representatives of the three Powers accordingly met on July 23 and resolved to take steps to arrange a meeting of the five Locarno Powers as soon as was conveniently possible, 'to negotiate a new agreement to take the place of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, and to resolve, through the collaboration of all concerned, the situation created by the German initiative of March 7'.⁴

Formal invitations were despatched to Germany and Italy on the following day, and a week later (July 31) an identic and qualified acceptance 'in principle' was received from both Powers.⁵ But in spite of reminders and proposals (not published) sent by the British Government to the four other Powers on September 18, November 4, and November 19, which were favourably received by Belgium and France, the conference was not

¹ No reply was ever received to the British *questionnaire* apart from an indirect reference in Herr Hitler's speech on January 30, 1937.

² See below, p. 218.

⁴ See below, p. 218.

³ See below, p. 218.

⁵ See below, pp. 219, 220.

destined during 1936 to proceed beyond the stage of 'preliminary preparations'. Parallel negotiations, however, between Great Britain, France, and Belgium regarding the international status of the latter proceeded during the winter and were successfully concluded in April 1937.¹

I. PROPOSALS BY THE LOCARNO POWERS.

(i)(a) *Text of Proposals drawn up by the Representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom and Italy, March 19, 1936.*²

The representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of Italy, having met to examine the situation created by the communication addressed to their respective Governments by the German Government on March 7, 1936.

I

Take note of the draft resolution³ submitted to the Council of the League of Nations in the name of Belgium and France, by which the fact of the breach by Germany of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been established with a view to giving notice thereof to the Powers Signatories of the Treaty of Locarno.

They further take note of the support given to this draft resolution by the Governments of the United Kingdom and Italy.

II

Whereas:

- (1) Scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations is a fundamental principle of international life and an essential condition of the maintenance of peace;
- (2) It is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty nor modify the stipulations thereof except with the consent of the other Contracting Parties;
- (3) The breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and the unilateral action taken by the German Government in violation of the Treaty of Locarno without recourse to the procedure laid down by the Treaty of Locarno for the settlement of disputes conflict with these principles;

¹ See below, p. 239.

² British White Paper, Cmd. 5134; *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), pp. 348-51.

³ See above, p. 119.

Consider that:

- (1) By this unilateral action the German Government confers upon itself no legal rights;
- (2) This unilateral action by introducing a new disturbing element into the international situation must necessarily appear to be a threat to European security.

III

Declare that nothing that has happened before or since the said breach of the Treaty of Locarno can be considered as having freed the Signatories of that Treaty from any of their obligations or guarantees and that the latter subsist in their entirety.

Undertake forthwith to instruct their General Staffs to enter into contact with a view to arranging the technical conditions in which the obligations which are binding upon them should be carried out in case of unprovoked aggression.

IV

Decide to invite the German Government to lay before the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague the argument which it claims to draw from the incompatibility between the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance and the Treaty of Locarno, and to undertake to accept as final the decision of the said Court, without prejudice to the operation of paragraph VII (2) below.

The French Government declares that it has already agreed that the said Court should be seized of the question stated above.¹

V

Decide in the name of their Governments jointly to invite the German Government to subscribe to the following provisional arrangements, which shall remain valid until the conclusion of the negotiations referred to in paragraph VII below:

- (1) All despatch of troops or war material into the zone defined by Article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles will be immediately suspended; in consequence, the forces stationed there will not exceed . . . battalions and . . . batteries of artillery (insert here the official figures given by the German Government);
- (2) The para-military forces (S.A., S.S., Labour Corps and other organizations) stationed in the said zone will be strictly maintained as they were before March 7, 1936; in particular they shall in no case be formed into large units or serve directly or indirectly for the reinforcement of troops;

¹ See above, pp. 34 and 120.

- (3) No works of fortification or preparation of groundworks shall be proceeded with in the said zone. No landing ground will be laid out, equipped or improved there.

The Governments of France and of Belgium undertake similarly to suspend during the period any despatch of troops into the zones adjoining the frontiers between their countries and Germany.

VI

Decide to take, for the same period, all the necessary measures with a view to:

- (1) Create an international force, including detachments from the armies of the guarantor Powers, to be stationed, with the agreement of all the Governments concerned, in a zone contained between the Belgian-German and Franco-German frontiers on one side, and on the other a line situated to the East of the said frontiers and following them at a distance of approximately 20 kilom., this zone being entirely reserved for occupation by the said international force;
- (2) Set up an international commission whose duty it shall be to supervise the carrying out of the obligations undertaken by the Powers which have formed the above-mentioned force, as well as by Belgium, France, and Germany for the eventual execution of paragraphs v and vi (1) above.

VII

Taking note of the proposals made by Germany in the memorandum communicated to them on March 7,

Decide, so far as they are concerned—

To propose to the German Government, if that Government explicitly accepts the invitations addressed to it in pursuance of the preceding paragraphs, that it should take part in negotiations which would be based in particular on the following elements:

- (1) Examination of the proposals Nos. 2 to 5 made by Germany in the memorandum of March 7;
- (2) Revision of the Status of the Rhineland;
- (3) Drawing up of mutual assistance pacts open to all the signatories of the Treaty of Locarno, and intended to reinforce their security.

So far as concerns the Four Powers represented in London, the reinforcement of their security provided for will include in particular obligations of mutual assistance between Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, or any of them, with suitable provisions to

ensure prompt action by the signatories in case of need as well as technical arrangements for the preparation of such measures as would ensure the effective execution of the obligations undertaken.

Further, the four Powers declare that they have agreed to press, in the course of the negotiations, for the adoption of provisions intended to prohibit or to limit the subsequent establishment of fortifications in a zone to be determined.

VIII

Considering that the maintenance of peace and the organization of collective security can only be assured by the respect for treaties and the limitation of armaments; that the re-establishment of economic relations between the nations on a healthy basis is equally necessary to the process of reconstruction,

Declare themselves ready—

To support the introduction at the Council of the League of Nations of resolutions proposing to invite all the nations concerned to an international conference which would in particular examine—

- (1) Agreements organizing on a precise and effective basis the system of collective security, and paying attention to the definition of the conditions in which Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations should be applied;
- (2) Agreements tending to assure the effective limitation of armaments;
- (3) International arrangements having as their object the extension of economic relations and the organization of commerce between the nations;
- (4) The proposals 6 and 7 made by the German Government in their memorandum of March 7, as well as the suggestions made subsequently in regard to Austria and Czechoslovakia.¹

IX

Recalling that, under Article 7 of the Treaty of Locarno, the obligations devolving upon their respective Governments do not restrict the duty of the League of Nations to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world;

Referring to the resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of April 17, 1935,² regarding the course to be adopted by the members of the League of Nations in the event of the unilateral repudiation of

¹ See above, p. 57.

² See *Documents for 1935*, vol. i, p. 98.

undertakings concerning the security of peoples and the maintenance of peace in Europe ;

Decide—

- (1) To notify the Council of the League of Nations, under Article 11 of the Covenant, of the unilateral action taken by Germany, action which appears a danger for European security and a threat to peace ;
- (2) Consequently to propose the annexed resolutions to the Council of the League of Nations, it being understood that the German Government would be entitled to present its observations on the subject.

(b) Draft Resolution to be presented to the League Council.

I. The Council:

Recalling that it has itself on several occasions recognized, as has also the Assembly, the importance of the Treaties of Locarno from the point of view of the maintenance of peace and security.

Considering that:

- (1) Scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations is a fundamental principle of international life and an essential condition of the maintenance of peace ;
- (2) It is an essential principle of the law of nations that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a Treaty nor modify the stipulations thereof unless with the consent of the other contracting parties ;
- (3) The breach of Article 43 of the Treaty of Versailles and the unilateral action taken by the German Government in violation of the Treaty of Locarno without recourse to the procedure laid down by the Treaty of Locarno for the settlement of disputes, conflicts with these principles ;

Considers that:

- (1) By this unilateral action the German Government confers upon itself no legal rights ;
- (2) This unilateral action, by introducing a new disturbing element into the international situation, must necessarily appear to be a threat to European security.

Entrusts a committee composed of . . . with the task of making proposals to it with regard to the practical measures to be recommended to the Members of the League of Nations.

II. Considering:

That the German Government has claimed that the Franco-Soviet Pact of Mutual Assistance is incompatible with the Treaty of Locarno, and that in consequence of this incompatibility that Government was justified, not only in denouncing the said treaty, but also in introducing its troops into the demilitarized zone.

That there thus arises a juridical question which might be usefully taken before the Permanent Court of International Justice if the interested Powers were to declare themselves ready to comply with the decision of the Court, as the French Government for its part has already agreed to do.

The Council:

Invites the German Government to notify the Permanent Court of International Justice of the question thus defined and in the conditions indicated above, and to request it to give its decision as soon as possible, it being understood that the parties will at once comply with the ruling of the Court.

III. Considering:

That the unilateral action of Germany has necessarily appeared to be a threat to European peace, and that in consequence it ought, without prejudice to the application of Articles 1 and 4 of the Locarno Treaty, to bring about on the part of the Members of the League of Nations, by application of, and in accordance with the terms of Article 11 of the Covenant, the adoption of any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations;

The Council takes note:

- (1) Of the declaration drawn up in the name of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, as regards the maintenance in force for those Powers of the rights and obligations resulting from the Treaty of Locarno;
- (2) Of the communications made to it by the Governments of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, on the subject of the measures contemplated in respect of the situation created by the violation of the zone defined in Article 42 of the Treaty of Versailles.

(c) *Letters to be addressed by the Representatives of the United Kingdom and Italy to the Representatives of Belgium and France.*

At the moment when the representatives of Belgium, France, Great Britain, and Italy have just decided, as provided in to-day's

arrangement, the common line of conduct of their respective Governments, I am authorized to give you the official assurance that, if the effort of conciliation attempted in the said arrangement should fail, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom/the Italian Government:—

1.—(a) Will at once consider, in consultation with your Government and the French/Belgian Government, the steps to be taken to meet the new situation thus created;

(b) Will immediately come to the assistance of your Government, in accordance with the Treaty of Locarno, in respect of any measures which shall be jointly decided upon;

(c) Will, in return for reciprocal assurances from your Government, take, in consultation with your Government, all practical measures available to His Majesty's Government for the purpose of ensuring the security of your country against unprovoked aggression;

(d) Will, for this purpose, establish or continue the contact between the General Staffs of our two countries contemplated in paragraph III (2) of the said arrangement;

2. And furthermore, will subsequently endeavour at the Council of the League of Nations to secure the formulation by the latter of all useful recommendations for the maintenance of peace and the respect for international law.

(ii) *Extracts from Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, March 20, 1936.*¹

I must first thank all parties in the House for the forbearance that they have shown since I last made a statement here on Monday, March 9. That forbearance, I can assure hon. Members, has been a real help to us in the negotiations and in the work upon which we have been engaged. . . .

I will, with the permission of the House, now proceed to give an account of the course of the events since I last made my statement to the House on March 9. On that same afternoon, the House may perhaps recall, my right hon. Friend the Lord Privy Seal and I proceeded to Paris on our way to Geneva for the purpose of holding conversations preliminary to the meeting of the Council of the League. The full difficulties of the situation were already apparent, and, after the preliminary discussion in Paris, it became evident that further consultation with our colleagues in the Government was necessary. In these circumstances, we suggested that convenience and expedition would be best served if not only the meeting of the

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, March 20, 1936, coll. 846–52.

four Powers signatory to the Locarno Treaties, but also the impending meeting of the League Council, were held here in London. This proposal was readily accepted by all those concerned, and the first meeting in London between the four Locarno Powers was accordingly held on Thursday, March 12. The House will realize that from the start two wholly separate but cognate sets of discussions have been taking place in London, one between the Locarno Powers and the other before the Council.

The immediate task of the Council was a relatively simple one. It was called upon to pronounce a finding on the question whether the action of the German Government in sending troops into the demilitarized zone on March 7 constituted a unilateral repudiation of its Treaty obligations. The course of the Council proceedings has been made public from day to day, and the House will be already aware that on March 19 this question was answered affirmatively and unanimously by the Council.¹ A dissenting vote was recorded by the German representative, and it may be well if I here say something of the events which preceded his arrival in London.² As soon as the appeal of the French and Belgian Governments with regard to Germany's violation of the Treaty of Locarno was received by the League, the Secretary-General sent an intimation of the date at which the Council would meet to consider this question, to the Members of the League and also to the German Government. To this intimation no reply was received from the German Government. It was, however, thought highly desirable that Germany should be represented at these grave deliberations, and have an opportunity of stating her case on equal terms before a vote was taken. On this basis a further definite invitation was sent, and I was glad to be able to second this invitation both to the German Ambassador here in London and through His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin. This invitation the German Government accepted and the German Delegation reached London on March 18. . . .

I will now give the House some account of the discussions between the Locarno Powers. These, as the House will readily understand, have been both long and complicated, and have filled to overflowing the brief time at our disposal. On our side the discussions have been carried on, in the main, by the Lord President of the Council, the Lord Privy Seal, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and myself. It was clear from the outset that the occupation of the demilitarized zone by German troops presented a *fait accompli* which made the opening of negotiations with Germany very difficult. It was strongly

¹ See above, p. 119.

² See above, pp. 87-90.

held that negotiations could not begin until this breach of international law had been in some measure restored. Immediately on my return from Paris, therefore, I suggested to the German Government that they should make a contribution to ease the situation created by their action.¹ The suggestion was, briefly, that pending negotiations they should withdraw troops in sufficient number to warrant their description of the re-occupation as symbolic, and that, similarly, they should abstain from the construction of fortifications. Though the German Chancellor publicly expressed his willingness not further to increase the number of troops sent in, this was not sufficient to enable much progress to be made. The discussions between the four Locarno Powers, which were resumed on March 12, were most actively pursued thereafter. The time at our disposal in these crowded days was limited, and the discussions have had to be carried on at all hours of the day and into the small hours of the morning. I should like here to pay, if I may, a warm tribute to the energy, patience, and equanimity of the representatives of our fellow signatories.

I will now give the House some particulars of the proposals which have resulted from these conversations. . . . The main objective of His Majesty's Government is to restore confidence in international law and create conditions in which an effort may be made to rebuild European stability. That has been our objective throughout these days. The restoration of confidence is no easy task, for it has been rudely shaken. Our main difficulty therefore has been to bridge the gap in time which will be necessary to enable negotiations for the re-establishment of a system of security in Europe to be effectually undertaken and carried to a conclusion.

During the interim period which I have described, it is proposed that Germany should be invited to refer to the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague her case as to the incompatibility between the Franco-Soviet Pact and the Treaty of Locarno. It is also proposed, with the assent of the Governments concerned, that an international force including detachments from the armies of the guarantor Powers should be stationed in a narrow zone to the East of the frontier, between Germany and France and Germany and Belgium. It is also proposed that Germany should undertake, during this interim period, not to reinforce the troops which have already been sent into the demilitarized zone, and not to modify the situation of the para-military forces which are stationed there. Germany is also asked not to proceed with fortifications there during this interim period, while the French and Belgian Governments, for their part,

See above, p. 81.

would undertake during the same period not to send further troops into the zone adjoining their frontiers with Germany. For our part, in addition to undertaking to supply detachments to an international force, we are making a contribution to the restoration of confidence by joining in a reaffirmation of our Locarno obligations, and by arranging for contacts between the General Staffs of the guarantor Powers and those of France and Belgium. I need hardly say that the sole object of these conversations would be to meet the possibility of any unprovoked aggression.

It is proposed to submit to the Council of the League of Nations certain resolutions reaffirming, on the lines of the resolution adopted by the Council of the League a year ago, after the Stresa meeting, the principle of scrupulous respect for Treaty obligations, proposing the reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice which I have just mentioned and taking note of the reaffirmation which Belgium, France, Italy and ourselves propose to make of their rights and obligations under the Treaty of Locarno. The Council would also take note of the contemplated measures to which I have referred, and which relate to the interim period. The House will, I venture to think, consider that these proposed arrangements to create a sense of security during the period of negotiations are fair and reasonable, and indicate the spirit in which the question has been approached by the French and Belgian Governments. Germany is asked to make certain contributions, but, in the situation which has been created by the German re-occupation of the demilitarized zone, I am sure the House will feel that it is very reasonable to ask Germany to make contributions. More particularly is this so in the light of the substantial contributions, which resulted from the restraint and moderation displayed by the French and Belgian Governments. If the House will appreciate the position of those Governments when we first met in Paris, and then compare that with the text of the White Paper, they will appreciate how substantial that contribution has been.

As regards the actual negotiations, what is proposed is that in the first instance the five signatories of Locarno should enter into negotiations on the basis, first, of several of the proposals made in the German Memorandum of March 7; secondly, of the revision of the status of the Rhineland; and, thirdly, of the drawing up of mutual assistance pacts open to all the signatories of the Treaty of Locarno.

The next stage of negotiation is a world conference to be held under the auspices of the League of Nations, to consider, in addition to certain other proposals made by the German Chancellor, the questions of security and the limitation of armaments and of economic

relations between the nations. Finally, since it is unfortunately necessary, however reluctant we may be to do so, to envisage the possibility of the failure of the proposed negotiations which I have described to the House, it is proposed that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Italy should address letters to the Governments of France and of Belgium indicating what their position in that event would be. The House will find the terms of these proposed letters in the White Paper.¹

Such are the proposals, which, after strenuous negotiations, have been referred to our respective Governments. I hope that the House will agree that they are not ill-designed to meet the present grave emergency. So far as His Majesty's Government are concerned, we are prepared to accept these proposals, and it is our most earnest hope that the German Government will also look on them in this light. The German Government have stressed their wish for a relaxation of that tension which can only lead to disaster. It is now for them to show what contribution they are willing to make to this end. Last night I asked Herr von Ribbentrop, the German representative, to come and see me, when I gave him a brief outline of these proposals. His Excellency at once stated that he would take no decision until he had seen the text as a whole, and completely reserved the position of his Government. Late last night I sent to Herr von Ribbentrop the text as soon as it had been approved by the Cabinet.

Such is the present position as it has emerged as a result of this week's intensive efforts. I would stress that, in the conversations between the Locarno Powers which have taken place, the object of His Majesty's Government has been twofold throughout: We have sought to meet the peril—it has been a very real peril—of an immediate and gravely critical international situation, and we have sought to create an opportunity for the settlement of Western Europe on a firm and enduring foundation.—[An Hon. Member: 'And also in Eastern Europe?']—In both. In the first instance, but not exclusively. In both these arduous tasks we have, we believe, made important progress in the last few days. I can assure the House that the Government will persist without any relaxation in their endeavours.

(iii) *Statement by M. Flandin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, March 20, 1936.*²

Le gouvernement vous apporte, après des journées qui ont été lourdes d'angoisse, la consolidation de la paix.

¹ See above, p. 132.

² In the Chambre des Députés. *Le Temps*, March 21, 1936.

Il a pu y réussir sans manquer aux principes qu'il avait énoncés dès le premier jour.

En effet, dans la déclaration qu'il avait faite au Parlement le 10 mars,¹ le gouvernement a marqué comment l'initiative prise par l'Allemagne en répudiant le traité de Locarno et en procédant à la réoccupation de la zone démilitarisée affectait non seulement la sécurité propre de la France, mais aussi l'avenir de la paix européenne et les destinées de la Société des nations.

Fidèle aux prescriptions du traité, le gouvernement français a saisi le conseil de la Société des nations en l'invitant à procéder à la constatation de la contravention à laquelle est subordonnée, sauf en cas de péril pressant, la mise en œuvre de l'assistance des puissances garantes.

En me rendant à Londres avec M. Paul-Boncour, j'avais pour mission à la fois de soutenir devant le conseil la requête de la France, et de poursuivre avec les représentants belge, britannique et italien les échanges de vues qui nous permettraient, une fois constatée la contravention allemande à l'article 43 du traité de Versailles, de faire appel dans les conditions appropriées à l'assistance prévue par les traités.

Sur l'initiative du gouvernement français, un premier échange de vues entre les signataires du traité de Locarno avait eu lieu à Paris le 10 mars. Le gouvernement anglais demanda qu'il fût continué à Londres à partir du 12. Nous ne fîmes à cette proposition aucune objection. Elle allait nous permettre, ce dont j'ai eu tout lieu de me féliciter, de faire entendre la voix de la France à Londres, où elle avait cessé depuis quelques mois d'être écoutée et comprise. Il était important qu'elle le fût, car la sécurité française ne devait souffrir aucune atteinte du geste de l'Allemagne et le principe du respect des traités devait, dans l'intérêt de la collectivité elle-même, être sauvegardé. Si disposé qu'il fût à engager des négociations avec l'Allemagne, le gouvernement français ne pouvait accepter d'être mis en présence du fait accompli; il ne pouvait admettre d'entrer dans des pourparlers avant que le respect de la loi internationale eût été à nouveau affirmé.

Les négociations se sont poursuivies du 12 au 19 mars de jour et de nuit, on pourrait presque dire sans interruption.

Elles ont abouti d'abord à la constatation faite à l'unanimité par le conseil de la Société des nations de la violation par l'Allemagne de l'article 43 du traité de Versailles et du traité de Locarno. Cette constatation a été faite après que le conseil de la Société des nations

¹ See above, p. 61.

eut entendu les arguments de la délégation allemande. L'Allemagne ne pourra plus prétendre ainsi que son geste a été condamné sans qu'elle ait pu tenter de le justifier.

Elles ont abouti ensuite à des textes auxquels les gouvernements intéressés ont donné leur sanction.

Je vais analyser rapidement les dispositions intervenues d'un commun accord.

Le gouvernement français aurait souhaité que fût intégralement rétabli le règne de la loi internationale par le retour à la situation qui existait en Rhénanie avant le 7 mars. Ce résultat pouvait sans doute être atteint, si les puissances signataires s'étaient trouvées d'accord pour exercer à Berlin la pression suffisamment énergique. J'ai pu rapidement me convaincre que cet accord ne pouvait être réalisé. Nos efforts sont du moins parvenus à faire accepter des solutions telles que cette fois la méthode du fait accompli n'aura pas prévalu.

Pour justifier son acte unilatéral, l'Allemagne a invoqué des griefs d'ordre juridique. Elle sera donc invitée à saisir de ses griefs la Cour permanente de justice internationale de la Haye.

Par l'acte du 7 mars, le gouvernement allemand avait prétendu affranchir la zone rhénane de toute servitude internationale. Il est invité aujourd'hui, en attendant l'arrêt de la Cour et les négociations qui s'institueront, à retirer, d'une zone de 20 kilomètres de large le long des frontières belge et française, les contingents qu'il y avait envoyés. Dans la zone ainsi évacuée seront installées des forces internationales dont la présence témoignera que la règle internationale l'a emporté. Dans le reste de la zone démilitarisée, les troupes allemandes ne devront pas dépasser le chiffre officiellement communiqué le 7 mars. Elles ne pourront recevoir aucun renfort ; tous envois de matériel de guerre sont interdits, aucun travail de fortifications ou d'organisation du terrain n'est admis ; aucun aérodrome ne pourra être créé ou agrandi. De notre côté, nous avons accepté, ainsi que la Belgique, à suspendre pendant la période de négociations tout envoi de troupes dans la zone voisine de la frontière commune entre notre pays et l'Allemagne. Une commission internationale est chargée de veiller à l'observation des engagements ainsi pris. On sera d'accord pour reconnaître que l'intervention de cette commission nous donne à l'égard de la remilitarisation et de la refortification de la zone des garanties que nous n'avions pas précédemment. Par cet ensemble de mesures conservatoires se trouve affirmé le caractère provisoire de la situation créée par le geste allemand. La Rhénanie, après l'arrêt de la Cour de la Haye, ne pourra recevoir son statut définitif que de négociations entre les gouvernements intéressés, et il est bien entendu,

par une disposition formelle, que les négociations au sujet de ce statut, comme d'ailleurs à tous les autres sujets, ne seront ouvertes avec l'Allemagne qu'après acceptation expresse par le gouvernement allemand de toutes ces conditions préalables qui forment un tout.

Dois-je ajouter enfin qu'il n'est pas question qu'une force internationale puisse occuper une partie quelconque du territoire français ou belge? C'eût été une monstrueuse iniquité que n'aurait jamais accepté un négociateur français qui n'a pas de leçons de patriotisme à recevoir de ceux dont l'action singulière n'a fait que compliquer sa tâche au cours de négociations laborieuses où il servait, au-dessus des partis, la France.

Le 7 mars l'Allemagne avait déclaré caduc le traité de Locarno. Contre cette répudiation solennelle, les quatre autres puissances signataires ont affirmé le 19 mars que Locarno subsiste. Elles en confirment les principes. Elles en reconnaissent réciproquement en ce qui les concerne les droits qui en résultent. Elles continuent d'en accepter les obligations. Rien n'est changé, si ce n'est qu'en raison de la répudiation allemande, désormais et aussi longtemps que le traité n'aura pas été régulièrement abrogé, les garanties que le traité stipulait également au profit de l'Allemagne, de la France et de la Belgique ne jouent qu'au profit de la France et de la Belgique.

Mais voici qui constitue une amélioration capitale pour notre sécurité. Dans la mesure même où l'entrée des forces allemandes dans la zone démilitarisée a pu créer sinon une menace, au moins la possibilité d'une prochaine menace, il importait que l'action des garants pût s'exercer avec rapidité, donc avec une efficacité plus grande. En plein accord avec la délégation belge, la délégation française a insisté pour qu'interviennent dès maintenant les accords destinés à assurer l'application éventuelle des garanties militaires et à défaut desquels, en présence d'un cas d'agression caractérisé, la mise en œuvre de l'assistance promise risquerait d'être tardive. Le gouvernement britannique a donné son adhésion à cette proposition. M. Grandi, dont l'attitude dans une situation pour lui fort difficile n'a cessé d'être empreinte de la plus franche amitié, a donné de son côté la sienne. La Chambre appréciera, j'espère, l'importance de cette décision.

Elle marque une étape décisive des relations franco-britanniques d'après-guerre. Il faudra peut-être plusieurs mois pour que les deux peuples en mesurent complètement la portée. Elle réalise pour nous l'aboutissement d'un effort persévérant et d'une conception de solidarité totale devant les menaces de guerre qui permettront, mieux qu'en 1914, d'en faire reculer le spectre hideux.

Même si le pacte de Locarno était remplacé demain dans un cadre

général d'organisation de la paix par un traité d'assistance mutuelle, cette garantie réciproque capitale serait insérée dans ce traité, en vertu de stipulations formelles inscrites dans notre nouvel accord.

Marquerais-je aussi combien je me suis efforcé et réjoui, par là même, de préparer la reconstitution du front pacifique de Stresa qui doit maintenant être réalisé grâce à l'ouverture de négociations de paix que j'ai réussi à obtenir à Genève récemment, négociations qui, dans notre esprit, devront entraîner rapidement la suspension simultanée des hostilités et des sanctions.

Telles sont fidèlement résumées les conditions dans lesquelles a été réglé le passé et préparé l'avenir. On peut juger insuffisants les résultats obtenus, on peut penser que la délégation française aurait dû s'obstiner à réclamer l'évacuation intégrale et immédiate de la zone rhénane. Elle aurait pu, pour l'obtenir, et à défaut d'un geste de force, proposer la mise en œuvre de sanctions qui auraient lourdement atteint une économie particulièrement vulnérable. Elle n'aurait pas eu dès maintenant pour cette politique le concours des puissances garantes ni de la Belgique, comme elle garantie. Nous avons donc préféré nous rallier à un système de propositions modérées; une invitation est faite à l'Allemagne: si elle l'accepte, s'ouvrent dans les conditions que je vais préciser des perspectives nouvelles pour la consolidation de la paix européenne. Si elle la refuse, le gouvernement britannique est d'accord avec le gouvernement français pour estimer que la situation devra être immédiatement reconsidérée. Elle le serait, dans ce cas, nul n'en doute, dans une atmosphère d'opinion beaucoup plus ouverte à l'audience des thèses françaises. Mais je veux écarter cette hypothèse, car je souhaite sincèrement que le gouvernement allemand, prenant conscience de la gravité de la décision qu'il avait prise et du caractère illégal du geste accompli, saura apprécier la modération des demandes qui vont lui être adressées.

Les puissances locarniennes n'ont pas voulu, en effet, se limiter à un programme négatif. Puisque le chancelier Hitler avait esquissé des propositions qui paraissaient positives, quelque réserve et quelque objection qu'elles pussent appeler, il importait de ne pas laisser dire que nous n'y opposions que des négations. Je n'ai donc eu aucune difficulté à m'associer à l'élaboration d'un programme de négociations qui pourront s'ouvrir dès que les mesures préalables que j'ai énoncées déjà seront intervenues et lorsque, la consultation électorale terminée, le gouvernement français pourra y participer avec une autorité renouvelée. De ces négociations devront sortir, avec un nouveau statut de la région rhénane, des conventions précises et complètes d'assistance mutuelle entre les puissances occidentales et dont l'application sera

assurée par des accords techniques. Dans ces négociations les propositions du chancelier Hitler recevront toute l'attention qu'elles doivent mériter.

Mais la paix européenne ne se réduit pas au problème des relations entre les puissances occidentales, et si la région rhénane a été un des champs de bataille de l'Europe, elle n'en est pas le seul. Nous n'oublions aucun de nos amis de l'Europe centrale et de l'Europe orientale, et c'est dans le cadre européen qu'un renforcement de la sécurité générale doit être recherché. Les puissances locarniennes sont donc tombées d'accord pour recommander au conseil de la Société des nations la réunion d'une conférence qui travaillerait à la réalisation de ce programme : une amélioration dans le jeu des pactes et dans les mécanismes juridiques serait à cet égard notoirement insuffisant. Par delà les textes et les clauses de traités, il y a des réalités qui viennent contrarier l'observation de ces textes et le jeu de ces clauses. Une organisation solide de la paix exige qu'une limitation effective se substitue à la course aux armements, qui pose pour les États dont les finances sont atteintes par la crise des problèmes chaque jour plus graves. Elle exige aussi une détente économique, une réorganisation du régime des échanges dont il faudra bien qu'on se préoccupe, si on veut rendre à l'Europe le calme et la prospérité.

Tel est le bilan d'une semaine de négociations. Entre les tendances britanniques et les tendances françaises, les résultats obtenus représentent un compromis dans la recherche duquel le premier ministre de Belgique a joué un rôle auquel je tiens à rendre hommage. Moins attentive que nous à la lettre du traité, moins directement visée par le geste de l'Allemagne, l'opinion britannique, aux fluctuations de laquelle le gouvernement de Londres est particulièrement sensible, ne pouvait apprécier de la même manière que l'opinion française l'initiative du chancelier Hitler. Mais les divergences de vues qui ont pu se produire n'ont pas altéré — elles ne sauraient le faire — la cordialité d'une collaboration qui se fonde sur des intérêts permanents et la solidité d'une entente qui répond à des nécessités fondamentales. Le gouvernement britannique entend demeurer fidèle au traité de Locarno, il entend, en cas de péril, remplir sans défaillance les engagements qu'il a contractés pour la sauvegarde de la sécurité française. Il accepte dorénavant d'en prévoir constamment et réciproquement les moyens pratiques. Les assurances écrites que j'ai reçues à cet égard du secrétaire d'État ont une importance sur laquelle personne, en France, ne se méprendra.

Si, d'un certain côté, l'on s'était flatté, à la faveur du trouble, de provoquer un relâchement des relations entre Londres et Paris, l'on

pourra constater que notre effort commun pour maintenir la paix a resserré les liens franco-britanniques.

Mais mieux que l'exposé que je viens de faire il résulte que les conversations de Londres ne constituent qu'une étape.

Ne rien négliger dans ce qu'elle a le pouvoir et par conséquent le devoir de faire par elle-même en vue d'assurer sa propre sécurité, telle est pour la France une des leçons de cette expérience comme de tant d'autres qui l'ont précédée.

Mais il n'y a pas que les forces militaires, navales et aériennes qui comptent. La défense nationale est un tout.

Vous allez, messieurs, partir dans le pays et prendre un contact direct avec le suffrage universel.

Puissiez-vous, dans l'ardeur de la bataille électorale, ne jamais oublier cette force essentielle pour notre pays que représente l'unité morale de la France.

D'autres négociations que celles que je viens d'achever m'attendent, moi ou mon successeur.

Renforcez notre autorité demain par votre affirmation unanime que les rivalités d'hommes, que les querelles de parti s'effacent lorsqu'il s'agit de maintenir la paix, présente et future, de fortifier la sécurité nationale et de garder à la France dans le monde le prestige d'une action constructive qui s'exercera toujours au profit du rapprochement des peuples sous la garantie de la loi internationale.

(iv) *Extracts from Statement by M. van Zeeland, Prime Minister of Belgium, March 20, 1936.*¹

Messieurs, j'ai pour devoir — et c'est d'ailleurs mon désir — d'informer la Chambre, aussi complètement que possible, des importantes négociations qui viennent de se dérouler à Londres.

D'autre part, ce serait une faute grave, une faute impardonnable, que de risquer, par une expression malencontreuse, de compromettre le résultat que nous venons d'obtenir après tant d'efforts. Aussi, je vous demande la permission de vous faire un exposé très prudent, très modéré dans les termes, serrant d'aussi près que possible les textes.

Si vous voulez bien vous en souvenir, avant de partir pour Londres, je vous avais donné quelques indications sur les règles de conduite que nous nous proposons de suivre au cours des négociations.² J'espère que vous reconnaîtrez que nous ne nous en sommes écartés à aucun moment. Nous poursuivons un triple but : tout d'abord, le maintien

¹ In the Chambre des Représentants. *Chambre des Représentants: Annales Parlementaires*, March 20, 1936, pp. 918-20.

² See above, p. 69.

de la paix ; en second lieu, la restauration, et même le renforcement de la loi internationale violée ; en troisième lieu, le maintien et le renforcement de la sécurité pour l'avenir.

Voyons comment nous avons essayé d'atteindre ces trois buts.

Les représentants des quatre puissances de Locarno se sont donc mis d'accord, sous toutes réserves, sur un projet d'arrangement général.

Le gouvernement vient de l'approuver en conseil ; les cabinets britannique et français se sont déjà, si je suis bien informé, prononcés en sa faveur. Ce projet comprend trois parties, mais j'insiste sur ceci : il forme un tout indivisible et doit être pris comme tel.

Dans la première partie du projet, les quatre puissances de Locarno : l'Angleterre, la France, l'Italie et la Belgique, se mettent d'accord sur un certain nombre de points, c'est-à-dire définissent leur communauté de vues, leur unité d'action.

Dans la seconde partie, elles ont arrêté le texte de trois résolutions qui seront présentées au conseil de la Société des nations par les quatre puissances agissant ensemble.

Enfin, la troisième partie est une lettre que chacune des puissances garantes : l'Angleterre et l'Italie, enverra à chacune des puissances garanties : la France et la Belgique.

Examinons la première partie. Dans un premier point, on rappelle simplement — et ceci est déjà de l'histoire — que les quatre puissances de Locarno sont d'accord pour appuyer, auprès du conseil de la Société des nations, la résolution qui a été déposée par la France et par la Belgique et qui constate la contravention commise à l'article 43 du traité de Versailles.

Le deuxième point est la condamnation par les quatre puissances signataires de Locarno de l'atteinte portée par l'Allemagne à la loi internationale.

Que je vous dise tout de suite que, dans tous ces textes, nous nous sommes efforcés d'éviter toute expression blessante. Nous avons cependant estimé qu'il était nécessaire, en employant des termes prudents et mesurés, d'affirmer que nous condamnions sans réserve la violation de la loi internationale.

Pour nous, le point capital, c'est la confirmation nette, sans réserve, du traité de Locarno. Ce traité subsiste avec tous ses droits pour les uns, avec tous ses engagements réciproques, et il subsiste entièrement jusqu'à ce qu'il ait été remplacé par quelque chose d'autre, de meilleur, j'espère. Non seulement il subsiste, mais il est renforcé. En effet, après avoir déclaré que rien de ce qui vient de se produire depuis la violation du traité de Locarno ne peut être considéré comme ayant délié les signataires de leurs obligations et de leurs garanties, qui sub-

sistent entièrement, les quatre puissances s'engagent dès à présent à prescrire à leurs états-majors d'entrer en contact et de préparer les conditions techniques dans lesquelles s'exécuteront les engagements en cas d'agression non provoquée.

Le quatrième point, c'est le recours à la Cour permanente de justice internationale. Les quatre puissances de Locarno décident d'inviter le gouvernement allemand à saisir la Cour permanente de justice internationale de La Haye de l'argument qu'il prétend tirer de l'incompatibilité entre le pacte d'assistance mutuelle franco-soviétique et le traité de Locarno et, cela va de soi, de prendre l'engagement de considérer comme définitive la décision de la Cour. J'ajoute — et je vous expliquerai tout à l'heure ce que signifie ce passage du texte — sans préjudice un article ultérieur qui vise la révision du statut de la Rhénanie. Toujours par souci de ménager tous les amours-propres, nous rappelons ici que le gouvernement français a déjà accepté que la dite Cour soit saisie de la question dans les conditions énoncées.

Dans un cinquième point, les quatre puissances de Locarno invitent l'Allemagne non pas à retirer les troupes qui se trouvent déjà en Rhénanie, mais à ne pas aggraver la violation de ses engagements.

La situation de fait est maintenue. On ne va pas jusqu'à une exigence qui ne pourrait pas être remplie, si ce n'est par la force des armes, et cette hypothèse-là nous l'avons exclue.

Par conséquent, ce que nous demandons, c'est d'arrêter l'infraction, de cesser d'étendre cette infraction. Voici comment : les quatre gouvernements décident que, par une démarche commune, ils inviteront le gouvernement allemand à souscrire aux dispositions provisoires suivantes, dispositions qui doivent valoir jusqu'à la conclusion de la négociation dont nous parlons plus loin. Ces dispositions sont les suivantes : Tout d'abord, tout envoi de troupes ou de matériel de guerre dans la zone définie par l'article 42 du traité de Versailles sera immédiatement suspendu. En conséquence, les contingents qui y sont stationnés ne dépasseront pas le chiffre actuel — je ne cite pas ici des effectifs pour ne pas risquer de me tromper — mais ce sont les effectifs officiellement déclarés par les Allemands comme ayant été envoyés en zone rhénane.

En second lieu, les forces para-militaires (ceci a une réelle importance, notamment en ce qui concerne les groupes de travail 'Arbeitsdienst' stationnant dans la dite zone) seront strictement maintenues dans la situation antérieure au 7 mars. Elles ne pourront être constituées en grandes unités ni en aucun cas servir directement ou indirectement au renforcement des troupes. Ceci porte sur des effectifs importants. Enfin, aucun travail de fortifications ou d'organisation

du terrain ne pourra être exécuté dans la dite zone. Aucun terrain d'aviation ne sera ni équipé ni amélioré.

Voilà donc à quoi nous demandons à l'Allemagne de souscrire.

C'est, je le répète, l'arrêt de l'infraction. Toutefois, dans toute la mesure du possible et tout en maintenant la distinction qui s'impose entre ceux qui ont rempli leurs engagements et ceux qui ne les ont pas tenus, nous avons essayé, pour des raisons psychologiques, d'établir un certain parallélisme dans les engagements. Aussi, les gouvernements belge et français sont-ils prêts, pendant la période des négociations en concomitance à l'action que nous attendons de la part du gouvernement allemand, à suspendre tout envoi de troupes dans la zone voisine de la frontière.

Dans le paragraphe suivant, nous prévoyons deux mesures qui, dans notre esprit, sont destinées à restaurer le droit, à rétablir la loi internationale.

Tout d'abord, la création, suivant le précédent de la Sarre, d'une force internationale comprenant, entre autres, des détachements des armées britannique et italienne. Elle serait stationnée avec l'accord de tous les gouvernements intéressés dans une zone comprise entre la frontière belgo-allemande et franco-allemande, et une ligne située à l'est des dites frontières, à une distance approximative de 20 kilomètres.

Cette zone serait évacuée par les forces allemandes.

Ensuite la constitution d'une commission internationale chargée de veiller à l'observation des engagements pris par les puissances ayant formé la force en question, ainsi que par la Belgique, la France et l'Allemagne.

Nous passons au point suivant. Si l'Allemagne accepte au préalable les deux groupes d'invitations dont je viens de vous entretenir, nous négocions. Les négociations s'ouvrent immédiatement et elles s'ouvrent sous deux chapitres et en deux étapes.

Tout d'abord, les quatre puissances de Locarno invitent l'Allemagne à venir négocier avec elles et, à l'ordre du jour de cette négociation, se trouvent inscrits trois points: 1° les propositions faites par l'Allemagne dans son mémorandum du 7 mars, sous les n^{os} 2 à 5.

Il s'agit des propositions relatives: (a) au pacte de non-agression pour vingt-cinq ans entre la Belgique et l'Allemagne, d'une part; entre la France et l'Allemagne, d'autre part; (b) au pacte aérien; (c) à l'intervention éventuelle des Pays-Bas dans le système général qui sera imaginé. Bref, les points du mémorandum allemand qui concernent l'Europe occidentale.

En second lieu: la revision du statut de la Rhénanie. Cela veut dire

que nous reconnaissons que le statut tel qu'il avait été établi par le traité de Versailles ne peut être considéré comme définitif et qu'il y a lieu de le réexaminer au cours de négociations avec l'Allemagne.

En troisième lieu : l'établissement de pactes d'assistance mutuelle ouverts à tous les signataires de Locarno, y compris l'Allemagne si elle le désire. Si elle ne le désire pas, si elle préfère s'en tenir à la proposition du chancelier Hitler visant les pactes de non-agression, nous n'insisterons pas en vue d'obtenir sa participation, mais les puissances de Locarno, dans le document actuel, déclarent que le renforcement de sécurité qu'elles doivent provoquer entre elles comprendra des engagements d'assistance mutuelle entre les quatre puissances ou entre certaines d'entre elles. Que nous ayons avec l'Allemagne un pacte de non-agression ou un pacte d'assistance mutuelle multilatéral, dans l'un et l'autre cas la France, la Belgique et l'Angleterre concluront entre elles un pacte d'assistance mutuelle. Ce pacte comprendra des dispositions propres à assurer, en cas de besoin, l'entrée en action prompte des signataires ; il comprendra en outre des accords techniques destinés à préparer les mesures qui assureront l'exécution efficace des engagements pris. En somme, la position que nous avons aujourd'hui en vertu de Locarno sera doublement renforcée, d'abord par le déclenchement automatique dans certains cas de la garantie donnée, ensuite par la préparation de cette garantie au moyen de contacts entre les états-majors. Je rappelle que nous avons déjà les contacts entre états-majors dans la période provisoire et nous engageons les uns vis-à-vis des autres à les maintenir dans la période destinée à assurer le régime définitif.

Les quatre puissances se déclarent en outre d'accord pour soutenir, au cours des négociations, l'adoption de dispositions propres à interdire ou à limiter l'établissement ultérieur de fortifications dans une zone à déterminer.

Vous voudrez bien vous souvenir que j'ai dit tout à l'heure que, pendant la période provisoire, nous avons demandé que l'Allemagne ne fortifie pas la Rhénanie. Il s'agit maintenant de la période définitive.

Nous n'imposons rien, nous ne demandons aucun engagement préalable ; mais, entre nous, entre les quatre puissances de Locarno, nous nous promettons de nous soutenir réciproquement, au cours de ces négociations, afin d'aboutir à certaines restrictions : à l'interdiction ou à la limitation de fortifications dans une zone déterminée.

Il s'agit donc ici de la négociation entre les puissances de Locarno. Mais nous faisons un pas de plus, et nous nous déclarons prêts à provoquer la réunion d'une conférence internationale comprenant non seulement les quatre puissances de Locarno et l'Allemagne, mais

encore une série d'autres pays directement intéressés, et qui y seraient convoqués par la Société des nations.

A l'ordre du jour de cette conférence seraient inscrits les points qui nous intéressent, qui intéressent le monde de la façon la plus large, mais aussi la plus pressante, et notamment l'organisation sur une base précise et efficace d'un système de sécurité collective, la mise au point des conditions d'application de l'article 16 du pacte de la Société des nations ainsi que des accords tendant à assurer efficacement la limitation des armements.

Nous nous trouverions à nouveau sur un pied d'égalité entre toutes les puissances du monde et l'idée de la limitation des armements pourra donc être reprise avec quelque chance d'aboutir, nous l'espérons ; enfin, tout le problème économique serait prévu à l'ordre du jour de cette conférence.

Vous vous rendez compte de l'étendue de ce programme ; il devra évidemment être précisé.

Restent les propositions faites par le gouvernement allemand, sous les numéros 6 et 7 de son mémorandum et dans les discours successifs du chancelier allemand, c'est-à-dire l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des nations, la conclusion de pactes de non-agression avec les pays de l'est et du sud de l'Allemagne, avec la Lithuanie, la Tchécoslovaquie et l'Autriche.

Cette partie de l'accord conclu à Londres se termine par l'engagement des quatre puissances de Locarno de présenter au conseil de la Société des nations trois résolutions. Ceci répond à l'idée suivante :

Entre les puissances de Locarno, nous nous sommes mis d'accord, nous avons créé une communauté de vues et une unité d'action ; nous avons une force que nous apportons, mais nous souhaitons que cette force soit doublée par celle de la Société des nations.

Nous demandons donc à la Société des nations d'approuver ce qui nous paraît rentrer dans ses attributions et devoir être approuvé d'avance par l'ensemble des nations.

Ces résolutions sont les suivantes : la première condamne la violation de la loi internationale ; la seconde concerne le recours à la Cour permanente de justice [*sic*], et par la troisième nous demandons à la Société des nations d'enregistrer les déclarations que nous avons faites entre nous, et notamment la confirmation du pacte de Locarno.

Il me reste maintenant à aborder un dernier point, dont l'importance me paraît considérable, c'est la lettre, la lettre que nous adressaient les puissances garantes dans le cas où le projet élaboré à Londres, et qui forme un ensemble, avorterait par la faute de l'une des parties. En fait, et je désire m'exprimer ici avec toute la prudence

nécessaire, cela vise le cas où le gouvernement allemand refuserait les deux groupes d'invitations qui lui sont adressées.

Je vous demande la permission de lire le document en entier,¹ étant donnée son importance. . . .

Ainsi donc, si tout ce programme se réalise et si l'Allemagne accepte les invitations, vous voyez comment les choses se dérouleront. Si, au contraire, elle refuse, la lettre que je viens de vous lire entre immédiatement en application. Les contacts entre états-majors belge, français et anglais sont acquis en vertu de trois passages de l'arrangement et de trois hypothèses différentes. La première, c'est la situation provisoire en attendant les négociations; on les établit immédiatement. La deuxième, c'est la position définitive résultant de l'issue heureuse des négociations; c'est une chose entendue. Si tout cela ne se fait pas, les contacts entre les états-majors sont établis immédiatement pour parer à toute éventualité.

Je vais essayer maintenant, mais avec une réserve plus grande encore, de vous donner une très courte interprétation du résultat des entretiens de Londres. La paix est-elle assurée? Je le pense. Nos amis français et nous-mêmes, nous avons fait de très sérieuses concessions. Il est entendu que, si nos prévisions se réalisent, le statut de la Rhénanie sera révisé. On n'exige plus que les troupes allemandes, entrées en Rhénanie en violation de l'article 43, soient retirées. Il apparaît donc dans ces conditions que le risque de guerre a disparu de l'horizon.

Le second but est-il atteint? Avons-nous trouvé une solution qui restaure la loi internationale et qui montre qu'on ne viole pas impunément les traités? Je le pense. En effet, l'infraction doit cesser. Lorsque nous commencerons à négocier, il y aura eu, tout au moins dans une certaine mesure, une reconnaissance du rétablissement de la loi internationale.

Pendant cette période provisoire il y aura des troupes internationales qui seront là comme une sorte de symbole de la force mise à la disposition du droit et il y aura une commission internationale, nantie des pouvoirs nécessaires pour garantir à toutes les parties l'entière exécution de toutes les clauses de l'arrangement provisoire.

Je dirai plus. Ne voyez-vous pas qu'en définitive ceci est la conséquence et une conséquence grave de la violation de la loi internationale? Cela signifie que, pour la première fois je pense dans l'histoire, un acte de ce genre a provoqué immédiatement des réactions qui affaiblissent la position diplomatique de celui qui a violé la loi. En effet, dès à présent, en toute hypothèse, la communauté de vues et

¹ For text see above, p. 132.

l'unité d'action des puissances occidentales est, non seulement maintenue, mais renforcée. Cette communauté d'action et de vues trouve immédiatement son expression sous la forme de contacts entre états-majors. Il en résulte que l'Angleterre — et je pense que c'est également la première fois dans l'histoire — se prononce en vue d'une hypothèse donnée avant que cette hypothèse se soit réalisée. Vous sentez la mesure que j'essaie de mettre dans mes paroles. Je voudrais pourtant vous faire comprendre toute l'importance de cet élément. Je le considère comme capital, non seulement pour notre sécurité, à nous Belges, en particulier, mais aussi pour la paix du monde.

Que va-t-il se passer maintenant ? Je suis hors d'état de faire un pronostic. L'Allemagne va-t-elle accepter ? Va-t-elle refuser ? Je crois très sincèrement qu'elle peut accepter et qu'elle doit accepter. Nous sommes restés aussi modérés qu'il est possible de l'être ; nous avons écarté toute pensée de haine, tout sentiment d'hostilité, toute réaction, même d'ordre sentimental, contre la violation de la loi internationale, qui nous a mis dans les difficultés où nous nous débattons. Nous avons essayé de nous mettre sur un plan tout à fait objectif en ne pensant qu'à l'avenir. Mais rien n'était possible si l'on ne restaurait pas, dans une mesure suffisante, la loi internationale. Je pense que nous avons fait tout ce que peuvent faire des nations comme les nôtres, pour faciliter à d'autres l'acceptation des propositions que nous avons mises sur pied.

Si l'Allemagne accepte, je crois que nous serons sortis de cette très grande difficulté d'à présent et qu'en nous avançant sur un terrain ferme, nous réussirons probablement à créer des conditions qui assureront la paix pour longtemps. Si l'Allemagne refusait, — j'hésite à envisager cette hypothèse, mais je dois cependant le faire parce qu'il faut que j'examine tous les aspects de la question, — la position des nations occidentales se trouverait, je pense, renforcée même dans ce cas.

Leur unité de vues est complète. Elles ont pris des dispositions qui sont de nature à donner à leurs décisions toute leur signification. Ce qu'il pourrait y avoir de fondé, dans une certaine mesure, non pas dans l'acte de l'Allemagne, mais dans les revendications ou dans les propositions du chancelier Hitler, tout ce qui pouvait faire appel à certaines fractions de l'opinion publique dans le monde, a été repris. Si l'Allemagne refuse nos propositions, elle se met en contradiction avec elle-même. Dans ce cas, sans avoir rien abandonné de notre position d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, nous nous trouverions dans une situation moralement renforcée. Notre position de fait serait également renforcée, parce que nous avons derrière nous l'Angleterre tout

entière, la France tout entière, et que leur concours, déjà, nous est assuré dans des conditions techniques destinées à en garantir pleinement l'efficacité.

Messieurs, j'emporte de Londres certaines impressions réconfortantes. J'en ai retiré une série de leçons dont, si vous le voulez bien, je vous ferai part un peu plus tard. Ces leçons sont graves; nous aurons à en tirer certaines conclusions d'ordre pratique pour la politique à suivre dans ce pays.

Je voudrais aujourd'hui me borner à une réflexion de caractère général. On ne gagne rien à violer le droit international. L'atmosphère qui s'est créée rapidement là-bas a été, à certains moments, de nature à faire impression même sur ceux qui sont le plus rebelles aux considérations d'ordre moral. J'aurais voulu qu'un grand nombre de personnes pussent assister à la séance du conseil de la Société des nations où l'on s'est prononcé sur les résolutions présentées par le gouvernement belge et par le gouvernement français constatant la violation de l'article 43. C'était simple, dans un cadre grandiose mais n'ayant rien de théâtral. Et cependant, au moment où successivement, l'un après l'autre, sont tombés dans le silence les 'oui' par lesquels toutes ces puissances se prononçaient sur la violation de la loi internationale par l'Allemagne, ce fut un moment d'une grandeur inoubliable. . . .

Dans ces conditions, au cours de ces négociations, la Belgique a pu répondre à ce qui est, je crois, sa mission historique: être un élément de concorde, un élément véritablement constructif dans les efforts que font les grandes puissances occidentales pour assurer la paix à l'avenir.

Quelle que soit, messieurs, l'hypothèse que nous envisageons, que l'Allemagne accepte ou qu'elle refuse, je pense qu'à force de bonne volonté, de désir de bien faire, chez tous les participants des négociations de Londres, on a réussi finalement à mettre sur pied une solution qui se traduira un jour comme ceci: la loi internationale aura été renforcée dans le monde.

(v) *Extract from Proceedings of the Seventh and Eighth Meetings (Private) of the Ninety-first (Extraordinary) Session of the League Council, March 20 and 24, 1936*¹

(a) *Statement by Colonel Beck (Poland), March 20, 1936.*

M. Beck agreed with the President that the Council would require some time for the necessary study of the document² that had just

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, April 1936 (Part I), pp. 341, 346-7.

² See above, p. 127.

been submitted to it. Accordingly, the discussion on the fundamental question should be deferred for a few days to enable the Council to examine the documents closely. He wished, however, to say a few words in connexion with procedure; his remarks would not conflict with the President's suggestion.

He had read very hurriedly the series of documents just distributed to the Council. He had not had time to examine them thoroughly; but even a brief glance had shown him that they fell into two parts. The larger section dealt with the arrangements among the signatories of the Rhineland Pact. So far as those arrangements concerned exclusively the respective interests of those States, he, not being a signatory of the Rhineland Pact, had no wish to offer an opinion.

The same did not apply to the draft resolution, which was submitted ready-made to the Council without having been first discussed by the latter. That procedure, he thought, formed an exception to the Council's ordinary practice. He need hardly remind his colleagues that, as a general rule, the Council, after a preliminary discussion, appointed a Rapporteur, and, in the more important cases, a special Committee to draw up a report. Moreover, it was according to the spirit of the Council's procedure that the members of such Committees should be, first and foremost, representatives of countries not directly concerned in the question under examination. That method ensured that members of the Council should be in possession of full information before they took their decisions, and should be able to realize the exact scope of the responsibilities they assumed.

The method followed in the present case might give the impression that the Covenant of the League was only an annex to the Rhineland Pact. None the less, those members of the Council who were not signatories of the Rhineland Pact, if they voted a resolution proposed under such conditions, would not be offering merely theoretical support, but would be assuming responsibilities of which the full consequences could only be foreseen after a very thorough examination.

That consideration led him to make a brief observation regarding the special arrangements among the signatories of the Rhineland Pact. Those arrangements, he would repeat, did not concern Poland so long as they affected exclusively the interests of the Powers in question. M. Beck could not, however, refrain from calling attention to the points in the arrangements which provided for the settlement of the general problems affecting all the Members of the League. On that question, he could only refer to the statement he had made at a public meeting of the Council—namely, that no such settlement

could usefully be made unless all the countries interested took part in all the stages of the negotiations.

Being somewhat in doubt both as to the procedure employed in the present case and as to the substance of the draft resolution, M. Beck must entirely reserve his Government's attitude.

(b) *Statement by the President (Rt. Hon. S. M. Bruce), March 24, 1936.*

The President said that the first matter for consideration was the course the Council's deliberations should take. By the courtesy of the Locarno Powers, the Council had had brought to its notice a document¹ outlining certain proposals and suggestions that were now under consideration. It had been made clear that that document had been sent to the Council, not as having been submitted by a number of nations which were Members of the League, but in order to keep the Council advised of the situation. Moreover, in the letter accompanying the document, it was made clear that, as regards one at any rate of the Governments which were parties to the discussions, the matter at the present stage was still under consideration. The Council therefore had, in fact, no document before it requiring any action, nor had such a state of things as was implied in Article 11 been brought to its notice by any Member of the League. At the present moment, therefore, there was no matter actually before the Council for its discussion. The Council had dealt definitively, by the resolution passed in the preceding week, with the one particular question with which it was under an obligation to deal under the Locarno Treaty.

The fundamental duty of the Council, as he saw it, was at all times to take any and every action that might be desirable to promote the general peace of the world, or to settle difficulties, as they arose. At the present moment, he would suggest to the Council that the best way to achieve those two great ideals of the League would be, not to close the session, but to adjourn and meet again at the earliest possible date, as soon as there was any useful part it could play in the solution of the difficulties with which the world was confronted.

In order to crystallize the suggestion he was putting to the Council, he had drafted a resolution as a basis for discussion. . . .²

(c) *Resolution adopted by the League Council, March 24, 1936.*

The Council,

Thanks the representative of the United Kingdom for his

¹ See above, p. 127.

² After amendment the Resolution was adopted in the form printed below.

communication, dated March 20, 1936, transmitting the text of proposals drawn up on March 19, 1936, by the representatives of the Members of the League who are signatories of the Treaty of Locarno, and which are now under consideration by the respective Governments;

Considers that any further action on its part should remain in abeyance for the present, in view of the conversations which are being carried on;

Invites the said Governments to keep it advised of the progress of the said conversations;

Decides to meet again as soon as circumstances render further consideration of the question desirable.

(vi) *Preliminary Reply of the German Government, March 24, 1936*¹

On March 19 the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Eden, gave Ambassador von Ribbentrop, who was then in London, the first cognisance of the draft of a proposal on the part of the Locarno Powers.

After the receipt of this document the German Government were requested to state their attitude towards it.

In complying with this request the German Government feel themselves impelled first to repeat the principles and the motives from which the inward necessity of their attitude arises.

1. The German Government, being convinced that by the Franco-Soviet military alliance the legal and political conditions on which the Rhine Pact of Locarno was based have been removed, have determined for their part to restore at last their full sovereignty over the entire territory of the Reich.

They did not, however, order the German troops to march into this territory of the German Reich in order to carry out a course of action for its own sake, but they considered this action necessary in order to provide for Germany the necessary conditions under which she could become a party to a new agreement for a clear and reasonable organization of peace in Europe. This condition will at all times only be found in the complete equality of the nations which join in such a common action.

Therefore this German action of restoring at last the full sovereignty of the Reich in its own territory cannot be separated from the agreements proposed by the German Government to the other nations for a general establishment of European peace.

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5175.

2. If the other States and Governments are ready for their part also to seek the way leading to such a new system for the establishment of peace in Europe, they cannot reject forthwith the elementary principles and the necessary conditions for such a development for the future. The following fact must be clear: Lasting agreements between the European nations with the aim of really guaranteeing peace can only be concluded in an atmosphere of sympathetic recognition and consideration of the natural, equal, vital and political rights of all the nations participating therein. Any attempt to introduce a new system of order in Europe by the old methods of a hate-inspired division of the nations into those with more and those with less rights, into defamed and honourable nations, or even into dictator nations and subject nations, must lead to the same result because it would be begun under the old conditions, which have proved themselves to be pernicious, *i.e.*, the new order will be no better than the old.

It would be advantageous for future developments in Europe if all parties were to understand that treaties on the one hand, and dictates on the other, have a different legal value in the life of the nations. The dictate will probably appear to the victor to be its own legal justification, but will always be regarded by the vanquished as a violation contrary to all right, and be judged from this standpoint. Only treaties which have been concluded by parties with equal rights, and of their own free will and free conviction, can claim from both partners the same lasting and sacred respect.

By the restoration of her sovereignty in her own territory Germany has only created the necessary condition which will enable her to conclude such genuine treaties. For this purpose and on this condition the German Government for their part have presented their proposals, already made known, and still abide by them.

3. The proposal for a draft treaty which was handed to the German Government by the British Secretary of State, Mr. Eden, contains not one of the necessary conditions for the successful organization of a really lasting peace, since it is based, in the first place, on a new discrimination which is intolerable for a great nation and on a further attempt once more to lay down Germany's inequality of rights with the other States.

If the German Government were to agree to this proposal they would share the responsibility for its inevitable results, a continued inner rejection of the humiliating subjection imposed upon the German people under such conditions.

The German Government will, however, not do this.

All historical experience shows that it is impossible to bring about on such a basis a real and lasting peace which is such because it is concluded of their own free will and with equal rights by all parties and thus is respected by all parties. The German Government must therefore reject all the provisions of the proposals of the Locarno Powers which are liable once more to infringe the honour of the nation or to bring into question or do away with its equality of rights.

4. The German Government and the German people have the most profound and earnest desire to make an important contribution to the peace of Europe after the restoration of the complete independence and sovereignty of the Reich. They are further convinced that all attempts to bring about an improvement in the social position of the peoples of Europe by means of economic conferences will be in vain until it has become possible to give to the European peoples and to the political and economic leaders the feeling of unconditional and lasting security. But this security can only be provided by a firm peace which is guaranteed for a long period.

The German Government do not disguise the fact that they themselves set more value upon this peace as one of the surest bases for a revival of the prosperity of the nations than on any assistance, support, or relief, &c., which may be negotiated by means of economic conferences.

Acting on this conviction the German Government have presented their proposals for international discussion. If, therefore, they are compelled to reject the proposal for a draft treaty presented to them by the Locarno Powers in all those points which affect the honour and equal rights of the German nation, they believe, nevertheless, recognizing their co-responsibility for the fate of the European peoples, that they must comply with the suggestions of His Britannic Majesty's Government in order for their part, by presenting any possible new proposals, to contribute to a solution of this European question. For this reason the German Government do not wish in this document to go into details of the points rejected by them, but they would like to reserve this procedure in order to bring this rejection of theirs into connexion with a new and detailed proposal for overcoming the European crisis, which they are determined to work out. They will present this to His Britannic Majesty's Government with the sincere wish that the latter may then succeed in finding in it a basis for starting those negotiations which shall bring peace to the European peoples and fructify anew their economic and social life.

In consideration of these facts the German Government are bound to inform His Britannic Majesty's Government that, since in this

week they are making the final preparations for their elections, they are technically not in the position to draw up so extensive a document and one requiring so much profound consideration. They therefore consider it necessary to send Ambassador von Ribbentrop to London once more on Tuesday, March 24, for a verbal discussion of a few important questions. The German Government will then present to His Britannic Majesty's Government their carefully considered attitude and their positive proposals on Tuesday, March 31.

(vii) *Statement by Herr von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador-at-Large, March 24, 1936.*¹

Question: . . . I asked [Herr von Ribbentrop] if he could give me some account of the impression which the proposals of the Locarno Powers made upon Herr Hitler and his advisers in Berlin.

Answer: At the first sight of the document handed to me by Mr. Eden last Thursday night I felt a profound conviction that it would arouse a very strong reaction not only in the minds of the German Government, but also throughout the entire German nation, for these proposals represent a lamentable lapse into the mentality which has imposed so much suffering on Germany during the years that have followed the war.

This mentality regards it as a basic principle that the nations of Europe should be divided into conquerors and conquered.

I can assure you that the German nation will no longer tolerate this Versailles spirit.

It follows, therefore, that the German Government will never accept any one-sided limitation of its sovereign rights within its own frontiers.

If M. Flandin says that he feels the presence of foreign troops on French soil would be a monstrous iniquity, we should feel the same about such a discrimination against Germany.

When I presented the proposals of the Locarno Powers to my Government in Berlin, its resentment of the spirit animating them was all the greater by reason of the fact that ever since the National-Socialist Party came to power its dominant desire and aim have been to bring about the pacification of the Continent of Europe on the basis of full equality of national rights.

It has often been asked, especially by French statesmen, why Germany did not follow up her peaceable words by deeds of a similar kind.

¹ In an interview given to Mr. G. Ward Price. *Daily Mail*, March 25, 1936.

I think I am justified in claiming that the *Führer* has surpassed the deeds of any European statesman by putting forward numerous concrete propositions which he has laid before the world.

They are a substantial proof that Germany really desires the consolidation of peace and co-operation between the peoples.

I believe that the day will come when it is universally recognized that the step taken by the German Government in reoccupying the Rhineland was a definite advance towards the consolidation of Europe.

I base these claims upon the following arguments:

(1) Quite apart from the fact that it is and must be intolerable for any nation not to be master in its own house, it was impossible, after the conclusion of an anti-German military alliance between France and Russia, to leave the densely populated western provinces of Germany any longer without military protection.

(2) Previous experience had taught us that it was quite useless to hope that an agreement about the restoration of German sovereignty in the Rhineland might be reached by way of negotiations.

(3) Is it conceivable that the mere restoration of full sovereignty in any one country should prevent the consolidation of peace in a whole continent?

The German Government therefore believes that its action in reoccupying the Rhineland on March 7 has opened the way to negotiations for a lasting peace because such negotiations can succeed only if they are carried on between equal and free peoples.

Question: Are you satisfied with the reception which you have had on your return to London?

Answer: My interview with Mr. Eden was friendly and cordial. I explained to him the background of the German Government's views in the same way as I have described it to you.

I have been greatly impressed since I first came to London by the manifestly sincere wish of the British people for peace and settlement in Europe. I can assure you that this wish is shared by 100 per cent. of the German nation.

The people of France, too, whom I have known for close on a quarter of a century, are equally desirous of peace and of improved relations with their German neighbours. I have no doubt that the same holds good of other European countries.

I feel most strongly that, in view of this widespread longing throughout Europe for an all-round 25-years guarantee of peace, it should and must be possible for the statesmen of Europe to translate it into fact.

If a plebiscite were held to-day in England, France, and Germany to decide how many people wanted to give Herr Hitler's constructive plan a trial, I am convinced that there would be an overwhelming majority in favour of it.

To my mind, Europe to-day stands at a parting of the ways. Do the nations want peace, or do they not?

As regards the German wish for peace, at any rate, the result of the elections next Sunday will prove to the whole world what the answer of the German nation is.

(viii) *Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, March 26, 1936.*¹

I should like my first sentence this afternoon to be one of expressing to all parties in this House, and to the press and the people of this country as a whole, the Government's sincere and grateful thanks for the restraint which they have shown during a most anxious international period, a restraint, if I may say so, which is all the more remarkable in that it was assumed and maintained on a purely voluntary basis. Perhaps if the same conditions of liberty of the press and speech, and the same distinction between liberty and licence, were to-day observed throughout Europe, we should not now be confronted with the problems which unfortunately beset us.

This afternoon I stand here to give an account on my behalf and on that of the Government of our stewardship during the recent critical international situation. If in doing that I should depart somewhat, as I shall, from the usual formal restraint in speeches on international affairs, I shall justify myself in so doing because what I have to say is in the main spoken, not to nations overseas, but to the people of my own country. It is imperative in the present international situation that this country should visualize its problems in a true perspective. We can only do that if I as Foreign Secretary speak frankly.

We must distinguish between what may be national sentiment and what are, for good or ill, our national obligations. Likely enough, there may be many people in this country who say to themselves, 'In our judgment the territories of France and Germany should be treated on exactly equal terms.' It may be that people feel that, but those are not the terms of the Treaty of Locarno. Those are not the terms of the Treaty of which we are guarantors and which has formed a main element in the security of western Europe for the last 10 years.

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, March 26, 1936, coll. 1439-53.

If I put the matter in this way, it is because I believe there is a special responsibility on this country at this time, and I want to begin to try and place matters in their true perspective by giving the House a brief account of the origins of this demilitarized zone, for I do not believe that they are generally appreciated. What happened was this. After the War the original French aim was to guarantee the security of France by the separation of the Rhineland provinces from the rest of Germany. The French Government were persuaded to abandon that position and, if I may say so, rightly persuaded, by means of an arrangement comprising three things, namely, a 15 years' occupation of the zone itself, the permanent demilitarization of the zone, and, most important of all, a guarantee of security from ourselves and the United States of America. In actual fact, that guarantee was never forthcoming. The United States failed to ratify, and, since our ratification was dependent upon theirs, that guarantee came to nothing. It is important that it should be realized that that was the most important element in inducing the then French Government to give up the demand for the separation of the Rhineland provinces from Germany.

Then the demilitarized zone was embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. It forms Articles 42 and 43 of that Treaty. There were time limits to certain provisions of that Treaty, notably in respect of the occupation of the Rhineland. That actually came to an end before the time had expired, but there was no time limit for this demilitarized zone. It was, in fact, under the Treaty an enduring undertaking. I say that—and I know the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) will believe me—in no spirit of criticism at all. I myself never criticized the Versailles Treaty and our part in it, because I had some appreciation of the difficulties in which it must have been negotiated. All I would say to the House, and more particularly to the right hon. Gentleman, is that he, too, would appreciate our difficulties in facing a situation for which we are not all of us on this bench responsible. He is one of the few to whom it has been given in history—and we are happy to note it—to have the proud position of being able to criticize his own legacy to history.

I will turn from the place of the zone in the Treaties of Versailles to its place in the Treaty of Locarno. The House may imagine that this zone forms part of the Treaty of Locarno because from the outset France and Belgium clamantly demanded it. That is not the position at all. This demand for the demilitarized zone figured in the original demand put forward by Germany, who herself initiated the

conversations which led to the signature of the Locarno Treaty. It figured from the start in the original German proposals, and I do not think it is very difficult, looking back, to see why that was. The Locarno Treaty was signed not very long after the Ruhr [*sic*], and it would not be astonishing if the German Government of that day reflected that some guarantee from us in those conditions would be of service to her.

What has happened since? Successive governments in Germany, in France, and in this country have reaffirmed Locarno. The present Chancellor of the German Reich has reaffirmed it, and other German spokesmen have done the same. We have heard much, more particularly since the advent of the present régime in Germany, about the *Diktat* of Versailles, but nobody has ever heard of the *Diktat* of Locarno. It is hard to conceive how such a phrase could be used of a Treaty which it has been admitted on all sides was freely negotiated and freely signed. Nor is that all. If Germany wished, as she was clearly entitled to wish, to modify any part of this Treaty, negotiations were open to her. Germany has claimed, as she has from her own point of view every right to claim if she believes it to be true, that the Franco-Soviet Pact is inconsistent with the Locarno Treaty, but I would draw the attention of the House in that connexion to Article 3 of the Locarno Treaty which specifically provides for just such a contingency. Under that Article

‘Germany and Belgium and Germany and France undertake to settle by peaceful means and in the manner laid down herein all questions of every kind which may arise between them . . .’

Germany was, therefore, clearly bound, under the terms of the Treaty, to settle this question by the methods which the Treaty made available. The French Government made it clear that they were willing to go to the Hague Court. The German Government regard that Court as unsuitable, but if it is not suitable it is only fair to point out that the Franco-German Arbitration Treaty signed between the two countries expressly provides that even legal questions can, by agreement, be submitted to a permanent conciliation commission which that agreement sets up. That might have been—I am not arguing it—the appropriate method for Germany to use. She did not use it. The German Government ignored Article 3 of the Treaty and decided for themselves that the Franco-Soviet Pact was incompatible with the Treaty of Locarno, and decided moreover that that incompatibility entitled Germany to regard the whole of the Locarno Treaty as non-existent.

I would now like to say a word about the position of one country

whose relations to the events of the last few weeks have not perhaps been wholly appreciated by the people of this country. I refer to Belgium. Germany's case is that the Franco-Soviet Pact conflicts with Locarno. But Belgium has signed no Pact with Soviet Russia, and more than half this zone runs along the Belgian frontier—the frontier of a country which has suffered more than any other, except perhaps Poland, as the battle-ground of Europe. Is it surprising, in these conditions, that there should be deep anxiety in Belgium to-day? I would like to pay my warmest tribute to the cool courage and constructive statesmanship of M. van Zeeland, the Prime Minister of Belgium. To sum up then this earlier part of what I wish to say to the House: I believe it to be the judgment of this country that even those in this country who think that Germany has a strong case deprecate the fact that she has chosen to present it by force and not by reason.

Now I want to say something about the position of our own country. There are some who may regard us as freely and fortunately placed at this anxious moment in European affairs, some who regard us as arbiters with a fortunate destiny. But we are not arbiters in this business; that is not so. We are guarantors of this Treaty, and as guarantors, for good or ill—I am not arguing that—we have certain commitments and they are very definite. I will draw the attention of the House to Article 4 of the Locarno Treaty. It runs as follows:

‘If one of the high contracting parties alleges that a violation of Article 2 of the present Treaty or a breach of Articles 42 or 43 of the Treaty of Versailles has been or is being committed, it shall bring the question at once before the Council of the League of Nations.’

That has been done—

‘As soon as the Council of the League of Nations is satisfied that such violation or breach has been committed, it will notify its findings without delay to the Powers signatory of the present Treaty, who severally agree that in such case they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed.’

Those words are clear. It cannot be said, in the light of them, that we are uncommitted and free arbiters. Our position is far different, and I want in all bluntness to make this plain to the House—I am not prepared to be the first British Foreign Secretary to go back on a British signature. And yet our objective throughout this difficult period has been to seek a peaceful and an agreed solution.

I consider that we are bound to do so by Article 7 of the Locarno Treaty itself, which states:

‘The present Treaty, which . . . is in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, shall not be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League to take whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world.’

It is in the spirit of that Article that we have sought conciliation and attempted to bring about agreement and understanding, and to do that without impairing confidence in our good faith or in our determination to carry out the obligations to which we have set our name. I do not pretend that our task would not have been easier had we been entirely free. That does not arise. We have entered upon our task with the weight of these commitments heavy upon us.

It was under these conditions that the Powers met in Paris a short while ago. There is no secret about the position which the French and Belgian Governments then took up. They stated that it would not be possible for them to negotiate with Germany unless some action were taken to show that the validity of international agreements was being upheld. When we asked, how did they propose that that should be done?, the French Government told us that in their view it was necessary that Germany should withdraw her troops from a zone which she had entered contrary to the obligations of a Treaty she had signed. When we asked how that was to be brought about if Germany were to refuse, it was replied to us that if withdrawal could not be otherwise arranged it must be brought about by progressive pressure, beginning with financial and economic sanctions. We did not take that view. We neither denied the gravity of the breach of the Treaty which had been committed nor the consequences to Europe, but we thought it our imperative duty to seek by negotiation to restore confidence. That being our objective from the very first hour of this critical fortnight, we have sought throughout to rebuild. But—we must face this fact—it is not possible to rebuild unless your foundations can be well and truly laid, and your foundations cannot be well and truly laid if some of those engaged in the task believe that the building will ultimately share the fate of its predecessor. It has been our task to create an atmosphere of confidence in which these negotiations could take place. Those, broadly, were the points of view at the outset.

We thought, the Lord Privy Seal and I thought, that in the condition of this present phase of international affairs it would be a wise step to attempt to induce our colleagues to move the scene of negotiations from Paris to London. They concurred, and as a result

the meetings of the Council and of the Locarno Powers took place in this city. There were many days of anxious and even critical negotiation. The crux of our problem was always the same, how was international law to be vindicated? How were we to bridge, as we ourselves are most anxious to bridge, this difficult interim period before negotiations could begin? The White Paper contains three proposals to that end. It asks Germany to do three things: To bring the dispute as to the relation of the Franco-Soviet Pact to the Locarno Treaty before the Hague Court; to suspend fortification of the zone; and to agree to an international force for the interim period.

I would say to any one in this House who considers those requests severe to remember the point from which we started in Paris, to remember the request which was made then, a request which could quite consistently and properly be made within the terms of the Treaty itself. I must make it plain that these proposals have always been proposals. They are not an ultimatum, still less a *Diktat*. If an international force were the difficulty, and if the German Government could offer some other constructive proposals to take its place, His Majesty's Government will be quite ready to go to the other Powers interested and try to secure agreement upon them; but it must be appreciated that without some constructive contribution from the German side the task of those whose sole aim and ambition is to start these negotiations will be an almost impossible one.

Now I would say a word or two about the White Paper itself, and more particular about our own undertakings as set out in that Paper.¹ Those undertakings come into force at three different stages. There are the undertakings which relate to the immediate situation, pending negotiations; there are the undertakings which we are prepared to contribute as part of the general settlement which we hope to bring about in the negotiations; and there are, finally, the undertakings which we are prepared to give in the event of a break-down of negotiations. I want to take first and to explain to the House the undertaking given for the interim period, which is in paragraph III of the White Paper. It says:

'Declare that nothing that has happened before or since the said breach of the Treaty of Locarno . . .'

and so forth. That undertaking in paragraph III is deliberately designed to compensate for the loss of security suffered by France and Belgium at this time owing to the violation of the demilitarized zone. The first part of that paragraph repeats the statement which I made to this House—the very first statement I made after the

¹ For text see above, p. 127.

breach of the Treaty took place. The undertaking is strictly limited and it is clearly defined. The staff conversations are only for the purpose of obligations under the Locarno Treaty. They are purely technical conversations. They can in no measure increase our political obligations—in no measure. We shall ask, and, indeed, insist, that some such paragraph as this shall be the understanding upon which those conversations take place: 'It is understood that this contact does not imply any political undertaking or any obligation as regards defence organization between the two parties.' I do not anticipate any great difficulty in securing this undertaking, because, as it happens, those very words are drawn from an agreement between Belgium and France. I think we must distinguish, and clearly distinguish, between staff conversations for a specific and limited purpose now and those conversations in the years before 1914. Before 1914 we had no political commitments. Consequently the staff conversations inevitably entailed a political commitment, though they might be military. [Hon. Members: 'No!'] Well, that is the fear that many people had.

Mr. Churchill: Every military agreement was preluded by a disclaimer of political significance.

Mr. Eden: Whether that be accepted or denied I do not think the House will disagree that it was a general fear, widely shown. My point is that whether that fear was justified or not it cannot arise in the present instance, because our obligations in the present instance are clearly set out by Treaty already, and the only question that can be at issue is whether or not you are prepared to make arrangements to carry out those obligations should the need arise. That is all. I would remind the House in this connexion that only in the last few months such conversations have actually taken place, on that occasion at our request, in connexion with obligations under the Covenant which we all shared and which had arisen out of a dispute in another part of the world.

So much for the interim period. At this stage I want to say one word to those who would argue that it is our duty at this time to keep free from all entanglements in Europe. With respect, I wonder whether those who say that are quite clear about what they mean. If they mean we must turn a blind eye to all that happens in Europe, I say that is to take no account at all of realities. We have never been able in all our history to dissociate ourselves from events in the Low Countries, neither in the time of Queen Elizabeth, nor in the time of Marlborough, nor in the time of Napoleon, and still less at the present day, when modern developments of science have brought

striking force so much nearer to our shores. It is a vital interest of this country that the integrity of France and Belgium should be maintained and that no hostile force should cross their frontiers. The truth is, and I say it with apologies to my right hon. Friend the Member for West Birmingham (Sir A. Chamberlain), there was nothing very new in Locarno.

It was a new label, but it was an old fact, and that fact has been the underlying policy of British foreign policy throughout history. To affirm it again is a threat to no one, for its purpose is purely defensive, and in every single Article where these conversations are mentioned it is clearly shown that they only apply in a case of unprovoked aggression. I hope that those conditions will never arise, but I am quite confident that they are much less likely to arise if we make quite clear our own position. What Locarno did was to carry a stage farther commitments which we already bore under the Covenant in respect of a much wider area. It was not, of course, inconsistent with the Covenant, but complementary to it, and, in fact, the idea of these regional pacts has been blessed by Geneva.

But it may be that those who urge that we should disentangle ourselves from Europe have something in mind rather different, or very different, from what I have just described. They may be thinking of another situation when, owing to obligations elsewhere, our neighbours may become involved in conflict and may call for help in a quarrel that is not ours. That I believe to be a general apprehension. The people of this country are determined that that shall not happen, and that is the view of the Government. We agree with it entirely. Our obligations are world-wide obligations, are the obligations of the Covenant, and we stand firm in support of them, but we do not add, nor will we add, one jot to those obligations, except in the area already covered by the Locarno Treaty. Let us make our position on that absolutely clear. We accept no obligations beyond those shared by the League except the obligations which devolve on us from Locarno.

Now I come to the second set of undertakings in this Paper. Those are the undertakings we are prepared to enter into with a view to securing, if we can, a final settlement of this troubled European situation. They are to be found in Paragraph VII of this White Paper. Briefly put, the scheme is that there should be, as suggested by the German Chancellor, a number of non-aggression pacts, that in Western Europe these non-aggression pacts should be guaranteed by Britain and Italy. That is the German Chancellor's scheme; but, over and above that, in our own proposals there will be pacts of

mutual assistance between the Powers of Western Europe which would differ from Locarno in this, that the guarantees would be reciprocal, and that we should share with others in the guarantees as well as in the risks. Those mutual assistance pacts would, of course, be open to all the signatories of Locarno. I am talking now of the permanent settlement we wish to reach, not of the temporary arrangement to restore confidence, open to all the signatories, including Germany. Those would be supplemented by staff conversations on exactly the same lines and with the same limitations as I have stressed before. The general scheme of this central part of our proposal is very much like the scheme of the Air Pact which has been under discussion for some time past.

Finally, I come to the position with which we should be faced if negotiations were to fail. The House may say, 'Why do you want at this stage to visualize failure? Why was it necessary, in trying to start negotiations, to contemplate failure?' The answer is a simple one. If we were to ask the Powers, as we do ask in this document, who enjoy guarantees under Locarno to come into a conference where we should seek to make a new scheme of security for Europe they would surely be entitled to turn round and say: 'That is all very well, but what if those negotiations break down? Are we left without Locarno and without anything at all?' That was a situation which clearly had to be met, and it was to meet it that this draft letter was proposed. This letter contains two undertakings.¹ The first, in paragraph (b) is that the Powers concerned:

'Will immediately come to the assistance of your Government, in accordance with the Treaty of Locarno, in respect of any measures which shall be jointly decided upon.'

That paragraph adds nothing to the obligations of Locarno except the word 'jointly,' which is clearly of considerable importance to us. Paragraph (c) contains two most important elements to which I would draw the attention of the House. It only applies to the event of an unprovoked aggression, and the assurances which it gives are strictly reciprocal, that is to say they are dependent upon the receipt of reciprocal assurances from Belgium and from France. The staff conversations visualized in paragraph (d) are again under the same limited conditions as apply in paragraph III of this White Paper.

To sum up, then, the position of our engagements: Except in respect of the parts of Europe covered by our Locarno obligations, our obligations are precisely the same as those of any other Member of the League of Nations. Even in respect of the area covered by

¹ See above, p. 132.

the Locarno Treaty there is no new commitment, but only arrangements for the more effectual fulfilment of commitments which already exist. We have visualized these not because they necessarily appeal to us, but because we think it imperative to make some contribution to try to secure negotiations to solve our present difficulties. I freely admit that it is not impossible to find faults with this White Paper—I could find a few myself—but I have given the House the reasons for it. In the circumstances of that time, I say, deliberately, that I regret not one of these proposals, because the House must recall that we were met together in circumstances as grave as those that have faced any governments since the War. The international position was extremely complicated. Few people in this country yet realize the immense significance to certain parts of Europe of that demilitarized zone. There were latent dangers which are not yet wholly appreciated. Our justification for these proposals lies simply in this, that at a moment of crisis they allayed the immediate prospects of steps being taken which might have led to war. They earned us a breathing space and we have now concluded the first phase of our efforts to preserve peace in a situation of difficulty which we have done nothing ourselves to create. My justification for this White Paper, and the Government's justification, is that no less than peace was in the balance when these meetings took place. If the House will weigh the danger of war against this document, I am convinced that their judgment will be the same as that of the Government—that it was worth while.

Of all these proposals, the one to which we attach most importance is the one which opens up opportunities for new negotiations. That is the phase we want to reach. If we are to reach it, as I said, we must have a contribution from the German Government. So far, despite all our efforts, and they have been many, none has been forthcoming, save the Chancellor's undertaking not to increase the number of troops that originally entered the zone. While admitting the importance of that, quite frankly, in the present international situation it is not enough. If, in addition to that, the German Government would give an undertaking that for the period of negotiations it would not fortify the zone, that would give us something to work upon, but I am informed that it is not possible for the German Government to give even that undertaking.

Our objectives in all this are threefold—first, to avert the danger of war, second, to create conditions in which negotiations can take place, and third, to bring about the success of those negotiations so that they may strengthen collective security, further Germany's

return to the League and, in a happier atmosphere, allow those larger negotiations on economic matters and on matters of armaments which are indispensable to the appeasement of Europe to take place. I assure the House that it is the appeasement of Europe as a whole that we have constantly before us. It would not be difficult to blame the Government because everything that each one of us would like has not been done. It would not be difficult to blame us because some particular thing has been done that an individual critic might have preferred left undone. But such a criticism is of little value, unless it takes account of the conditions in which we have to work, of our obligations and the fact that France and Belgium on the one side, and Germany on the other, view these things from different angles. Some people in this country could quickly produce an agreement that would suit Germany and ourselves. Others could produce an agreement that would suit France and ourselves. But, if we are to get agreement at all, we have to get them both at a table and our objective is to get them there.

What are the chances of achieving that now? Much, clearly, depends on the proposals which the German Chancellor has been good enough to tell us he is going to make at the beginning of next week. We know that the Chancellor, who has, I believe, appreciated the efforts which the British Government have made, will understand with what anxiety Europe awaits those proposals. He can be assured, so far as we are concerned, that those proposals will be received, not only with an open mind, but with a keen desire to make the best use we can of them in order to bring about the permanent pacification of Europe. I say this all the more sincerely because we are conscious of the difficulties of our time. There is another essential condition if these conversations are to start and are to have any chance of success. We need time. We must reduce the present *tempo* of international exchanges and we need a calmer and quieter atmosphere in which to attempt to study these new proposals when they come next week, and to take stock of the general situation as we then find it. When we have those proposals, we shall need an indispensable breathing-space, and any action we shall take will simply be calculated to try to steady the situation to that end.

I am approaching my concluding plea which is addressed not only to this country. We are, I believe, only at the beginning of a period which must be, at best, one of most critical international negotiations. I do not view the future with a light heart, but there are a few general observations which I want to make and which, I think, the Foreign Secretary of this country ought to make without restraint

at this time. I do not intend to approach the problem of the immediate future with the idea of being bound to the divergent policies either of France or of Germany. Our policy is the Covenant and our membership of the League. We know our obligations and we are prepared to fulfil them. But what is uppermost in my mind and what, I believe, is uppermost in the minds of the great mass of the people of this country, is that we must persist in our search for peace on an enduring foundation. If we are to achieve that we shall need help from all.

I say, first, to the British public: We cannot secure peace unless you are prepared frankly to recognize the real perplexities of the present international situation. We cannot ensure peace if you refuse to take upon yourselves obligations to assist us at this time. We cannot ensure peace, unless, in this country and elsewhere, we divest ourselves of prejudices about this or that foreign nation and unless in this country we can divest ourselves of prejudices about our own politicians. It is fantastic to suggest that we are tied to the chariot wheels of this or that foreign country. I would like to say to France, that we cannot ensure peace unless the French Government is ready to approach, with an open mind, the problems which still separate it from Germany. I would like to say to Germany: How can we hope to enter on negotiations with any prospect of success, unless you are prepared to do something to allay the anxieties in Europe which you have created?

If we are to bring a happy issue out of all our troubles, the British public, whose one aim is peace, whose one ambition is a European settlement and whose one political objective is support of the League of Nations, will judge other nations by the spirit in which, and the extent to which, they co-operate with us in this task. We are conscious that the country feels deeply upon this issue. I would ask it to think deeply also. I do not believe that, at this time, we shall contribute to a solution of our difficulties by fashioning our foreign policy exclusively on that of any foreign country, but rather by seeking to understand the difficulties that exist in each and attempting to contrive a common meeting-place. That is our whole objective.

Nobody, I think, in this House will envy me my task at this time. He would be an unimaginative being indeed who did not appreciate its burden. But there is always some comfort in approaching a task the fulfilment of which, could it ever be attained, is one's keenest desire. A strengthened League of Nations, an ordered Europe, a greater confidence in which nations would rely less on arms and more on law and order—are these things truly impossible of achievement?

They are very difficult at this time, but out of this unpromising outlook opportunities may be offered. If we are to seize them, it is imperative that as a country we should be united in policy and in purpose. These issues far transcend the ordinary limitations of party politics. When the whole future of our civilization may be at stake, who cares about party labels? I would ask for the continuance of that support which has been so generously extended to me in the last few weeks and I would ask it because I believe that the purpose for which I am working—with how many errors and through how many discussions—is one which is shared by the great majority of the men and women of this country. It is to maintain peace, to strengthen the League, to uphold the sanctity of treaties, and above all to seek, without respite, to fashion from the troubled present a future which may be freed from the haunting fears that shadow our own time.

(ix) *Speech by M. Flandin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, March 30, 1936.*¹

Depuis que l'Allemagne, ayant répudié et dénoncé le traité de Locarno, a réoccupé la zone démilitarisée, garantie de la sécurité belge et française, solennellement confirmée par un traité librement négocié et signé, le chancelier Hitler a multiplié ses harangues et ses proclamations à l'appui de la nouvelle paix qu'il prétend offrir en compensation au monde.

J'ai déjà dit, au nom du gouvernement, que la France, une fois rétabli le respect de la loi internationale, se prêterait à toute négociation susceptible de consolider la paix. Encore faut-il que les bases de cette négociation soient précises et sérieuses.

On pouvait espérer que, dans ses discours, le chancelier Hitler corrigerait par ses commentaires le vague de ses propositions d'origine.

Il ne l'a guère fait que sur un point, mais il est d'importance: c'est pour opposer dans presque tous ses discours la valeur des traités à ce qu'il a appelé le droit vital éternel du peuple allemand.

Ainsi, sentant combien sa thèse était fragile, de justifier la réoccupation de la zone démilitarisée par la conclusion du pacte franco-soviétique, au moment où l'Allemagne se refuse à faire juger par la Cour internationale de la Haye la compatibilité ou l'incompatibilité du traité de Locarno et du pacte franco-soviétique, le *Führer* revendique, au nom de son peuple, le droit d'installer sa maison comme il lui plaît.

A Berlin, notamment, il a déclaré: 'Si d'autres peuples se cram-

¹ At Vézelay. *Le Temps*, March 31, 1936.

ponnent à la lettre du traité, moi je me cramponne à la morale éternelle. S'ils nous opposent des textes, je leur oppose les droits éternels et les devoirs éternels de mon peuple.' Et il précise qu'il est engagé dans une lutte qui doit aboutir au rétablissement de la position de l'Allemagne dans le monde.

Alors deux séries de questions se posent et doivent être posées. Ce sont des questions de principe et des questions de fait. La première question de principe est celle-ci : quelle sera demain la valeur d'un traité si l'Allemagne se réserve le droit de la répudier au nom de la morale éternelle et du droit vital du peuple allemand ?

Voici, par exemple, le cas de la Belgique. Elle n'a conclu aucun traité avec l'U.R.S.S., objet de la haine présente et déclarée du *Führer*. Cependant, l'Allemagne dénonce le traité de Locarno à l'égard de la Belgique, au nom du droit vital éternel du peuple allemand. Si on lui objecte qu'il n'en avait pas le droit, il répond : 'Je suis le seul maître d'interpréter les traités.'

Et voici la deuxième question de principe : quel sera demain, à l'égard d'un nouveau traité avec l'Allemagne, le juge indépendant et impartial qu'elle reconnaîtra et aux décisions duquel elle se soumettra ?

Il est impossible, en effet, de ne pas apercevoir une contradiction profonde entre les deux conceptions de la vie internationale qui s'opposent aujourd'hui : l'une, celle de l'Allemagne, est la conception de la force ; l'autre, celle du reste du monde, pourrais-je dire, est la conception du droit. Quand nous disons : j'établis mes relations avec les autres peuples sur la base des traités, je m'oblige à les respecter, et si l'autre partie croit que je ne les respecte plus, j'accepte par avance la décision d'un tribunal international, je m'interdis de m'affranchir de mes obligations avant leur terme et, si j'en souhaite la révision, je ne la conçois que par la voie légale de la négociation ou de l'arbitrage, le *Führer* répond : Au-dessus des traités il y a le droit vital éternel du peuple allemand. Ce droit vital, j'en suis seul juge. C'est parce que je le veux qu'il faut que cela soit.

Ces dernières paroles ont été prononcées à Berlin récemment et couvertes d'applaudissements frénétiques.

Pour le moment donc, et sans doute pour les besoins actuels de sa propagande diplomatique, le chancelier Hitler déclare vouloir la paix. Vingt-cinq ans de paix, proclame-t-il, et peut-être demain même la paix éternelle avec la France. Est-ce pour préparer cette paix qu'il remilitarise en hâte la zone démilitarisée, qu'il s'y livre aussitôt à des travaux de fortification : contre qui sont-ils dirigés et pourquoi sont-ils entrepris ?

Et c'est là qu'il faut en venir aux questions de fait.

Si le chancelier Hitler est sincère dans son affirmation de paix, il est indispensable qu'il précise sa pensée quant à la définition du droit vital du peuple allemand et de l'égalité des droits.

Le *Führer* a dit: 'L'Allemagne ne veut rien prendre à personne.' Mais il avait déjà déclaré, au lendemain du plébiscite de la Sarre: 'Il n'y a plus aucune question territoriale qui divise l'Allemagne et la France.' Il réaffirmait alors le traité de Locarno, qu'il a répudié depuis. Au nom de la souveraineté intégrale du peuple allemand, le *Führer* a-t-il l'intention, quand l'occasion lui semblera favorable à ses desseins, de mettre en question le statut de Dantzig? Quand il propose un pacte de non-agression avec la Lithuanie accepte-t-il définitivement le statut de Memel, ou n'est-ce qu'une finasserie destinée à préparer de nouveaux coups de force, de nouveaux faits accomplis en violation des traités?

Nous avons le droit de poser ces questions et d'obtenir des réponses claires, car le chancelier Hitler pourrait se prévaloir un jour d'avoir condamné en bloc tout ce qui résulte du traité de Versailles en Europe, sans qu'il ait été demandé des réponses catégoriques à des questions nettes.

Et voici d'autres questions qui ne sont pas moins nécessaires, ni moins précises.

Dans le mémorandum qu'il a distribué aux puissances signataires du traité de Locarno, comme dans le discours qu'il a prononcé, et qui accompagnait ce mémorandum, le chancelier Hitler a fait allusion à propos de l'égalité des droits à la question des colonies et à propos de certains droits vitaux des peuples à la révision des traités.

Si l'Allemagne entend revendiquer des droits à posséder et à exploiter des colonies, sur quelles colonies porteront ses revendications? Demande-t-elle que lui soient restituées toutes ses colonies d'avant-guerre ou certaines d'entre elles, et dans ce dernier cas, lesquelles? A-t-elle l'intention de prétendre un jour qu'au nom du droit vital du peuple allemand de se développer, fût-ce aux dépens des autres peuples, il demandera qu'on donne à l'Allemagne un empire de peuplement, et, dans l'affirmative, où et aux dépens de qui l'Allemagne entend-elle se constituer cet empire?

J'entends bien que le chancelier Hitler pourra répondre: 'Que vous importe, si ce n'est pas à vous, Français, que je m'adresse?' Mais c'est là, précisément, qu'un abîme sépare nos conceptions respectives de la vie internationale.

Pour nous, la paix est indivisible, et elle ne peut pas être couverte par des pactes bilatéraux de non-agression dont les uns seraient

reniés au moment choisi, tandis que les autres couvriraient l'agresseur contre une action collective, destinée à faire respecter la loi des traités et la sécurité de tous les associés, forts ou faibles, grands ou petits.

S'il en était ainsi, le nouveau système pour organiser la paix proposé par le chancelier Hitler ne viserait, en réalité, qu'à mieux préparer la guerre par l'impunité assurée de l'agresseur.

N'est-il pas significatif, d'ailleurs, qu'au moment où le chancelier Hitler lance au monde ses appels à la paix, la propagande naziste redouble en Autriche, dans le Schlesvig danois, dans la Silésie polonaise, dans la minorité allemand de Tchécoslovaquie, voire même en Suisse alémanique ?

Oui ou non, M. Hitler renonce-t-il à toute annexion et même à toute absorption de ces populations et de ces territoires dans le Reich, ou proclame-t-il, tant qu'il le croira possible, que ce sont là des affaires intérieures du peuple allemand, auxquelles il n'entend pas que se mêlent d'autres États ?

Dans ce cas, et en raison même de la disproportion des forces existant entre le Reich, qui poursuit son réarmement à une cadence jusqu'alors jamais atteinte, et les États auxquels je viens de faire allusion, on comprendrait pourquoi le chancelier Hitler est si préoccupé de s'affranchir de l'organisation de la sécurité collective par des pactes bilatéraux conclus dans le cadre de la Société des nations, pour n'admettre que les pactes bilatéraux de non-agression, lesquels, soit dit en passant, n'ajoutent rien au pacte Kellogg déjà en vigueur.

Le peuple français est tout autant convaincu que le peuple allemand de la nécessité pour l'Europe d'organiser la paix sur des bases solides et durables.

Il en est même à ce point convaincu qu'il ne conçoit pas une paix provisoire dans le temps, ni limitée dans l'espace, qui laisserait renaître çà et là, et par intervalles, les menaces de guerre.

Si le chancelier Hitler est prêt à une explication générale, sans réserves et sans réticences, qu'il réponde à toutes les questions que nous posons, et que, à la face de son peuple, il se prononce, non par des discours vagues, destinés à tromper ou à endormir certaines opinions publiques, mais par des déclarations catégoriques et précises.

Il n'y a rien là, je suppose, de contraire à l'honneur ou à la dignité du peuple allemand. L'Europe a besoin de savoir, et le monde aussi, je pense, s'il y a ou non une réalité dans la paix qu'on prétend lui offrir.

Certains, en présence des événements actuels, même parmi nos amis, ont cru que la France n'avait en vue que sa propre sécurité.

Après tant d'invasions venues de l'est, qui ont ruiné son sol et décimé sa population, elle en aurait eu le droit ; mais telle n'est pas son attitude. Malgré ses déceptions et ses épreuves, sa conception reste la même de la paix indivisible, fondée sur une meilleure organisation de la sécurité collective, dans le cadre de la Société des nations. Plus que jamais, elle proclame que l'assistance mutuelle, obligatoire et immédiate, au moins dans des régions déterminées, et en cas d'agression non provoquée, constitue le moyen préventif le plus sûr pour empêcher la guerre. Elle soutient toujours avec la même foi que la paix repose sur la stricte observation des traités, étant entendu que, par la conciliation et l'arbitrage, une procédure régulière de révision doit pouvoir adapter les traités aux circonstances fluctuantes de la vie des peuples. Elle pense qu'une fois acquises cette sécurité et ces garanties, au moins dans le cadre européen, les nations européennes doivent largement désarmer.

Augmenter les forces collectives mises au service du droit et de la justice internationale, diminuer les forces qui pourraient être utilisées au profit de tel ou tel impérialisme, tel est notre but. Et si, pour l'atteindre, les droits et les devoirs de chacun sont encore mal ou insuffisamment définis, nous sommes prêts, pour l'œuvre constructive de la paix, à donner tout notre concours.

Mais autant nous sommes résolus à travailler à l'établissement de la paix véritable et durable, autant nous sommes décidés à dénoncer les manœuvres et les ruses qui, sous le masque de la paix, prépareraient de nouveaux conflits et de nouvelles guerres.

(x) *Exchange of Notes between the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the French and Belgian Ambassadors at London, April 1, 1936.*¹

(a) *Note from the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden to the French Ambassador.*²
Your Excellency,

I have the honour to hand herewith to your Excellency the letter contemplated in the Text of Proposals drawn up on March 19 by the representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Italy. Your Excellency will appreciate that the delivery of this letter in no way implies that in the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the effort of conciliation referred to in this letter has failed. As you are aware, we have to-day received from the German Government certain

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5149.

² An identical note was handed to the Belgian Ambassador at London on the same date.

proposals which we have communicated to your Government and to which we are giving our immediate consideration.

Meanwhile, His Majesty's Government are willing, in accordance with paragraph III of the Proposals, to instruct their General Staffs forthwith to enter into contact with the French General Staffs, with a view to arranging the technical conditions in which the obligations referred to in that paragraph should be carried out in case of unprovoked aggression.

On behalf of His Majesty's Government I have the honour to state that it is understood that this contact between the General Staffs cannot give rise in respect of either Government to any political undertaking, nor to any obligation regarding the organization of national defence. I shall be glad to have your Excellency's confirmation that this is likewise the understanding of your Government.

His Majesty's Government propose that the conversations between the General Staffs of the two countries, necessary for establishing the contacts in question, should be begun in London.

I am addressing a similar letter to the Belgian Ambassador.

I have, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

*(b) Note from the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden to the French Ambassador.*¹
Your Excellency,

With reference to the 'Text of Proposals drawn up by the Representatives of Belgium, France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Italy', dated March 19, 1936, I am authorized to give you the official assurance that, if the effort of conciliation attempted in the arrangement there proposed should fail, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom—

1. (a) Will at once consider, in consultation with your Government and the Belgian Government, the steps to be taken to meet the new situation thus created ;

(b) Will immediately come to the assistance of your Government, in accordance with the Treaty of Locarno, in respect of any measures which shall be jointly decided upon ;

(c) Will, in return for reciprocal assurances from your Government, take, in consultation with your Government, all practical measures available to His Majesty's Government for the purpose of ensuring the security of your country against unprovoked aggression ;

¹ An identical note was handed to the Belgian Ambassador at London on the same date.

(d) Will, for this purpose, establish or continue the contact between the General Staffs of our two countries contemplated in paragraph III (2) of the said arrangement;

2. And, furthermore, will subsequently endeavour at the Council of the League of Nations to secure the formulation by the latter of all useful recommendations for the maintenance of peace and the respect for international law.

I have, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

(c) *Reply of the French Ambassador to the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden.*

Your Excellency,

You were so good as to inform me by your letter of April 1 that His Majesty's Government, in accordance with paragraph III of the Text of Proposals drawn up in London on March 19 last by the representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Italy, are willing to instruct their General Staffs forthwith to enter into contact with the representatives of the French General Staff, with a view to arranging the technical conditions in which the obligations referred to in that paragraph should be carried out in case of unprovoked aggression.

On behalf of the Government of the Republic, I have the honour to state that it is understood between the two Governments that this contact cannot give rise in respect of either of the interested parties to any political undertaking nor to any obligation regarding the organization of national defence.

The French Government agrees that the conversations in question should be begun in London.

I have, &c.

A. CORBIN.

(d) *Reply of the Belgian Ambassador to the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden.*

Your Excellency,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of to-day's date regarding the contact to be established between the British and Belgian General Staffs in accordance with paragraph III of the Text of Proposals drawn up in London on March 19, 1936, by the representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Italy.

I am instructed by my Government to put on record their agreement with the contemplated procedure, and to confirm that it is understood that this contact cannot give rise, in respect of either

Government, to any political undertaking nor to any obligation regarding the organization of national defence.

I have, &c.

BARON DE CARTIER DE MARCHIENNE.

2. PEACE PLAN OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT

(i) *Extracts from German Election Speeches, March 14-28, 1936.*

(a) *Extracts from Election Speeches by Herr Hitler. At Munich, March 14, 1936.*¹

. . . I have tried to see territorial problems in a reasonable light and to leave the colonial problem to be settled by reason, in the conviction that reason will finally make itself heard and that it is madness to act against reason. . . .

A previous German Government concluded the Rhine Pact of Locarno. Even then it was one-sided, and imposed on Germany an infinitely heavy burden. It was laid down that throughout a territory with a population of 14,700,000 (twice that of Belgium) German sovereignty in its military aspect should be non-existent. No German soldier might occupy the territory. There was to be no fortification, 'although this territory is one of the most vital for the German people'.

In spite of this I declared in 1933 when I took office that, thanks to our love of peace, we would respect this Treaty as long as the other parties to it maintained it in the letter and the spirit. The Pacts between France and Russia and Russia and Czechoslovakia are, however, an absolute violation of the Locarno Treaty both in the spirit and the letter. In the Pacts it is not stipulated that the aggressor should be determined by the League of Nations, but by the High Contracting Powers. For instance, if a war broke out in Eastern Europe we may be sure that France would allege Germany to be the aggressor, as in 1914, when we were falsely accused of having begun the World War. I have to bear in mind that in a crisis no State can judge the rights and wrongs of its position for itself.

Let us assume a hypothetical case. France declares that we are the aggressors although our frontiers do not border on Russia, and the only possibility of a collision would be if Russia were to send an army into Czechoslovakia. In such an eventuality the three countries, France, Russia, and Czechoslovakia, would be united against Germany. What country would apply sanctions against those three nations?

¹ *The Times*, March 16, 1936.

... As the responsible head of the Reich it is my duty to go beyond legal technicalities and face realities and future possibilities. The demilitarized zone, whether it exists or not, is something which must not be bound up with possible developments in other parts of Europe. ... Russia is an 'Imperialist Bolshevist State' ... and it is conceivable that France may become Bolshevist, in which event the decision whether the responsibility for an act of aggression lay with Berlin or Moscow would be decided by the Communist faction in Paris, who would receive their orders from Moscow.

I cannot expose the German people to such a danger, especially in view of the yawning gap in the west [the demilitarized zone]. The Franco-Russian Pact is an absolute breach of the spirit and purpose of the Locarno Treaty. I have always endeavoured to extend our hands in friendship to France, and I have made an offer of understanding to the whole of Europe. When I decided to restore the complete sovereignty of the Reich I purposely combined with my offer the proposal for a new constructive solution for European peace. Many people come to me and say, 'Herr Hitler, why do you not make a great gesture?' They talk of gestures; but I have done something which is worth a thousand gestures. I have put forward a scheme which will ensure the peace of Europe for the next twenty-five years, by giving security to France, Belgium, and Holland. When we are all old men this treaty would still be in force.

One of the most vital decisions which the new régime has made is the transformation of the political power of the nation into the military power of a new army. I was convinced that if a nation does not protect itself by its own strength it is lost in this world, because even a hedgehog needs spines for its defence. At the present time the idea has become ingrained with some foreign statesmen that the dependence (*Unfreiheit*) of the German people is a natural legal status, and they have become so attached to this notion that they regard an alteration of this alleged legal status as a wrongful act, whereas in reality it was nothing more than the re-establishment of the most primitive right imaginable ... We will not suffer Germany to be all the time haled before international Courts, particularly when we are definitely in the right. ...

*At Frankfurt-a.-M., March 16, 1936.*¹

... I should be ready at any time to enter into an agreement with the French Government. We should call upon both nations. I would put this question before the German nation: 'People of Germany, do

¹ *Völkербund*, April 17, 1936.

you wish that at last the hatchet be buried between us and France, and peace and understanding rule? If this be your will, then say Aye.' And on the other side of the frontier, the same question should be put to the French nation. And I have no doubt it wishes an understanding just as much, it wishes a reconciliation just as much. Then I would ask the German nation a further question: 'Do you desire that we should oppress the French nation, or give it inferior rights?' And the answer would surely be: 'No, we do not want that!' Then those on the other side should also put the question to their nation whether they want the German nation in their own house to have inferior rights to other nations. And I am convinced that the French nation, too, would say: 'No, we do not want that!'

We cannot do more than stretch out a hand of reconciliation and understanding to the world. . . .

*At Hamburg, March 20, 1936.*¹

. . . I need the vote of the German nation in order to proclaim on its behalf before the whole world that, no matter what happens, we will not cede an inch of our demand for equality of rights!

We do this, not because we want to disturb the European order, but because we are convinced that a lasting order in Europe is possible only if based on the supposition of equal rights between nations. The opinion that a European order can in the long run be founded on the defamation of a people of sixty-seven millions, is counter to history, is foolish, is madness. . . .

The problem then to be solved by us is not the revision of the letter of a treaty, but the revision of a mentality which consists in the belief that to-day, seventeen years after the end of the war, equality of rights can still be denied to the German people. This problem must be solved, and there is only one possible choice: either it is solved in all decency—we strive for that—and thereby our collaboration with the rest of Europe will become possible; or Germany will go her way alone; but under no circumstances will she sacrifice once more her right or her honour! This resolution threatens no one. On the contrary, it liberates the world from an impossible load. It is this resolution which has produced our great offer which we hope—we continue to hope—will help to give Europe the longed-for pacification.

We stand by that offer. The world asks: Yes, but will they keep it?—The world has no right to talk of non-fulfilment of treaties! We could open up an account as to how treaties have been kept

¹ *Völkerbund*, April 17, 1936.

since the year 1918. The German nation will allow no one to contest its honour. We do not presume, either, to pass votes of censure upon other nations. . . .

*At Berlin, March 24, 1936.*¹

. . . If, to-day, other statesmen make unfair demands on us, which, if made on their own nations, would probably be refused by them with the most righteous indignation, then let them not be astonished if they are met by the same refusal from Germany.

I acted according to the wish of the entire people. I was not just one individual: no, it was the entire German nation which rose up.

It is the will of this nation to live in peace and friendship with the other nations. It is the will of this nation to have this peace secured. It is the will of this nation to make its contribution to this peace.

But it is impossible for this nation to continue to take humiliations upon itself. That is impossible, and remains impossible. Therefore we have offered a clear programme to the world. And next Tuesday [March 31], I shall restate that programme in an even clearer and more urgent form. I shall state before the world what is possible, what we are ready to do—just as I have made clear to-day what is impossible, and what we shall never do.

I am not the leader of the German people in order to make gestures. I am charged by the German people purely and simply to represent their interests. And that is what I propose doing.

If they talk of a 'symbolic gesture' which we should make—I have made it already! I have proclaimed to the world a programme for an international peace of a quarter of a century's duration. For this I have pledged my word and the word of the nation. I summon Germany to show the world symbolically on March 29 that this gesture corresponds to her will. And, I repeat it, I would like to invite the other statesmen to accomplish the same symbolic gesture.

*At Cologne, March 28, 1936.*²

. . . We want nothing but to live together with the other nations exactly as they themselves do, with equal rights, and what is more, with equal duties. Whether we can keep treaties? This question is wrongly put. We have waited for seventeen years to see whether the others, too, respect these sacred treaties. At this place I should like to declare one thing: We shall not sign any treaty any more except in freedom and with equal rights.

¹ *Völkerbund*, April 17, 1936.

² *Ibid.*

We all believe that a new order is necessary in Europe, which cannot be based on the sterile conceptions of a senile generation. It cannot be based on the hair-splitting of jurists or politicians. This European order can be definitely constructed only by taking the nations themselves as basis.

The German people have completely lost the habit of making gestures and symbolic actions. Germany has become more sober because she has become more idealistic. More guarantees than the security offered by a hand which comprises sixty-seven millions cannot be found anywhere else in the world. This nation offers its open hand to the world around it, and this world offers nothing but gestures and symbolic actions. What a discrepancy between the offer on the one part, and the pettiness of thought on the other. . . .

(b) *Extract from Election Speech by Dr. Goebbels, March 23, 1936.*¹

. . . Germany warned the world against the Franco-Soviet Alliance. But that warning went unheeded and Germany drew her own conclusions. It is a mistake to suppose that she will again alter her decision. German soldiers now occupy the Rhineland and they will stay there. If any one believes in the idea of a twenty-kilometre zone on the western frontier of the Reich, he is thinking still in terms of 1919, and does not understand how present-day Germany is inspired. That happened only once; it will never happen again. If other countries now want Germany to make a gesture, our answer can only be: We have offered a twenty-five years' peace; that is our gesture. Such a peace treaty would be kept by Germany, because it would not be signed under compulsion. But when so much is at stake, then no one can impose on the German people petty humiliations which they cannot and will not accept. . . .

(c) *Extract from Election Speech by General Göring, March 26, 1936.*²

. . . We must ask the French people what has happened that Germany should find it impossible to give way. Germany has reoccupied her own territory with a few battalions. It may be a debatable point who broke the Treaty, but the main question is, have we insulted the French people? Have we injured them? Have we attacked their honour? Will you have peace for twenty-five years? What has happened to injure you?

At what point are you threatened? You say that Strasbourg lies within the range of German guns. German territory also lies

¹ At Frankfurt-a-M. *Frankfurter Zeitung*, March 25, 1936.

² At Karlsruhe. *The Times*, March 27, 1936.

within range of the French fortresses. French security is guaranteed by Great Britain, Belgium, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, and France's own armaments. Have the French people so little self-reliance that they want further securities? The peace we offer is guaranteed by the honour of the German people and the German Government. No people was ever offered so powerful a guarantee. It is alleged that we intend to attack the countries in the East. But we will guarantee peace in the East also. Is it not an insult to expect us to take police troops into our own land? The stake at issue is that of the peace of nations, and not the susceptibility, vanity, and fantasy of certain politicians. Anti-German sentiments in France were the result of Jewish machinations. . . . We remain firm whether you greet us with promises of Paradise or threats of Hell. Threats are of no avail in the Third Reich. . . .

(ii) *Text of the Plan of the German Government, March 31, 1936.*¹

1. It was with hearty approval that the German Government learnt from Ambassador von Ribbentrop that it is the wish of the British Government and the British people to begin as soon as possible the practical work for a real pacification of Europe. This desire is in full accord with the innermost intentions and hopes of the German people and their Government. The German Government therefore regret all the more that they are unable to recognize in the draft submitted to them by the representatives of the Locarno Powers on March 20 a serviceable and fruitful basis for the initiation and carrying out of such a genuine work of peace. In the eyes of the German people and of their Government, this draft lacks that spirit of understanding of the laws of honour and equality of status which at all times in the life of peoples constitutes the primary condition for the conclusion of free, and thus sacred, treaties.

2. The German Government believe that they owe it to the sacred gravity of the task with which they are faced to limit to the most essential points their statement of the negative aspects of the memorandum presented to them. They will, however, endeavour, by amplifying and clarifying the proposals made by them on March 7, to facilitate the beginning of concrete work to secure European peace.

3. In order to explain their rejection of certain discriminatory points and to make clear the basis of their constructive proposals,

¹ Communicated to the British Government by Herr von Ribbentrop, April 1, 1936. British White Paper, Cmd. 5175.

the German Government feel impelled to make the following statement of principle:

4. The German Government have just received from the German people, among other things, a solemn general mandate to represent the Reich and the German nation in accordance with the following two lines of policy:

- (1) The German people are determined to preserve under all circumstances their freedom, their independence and at the same time their equality of status. They regard the upholding of these natural principles of international comity as a precept of national honour and a necessary condition for any practical co-operation between nations, from which they will in no circumstances deviate any further.
- (2) The German people most earnestly desire to co-operate with all their might in the great work of general reconciliation and understanding of the nations of Europe, for the purpose of safeguarding peace which is so necessary for the culture and welfare of this continent.

5. These are the wishes of the German people and therefore the duty of the German Government.

6. The German Government further wish to make the following observations in pursuance of the attitude adopted by them in principle, as set forth in their provisional communication of March 24, 1936:

- (a) In the year 1918 Germany concluded the armistice on the basis of the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. These did not contemplate any limitation of German sovereignty in the Rhineland. On the contrary, the main idea on which these Points were based was the establishment of a better, and a permanent, peace through the creation of a new international order. That conception was intended to do the fullest justice to the principle of self-determination without regard to victor or vanquished!
- (b) The British Foreign Minister, in his speech of March 26 regarding the demilitarized zone, stated that in the last analysis this had only been created as a *quid pro quo* for the aim of France in 1918 to separate the Rhineland from Germany.¹ From this statement it is clear that the demilitarized zone only came into being as the result of a breach already perpetrated of an obligation binding on the Allies also.

¹ See above, p. 160.

- (c) The demilitarization provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were accordingly based on the breach of an assurance given to Germany, and the only legal argument behind them was force. These provisions of the Treaty of Versailles were incorporated in the Locarno Pact after a further infringement of right, namely, the occupation of the Ruhr Territory, which was characterized as a breach of law by British Law Officers of the Crown.
- (d) The so-called 'voluntary renunciation' of sovereignty by Germany over these western provinces of the Reich is thus a result of the 'dictate' of Versailles, and of a series of the harshest acts of oppression suffered by the German people as a result of that treaty. In this connexion special reference must be made to the terrible distress and helplessness of the Reich in consequence of the occupation of the Rhineland.

7. If, therefore, the British Government now declare that while there may have been a question of a 'dictate' in the case of the Treaty of Versailles, but certainly not in the case of the Treaty of Locarno, the German Government must put this question in reply: 'Has there ever been, or can there ever be, a great nation in the world which has voluntarily, and without extreme pressure, renounced unilaterally its sovereign rights, and, in the present case, its most fundamental right, that of defending its own frontiers?'

8. Nevertheless, the German nation had tolerated such a state of affairs for 17 years, and as recently as May 21, 1935, the German Chancellor declared that 'the German Government regard the demilitarized zone as an exceedingly onerous contribution for a sovereign State to make for the sake of the pacification of Europe', and that the Government of the Reich 'will observe all the obligations arising out of the Locarno Treaty so long as the other parties to the treaty are willing to observe it'.

9. The German Government, in their provisional communication of March 24, 1936,¹ called attention to the fact that the military treaty concluded by France with Soviet Russia had deprived the Locarno Treaty of its legal and, in particular, of its political, basis and thus of the conditions for its existence. It is superfluous to go into details in this matter again because there is no doubt that the tendency to involve Europe in a network of military alliances is contrary to the spirit and the idea of the establishment of a real community of nations. There is a great and growing danger that

¹ See above, p. 154.

out of this general entanglement in military alliances a situation will arise similar to that to which, amongst other principal causes, the world owed the outbreak of its most frightful and most senseless war.

10. It is not within the power of any single government to prevent such a development initiated by certain Great Powers, *but it is the duty of every government within the limits of its own sovereign power to take precautions against the surprises which may arise out of such obscure military and governmental policies in Europe.*

11. The German Government have, therefore, in view of the present situation, which signifies the abrogation of the legal and political principles and assumptions on which the Locarno Pact is based, declared themselves, for their part, to be no longer bound by the said pact, and have restored the sovereignty of the Reich over the entire territory of the Reich.

12. The German Government are not in a position to submit the measure which they have adopted for the security of the Reich, and which *involves only German territory*, and is a menace to no one, to the judgment of a body which, at best, is only in a position to judge the legal aspect of the question, but not in any circumstances whatever its political aspects. This is all the more true, since the Council of the League of Nations have already reached a decision which prejudices the legal judgment of the question.

13. The German Government are further convinced that a verdict of this kind could not only make no positive contribution to a constructive solution of the question of European security, but would rather be calculated to make such a solution more difficult, if not indeed to prevent it.

14. Furthermore, either one believes in the possibility of securing general European peace, in which case such interference with the sovereign rights of a State as contemplated can only aggravate matters, or one does not believe in such a possibility of attaining peace, in which case such a decision would at the best have an *ex post facto* significance.

15. The German Government, therefore, on this point, as well as on the others contained in the draft proposal of the representatives of the Locarno Powers which can only be regarded as unilaterally onerous to Germany, not only can see no useful contribution to a really broad and constructive solution of the question of European security, but only points of discrimination against a great nation, which thus makes questionable the establishment of any permanent peace.

16. In accordance with the mission entrusted to them by the

German people, the German Government must consequently decline all proposals in the draft which impose one-sided burdens on Germany and therefore discriminate against her.

17. As is obvious from an offer she has made, Germany has no intention of ever attacking France or Belgium. Furthermore, taking into consideration France's huge armaments and the enormous fortresses on her Eastern frontier, it is well known that such an attack would be senseless purely from the military point of view alone.

18. For these reasons, moreover, the desire of the French Government for immediate General Staff discussions is incomprehensible to the German Government. The latter could not but regard such discussions as seriously prejudicial if arrangements between General Staffs were reached before the conclusion of the new security pacts. They are of the opinion that such arrangements should in any case only take place as a result of the political obligations of the five Locarno Powers to render assistance, and then only on a strictly reciprocal basis.

19. The German Government are further of the opinion that, to arrive at an easier solution of the present complex of problems, these should be appropriately divided up according to the aims in view. They must accordingly put the following fundamental questions of principle:

To what goal shall European diplomacy direct its efforts?

(a) Is this goal to be the maintenance and continuation, in whatever new forms and with whatever modifications, of that splitting of the nations of Europe into two camps, into those with more, and those with less, rights, into honourable and dishonourable, free and fettered, which has shown itself so unsuitable for ensuring any lasting peace?

Is it, moreover, the endeavour of European diplomacy to adopt this view and reach conclusions regarding past events by means of mere majority decisions; and thus to seek for the continuance of this former state of affairs a legal justification which is apparently still lacking? Or—

(b) Shall the efforts of the Governments of Europe be directed to achieving, come what may, a really constructive re-organization of the relations of the nations of Europe with one another and to attaining a sure and permanent peace?

20. The German Government owe it to their people to declare plainly that they will only take part in the second of these endeavours, which, in their opinion, is the only constructive one. Moreover, they

make this declaration with the profoundest possible conviction and with the whole weight of the people's sincere will and longing behind them.

21. The German Government believe, then, that the task confronting the statesmen of Europe should be divided into three parts as follows:

- (a) A period (during which the atmosphere would gradually be calming down) for elucidating the procedure for the negotiations to be initiated.
- (b) A period of actual negotiations for securing the peace of Europe.
- (c) A later period for dealing with such supplementary aspects of the European peace settlement as are desirable, and the content and scope of which cannot or should not be precisely laid down or defined in advance (disarmament, economic questions, &c.).

22. To this end the German Government propose the following peace plan:

(1) In order to give to the future agreements to ensure the peace of Europe the character of inviolable treaties, the nations participating in them shall do so only on a footing of absolute equality and equal respect. The only compelling reason for signing these treaties must lie in their generally recognized and obvious suitability for ensuring the peace of Europe, and thus the social happiness and economic prosperity of the nations.

(2) In order to shorten, as far as possible, the period of uncertainty (in the economic interests of the European nations) the German Government propose a limit of four months for the first period until the signature of the proposed non-aggression pacts, and the consequent guaranteeing of European peace.

(3) The German Government give the assurance that they will not proceed to any reinforcement whatsoever of the troops in the Rhineland during this period, always provided that the Belgian and French Governments act similarly.

(4) The German Government give the assurance that they will not, during this period, move the troops in the Rhineland closer to the Belgian and French frontiers.

(5) The German Government propose to set up a commission composed of representatives of the two guarantor Powers, England and Italy, and of a disinterested third neutral Power, to guarantee the execution of these reciprocal assurances.

(6) Germany, Belgium, and France shall each be entitled to send a representative to this commission. If Germany, Belgium, and France think, for any particular reason, that they can point to a change in the military situation within this period of four months, they have the right to communicate what they have observed to the Guarantee Commission.

(7) Germany, Belgium, and France declare their willingness, in such a case, to permit the Commission to make the necessary investigations, through the British and Italian Military Attachés, and to report thereon to the participating Powers.

(8) Germany, Belgium, and France give the assurance that they will take fully into consideration the objections arising therefrom.

(9) Moreover, the German Government are willing, on the basis of complete reciprocity, to agree with their two western neighbours to any military limitations on the German western frontier.

(10) Germany, Belgium, and France and the two guarantor Powers shall agree, at once or at the latest after the French elections, to enter into discussions, under the leadership of the British Government, for the conclusion of a twenty-five years' non-aggression pact or security pact between France and Belgium, on the one hand, and Germany, on the other.

(11) Germany agrees that England and Italy shall once again sign this security pact as guarantor Powers.

(12) Should special obligations to render military assistance arise out of these security agreements, Germany for her part declares her willingness to assume such obligations also.

(13) The German Government hereby repeat their proposal for the conclusion of an air pact to supplement and reinforce these security agreements.

(14) The German Government repeat that, should the Netherlands so desire, they are willing to include this country also in the proposed Western European security agreement.

(15) In order to give to this covenant of peace, voluntarily entered into between Germany, on the one hand, and France, on the other, the character of a reconciliation and of a settlement of their centuries-old feud, Germany and France shall pledge themselves to take steps, in connexion with the education of the young in both countries, and in publications, to avoid everything which might be calculated to poison the relationship between the two peoples, whether it be the adoption of a derogatory or contemptuous attitude, or improper interference in the internal affairs of the other country. They shall agree to set up, at the headquarters of the

League of Nations in Geneva, a joint commission whose function it shall be to submit to the two Governments, for their information and investigation, all complaints received.

(16) In pursuance of their intention to give this agreement the character of a sacred covenant, Germany and France shall undertake to ratify it by means of a plebiscite of the two peoples.

(17) Germany declares her willingness, for her part, to enter into communication with the States on her south-eastern and north-eastern frontiers, with a view to extending to them a direct invitation to conclude the non-aggression pacts proposed.

(18) Germany expresses her willingness to re-enter the League of Nations either at once or after the conclusion of these agreements. At the same time, the German Government again express their expectation that, within a reasonable time and by means of friendly negotiations, the question of colonial equality of rights, as well as that of the separation of the Covenant of the League of Nations from its basis in the Treaty of Versailles setting, will be cleared up.

(19) Germany proposes the constitution of an international court of arbitration, which shall have competence in respect of the observance of the various agreements concluded, and whose decisions shall be binding on all parties.

23. After the conclusion of this great work of securing European peace, the German Government consider it urgently necessary to endeavour by practical measures to attempt to check unlimited competition in armaments. This they would regard not merely as an alleviation of the financial and economic position of the nations, but above all as leading to a psychological *détente*.

24. The German Government have, however, no faith in an attempt to bring about settlements of a universal kind, which would be doomed to failure from the outset, and can therefore be proposed only by those who have no interest in achieving practical results. They believe, on the contrary, that the negotiations conducted and the results achieved in the sphere of the limitation of naval armaments can have an instructive and stimulating effect.

25. The German Government therefore propose that conferences be convened in the future having each time only one clearly defined objective.

26. They consider that the task of most immediate importance is to impart to aerial warfare the moral and humane atmosphere of, and the protection afforded by, the Geneva Convention, as far as non-combatants or wounded are concerned. Just as the killing of

defenceless wounded, or prisoners, or the use of dum-dum bullets, or the waging of submarine warfare without warning, have been regulated or forbidden by international conventions, so it must be possible for civilized humanity to prevent the senseless abuse of new types of weapons without running counter to the object for which war is waged.

27. The German Government therefore propose as the immediate practical objectives of these conferences—

- (1) The prohibition of the dropping of gas, poisonous, or incendiary bombs.
- (2) The prohibition of dropping bombs of any kind whatsoever on open localities outside the range of the medium artillery of the fighting fronts.
- (3) The prohibition of the bombardment with long-range guns of places more than 20 km. distant from the battle zone.
- (4) The abolition and prohibition of the construction of tanks of the heaviest type.
- (5) The abolition and prohibition of artillery of the heaviest calibre.

28. As and when possibilities of further limitation of armaments emerge from such discussions and agreements, attention shall be given to them.

29. The German Government hereby declare themselves prepared now to accede to every arrangement, in so far as it is internationally valid.

30. The German Government believe that if only a first step is taken on the road to disarmament, this will have an enormous effect on the relations between nations, and consequently on the return of that atmosphere of confidence which is the prior condition for the development of trade and prosperity.

31. In order to meet the general desire for the restoration of favourable economic conditions, the German Government are therefore prepared, immediately after the conclusion of the political treaties, to enter into an exchange of views on economic problems with the other countries concerned in the spirit of the proposals made, and to contribute as far as lies in their power to the improvement of the economic situation in Europe and of the world economic situation, which is inseparable from it.

32. The German Government believe that in the peace plan set forth above they have made their contribution to the creation of a new Europe on a basis of mutual respect and confidence between

sovereign States. Many opportunities for such a pacification of Europe, to which Germany has so often, in the last few years, offered to contribute, have been neglected. May this effort to achieve a European understanding at last succeed.

33. The German Government confidently believe that by submitting the peace plan outlined above they have paved the way to this goal.

(iii) *Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April 3, 1936.*¹

I am glad to have this opportunity of giving the House some information with regard to the events of the past few days. These events have fallen into two categories. The first relates to the communication which was made to His Majesty's Government by the German Government on April 1.² The second relates to communications which have passed between His Majesty's Government and the French and Belgian Governments arising out of the White Paper of March 19.³

I will first deal with the communication of the German Government. On April 1 Herr von Ribbentrop visited the Foreign Office, and had an interview with the Lord Privy Seal and myself, at which he presented the document of the German Government, which has now been published in the press. Yesterday I had a further conversation with the German representative. At this conversation, I told Herr von Ribbentrop that, while His Majesty's Government had only had time for a preliminary examination of Herr Hitler's latest proposals, we regarded them as most important and as deserving of careful study, which we now intended to give them. The immediate question which confronted His Majesty's Government was what should be the next step. It was clear that we would have now to get into communication with other governments. That would take a little time, and indeed His Majesty's Government thought a pause at this moment would be valuable.

I emphasized to Herr von Ribbentrop that our object in the present difficult situation was the same as it had been from the first: to seek to get negotiations going to bring about a final settlement. I asked Herr von Ribbentrop to assure the German Chancellor that His Majesty's Government would spare no effort to that end. At the same time I felt bound to point out to him that in respect of the

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, April 3, 1936, coll. 2309-12.

² See above, p. 183.

³ See above, p. 175.

interim period, for which His Majesty's Government had particularly appealed for a contribution, the German Government had not been able to meet us. The difficulty, therefore, of creating that sense of confidence which was an essential condition of successful negotiations still remained.

This brings me to a matter which has been engaging the particular attention of His Majesty's Government during the last few days. The House will remember that in my statement in the Debate on March 26 I said that it was our main task in these difficult times to create an atmosphere of confidence in which negotiations for a general settlement could take place. As was then explained, His Majesty's Government are ready to take two particular steps with this object. One step is to give to the French and Belgian Governments certain undertakings, to come into effect in the event of the ultimate failure of the effort of conciliation which we hope to achieve. These undertakings are contained in the draft letter which appeared on page 7 of the White Paper of March 19.¹ The other step decided on by His Majesty's Government was to reaffirm their existing obligations to France and Belgium under the Treaty of Locarno and to express their willingness that, pending the negotiations, there should be conversations between the Staffs of the three countries for the purpose of these obligations. It must be emphasized that these conversations, which will relate only to the intermediate period pending negotiations, will be of a purely technical character and will not increase our political obligations.

I accordingly handed yesterday to both the French and the Belgian Ambassadors a letter in the terms set out on page 7 of the White Paper of March 19, subject to certain necessary modifications of a formal nature. I accompanied each of these letters with a further communication, the terms of which I will read to the House . . .²

It will be seen that these communications deal with three separate points. First, I made it clear that the delivery of the letter in no way implies that in the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the effort of conciliation referred to in this letter has failed. In that connexion honourable Members will see that I drew attention to the latest proposals of the German Government, which had just been received. Secondly, the two Ambassadors were informed that His Majesty's Government were willing forthwith to authorize the Staff conversations provided for in paragraph III of the White Paper of March 19, to which I have just referred. Thirdly, I placed

¹ See above, p. 132.

² Here follows text of letter printed on p. 175 above.

on record the understanding that this contact between the General Staffs cannot give rise in respect of either Government to any political undertaking, nor to any obligation regarding the organization of national defence. The House will remember that in my speech on March 26 an undertaking was given that this should be the understanding upon which these conversations should take place, and His Majesty's Government have now received from the French and Belgian Ambassadors confirmation that this is also the understanding of their respective Governments.¹

The House will also notice that it was in London that we proposed that the General Staffs should meet. To this also the French and Belgian Governments have agreed. No date has yet been fixed for this meeting, but it will take place as soon as the necessary arrangement can be made.²

I must repeat that His Majesty's Government had made up their mind some time ago that they, for their part, must make their contribution towards that restoration of confidence which is an essential condition of successful negotiation. This was the main object of His Majesty's Government in deciding on Staff conversations with France and Belgium. These conversations, in the view of His Majesty's Government, cannot be considered as in any way prejudicing the settlement which we all wish to realize.

(iv) *Extract from Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, April 6, 1936.*³

... May I turn for a few moments to the other subject which is very much in our minds to-night, that is the situation created by the German Chancellor's reply? I told the House last Friday that the Government were engaged in examining these proposals. That examination is still in progress. A few days ago the French and Belgian Governments approached His Majesty's Government with a request that we should hold a meeting of the Locarno Powers other than Germany early this week, either in Paris or in Brussels. I confess that we were a little doubtful of the utility of such a meeting at this moment. At any rate, I thought it right to make it clear that His Majesty's Government could not come to a meeting and agree that conciliation was at an end. On the other hand, we thought that an exchange of views might be valuable whether through the

¹ See above, p. 178.

² These conversations opened in London on April 15, 1936.

³ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, April 6, 1936, coll. 2515-17.

ordinary diplomatic channels or direct by Ministers meeting. Since in our view a meeting of the Committee of Thirteen dealing with the Abyssinian dispute was urgently necessary, we thought it an opportunity of suggesting to the French and Belgian Governments that during the period of that meeting an opportunity might arise for informal consultations between us. I am glad to tell the House that both the French and Belgian Governments have concurred in that view. I am leaving for Geneva tomorrow, and I understand that M. Flandin and M. van Zeeland will be there within the next day or two. That will afford an opportunity for exchanging views at Geneva.

The right hon. Member for Epping and the Leader of the Opposition remarked upon the importance in their view of bringing the League into these discussions at the first opportunity. I entirely agree. The German Chancellor's proposals contained, as the right hon. Member for West Birmingham most rightly said, a number of proposals. Some of them concern the group of Western Powers; some of them concern individual Powers, either in the south or east of Europe. It is in our view essential, if we are not to enter into confusion which might weaken the League, that these proposals should be co-ordinated, and should be co-ordinated by the League. The Leader of the Opposition said that Locarno is too narrow in basis—we must broaden it. He was really simplifying our difficulties too easily. The task is not as simple as that, because the Locarno obligations are there, and we are bound by them. I would remind the Leader of the Opposition that successive Governments have been bound by them, the Government of which he was a Member was bound by the Locarno Treaty, and it will not be a great contribution to confidence in Europe to say that Locarno is much too narrow and must be widened. It would not meet the circumstances. What we must do is to ensure that the League is in charge and co-ordinates and controls our new efforts to create security in Europe. That is exactly the policy of His Majesty's Government in this matter.

I would utter this word of warning. If the idea is that what we ought to do now is to set aside the German Chancellor's proposals, set aside our immediate task which has been created by the violation of the Locarno Treaty and try to negotiate some wide scheme of general settlement for Europe—if that is the idea I want to enter a caveat. I am not so sure that that is the best method to proceed, and I will tell the House why. I am very doubtful whether it is possible or desirable at this moment to negotiate general obligations

of mutual assistance all over Europe going beyond the terms of the Covenant itself. We all have general commitments in the Covenant which we must make plain we are prepared to fulfil, but we are equally at liberty to reinforce the Covenant for given circumstances by regional agreements. I want to make clear to the House what my fear is if at this moment we try to get some vast new European settlement on terms other than the Covenant. In trying to obtain that we may lose the immediate objective upon which, I think, we should concentrate.

If I may be frank with the House I would say what in the view of the Government we should wish to see realized by the end of this summer. We should wish to see a complete European membership of the League; all the nations of Europe Members of the League. We should wish to see a new structure of security in Western Europe to take the place of Locarno. We should wish to see a strengthening of security elsewhere by arrangements directly supervised and controlled by the League itself. If we could ensure that result by the end of the summer, we should have gained so much more security for Europe that it might then be possible to enter upon these larger schemes in respect of armaments and economic matters, and also a strengthening of the security afforded by the Covenant itself. It may seem that the programme I put forward is modest, but we have seen so many grand-scale conferences fail that I believe we should be wiser to seek to make this immediate contribution which can and should be made to the security of Europe.

Let there be no mistake. If the Covenant itself is accepted and reaffirmed by all European States, it must have a stabilizing effect. It would mean a recognition by the States that in any question, territorial or otherwise, which faces a nation, they would act only in accordance with the principles and through the machinery of the League. If we can secure that, together with the reinforcement of regional agreements, we shall have made an important step in advance. Finally, I would like to say to the House, that in the present period of extreme difficulty it is none the less true that through all these years the League has grown in strength; that its roots have struck deep. That is why it is imperative that everything we do should be founded on the Covenant. For my part, I hope that not lightly shall we seek to amend that instrument until we are sure, in the first place, that every one in Europe is ready and willing to fulfil their obligations under that instrument. His Majesty's Government are prepared to do that. In that belief and confidence we shall face the task which now confronts us.

3. PEACE PLAN OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, APRIL 8, 1936.¹(i) *Memorandum*

Through the French Embassy in London, the French Government received from the British Government a communication of the translation of the Memorandum handed to the Secretary of State on April 1, 1936, whereby the German Government, at the same time as it defines its attitude regarding the arrangement drawn up on March 19 by the representatives of the Locarno Powers, sets forth a number of proposals which, according to it, constitute 'a peace plan'.

The Government of the French Republic considers that it must formulate without delay the principal observations suggested to it by a first study of this document.

The German Memorandum having been made public, the French Government naturally reserves the right to give the same publicity to its own observations.

Paragraph 1

On the morrow of the repudiation by the Reich of the undertakings freely and solemnly contracted or renewed at Locarno, and following the entry into the Demilitarized Zone of armed forces, the Government of the Republic would have had the right to take, without delay, suitable measures for re-establishing the legal situation and repressing 'a hostile act' constituted by the German initiative. Anxious to avoid the risks of new complications for Europe, it did not do this.

It first asked the Council of the League to take note of the infringement of the Treaty and, at the same time, in conversations carried on from March 12 to March 19 with representatives of the other Powers who are parties to the Locarno Treaty, it endeavoured to seek possibilities of friendly solution.

The arrangement which resulted from these conversations is proof of the care of the four Governments represented to take into account the legitimate susceptibilities of Germany.

The German Government nevertheless rejects the proposals of March 19 as derogatory to the German people and refusing it equality of rights.

No one, however, threatens the independence of the German people, no one refuses it equality of rights, no one dreams of assailing its honour, unless it be an attempt against the honour of the nation to remind it that respect of treaties is a fundamental rule of inter-

¹ *The Times*, April 9, 1936.

national relations, a rule which the German Government, like any other, cannot escape by alleging that such and such an obligation hinders its liberty or its independence, or that the execution of such and such an engagement can no longer, according to its own expression, 'be tolerated' by the German nation.

'In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security,' says the preamble to the League Covenant, it is necessary to maintain 'a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations'.

Will the Government of the Reich which announces its intentions of rejoining the League of Nations ask on that occasion that this text should be revised in order to conform with its conceptions?

Should we henceforward inscribe in it (i.e. in the Covenant) that the rule stops short at the point where for each people begins 'the vital right' of which it alone shall be the judge?

Paragraph 2

Having thus estimated cheaply the essential principles of international law, the German Government in its Memorandum had not to take history into any further account. According to it, the demilitarization of the Rhineland is said to be in contradiction to the very bases on which peace was concluded and to run counter to engagements taken at the moment of the Armistice.

These assertions have no foundation either directly or indirectly.

The demilitarization of the Rhineland was nothing else than a guarantee of security granted to Europe against the new enterprises of Germany.

It did not violate any of the principles inscribed in the Fourteen Points of President Wilson. If it had been otherwise, the German Delegation to Versailles would not have omitted to call attention to it.

Among the provisions of the Peace Treaty, the demilitarization clauses are among the few against which, at no moment in the course of the negotiations, did the representatives of Germany protest.

As for the Treaty of Locarno, an attempt is now being made to give credence to the view that it was negotiated under constraint of the occupation of the Ruhr.

The Ruhr was evacuated before the negotiations were even envisaged.

In reality, the Rhineland Pact tended to create a new situation in Western Europe, based on respect of undertakings freely subscribed, and its negotiation was instigated by the German Government

itself, seeking a guarantee of security for the western frontier of the Reich.

Free recognition of the Demilitarized Zone was given in exchange for a pledge of peace for Germany.

The Locarno Treaty constituted the firmest foundations of Western peace. It is these foundations which the policy of the Reich has not hesitated to destroy.

In support of the thesis, which facts and dates belie, the German Memorandum thinks that it can invoke a new juridical theory—namely, that no nation could voluntarily renounce its sovereign rights without exterior pressure; the origin of the demilitarization clauses was the constraint of necessity; and even if they were negotiated in conditions of liberty and equality, the Locarno Treaty could not have a sacred character because it reproduces the provisions already included in the Treaty signed after defeat.

Here, in all its gravity, appears the strange pretension of Germany, the import of which Europe should weigh well—in so far as the European territorial statute results from the Treaties of 1919, it is this whole statute which Germany reserves the right to call into question, in spite of whatever confirmations it may have been the object since the peace was made.

What then does it matter that the German Government declares that it cherishes no territorial ambition? What does it matter that it proclaims its will to respect frontiers if, from now on, it has reserved to itself the possibility of declaring some day that the confirmation freely given by it could not have the effect of changing the initial character of the cession of the territories of which these frontiers are the issue, cession which was granted under outside pressure or under the empire of necessity?

Must we conclude that Germany, starting from this new juridical basis taken from an unpublished international law, might to-morrow call into question the Statute of Danzig, that of Memel, and that of Austria; might demand such and such a revision of European frontiers; and such and such a restitution of German colonial territories?

The French Government considers that all these questions should be clearly put to the Government of the Reich, and that the latter should reply as clearly, since no peace plan can be constructed on an equivocation so dangerous for the very maintenance of peace.

Paragraph 3.

A return to arguments of the juridical order, by which the German

Government has the pretension of justifying its initiatives of March 7, might be dispensed with.

These arguments have, moreover, been refuted countless times.

Whatever the Reich may maintain, it remains that none of the other Powers signatory to Locarno have ever admitted that the Franco-Soviet Pact was incompatible with this treaty; it remains that Germany has thought fit to stand as judge of her own case, whereas the treaty expressly provided for arbitration and conciliation in case of dispute; and, finally, there remains the finding of the Council of the League.

Moreover, in again refusing to submit its claim to the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Government of the Reich admits the weakness of its juridical arguments—Germany does not want to go to The Hague because she knows the Court would condemn the German thesis.

Paragraph 4.

Grave as was the situation on March 7, it did not divert the Locarno Powers from a policy of moderation.

Their Governments were ready, with Germany, to seek a new statute for the Rhineland; were ready to take part in wide negotiation to settle problems that the security of Western Europe involves; and to establish the whole of European peace on solid foundations.

But on the basis of a *fait accompli* such negotiation was impossible.

Reducing their legitimate demands to a minimum, the four Governments simply demanded that Germany should make the necessary 'gestures' so that provisional solutions allowing the re-establishment of confidence which had been so greatly shaken might prevail.

They asked her to recognize the sovereignty of international law by submitting her claims to The Hague Tribunal, to recognize that the Rhineland question, the object of an international arrangement, could not be settled by unilateral decisions, and, finally, to join in measures capable of creating a new atmosphere in countries whose security was menaced by the act of March 7.

To these generous suggestions the German Government answered only with a refusal; if the Reich admits that a *détente* is necessary it does not propose to contribute to it.

Germany was asked to apply to The Hague Court. Germany refused.

She was asked to form on her territory along the Franco-Belgian frontiers a zone occupied by international forces. She replied with silence equivalent to a refusal.

She was asked for guarantees regarding the use of para-military forces stationed in the Rhineland during the transitional period. The same silence.

She was asked to abstain from all fortification work and air equipment. Silence again.

And if the German Government agreed reciprocally, and under the control of an international commission, not to augment the present effectives in the Rhineland Zone, it did not give any assurance that these effectives are not even now greater in number than the contingent officially announced on March 7.

Thus the efforts at conciliation by the Locarno Powers found no echo in the German Government.

Paragraph 5.

The Reich Government claims, it is true, with its 'peace plan' to offer a decisive contribution to the reconstruction of the new Europe.

This contribution is unfortunately more apparent than real. The Government of the Republic notes the German proposition tending to the conclusion of a new treaty for the reconstruction of the system of security which Germany saw fit to destroy on March 7; this proposition, however, will assume some value in its eyes only when it knows how the observance of its new engagements by the Reich can be guaranteed.

It also notes that the Reich Government, retracting the sentiment expressed only a few weeks ago to the British and French Ambassadors, to-day declares itself favourable to the conclusion of a Western Air Pact.

It would nevertheless like to know if, in the opinion of the German Government, this pact includes an agreement for air limitation, in the absence of which the security guarantees that it might offer would be practically non-existent.

The arrangement of March 19 contained one essential disposition concerning the prohibition or limitation of the right in future to build fortifications in a zone to be determined. In the present state of Europe the attitude of the German Government with regard to this essential clause must be known.

It will thus be possible to see if the Reich is ready to recognize, not only in word but in deed, the principle of collective security, or if, on the contrary, it reserves to itself the possibility of settling by its own will, even by force, its relations with its weaker neighbours by limiting with regard to them the carrying out of assistance.

The demilitarization of the Rhineland was not only an element in

French and Belgian security ; it concerned the political status of the whole of Europe. The German plan bears no guarantee which would compensate for its eventual disappearance.

Paragraph 6.

One is forced to note that Germany replies with definitely insufficient suggestions for strengthening European peace. If she declares herself ready to negotiate directly the conclusion of non-aggression pacts with each of her neighbours on the south-east and north-east frontiers, she does not admit that these facts can be included in a system of collective security. She admits even less that they can be accompanied by guarantees of mutual assistance.

But bilateral non-aggression agreements, unaccompanied by a clause providing mutual assistance in favour of the victim of a brutal denunciation and a *coup de force*, would not add to the engagements already dependent, for Germany and her neighbours, on the 1928 Paris Pact [Briand-Kellogg Pact].

European security forms a whole, and the principle of collective security is not valid for only part of the Continent. France, for her part, takes thought not only for her friendships but also for her obligations as a Member of the League, and could not conceive of a settlement of Western security for which she would have to disinterest herself in the security of the rest of Europe.

It was the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact which supplied the Reich with the pretext it sought for freeing itself from the obligations of the Locarno Treaty. It denounced the menace of a military alliance directed against its own security. It is therefore strange that in its own interest it does not envisage the conclusion of some agreement of non-aggression with Soviet Russia. As a year ago, at the time of the Stresa Conference, the German Government declared itself ready to conclude such an agreement, while admitting that alongside this agreement mutual assistance pacts between Russia and other Powers might follow, the German dispositions have therefore changed—for what reason and with what aim ?

Paragraph 7.

It is true that Germany declares that she is ready to re-enter the League. Since Germany left Geneva, the Government of the Republic has not ceased to affirm that European security could only be realized within the framework of the League ; it would, therefore, not be the last to express approval of the decision which the Government of the Reich announced on March 7. It must, however, ask the question:

How, before the solution of the crisis which she brought about by her policy of the *fait accompli*, could Germany be considered as 'giving effective guarantees of her sincere intention to observe her international engagements'? The return of Germany to the League would in the present circumstance be equivocal. It would not be accomplished, however, without conditions. By recalling in a more pressing manner than several weeks ago its pretensions in the colonial sphere, did not the Government of the Reich wish it to be understood that, in default of a satisfactory solution, it reserved the possibility of again seceding? And as for the separation to be established between the League Covenant and the Peace Treaty, the least one can say of this formula, already put forward many times, is that its sense has never been made clear.

The Government of the Reich formulates another proposal which hardly appears compatible with the principles of the Covenant. By suggesting that respect of agreements to be concluded should be ensured by a Court of Arbitration whose decisions would be binding, it not only sets aside all intervention by the Permanent Court of International Justice, but also it appears to reject in advance even the competence of the Council.

If one of the agreements of non-aggression, the conclusion of which is envisaged by Germany, should be violated, would this violation fall under the Covenant?

If, in the mind of the German Government, it should be otherwise, it must conclude that the return of the Reich to the League is envisaged as a means of intervention in the policy of other States without any essential German element of policy having been submitted to the control of the League.

Paragraph 8.

The Government of the Reich only appears disposed to enter upon the path of limitation of armaments with the greatest circumspection.

The limitation of air armaments does not appear to be envisaged in the German plan, either from the qualitative or quantitative point of view.

As for land armaments, no quantitative limitation is even suggested, and if it is a question of qualitative limitation, nothing is said of the putting into effect of an efficacious system of control which would be an indispensable condition. It is true the German Government has proposed to deal with the humanization of war, and the proposal is not one of those which the French Government would ever think of rejecting. But rather than humanizing war one should render it

impossible, by organizing against an eventual aggressor effective and immediate action of a collective nature. The Government of the Reich has not up to the present given its approval to such a conception. Moreover, the prohibition proposed by Germany of air bombardments with asphyxiating, toxic, or incendiary bombs is already laid down by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which the French Government for its part has ratified. If the problem was again discussed during the Disarmament Conference, it was with a view to completing these prohibitions by energetic measures of reprisal against an eventual violator. We should have liked the German ideas on this point to be stated more precisely.

Paragraph 9.

The German 'peace plan' contains proposals concerning the improvement of Franco-German relations. The French Government has taken note of these and will in no wise refuse, within the measure of the possibilities provided, to seek directly with the German Government means to give fresh impulse to the efforts which have already been undertaken in this sense. But it goes without saying that, as far as they concern the relations between France and Germany, dispositions of this nature are not in their place in the system of general agreements at present envisaged. On the other hand, and as far as it is a question of the general problem of moral disarmament, the League is already entrusted with the matter, and its important preparatory work has been brought to a successful conclusion which, when the time comes, should be drawn upon in direct relations between France and Germany.

Paragraph 10.

As for the observance by the French Republic of undertakings its Government takes in its name, there is no need, to ensure it, of procedure contrary to the very principles of the French Constitution.

And we should not even mention this point if there were not to be seen in it a new expression of the theory which tends to make distinction between governments and peoples.

Fidelity to treaties is a fundamental principle of French policy, and it is not French initiative which to-day obliges peoples to ask themselves whether international relations will continue to resolve in accordance with the rules of law or whether henceforward there will be known no other rule than that of force.

For such is unhappily the primordial question which, to spare their countries bitter surprises, the governments are obliged to ask to-day.

In conclusion, does the vital right of the people authorize unilateral cancellation of engagements undertaken; will peace be ensured by the collaboration of all in respect of the rights of each; or will States have every latitude to settle their differences as they please in a tête-à-tête with the States whose good faith they have taken by surprise? No European Government can undertake the conclusion of new agreements without having received a clear reply to this question. And still more directly another question may be put to the German Government: Does Germany unreservedly recognize as valid the present territorial and political statute of Europe? Does she admit that respect of this statute can be guaranteed by agreements concluded on the basis of mutual assistance? The proposals handed in in London on April 1 are silent on this point.

(ii) *Text of Proposals.*

France, faithful to her tradition, asserts that she does not want to seek peace in securities for herself alone, in incomplete pacts, which allow war risks to remain.

Peace for all, peace total and lasting, peace with equality of rights, peace with confidence in the honour of all and with respect for the pledged word, a happy peace and a safe peace founded on international exchange which would succeed the mortal rivalry of economic nationalism, peace made real by a wide limitation of armaments leading to disarmament.

That is what the French Government proposes to other States in circumstances which, in spite of their gravity, appear to offer Europe a new possibility of union.

A small number of precise classified rules should enable all governments who interpret the wishes of pacific peoples with good-will to agree and to bear witness to common constructive views.

Collective security, mutual assistance, disarmament, economic co-operation, and European associations of resources for credit, of work, of intelligence, and the will of the peoples in favour of peace and against war, for prosperity and against misery—such are the broad lines of action for peace that the Government, sprung from the French people, offers in its name.

Paragraph 1.

The first basis of international relations should be the recognition of the equality of rights and independence of all States, as well as the respect of contracted engagements.

Paragraph 2.

There is no durable peace between nations if that peace remains subjected to the fluctuations, needs, and ambitions of each people.

Paragraph 3.

There is no real security in international relations if all conflicts which can arise between States are not resolved according to international law, obligatory on all and interpreted by impartial and sovereign international jurisdiction, and guaranteed by the forces of all the associates of the international community.

Paragraph 4.

Equality of rights does not prevent any State, voluntarily and in the common interest, limiting in certain circumstances the exercise of its sovereignty and rights.

Paragraph 5.

This limitation is particularly necessary in the matter of armaments in order to avoid any danger of hegemony by a more powerful people over weaker peoples.

Paragraph 6.

The inequality in fact existing between peoples should be compensated within the international community by mutual assistance against any breaking of international law.

Paragraph 7.

If mutual assistance in the general framework of the League is at present difficult to apply rapidly and efficaciously, it should be supplemented by regional agreements.

Paragraph 8.

A typical regional unit is constituted by Europe, the development of which makes the organization of security on the above-defined bases easier.

Paragraph 9.

Even were Europe, in the light of experience, to appear too vast a field for the application of collective security by mutual assistance and disarmament, there would be room for organizing regional ententes within the European framework.

Paragraph 10.

This organization should be confided to a European Commission formed within the framework of the League.

Paragraph 11.

International law demands respect of treaties. No treaty should be regarded as unalterable, but no treaty can be repudiated unilaterally. In the new European organization, wherein all peoples with equal rights shall be freely associated, each State will bind itself to respect the territorial status of the members, which cannot be modified without the consent of all. No demand for modification shall be submitted for 25 years.

European or regional treaties concerning the independence of States, and all limitations of their sovereignty accepted by common accord, notably regarding armaments, shall be placed under the mutual guarantee of the associates.

To this end special disposition shall be made whereby, after observation by a competent international authority that the aforesaid treaties have been broken, sanctions, reaching as far as force, shall be taken with a view to the re-establishment of international law.

Paragraph 12.

In order that they may be able to accomplish their duties of mutual assistance, the States associated with the European framework, or in the regional framework, shall specially provide and permanently maintain military, aerial, and naval forces at the disposal of the European Commission or the Council of the League of Nations.

Paragraph 13.

The permanent control of the carrying-out of treaties within the European framework, or the regional framework, shall be organized by the European Commission. All the associated European States shall bind themselves to make its work easy and to assure the execution of the decisions which this control might cause.

Paragraph 14.

Collective security having been organized in the European or regional frameworks by mutual assistance, all the associates shall proceed to a wide measure of disarmament.

The limitation of armaments in each State shall be decided by a two-thirds majority of the European Commission or any other organ

appointed by the Council of the League, with the reservation that each State may appeal to a high permanent Arbitration Court, formed for this purpose by the Council of the League, and which shall be charged to pay particular attention to the application of the principle mentioned above in paragraph 5.

Paragraph 15.

All treaties existing at present in Europe, and those which may be concluded in the future between two or more members of the European community, shall be submitted to the European Commission, which shall be able to pronounce by a two-thirds majority that they are incompatible with the European pact or regional pact foreseen in paragraphs 8 and 9.

These dispositions shall apply to economic agreements as well as political ones.

Paragraph 16.

If it must be admitted that the prosperity of the peoples, and even without speaking of prosperity, the lightening of their present sufferings, can only be obtained by the consolidation of a durable peace, founded on equal and honourable relations, then the economic co-operation of the peoples must be organized once the political work of establishing peace has been assured.

Paragraph 17.

The rational organization of exchanges is at the basis of economic co-operation.

Paragraph 18.

The expansion of markets provides the first solution. A first expansion should be found in a preferential system applicable to the inter-European exchanges.

Special economic relations leading as far as even a partial or total Customs Union would appreciably improve the economic conditions of certain European regions.

Paragraph 19.

Security in exchanges is the second factor in economic progress. On the one hand, exchanges shall be protected by an international convention, or at least a European one, assuring guarantees against the abuse of protectionism either direct or indirect. The projected

convention for concerted economic action established in 1931 by the League should be remembered to this end.

On the other hand, international exchanges must be protected against abusive interference on the part of States.

The conclusion of a European Customs truce, made possible by an appreciably stabilized standard of living in Europe, shall be set up, as also an international tribunal of exchanges to avoid the denunciations of commercial agreements and breaks in international relations between peoples, so prejudicial to the regularization and development of exchanges.

Finally, monetary instability and the restriction of international credit will have to be fought, particularly by means of the organization of money and credit in the European framework.

Paragraph 20.

The double necessity for a common reservoir of raw materials and for territory for expansion for surplus European production should lead to a revision of certain colonial statutes, not in the domain of political sovereignty, but from the point of view of equality of economic rights and the co-operation of credit between European States, which, having assured themselves of collective security and mutual assistance, will accordingly have to be considered as associates, not as rivals.

Paragraph 21.

All the problems will have to be treated, once political security has been established, by a special section in the European Commission before being submitted, if necessary, to the League Council or a general conference to which non-League Members would also be invited.

Paragraph 22.

Nothing in the present peace plan should be considered as contrary to the Covenant of the League or as providing an obstacle to its application, the Covenant and the plan being brought, where necessary, into harmony, in order to take into account agreements which might be drawn up between the contracting parties.

Paragraph 23.

It is suggested that the organizations aimed at in the present plan should as far as possible be identical with those already existing in the League, or that the League should be asked to create those as yet not in existence.

Paragraph 24.

Final adherence to the peace plan presupposes adherence to the Covenant, of which the principles remain the supreme law for the contracting parties.

Paragraph 25.

Failure to adhere to this plan by one or other State in the European community could not absolve the other States desiring to conform with it from putting it into operation. The plan would only have to be consequently modified, notably as regards the organization of collective security, mutual assistance, and disarmament.

4. FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

(i) Communiqué issued by the remaining Locarno Powers, April 10, 1936.¹

The representatives of Belgium, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy met at Geneva for an exchange of views on April 10, 1936.

They took note of the intentions expressed by the German Government in sub-sections three, four, five, six, and seven of paragraph 22 of its Memorandum of March 31, 1936. They noted that the German Government have not made a contribution to the re-establishment of confidence indispensable for the negotiation of new treaties, which would have permitted immediate general negotiations and the application of Article 7 of the said proposals drawn up at London on March 19.

They consider, however, that it is desirable completely to explore all the opportunities of conciliation; for this purpose the elucidation of a certain number of points contained in the German Memorandum is, in the first instance, necessary, notably those set out in the French Memorandum. The representatives of the United Kingdom will for this purpose get into touch with the German Government. In particular they will inquire what was the meaning attached by the German Government to the bilateral treaties which it proposed and how these treaties would fall into the framework of collective security or of the mutual assistance provided in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The representatives of France made all reserves in the event of any material changes occurring in the present situation in the Rhine-land Zone during the discussions in question. In the event of any such

¹ *The Times*, April 11, 1936.

changes the representatives of the four Governments decided to meet at once.

They took note of the fact that the contacts between the General Staffs provided for in Section 3 of the text of the proposals of March 19 would begin on April 15 next. They decided to communicate the French peace plan to the League of Nations for a detailed examination; the consent of the German Government will be asked for the similar communication to the League of Nations of the German Memorandum, subject to the observations made in paragraph 3 above.

They will in any case meet again at Geneva during the next session of the Council of the League of Nations.

The representative of Italy reserved his approval on behalf of his Government.¹

(ii) *Declaration by Baron Aloisi, April 10, 1936.*²

Avant de participer à vos conversations, je suis chargé par mon gouvernement de vous lire la déclaration suivante:

Signataire du pacte de Locarno, dans sa qualité de garant, l'Italie a, pendant cette longue période, fait honneur à sa signature. La crise rhénane ayant éclaté, l'Italie a participé aux réunions de Paris et de Londres en maintenant une attitude de réserve due aux circonstances particulières dans lesquelles elle a été placée. Or, le gouvernement italien a été obligé de noter que, dans toutes les manifestations officielles récentes du gouvernement britannique, l'Italie a été ignorée d'une façon ostentatoire. Mon gouvernement me charge donc de vous demander, à chacun d'entre vous, si la présence de l'Italie est la bienvenue et si sa collaboration à l'œuvre de reconstruction européenne sur la base d'un nouveau Locarno est désirée. Car, s'il n'en était pas ainsi, l'Italie n'aurait aucun motif d'assumer des risques et des responsabilités et elle se réserverait d'adopter une ligne de conduite en conséquence.

(iii) *Despatch from the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden to the British Ambassador at Berlin, containing the British Questionnaire to the German Government, May 6, 1936.*³

Sir,

Your Excellency will be aware that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom have for some time past had under the most

¹ See following document.

² *Journal des Nations*, April 15, 1936.

³ In the absence of the German Chancellor from Berlin a copy of this despatch was handed on May 7 to the German Minister for Foreign Affairs by His Majesty's Ambassador. British White Paper, Cmd. 5175.

careful consideration the Memoranda communicated to me by the late Herr von Hoesch on March 7, 1936, and by Herr von Ribbentrop on March 24 and April 1, 1936,¹ respecting the reoccupation of the demilitarized zone and the peace proposals of the German Government.

2. Such consideration was naturally indispensable in view of the importance which, as your Excellency is aware, His Majesty's Government attach to the establishment in Europe of a real and lasting peace based on the recognition of the equality of rights and independence of every State, together with respect by every State for the engagements entered into by it. It is the desire of His Majesty's Government to make every effort within their power to co-operate in the promotion of the objective described by the German Government in the Memorandum of March 31 as 'the great work of securing European peace'; and it is accordingly with this aim in view and in order to open the way to fruitful negotiation that I address to you this despatch and request your Excellency to seek an interview with the German Chancellor. You should preface your remarks by a statement to this effect.

3. Certain of the German Government's proposals deal, as your Excellency is aware, with temporary arrangements in the demilitarized zone pending the completion of the first stage of the general negotiations for the peace of Europe which were proposed by the German Government. On these temporary arrangements it is not my purpose to comment in the present despatch, though your Excellency knows that His Majesty's Government regret that the German Government have not been able to make a more substantial contribution towards the re-establishment of the confidence which is such an essential preliminary to the wide negotiations which they both have in view.

4. In the course of my interview with Herr von Ribbentrop on April 2, I informed his Excellency that His Majesty's Government regard the proposals for the future in the German Memorandum of March 31 (that communicated to me on April 1) as most important and as deserving of careful study. This study is now at an advanced stage; but His Majesty's Government find difficulty in carrying it further without discussing more closely with the German Government (as foreshadowed in the Geneva communiqué of April 10)² a certain number of points in the three Memoranda, particularly in those of March 24 and 31. His Majesty's Government feel sure that the German Government will share their view that the greatest possible

¹ See above, pp. 41, 154, and 183.

² See above, p. 210.

precision is desirable before general negotiations can open, in order that in the future no misunderstandings may cloud the confident co-operation of the Powers of Europe, which it is the most earnest hope of His Majesty's Government, as they are sure also of the German Government, that the proposed negotiations may advance.

5. There are a number of passages in the German Memoranda of March 24 and 31 which leave His Majesty's Government in some doubt as to the conception held by the German Government of the basis upon which the future settlement should be founded.

6. The first point on which it is desirable to be clear is whether Germany regards herself as now in a position to conclude 'genuine treaties'. There are passages in the second sub-paragraph of paragraph 1 of the German Government's Memorandum of March 24, 1936, which seem to suggest that it is the view of the German Government that by their action in the Rhineland they have established this position. On the other hand, there are passages in paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of March 24 which might be capable of a different interpretation, which, however, His Majesty's Government would not themselves wish to draw. It is, of course, clear that negotiations for a treaty would be useless if one of the parties hereafter felt free to deny its obligation on the ground that that party was not at the time in a condition to conclude a binding treaty, and His Majesty's Government will welcome a clear declaration from the German Government to remove any uncertainty on this point.

7. If the argument set out in paragraph 6 of the German Government's Memorandum of March 31 is intended to be of general application, it might give rise to doubt as to the view which the German Government take of the continued maintenance in force of the remaining operative clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and, indeed, of any agreement which might be said to have had its origin in the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles. His Majesty's Government do not wish to enter into controversy as to the historical interpretation of events set forth in that paragraph, and consequently they do not propose to state their views here. But they must, of course, make it clear that they are unable to accept the views put forward by the German Government in the paragraph in question.

8. There is in paragraph 4 of the Memorandum of March 31 a further cause for uncertainty. It is stated in that paragraph that 'the German Government have received from the German People (*Volk*) a solemn general mandate to represent the Reich and the German Nation (*Nation*) to carry out a policy which implies the preservation under all circumstances of their freedom, their independence

and at the same time their equality of status'. A distinction is apparently drawn between the Reich and the German Nation. The question is really whether Germany now considers that a point has been reached at which she can signify that she recognizes and intends to respect the existing territorial and political status of Europe, except in so far as this might be subsequently modified by free negotiation and agreement.

9. I turn now to other matters. Sub-paragraph 13 of paragraph 22 of the Memorandum of March 31 refers to 'the conclusion of an Air Pact to supplement and reinforce these (Western European) security agreements'. In the spring of 1935 the German Government were understood to hold that the negotiation of an Air Pact should not be complicated by an attempt to accompany it by an agreement for the limitation of air forces. Since then a somewhat contradictory position seems to have arisen. In the Reichstag on May 21, 1935, Herr Hitler mentioned the possibility of an agreement for air limitation on the basis of parity between the great Western Powers, provided, so we understood, that the development of the Soviet air force was not such that revision would be necessary. The Chancellor's speech of May 21, 1935, was made after the signature of the Franco-Soviet Treaty; yet in December 1935 he informed your Excellency that that Treaty had made air limitation impossible. A decision not to attempt to accompany a Western Air Pact by a regional agreement for limitation of air strengths would be very much regretted by His Majesty's Government; and the statement in paragraph 2 of the German Memorandum that the German Government are impressed by the results achieved in the limited sphere of the recent agreement respecting naval armaments encourages them to hope that the German Government will be able to fall in with their views on this point.

10. His Majesty's Government are gratified to see that, in sub-paragraphs 10 and 14 of paragraph 22 of the Memorandum of March 31, the German Government propose the conclusion of non-aggression pacts between Germany, on the one hand, and France, Belgium, and possibly Holland on the other. They note that the German Government are willing that these pacts should be accompanied by treaties of guarantee. The exact form which these instruments will assume must be a matter for detailed negotiation.

His Majesty's Government also note the proposal in sub-paragraph 17 of paragraph 22 for non-aggression pacts between Germany and the States on Germany's south-eastern and north-eastern frontiers. His Majesty's Government would venture to recall the general out-

line of such pacts given to Sir John Simon by Baron von Neurath in Berlin on March 26, 1935. They would be glad to know whether the German Government suggest that these pacts should follow generally that outline, and whether they agree that these pacts also may be guaranteed by mutual assistance arrangements.¹

The announcement which the German Government have been able to make of Germany's readiness to re-enter the League of Nations permits His Majesty's Government to assume that no difficulty will arise as regards the conformity of the proposed non-aggression pacts with the obligations of Members of the League of Nations, and that the operation of these pacts will take place within the framework of the Covenant.

There are two further points to which attention should be drawn. The first concerns the meaning of the words 'the States on Germany's south-eastern and north-eastern frontiers'. His Majesty's Government cannot but feel that the general settlement would be very greatly facilitated if the German Government could see their way to interpret these words so as to cover at least also the Soviet Union, Latvia, and Estonia, as well as the States actually contiguous to Germany. In this connexion His Majesty's Government would venture to recall that in their Memorandum of March 26, 1935, the German Government stated their readiness to conclude pacts of non-aggression with 'the Powers interested in East European questions'.

The second is that of non-interference in the affairs of other States, as distinct from non-aggression against them. His Majesty's Government recall with satisfaction the Chancellor's statement in the Reichstag on May 21, 1935, that the German Government were 'ready at any time to agree to an international arrangement which will effectively prevent and render impossible all attempts to interfere from outside in the affairs of other States'.

11. In sub-paragraph 19 of paragraph 22 'Germany proposes the constitution of an international court of arbitration which shall have competence in respect of the observance of the various agreements concluded'. Presumably, these agreements are those mentioned in sub-paragraphs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 17 of paragraph 22. It would be desirable to know generally the functions and constitution of the proposed court and the relation which the former would bear to the functions of the Council of the League of Nations and of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

In view of the announcement of Germany's willingness to return

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 78 and also p. 82.

to the League of Nations, the German Government will, no doubt, be willing to indicate their future attitude towards the Permanent Court of International Justice (particularly in relation to the Optional Clause) and towards the various provisions for arbitration, conciliation, or judicial settlement contained in treaties to which Germany is a party.

12. When your Excellency sees the Chancellor, I request that you will discuss with him the points raised in this despatch and leave with him a copy. Your Excellency should explain that these are not exhaustive. There are other matters which will have to be raised at a later date; and before the return of Germany to the League of Nations comes under discussion, the German Government will no doubt think it desirable to give some definition of the phrase 'the separation of the Covenant of the League of Nations from its basis in the Treaty of Versailles setting', which occurs in sub-paragraph 18 of paragraph 22. At the moment His Majesty's Government prefer only to deal with points the elucidation of which is essential prior to the opening of the general negotiations which, as stated above, they are sincerely desirous of promoting.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

(iv) *Extracts from Statement by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, June 18, 1936.*¹

. . . I should like to turn to another and no less important aspect of the international situation which now confronts us, and I want to deal, if the Committee will allow me, with the negotiations which the Government have sought to set on foot ever since the German re-occupation of the Rhineland in March. Successive Governments in this country have long stood for a policy based on a desire to establish good relations between Germany and the countries which were her enemies in the War. We have sought to do that on a basis of German equality and independence and the equality and independence of others, and on a basis of respect for engagements undertaken. The collaboration of Germany is indispensable to the peace of Europe, and we have asked, as successive British Governments have asked, nothing better than to work with Germany to that end. That is the purpose that underlay the Treaty of Locarno. . . . It was the purpose in the mind of successive British Governments when they negotiated the reparation arrangements, culminating in their disappearance at Lausanne altogether. It formed part of the negotiations of the

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, June 18, 1936, coll. 1209-12.

Disarmament Conference, and after the break-down of that conference in the spring of 1934 the Government of this country did not relax their efforts. The Committee has only to read the Blue Book which we published last April—I think it is of interest to read that Blue Book—to appreciate the whole course which these negotiations have followed. . . . Ever since the events of March 7 we have sought to rebuild. We did not suppose, of course, that the action of the German Government could be revoked, and we did not ask for it, but we did hope from the German Government some contribution which would show, as they affirmed themselves, that their action was only of symbolic significance. We asked the German Government to make spontaneously a contribution towards the restoration of confidence. The German Government unhappily felt unable to do so. So far as we are concerned we have done everything we could to restore confidence and allay apprehensions. That is why we reaffirmed on March 19 our obligations and our guarantees under the Locarno Treaty. That is why, as tangible evidence, we agreed to Staff conversations to arrange the technical conditions in which our obligations could be carried out in case of unprovoked aggression. Moreover, we made it plain at once that we were ready to negotiate with Germany, France, and Belgium new non-aggression and security arrangements for Western Europe.

But it was also clear, in view of the German occupation of the zone, that Europe at large would wish to know what Germany's intentions were towards the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and all the more naturally in the light of the proposals which the German Chancellor had himself announced. Moreover, it was important for us and for Europe to be assured that Germany now felt that a point had been reached at which she could signify that she recognized and intended to respect the existing territorial and political status of Europe except of course as it might subsequently be modified by free negotiations and agreements. A frank and a reassuring response to that question I am sure would be the signal for a return of confidence to Europe. I believe that nothing less, if I may say so, than a European settlement and appeasement should be our aim. If a reassurance can be given on this point then there are elements in the present situation which would enable us to attempt to conclude a permanent settlement in Europe based on the disappearance of the demilitarized zone. That was the primary purpose of the communication which the British Ambassador made to the German Government on May 6 last. The inquiries thus put to the German Government were in our view very necessary and legitimate on our

part. They were made as soon as possible after we had elucidated the position at Geneva in a meeting with the other Powers signatory to the Locarno Treaty. For that reason the Government felt justified in looking for an early reply from the German Government, a reply which we trust will enable progress to be made with the negotiations which it is our first object to see successfully realized. . . .

(v) *Communiqué issued by the Three-Power Conference, Geneva, July 3, 1936.*¹

As a result of the conversations at Geneva between M. Blum, M. Delbos, Mr. Eden, M. van Zeeland, and M. Spaak, it was agreed that a further meeting of the Locarno Powers whose representatives drew up the London arrangements of March 19 would be desirable at an early date in order to discuss the present situation. No final decision was arrived at as to time or place of the meeting, but it was agreed that the invitation should be issued by M. van Zeeland after a further consultation with those concerned.

(vi) *Reply of the Italian Government, July 11, 1936.*²

The Belgian Premier has invited the Italian Government to participate at the preparatory meeting of the Locarno Powers which will take place shortly at Brussels. The Italian Government has replied stating that it is ready to give a concrete contribution for guaranteeing peace, but that it has been obliged to take account of the existence of certain Mediterranean obligations which form an obstacle to Italy's participation in the work of international co-operation in which she is so earnestly interested.

The Italian Government has, moreover, expressed the opinion that it is necessary to invite Germany also to the preparatory phase of the forthcoming Locarno meeting. The absence of one of the signatory States to the Treaty of Locarno would complicate rather than clarify the existing situation.

(vii) *Communiqué issued by the Three-Power Conference, London, July 23, 1936.*³

The representatives of France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, having met in London on July 23, 1936,

Mindful of the arrangement of March 19, of the proposals of the

¹ *The Times*, July 4, 1936.

² *Manchester Guardian*, July 13, 1936.

³ *The Times*, July 24, 1936.

German Chancellor of March 31, and of those of the French Government of April 8, have arrived at the following conclusions:

(1) The main purpose to which the efforts of all European nations must be directed is to consolidate peace by means of a general settlement.

(2) Such a settlement can only be achieved by the free co-operation of all the Powers concerned, and nothing would be more fatal to the hopes of such a settlement than the division, apparent or real, of Europe into opposing *blochs*.

(3) The three Governments accordingly consider that steps should be taken to arrange a meeting of the five Locarno Powers as soon as such a meeting can conveniently be held. The first business to be undertaken should, in their opinion, be to negotiate a new agreement to take the place of the Rhine Pact of Locarno, and to resolve, through the collaboration of all concerned, the situation created by the German initiative of March 7.

(4) The three Governments accordingly propose to enter into communication with the German and Italian Governments with a view to obtaining their participation in the meeting thus proposed.

(5) If progress can be made at this meeting, other matters affecting European peace will necessarily come under discussion. In such circumstances, it would be natural to look forward to the widening of the area of the discussion in such a manner as to facilitate, with the collaboration of the other interested Powers, the settlement of those problems the solution of which is essential to the peace of Europe.

(viii) *Official Communiqué issued by the Italian Government,
July 31, 1936.*¹

Count Ciano, the Italian Foreign Minister, to-day received the French Ambassador and the British and Belgian *Chargés d'Affaires*, and in reply to the communication which was made to him on July 24, informed them that the Italian Government would in principle be glad to take part in the Conference of the five Locarno Powers on a date to be agreed on. He added that the Italian Government considered it useful, in view of the high aims of the Conference, to have it adequately prepared by exchanges of views through the ordinary diplomatic channels. Count Ciano has notified the German Ambassador of this decision.

¹ *Corriere della Sera*, August 1, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

(ix) *Official Communiqué issued by the German Government, July 31, 1936.*¹

Baron von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, to-day received the British and French Ambassadors, as well as the Belgian Minister, and informed them that the German Government accepted the invitation of the three Governments to a five-Power discussion on a Western pact.

He particularly pointed out that this discussion needed careful diplomatic preparation in every respect, especially in regard to the programme.

The Italian Ambassador was informed accordingly.

III. THE INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF BELGIUM²

Not the least important result of the German action of March 7, 1936, was the modification of the international status of Belgium. In 1919, at her own wish, relying upon the protection afforded by the League Covenant, the disarmament of Germany, and the demilitarization of the Rhineland Zone, Belgium had been released under Article 31 of the Treaty of Versailles from her pre-War status of neutrality established by the Treaty of London in 1839. From the Peace Conference onwards Belgium had tended to be regarded very much as the political satellite of France—one of the *cortège habituel*—bound to her by the Military Agreement of 1920, following her lead in the occupation of the Rhine in 1923 and entering with her the Locarno Agreements of 1925. Belgium covered the left flank of the Maginot line and had even been exhorted to build fortifications in continuation of this amazing achievement of military engineering. In effect, from 1920 to 1935 the policy of Belgium had been pro-French and anti-German. But, with the conclusion of the Franco-Soviet Pact there had grown up in Belgium an increasing distrust of French policy, the shifting tendency of which was felt to have increased the danger of aggression from Germany. Moreover, the Belgian Government had been deeply impressed by the events of the winter of 1935-6 in Rome, Berlin, and Geneva, where the break-down of the collective system was being enacted before their eyes,³ and they were additionally concerned internally with the sudden rise of M. Degrelle's Rexist movement and the increased pressure from the Flemish population of the country. Part of the agitation was directed against the Military Agreement of 1920, and conversations with France resulted in an exchange of Notes on March 6.⁴ In this the two Governments recognized that parts of the agreement were largely out of date and decided, therefore, to retain and confirm the sole provision which was of value, namely, the maintenance of contact between the General Staffs for the purpose of carrying out the undertakings defined

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, August 1, 1936. ² See *Survey* for 1936, Part III (i) (j).

³ See below, pp. 228-30.

⁴ See above, p. 72.

by the Locarno Treaty. It was made clear that 'such contact cannot give rise to any liability of a political nature, nor to any obligation regarding the organization of national defence for either of the interested parties'.

Thus the events of March 7, 1936, found the ties of Franco-Belgian co-operation already somewhat weakened, and, when Belgium found herself faced on her immediate eastern frontier by a rearmed and militarist Germany and without the protection of a demilitarized zone, that desire for equality with the Great Powers which had characterized Belgian policy at the Peace Conference wilted beneath the burden of responsibilities involved. Despite the reaffirmation among the Locarno Powers of the continued existence of treaty obligations¹—or, perhaps, because of them, since they entailed the immediate support of France by Belgium in the event of German aggression—Belgian policy was influenced more and more by the weakness of her exposed position and by the conviction that, whatever promises were made, the Locarno Treaties had died on March 7 and that Belgium was well out of them.

These and other circumstances were reviewed by H.M. King Leopold III in an address to his Cabinet on October 14 in which he expressed, for the first time publicly, the views which many had discussed in private.² Developments, said His Majesty, had placed Belgium 'almost in the international position she was in before the War', and her undertakings 'should not go beyond having a military machine big enough to dissuade any one of her neighbours from using our territory to attack another State'. Any policy of alliance with a single country would weaken Belgium's position abroad and, rightly or wrongly, cause divisions at home. A purely defensive alliance would not meet the case, because, however prompt the intervention of an ally, it would only come after the invader's blow, which would be a lightning attack. 'That is why we must follow a policy exclusively and entirely Belgian. That policy should aim resolutely at placing us outside any dispute of our neighbours. It responds to our national ideal.'

The speech came as somewhat of a shock to the Locarno Powers, and in the days following there was considerable diplomatic activity between London, Paris, and Brussels. It was explained that the Cabinet had been so impressed with the King's justification for the defence programme that they had asked him to allow his speech to be published without considering that it included statements on foreign policy which, by ordinary diplomatic usage, should first have been communicated to the Governments of the Powers most concerned. Belgium, it was asserted, renounced none of her obligations, and remained loyal to the Covenant of the League of Nations; she did not wish to return to the pre-War status of neutrality, but claimed that she had the right to examine in full independence any new agreement for a Western Pact.

The position of the Government was explained in the Chamber by the

¹ See above, pp. 132, 175-8.

² See below, p. 223. The occasion of King Leopold's speech was the introduction of a new defence scheme providing for frontier garrisons, the fixing of military service at 18 months for infantry and 12 months for machine-gunners, and the increasing of the annual contingent by 4,000 men to a total of 48,000.

Foreign Minister, M. Spaak, on October 28 in the course of the debate on the Defence Bill.¹ After expressing the views outlined above, he added the fundamental point that Great Britain, Germany, and France must of necessity pursue a policy different from Belgium, as they were engaged in world politics, and considerations of prestige also counted with them. All Belgium had to do was to defend her own territory.

There followed a period during which Belgium was courted by both Germany on the one side and France and Britain on the other. The rumour of a German-Belgian non-aggression pact² was revived, and Dr. Goebbels, in an interview published in the Brussels press on November 17, was warmly reassuring as to Germany's designs on the Belgian Congo and the restitution of Eupen and Malmédy. In the course of a visit to London M. van Zeeland, at a luncheon given by the British Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce on November 27, exchanged assurances with Mr. Eden, who took the opportunity to reaffirm that the independence and integrity of Belgium was a vital interest to Great Britain.³ A further exposition of the Belgian point of view was given before the Chamber by M. van Zeeland, on December 2,⁴ in the closing stages of the debate on the Defence Bill.⁵ Belgium, he said, could give no undertaking likely to compromise the effectiveness of the position of independence she wished to assume. But independence was not isolation. They would fulfil all their obligations precisely because they were a small country. But they wished to prevent their territory from being used for military transit, thus diminishing the risk of war, and in that connexion therefore they could only accept the implications of Article 16 of the Covenant subject to their own interpretation.

It became evident from these declarations that what Belgium really desired was an Anglo-French guarantee of her territorial integrity and independence without the onus of a reciprocal guarantee of direct military assistance on her part.⁶ With regard to the League of Nations she was prepared to remain a Member, but insisted upon the reservations to the operation of Article 16 which had been inserted in Annex F of the Treaty of Locarno, originally at the request of Germany. The course of negotiation gradually progressed in this direction. Visits to London by King Leopold in March 1937 and by M. van Zeeland in the month following helped matters forward, and Belgium accepted the principle that, if she received the guarantee required, she must herself undertake to take up arms in defence of her own independence and integrity, or, in other words,

¹ See below, p. 227.

² The offer of non-aggression pacts to Germany's neighbours was put forward by Herr Hitler on May 17, 1933, December 18, 1933, and May 21, 1935; it was renewed specifically in respect of Belgium in the German proposals of March 7 and 31, 1936. See above, pp. 44, 189.

³ See below, pp. 233-4.

⁴ See below, p. 234.

⁵ This was adopted on the same day in the Chamber by 137 votes to 43 and in the Senate two days later by 122 votes to 19. The text of the Bill as passed was unaltered except for the reduction of the period of service from 18 to 17 months.

⁶ In the Belgian view, the determination to resist any invasion of Belgium amounted, in effect, to a guarantee to France (and likewise to Germany) against attack through their country.

resist invasion. Finally, on April 24, 1937, the new status of Belgium was established by a joint Anglo-French declaration¹ signed in Brussels, releasing her from her obligations under the Locarno Treaties and the Four-Power Agreement of March 19, 1936. France and Great Britain also reaffirmed to each other their own obligations under the Locarno Agreement and renewed their pledges of assistance to Belgium given on March 19, 1936. It was understood that for her part Belgium would defend her frontier against all invasion and aggression, or the use of her territory for the purposes of aggression against another State, and would organize her defences in an efficient manner for this purpose. She also gave renewed assurances of fidelity to the League Covenant. Thus the active Locarno Powers were reduced to two. On April 29 M. Spaak gave a comprehensive exposition of Belgium's new status and policy to the Chamber,² in the course of which he noted the fact that the agreement of April 24 was a unilateral declaration by Great Britain and France and not a treaty and that, in consequence, should Belgian policy be modified in a manner contrary to the sense of the declaration, the two Powers would be in a position unilaterally to withdraw their guarantee. M. Spaak also declared that the Belgian Government interpreted their obligations under the third paragraph of Article 16³ in the sense that the right of transit could not be imposed on Belgium without her consent, and that such consent was conceivable only if it were a question of carrying out common action. Finally, the Declaration of April 24 was communicated to the League Council on May 26⁴, and on the next day M. Delbos,⁵ Mr. Eden,⁶ and M. Spaak⁷ spoke, pointing out that their Governments considered the Declaration a stage towards the elaboration of a new Western Pact.

1. DECLARATION BY H.M. KING LEOPOLD III OF THE BELGIANS, OCTOBER 14, 1936.⁸

En prêtant le serment constitutionnel, les souverains belges s'engagent à maintenir l'intégrité et l'indépendance du pays.

Comme mes prédécesseurs, j'entends exécuter cette promesse solennelle. C'est pourquoi j'ai tenu à présider ce conseil, qui doit arrêter les mesures à soumettre au Parlement en vue de doter la Belgique d'un statut militaire adapté aux circonstances actuelles.

Le gouvernement s'est posé, depuis plus d'un an déjà, le problème

¹ See below, p. 239.

² See below, p. 240.

³ This reads as follows: 'The Members of the League agree, further, that . . . they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.'

⁴ See below, p. 248.

⁵ See below, p. 249.

⁶ See below, p. 250.

⁷ See below, p. 250.

⁸ To the Belgian Cabinet. Text furnished by the Belgian Embassy in London.

du renforcement de notre état militaire. Plusieurs raisons l'y ont contraint :

(a) Le réarmement de l'Allemagne, succédant à la remilitarisation intégrale de l'Italie et de la Russie, a provoqué des mesures de précaution exceptionnelles dans la plupart des autres États, même délibérément pacifiques, comme la Suisse et les Pays-Bas ;

(b) La transformation des méthodes de guerre sous l'influence des progrès techniques, notamment en matière d'aviation et de motorisation, permet d'imprimer désormais aux opérations initiales d'un conflit armé une puissance, une rapidité et une ampleur particulièrement alarmantes, pour des pays de faible étendue comme la Belgique ;

(c) La réoccupation, en coup de foudre, de la Rhénanie et le transfert à notre frontière des bases de départ d'une invasion allemande éventuelle, ont accentué nos inquiétudes ;

(d) En même temps, nous avons assisté à l'ébranlement des assises de la sécurité internationale par des infractions à des conventions, même librement souscrites, et par la quasi-impossibilité d'adapter, dans les circonstances actuelles, les stipulations du pacte de la Société des nations à la répression de ces infractions ;

(e) Enfin, les dissensions intestines de certains États risquent de s'enchevêtrer dans des rivalités de systèmes politiques et sociaux d'autres États, et de déclencher une conflagration plus acharnée et plus dévastatrice que celle dont nous subissons encore le contre-coup.

Il n'est pas inutile, je pense, de rappeler ici les étapes successives par lesquelles l'examen de la question militaire a passé au cours de ces derniers mois.

Ce tableau récapitulatif établira en même temps que l'on peut considérer comme clos le cycle des études.

La nécessité de proportionner nos forces militaires aux risques des dangers extérieurs se manifesta dès le printemps 1935.

Divers projets me furent soumis par l'État-major Général de l'Armée et finalement, en novembre 1935, je marquai mon accord sur un programme dont les bases essentielles constituaient alors, à mes yeux, un minimum.

Ce programme a été soumis aux membres du gouvernement et celui-ci a constitué, en son sein, un comité restreint chargé d'examiner, de façon approfondie, le problème de notre sécurité.

Le 7 février 1936, le Conseil de Cabinet s'est mis d'accord sur le texte d'un projet de loi militaire ; celui-ci ne recueillit pas les suffrages des sections de la Chambre, et le gouvernement se rallia au dépôt d'un amendement suggérant l'application immédiate de l'article 53 de la loi de milice.

Le projet ainsi modifié fut voté par la Chambre le 6 avril.

Entre-temps, dès le 10 janvier, l'idée fut émise de faire discuter le problème, dans son ensemble, par une Commission mixte.

Cette idée fut accueillie favorablement dans les milieux politiques et parlementaires.

La Commission mixte fut créée par Arrêt Royal du 25 mars 1936.

Après trente-sept séances, la Commission, ayant examiné le problème sous tous ses aspects, a clôturé ses travaux et formulé une série de conclusions. Si celles-ci divergent quant aux modalités d'application, elles témoignent d'une unanimité d'opinion en ce qui concerne les principes généraux et notamment la nécessité d'une couverture permanente. Ses suggestions principales, qui ont trait à des achats de matériel, à la défense contre les attaques aériennes, à l'aménagement des places fortes, au régime d'incorporation, sont de nature à exiger des décisions sans délai.

De toute façon, la nouvelle loi de milice doit être votée avant le 1^{er} décembre prochain, date à laquelle commence l'incorporation de la classe de 1937.

D'autre part, devant les dangers de la situation internationale, le pays ne comprendrait pas que le gouvernement tardât à soumettre au Parlement les propositions qui s'imposent.

Encore convient-il que le problème soit posé avec précision devant l'opinion publique.

Notre politique militaire, comme notre politique extérieure, qui nécessairement détermine la première, doit se proposer, non de préparer une guerre plus ou moins victorieuse, à la suite de coalition, mais d'écarter la guerre de notre territoire.

La réoccupation de la Rhénanie, en faussant les accords de Locarno dans la forme et dans le fond, nous a presque replacés dans notre position internationale d'avant-guerre.

Notre situation géographique nous commande d'entretenir un appareil militaire de taille à dissuader un quelconque de nos voisins d'emprunter notre territoire pour attaquer un autre État. En s'acquittant de cette mission, la Belgique concourt d'une manière éminente à la paix de l'Europe occidentale, et elle se crée *ipso facto* un droit au respect et à l'aide éventuelle de tous les États qui ont intérêt à cette paix.

Sur ces bases, je crois l'opinion belge unanime.

Mais nos engagements ne doivent pas aller au delà. Toute politique unilatérale affaiblirait notre position à l'extérieur, suscite — à tort ou à raison — la division à l'intérieur. Une alliance, même purement défensive, ne conduit pas au but ; car, si prompt que pourrait être le secours d'un allié, il n'interviendrait qu'après le choc de l'envahisseur,

qui sera foudroyant ; pour lutter contre ce choc, nous serions seuls en tout état de cause.

A moins de disposer elle-même du système de défense capable de lui résister, la Belgique se verrait, dès le début, profondément envahie et tout de suite saccagée. Passé ce stade, les interventions amies pourraient certes assurer la victoire finale ; mais la lutte couvrirait le pays de ravages dont ceux de la guerre 1914-1918 n'offrent qu'une faible image.

C'est pourquoi nous devons, comme l'a dit récemment le ministre des affaires étrangères, poursuivre une politique 'exclusivement et intégralement belge'. Cette politique doit viser résolument à nous placer en dehors des conflits de nos voisins ; elle répond à notre idéal national. Elle peut se soutenir par un effort militaire et financier raisonnable et elle ralliera l'adhésion des Belges, tous animés d'un intense et primordial désir de paix.

Que ceux qui douteraient de la possibilité d'une pareille politique étrangère considèrent l'exemple fier et décidé de la Hollande et de la Suisse.

Qu'ils se rappellent de quel poids décisif l'observation scrupuleuse par la Belgique de son statut de neutralité pesa en notre faveur et en faveur des alliés pendant toute la guerre et pendant le règlement des comptes subséquent.

Notre situation morale eût été incomparablement plus faible à l'intérieur, et le monde ne nous eût pas voué la même sympathie si l'envahisseur avait pu tirer argument d'une alliance de notre part avec un de ses adversaires.

C'est donc, je le répète, **uniquement** à nous préserver de la guerre, d'où qu'elle vienne, que doit répondre notre système militaire, et il importe que l'opinion publique en reçoive l'assurance indiscutable.

Notre statut militaire, issu de la loi de milice de 1929, excellente à divers égards, ne répond plus aux possibilités nouvelles d'une invasion brusquée. Il n'assure ni la défense permanente de nos frontières, ni la sécurité de la mobilisation, ni celle de la concentration de l'armée. Une irruption plus ou moins inopinée pourrait, en quelques heures, conquérir de précieux gages et paralyser sans retour le gros de nos forces.

Il faut remédier d'urgence à cette organisation défectueuse. C'est pour en arrêter les moyens que je vous ai réunis.

Représentants des trois grands partis traditionnels qui groupent l'immense majorité des Belges, vous ferez vôtre, j'en forme le vœu, le projet du ministre de la défense nationale.

En résolvant le problème militaire dans une union de haute compréhension patriotique, vous rendrez au pays, en même temps

que la sérénité d'esprit nécessaire à l'égard des événements extérieurs, l'ambiance de sécurité indispensable à la prospérité publique.

Vous aurez ainsi établi, une fois de plus, devant le pays que la préoccupation essentielle du gouvernement d'union nationale est de placer au-dessus de tout l'intérêt supérieur de la Belgique.

2. EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT BY M. SPAAK, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BELGIUM, OCTOBER 28, 1936¹

Mesdames, messieurs, sans vouloir renouveler les incidents fort pénibles qui se sont produits tout à l'heure, je ne puis cependant pas vous cacher combien ils rendent ma tâche plus difficile et combien je les déplore. Que dans un débat de cette gravité et de cette importance, où les intérêts essentiels de notre pays sont en jeu, on voie un certain nombre de députés se dresser les uns contre les autres en s'écriant 'A Moscou!' ou 'A Berlin!' ou 'A Paris!', c'est, vous le reconnaîtrez, un spectacle vraiment affligeant.

Je vous en prie, au cours de ce débat, pour régler les questions graves que nous avons à régler, tous, autant que nous sommes, cessons des accusations aussi injurieuses que celles que l'on a proférées ici, et tous, autant que nous sommes, tâchons de résoudre les problèmes qui se posent en ne pensant qu'à une chose et en ne voulant qu'une chose: la Belgique et la défense de sa sécurité. . . .

Je voudrais essayer maintenant de déterminer aussi clairement que possible et avec l'espoir que les paroles que je prononcerai ne pourront donner lieu à aucune interprétation, les règles de notre politique étrangère. Si j'avais à résumer en quelques phrases essentielles les intentions que je me propose de réaliser, je vous dirais: Ne rien sacrifier de notre sécurité et de nos intérêts à des formules ou à des idéologies que nous ne puissions transposer d'une manière claire dans la réalité. Ne rien faire qui puisse augmenter la tension de l'Europe.

Pas de politique d'alliances dirigées contre un peuple quel qu'il soit. Refus d'intervenir dans les affaires intérieures de n'importe quel peuple; empêcher par tous moyens qu'on intervienne dans les nôtres. Participer à toute action collective raisonnable en vue du maintien de la paix. Tenir scrupuleusement tous nos engagements, mais exiger qu'ils soient clairs, précis, ne donnant lieu à aucune discussion ni à aucune équivoque. Dans ce cadre, faire une politique belge, en tenant compte de notre position géographique, de nos traditions historiques et de nos possibilités.

Messieurs, les idées générales étant ainsi exposées, je voudrais

¹ In the *Chambre des Représentants*. *Chambre des Représentants, Annales Parlementaires*, October 28, 1936, pp. 369-71.

essayer de voir avec vous ce qu'elles donnent dans la pratique, quand à l'heure où nous sommes on essaye de les rapporter aux deux instruments diplomatiques qui jusqu'en ces derniers temps étaient à la base de notre politique: le pacte de la Société des nations et le traité de Locarno.

Après le discours que j'ai eu l'honneur de prononcer à la presse étrangère, on m'a dit, et on l'a répété après le discours de Sa Majesté: Retournez-vous à la neutralité, quittez-vous la Société des nations, renoncez-vous à la sécurité collective et à l'assistance mutuelle? Messieurs, toutes ces questions se tiennent. En réalité, elles n'en forment qu'une et ma réponse est claire et précise: je réponds non! Pas de neutralité parce que nous entendons rester à la Société des nations, et parce que nous croyons qu'il est de notre devoir de participer, dans une mesure que je vais expliquer, à la sécurité collective et à l'assistance mutuelle. . . .

Messieurs, si la sécurité collective et l'assistance mutuelle étaient véritablement et complètement organisées, ce serait, personne ne peut le contester, le système idéal pour assurer la paix dans le monde, et ce serait dans tous les cas un système bien préférable à celui de la paix armée, de la course aux armements. Ai-je besoin d'y insister? Si l'on pouvait croire que, sur un point quelconque du globe le droit d'un peuple étant violé, tous les autres peuples du monde arriveraient à son secours, avec toutes leurs forces, je pense que nous pourrions définitivement rayer le mot 'guerre' de notre vocabulaire. Aussi la question n'est pas de savoir si, dans le fond de mon cœur, j'espère qu'un jour nous en arriverons à un état comme celui-là: la question est de savoir dans quel état se trouve aujourd'hui le régime de la sécurité collective et de l'assistance mutuelle. Jamais de ma bouche ne sortira un mot de critique ou un mot de raillerie contre ceux qui ont conçu l'idée de la Société des nations et qui lui ont apporté leur intelligence et le meilleur de leurs forces. Et grands dieux! Je ne me moque pas quand je reprends un mot de M. Hymans qui disait qu'en 1919 ceux qui avaient conçu la Société des nations avaient le sentiment d'une marche aux étoiles. C'était un rêve admirable, c'était une idée noble, et, voyant aujourd'hui que leurs efforts n'ont pas donné tout ce qu'ils en espéraient, nous n'avons même pas le droit de sourire. Mais la politique étrangère ne peut pas être basée sur l'idéologie, ni même être basée sur les sentiments; elle doit être basée sur des réalités. Quand nous parlons d'assistance mutuelle et de sécurité collective, quand nous examinons ces notions pour en faire une des assises de notre statut international, nous devons avoir le courage de voir ce que cela représente exactement.

Messieurs, que la Société des nations ait connu dans ces dernières années, et plus spécialement dans ces derniers mois, des épreuves très lourdes, très difficiles, qui ont atteint son prestige, sans m'en réjouir un instant, je puis tout de même, je dois tout de même le constater. Que ce système qui fonctionne parfaitement exigerait des peuples et presque de chaque individu dans chaque peuple une haute conception du devoir et du droit soit apparu dans ces derniers mois comme visant trop haut, c'est, je le répète, une réalité. Je crois qu'il n'y a personne dans cette Chambre qui oserait dire au ministre des affaires étrangères: Vous allez vous baser uniquement sur la sécurité collective et sur l'assistance mutuelle comme elles existent à Genève pour assurer la sécurité de votre pays, et ayant agi de la sorte, vous irez dire devant la Chambre que le statut international de la Belgique est bien réglé et que chacun peut être tranquille.

Personne n'oserait prendre une semblable attitude.

Je m'excuse de me répéter, mais je voudrais faire sentir ce qui est le fond de ma pensée. J'ai souvent dit, ces derniers temps, que lorsque je songeais au dernier échec de la Société des nations, à l'affaire éthiopienne, le remords — je n'hésite pas à employer le terme — qui s'emparait de moi, ce n'était pas d'avoir contribué à la levée des sanctions, c'était d'avoir, par notre adhésion aux principes de la sécurité collective, trompé l'Éthiopie sur la valeur réelle de ce système. C'est un aveu, peut-être cruel à faire, mais il est utile. Si la Société des nations n'avait pas existé, si l'Éthiopie n'avait pas cru à l'assistance mutuelle qui lui avait été promise, son sort ne serait pas ce qu'il est aujourd'hui. Elle aurait probablement trouvé un compromis dans un conflit avec l'Italie, et elle n'aurait pas basé toute sa défense sur un système qui s'est révélé inefficace.

Voudriez-vous donc, messieurs, que demain, nous étant abrité derrière une formule, ayant obéi à nos sentiments, ayant voulu rester fidèle à une idéologie, nous nous réveillions devant un spectacle aussi tragique que celui que j'évoque devant vous ?

Le problème de la Société des nations soulève deux questions extrêmement graves: il y a quelque chose qui, depuis que j'ai l'honneur de diriger le département des affaires étrangères, me frappe et, je ne puis vous le cacher, m'inquiète: c'est l'imprécision des termes de certains articles du pacte et imprécisions qui se trouvent dans des articles essentiels.

La vérité, c'est qu'actuellement le mécanisme du pacte n'est pas encore complètement au point. Il y a des choses graves qui restent encore mystérieuses. Chaque pays ne sait pas d'une manière précise ce qu'il devrait faire si la guerre éclatait.

Messieurs, est-ce qu'il est possible de rester dans une situation comme celle-là ? Est-ce qu'on peut accepter d'un cœur tranquille cette idée que si la guerre survenait, au lieu de voir chaque peuple faire immédiatement ce qu'il a promis de faire, on serait forcé de réunir une commission juridique pour discuter l'étendue des obligations de chacun ? Il me semble qu'il n'y a rien de plus dangereux que de souscrire à des engagements qui ne sont pas précis.

Ai-je besoin de dire dès maintenant et de souligner avec force qu'un principe essentiel de la politique étrangère de la Belgique a été, est et sera toujours, le respect total, absolu, à la signature donnée ? Encore faut-il, messieurs, que nous sachions exactement ce que nous avons promis de faire. Cette clarté-là, elle me semble absolument indispensable.

On me dit : 'C'est entendu ; vous faites quelques saluts, quelques courbettes devant l'idée de l'assistance mutuelle, de la sécurité collective. Au fond, vous n'y croyez pas du tout et vous ne faites rien pour perfectionner le système.'

Messieurs, c'est plus facile à dire qu'à faire, et je regrette de devoir encore une fois mettre le parlement devant une réalité peut-être déplaisante.

Il y a eu de longues discussions à Genève, au mois de juillet dernier.¹ Il y a eu de nouvelles et longues discussions au mois de septembre sur cette question essentielle : la réforme du pacte. De toutes ces discussions — il ne sert à rien de fermer les yeux — il ressort qu'il y a entre les pays des divergences profondes, que c'est un sujet extrêmement grave, qu'après les échecs subis il faut être prudent si l'on veut modifier quelque chose et que la conciliation de points de vue très divergents sera difficile.

On s'est donc borné de créer une commission. Le gouvernement belge ne refuse pas de participer aux travaux de cette commission et de faire connaître son point de vue, mais tous ceux qui connaissent le milieu, qui ont suivi les discussions qui ont eu lieu, savent combien la question est délicate et combien il faut l'aborder avec prudence.

Je suis, quant à moi, de ceux qui croient que la Société des nations pour être efficace doit être universelle. Je crois qu'aussi longtemps que l'Italie se tiendra à l'écart de la Société des nations, que l'Allemagne lui restera délibérément hostile, que l'Amérique et le Brésil s'en désintéresseront, je crois, dis-je, qu'aussi longtemps que durera cet état de choses, les possibilités de la Société des nations seront singulièrement réduites.

Mais, messieurs, ne nous le dissimulons pas : sur cette question

¹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. ii, pp. 513-42.

de l'universalité et plus encore sur le moyen de la réaliser, les opinions sont très différentes, les divergences très profondes, et chacun a senti au cours des derniers pourparlers que trancher la question dans un sens ou dans l'autre pouvait amener une situation plus difficile, plus complexe encore que celle qui existe aujourd'hui.

Voilà, messieurs, ce que je pense de l'une des bases de notre statut international.

Je voudrais maintenant, avec la discrétion qui s'impose, dire quelques mots de l'autre base : le traité de Locarno.

Messieurs, que la violation par l'Allemagne du traité de Locarno ait bouleversé la situation, c'est l'évidence. Que nous soyons aujourd'hui dans une situation transitoire, provisoire, je crois que personne ne peut le contester. Lorsque l'Allemagne a réoccupé la zone démilitarisée, il a fallu que la France, l'Angleterre, la Belgique, l'Italie se réunissent pour prendre des mesures appropriées à cette situation nouvelle.

Ces mesures, messieurs, vous les connaissez ; elles se résument en définitive par ce qu'on appelle les accords de Londres, par des échanges de lettres qui ont eu lieu à cette époque, qui impliquent non seulement des contacts entre les états-majors de la France et de la Belgique, mais des contacts entre les états-majors de l'Angleterre, de la France et de la Belgique.

Que nous soyons à l'heure actuelle dans un régime provisoire et transitoire, et j'ajoute dans un régime boiteux, c'est évident ! Et chacun l'a reconnu, puisque les signataires du traité de Locarno, et plus spécialement l'Angleterre, la France et la Belgique, ont décidé de faire un effort pour élaborer et signer un nouveau pacte de paix à l'Occident, pacte auquel participeraient, bien entendu, l'Allemagne et l'Italie, qui tendrait à mettre fin à ce régime transitoire. Sur ces pourparlers, la Chambre ne m'en voudra pas de garder une discrétion qui est de rigueur. Elle ne peut pas me demander de la mettre au courant des pourparlers en cours, de l'état de discussion, qui ne peuvent aboutir que si elles se font par la voie diplomatique. Je veux cependant dire à la Chambre dans quel esprit les discussions se sont engagées et la Chambre est suffisamment avertie pour en déduire les buts que je cherche à atteindre.

Je tiens à répéter que notre politique extérieure ne tend pas à un retour à la neutralité, notre politique extérieure nous la plaçons sous le signe de l'indépendance. La politique de la Belgique doit s'inspirer, dans la discussion pour la conclusion du pacte occidental, de trois idées essentielles. Ce sont, je le répète, notre position géographique, nos traditions et nos possibilités.

Messieurs, je crois que la Belgique a un rôle bien déterminé à

jouer dans l'Europe occidentale, un rôle qui lui est particulier et qui n'est ni le rôle de l'Allemagne, ni le rôle de la France, ni celui de l'Angleterre. La Belgique, on l'a dit mille fois, et je m'excuse de le répéter, se trouve à un carrefour. Quelle ligne de conduite lui impose cette position ? La réponse est évidente à mes yeux. Donner l'assurance à tous ses voisins qu'en aucun cas, qu'en aucune circonstance, la Belgique ne permettra que son territoire serve soit de passage, soit de base d'occupation à une armée étrangère, qui en profiterait pour attaquer plus facilement un autre de ses voisins.

M. De Lille : Et quand deux viennent en même temps ?

M. Spaak : Ai-je besoin de dire que cette position, nous la maintenons complètement ? Ce qu'on n'a pas suffisamment compris, me semble-t-il, ni en Belgique, ni à l'étranger, c'est que le discours prononcé par le Roi forme un tout, et quant à moi je n'admets pas l'interprétation de certains, qui disent : J'accepte la politique étrangère, mais je rejette la politique militaire. La politique militaire et la politique étrangère forment un ensemble cohérent, qui ne peut être mutilé. Si on accepte l'une il faut accepter l'autre. Je crois que quand la Belgique fait cet effort militaire auquel le Roi fait allusion, un effort en hommes, en temps de service et en argent, effort nécessaire, mais aussi effort considérable, je crois qu'en faisant cela la Belgique comprend son rôle et qu'elle apporte à l'Europe tout ce qu'elle peut lui apporter. Je ne critique pas la politique des grandes puissances et je conçois que l'Allemagne, que l'Angleterre et la France aient une tout autre politique que la nôtre.

Je ne critique pas les alliances défensives que peuvent conclure tels ou tels pays. Les grands pays ont une politique d'intérêt mondial, ils ont même une politique de prestige à maintenir. Lorsque, par contre, la Belgique se défend, lorsqu'elle prend toutes les mesures pour le faire, lorsqu'elle donne à l'Europe cette assurance que son territoire ne servira pas de base à une attaque quelconque, la Belgique fait tout ce qui lui est possible de faire. Si nous allons au delà, bien loin d'apporter notre pierre à l'œuvre de paix, nous créerions dans le monde une dangereuse illusion, car nous savons bien que si la guerre éclatait et que si nous y étions entraînés, en dehors de la défense, mais de la défense irréductible de notre territoire, nous ne pourrions rien faire d'autre de réel.

Messieurs, ce sont là des vérités. Ces vérités découlent des trois principes que je viens de définir : notre position géographique, notre tradition et nos possibilités. Il n'y a rien de contradictoire entre ce que j'ai dit ici, ni avec le discours que j'ai prononcé à la presse étrangère, ni avec le discours du Roi. . . .

Il y a un dernier point sur lequel je veux insister en terminant. Ma conviction est qu'au ministère que j'occupe, plus que dans un aucun autre, il faut trouver le point d'équilibre exact entre toutes les opinions du pays. Je ne veux et le gouvernement ne veut faire ni une politique flamande, ni une politique wallonne. S'il faisait l'une ou l'autre, il courrait à un cataclysme. Je sais bien que c'est une chose grave et triste de devoir dire que la politique étrangère se fait beaucoup en fonction de cette hypothèse effroyable qu'est la guerre. Ai-je besoin de dire que mon désir et le désir du gouvernement auquel j'appartiens, le désir sincère vers lequel nous tendons tous nos efforts, c'est de tâcher de maintenir dans la mesure de nos moyens la paix en Europe et la paix pour notre pays ? Ne me faites pas l'injure de croire qu'une idée belliqueuse quelle qu'elle soit pourrait passer par mon esprit. J'appartiens à une génération qui est arrivée à la vie politique au lendemain de la guerre et dont tous les efforts sont tendus vers ce but : éviter le retour des événements qui ont assombri les années de notre adolescence. Mais si, par malheur, malgré notre volonté, malgré la prudence que nous voulons mettre dans notre politique étrangère, si, malgré tout cela, la guerre devait éclater, une des conditions essentielles que nous devons réaliser, non pas pour sortir victorieux de cette épreuve, car victorieux ou vaincu la chose n'en est pas moins effroyable, mais pour garder notre indépendance, c'est que nous puissions réaliser une opinion publique unanime, en faisant, non pas une politique flamande ou une politique wallonne, mais une politique belge.

3. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY THE RT. HON. ANTHONY EDEN,
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NOVEMBER 27, 1936¹

. . . I think it is no exaggeration to say that Belgium has a special place in the friendship of the British people . . . I believe, in the present state of the world, there is no greater service that can be done by our country to the cause of peace than clarity. Let us therefore once again affirm that the independence and integrity of Belgium are a vital interest for this nation, and that Belgium could count upon our help were she ever the victim of unprovoked aggression. I say these words deliberately because I am confident that they represent the will of the British people and that to make this plain is a contribution to peace. . . .

¹ At a luncheon given in honour of M. van Zeeland by the British Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce in London.

4. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY M. VAN ZEELAND, PRIME MINISTER OF BELGIUM, NOVEMBER 27, 1936¹

... We Belgians know that in this cause of peace we, too, have an historical part to fulfil. Our geographical position makes our country a keystone of Western Europe; one cannot tamper with keystones without wrecking the edifice itself.

It is for us a duty—a duty towards ourselves and a duty to the great nations that are our neighbours—to do the utmost in our power to dissuade any one from the temptation of attacking us, of using our soil as a short cut.

It is in this way that we, too, serve peace, not in word, but in deed. . . .

5. EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT BY M. VAN ZEELAND, PRIME MINISTER OF BELGIUM, DECEMBER 2, 1936²

... Il me reste maintenant, messieurs, à vous montrer comment le projet militaire s'intègre dans la politique générale du gouvernement et, en particulier, dans sa politique extérieure.

Un trait capital qui domine toute l'action du gouvernement: c'est une intense volonté de paix. Il est presque ridicule, tant cela paraît évident et dans la nature même des choses, de répéter que la Belgique ne demande rien à personne, ne désire rien enlever à qui que ce soit, qu'elle est satisfaite de ce qu'elle a; son seul désir est de pouvoir travailler en paix, apporter sa part à la civilisation de l'occident, en conjuguant ses efforts dans une parfaite harmonie avec ceux de tous les peuples qui l'entourent. Nous sentons mieux que quiconque combien la guerre est vaine, qu'elle est toujours une duperie, même pour le vainqueur, et que rien, sinon la légitime défense, ne peut, en fin de compte, la justifier.

Notre position à cet égard peut se résumer ainsi: tout d'abord, faire tout ce qui est en nous — c'est peu de chose, mais c'est quelque chose, cependant — pour contribuer au maintien de la paix en Europe et dans le monde; et dans toute la mesure où nous le pouvons, collaborer à l'établissement de conditions générales qui rendent la guerre moins probable ou moins proche.

En second lieu, si un conflit doit éclater quelque part, faire tout ce qui dépend de nous pour le limiter, pour empêcher qu'il ne s'étende et, en dernière analyse, pour éviter qu'il ne gagne nos frontières et ne nous entraîne dans la catastrophe.

¹ At a luncheon given in his honour by the British Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce in London.

² In the *Chambre des Représentants. Chambre des Représentants, Annales Parlementaires*, December 2, 1936, pp. 317–19.

Telle a été, depuis toujours et particulièrement depuis la guerre, la politique de notre pays ; telle elle est aujourd'hui, telle elle sera demain.

N'y a-t-il rien de changé dans l'attitude de notre pays, en matière de politique étrangère ? Celui qui le soutiendrait se tromperait gravement, mais celui-là commettrait une erreur tout aussi lourde qui soutiendrait que la position prise aujourd'hui constitue un bouleversement complet, une sorte de changement de décor à vue. Non, nous restons fidèles, objectivement et véritablement fidèles aux principes généraux qui sont à la base de notre politique étrangère depuis des années et qui tiennent, en réalité, aux exigences primordiales de l'existence de notre pays. Mais ces principes, nous les appliquons — et nous devons les appliquer — en tenant compte des changements intervenus dans les réalités que nous heurtons en chemin.

Si les données du problème changent, quoi d'étonnant à ce que, en appliquant les mêmes règles et les mêmes méthodes, les conclusions se modifient ?

La caractéristique la plus nette de notre politique, celle que nous n'avons cessé de mettre en relief avec une insistance croissante, c'est le souci d'une indépendance absolue et dans toutes les directions. . . .

Je crois pouvoir sans manquer à aucun devoir de discrétion déclarer ici qu'au sein de ce conseil historique où Sa Majesté fit à ses ministres la communication reprise dans ce document destiné à eux seuls, la réaction spontanée fut telle qu'un des membres importants du cabinet déclara aussitôt : il n'est pas un mot de ce discours auquel nous ne puissions tous souscrire sans réserve. A ce discours, devenu, par sa publication, un acte du gouvernement, nul n'a droit de donner des interprétations plus ou moins fantaisistes ou plus ou moins imaginaires ; nul n'a le droit de le découper pour en retenir, plus ou moins loyalement, ce qui lui plaît et en rejeter le reste.

Cet acte, qui est un grand acte, constitue un tout ; il doit être pris comme tel. Il montre merveilleusement les liens serrés et indestructibles qui attachent, dans une même conception d'ensemble, les vues de politique étrangère et les vues de politique militaire qui y sont exprimées. Je ne comprends pas que quelqu'un ose invoquer le discours royal et obéir, en matière militaire, à d'autres préoccupations que celles qui ont animé le Roi et son gouvernement, à l'égard du projet militaire qui vous est soumis. . . .

Cette politique d'indépendance solennellement affirmée, soulignée par le recours à une méthode exceptionnelle qui a, en effet, frappé

le monde, le gouvernement est résolu à l'appliquer fermement demain, au cours des négociations qui devront régler la situation de l'occident. Nous ne prendrons aucun engagement, nous ne signerons aucun acte, nous ne renouvellerons aucun accord qui puisse, en droit, en fait, ou même en apparence, compromettre l'efficacité de la position d'indépendance et d'équilibre que nous entendons prendre.

Je crois qu'il n'est pas possible d'être plus net et plus catégorique, ou alors les mots n'auraient plus leur sens.

Mais cela dit, il convient que je précise certains autres aspects de notre attitude.

L'indépendance ne signifie pas une absurde prétention à l'isolement, ni davantage une méconnaissance dangereuse et aveugle de nos devoirs. Nos devoirs, nous entendons au contraire les remplir tous et nous mettre à même de les remplir mieux.

Tout d'abord nos engagements. Les petits pays doivent avoir, plus que n'importe qui, le souci de respecter scrupuleusement et d'appliquer rigoureusement tous les engagements qu'ils ont pris. Nous l'avons toujours fait, nous le ferons toujours. C'est là, d'ailleurs, une raison de plus pour ne s'engager qu'avec prudence, pour n'assumer que des engagements que nous puissions tenir, pour n'accepter que des engagements bien précis, bien clairs, bien délimités, qui ne puissent jamais nous entraîner dans des aventures où nous n'avons que faire.

Quels sont les engagements que nous avons aujourd'hui ? Tout d'abord, nous sommes membre de la Société des nations. Notre position, vis-à-vis de la Ligue, n'a pas changé ; nous restons convaincus que la Ligue des nations représente un grand effort vers un avenir meilleur ; nous croyons à son utilité ; nous croyons à son devenir. Ce n'est pas un échec passager, si grave soit-il, qui modifiera notre opinion. Mais nous n'avons jamais pensé que la Ligue nous dispensait de faire l'effort maximum en notre pouvoir, pour nous protéger nous-mêmes ; nous l'avons considérée, et nous la considérons encore comme un élément supplémentaire qui peut nous apporter, dans certaines circonstances, un appoint de sécurité, et j'estime que nous n'avons le droit de renoncer à aucun des éléments qui peuvent, en des périodes difficiles, nous renforcer en quelque mesure que ce soit. Mais, tenant compte des réalités, nous devons bien reconnaître aujourd'hui que l'appui apporté ou promis par la Ligue à ses membres est, depuis son échec dans l'affaire d'Éthiopie, sensiblement réduit. Notre volonté de fidélité à la Société des nations nous pousse à voir définir, en les limitant et en les précisant en même temps, les engagements qui nous incombent en vertu du pacte. D'ici là, jusqu'à

ce que ces précisions aient été données, notamment en ce qui concerne l'article 16, nous n'acceptons d'autre interprétation que celle que nous entendons nous-mêmes y donner, dans la plénitude de notre souveraineté.

L'autre ordre d'engagements internationaux que nous ayons relèvé du traité de Locarno. Ils sont, à l'heure actuelle, réinscrits par novation, si je puis ainsi dire, dans les accords avenus à Londres, en mars dernier. Encore une fois — et cela va sans dire — à ces engagements, comme aux autres, nous sommes strictement et rigoureusement fidèles. Mais ces accords de Londres ont un caractère provisoire ; ils doivent être remplacés par d'autres ; ils ne pourraient, en aucune manière, se transformer automatiquement en des accords définitifs, et nous souhaitons que les nouveaux accords vers lesquels on s'oriente puissent, par quelque méthode que ce soit, être conclus dans le plus bref délai possible.

Nous avons défini nettement quelle est la position que nous prendrons dans la négociation de ces nouveaux accords. Nous n'entendons plus donner à la France et à l'Allemagne la garantie qui se trouvait inscrite dans les accords de Locarno de 1925, garantie qui, à ce moment, était nécessaire et justifiée, mais qui serait aujourd'hui inefficace, dangereuse et injustifiable.

N'apporterons-nous rien à l'effort d'organisation de la paix en occident ? Loin de là, car nous avons un grand devoir à remplir envers nos voisins ; notre rôle historique découle lui-même de notre position géographique ; il s'agit pour nous, dans la pleine mesure de nos forces, d'immuniser l'un des points les plus sensibles, les plus névralgiques de l'occident et probablement du monde. En empêchant que notre territoire ne serve de point d'appui, de terrain de passage ou de gage à l'un ou l'autre des grands pays qui peuvent et qui sont si souvent entrés en conflit, nous diminuons par là même, dans une mesure considérable, les possibilités et les risques de guerre. Tel est le service que tous nos voisins sont en droit d'attendre de nous. Nous avons, en somme, à les protéger réciproquement les uns contre les autres, tout autour de nous, le long de nos frontières communes. Pour cela, il faut que nous soyons forts à tous les points de vue, assez forts pour enlever d'avance à un quelconque de nos voisins le bénéfice qu'il pourrait retirer d'une violation de nos frontières.

Et nous voici ainsi ramenés nécessairement au problème militaire.

Pour mener la politique d'indépendance que nous avons choisie, pour que cette politique donne les résultats que nous visons, c'est-à-dire la paix chez nous et un élément de paix en occident, il faut

que nous soyons en état d'assurer nous-mêmes la couverture de notre mobilisation ; il faut que notre armée soit à la mesure des ressources, en hommes et en richesses, qu'offre notre pays. Mais en même temps il faut que notre organisation militaire corresponde à nos conceptions de politique extérieure. Il nous faut donc un système militaire qui ne soit, de façon permanente, tourné contre personne, ni lié aux dispositions militaires de qui que ce soit. Telle est la conception qui préside au projet que nous vous avons soumis.

L'interprétation que nous avons donnée à cette notion de la couverture est assez large pour la mettre en concordance avec toutes les aspirations légitimes auxquelles elle doit satisfaire. Nous entendons couvrir la mobilisation dans tout le territoire, sans exception, depuis le bas jusqu'en haut, et de l'est à l'ouest. Nous entendons défendre, de la manière la plus efficace et par des méthodes appropriées, le territoire belge dans son intégrité. Et en même temps nous entendons protéger tous les nœuds, toutes les communications, tous les centres vitaux, toutes les artères dans lesquelles bat la vie du pays.

Notre organisation militaire constitue donc une mécanique qui peut être tournée dans n'importe quelle direction, pour parer à n'importe quelle difficulté. Bien entendu, cette mécanique, cet organisme souple et mobile qui peut pivoter suivant les exigences de l'heure, doit cependant, à tout moment, tenir compte des réalités de fait ; il doit pouvoir être tourné, à tout moment, dans la direction d'où vient la principale, la véritable menace. Et c'est encore une fois ce que nous faisons.

La politique que nous voulons mener — politique d'indépendance, politique d'équilibre — est une politique d'objectivité et de réalisme.

Nous n'entendons nous laisser à aucun moment détourner de ces règles, ni par des souvenirs, vieux ou récents, ni par des réactions sentimentales, quelles qu'elles soient ; mais nous n'entendons pas davantage ignorer les réalités ; nous les suivons de près ; sans négliger aucune précaution, nous commençons par prendre celles qui s'imposent avec le plus d'urgence.

Enfin, laissez-moi répéter ici ce que je disais à Londres la semaine passée : nous avons toujours su, et nous savons aujourd'hui plus clairement que jamais, que nous ne sommes pas seuls ; nous avons des amis, des amis fidèles, et ils savent, eux aussi, que, de notre côté, nous restons fidèles à toutes nos amitiés. Nous avons et nous devons avoir le souci de ne porter ombrage à personne ; il faut que tous nos voisins soient persuadés de ceci : d'une part, si l'on nous attaque, nous nous défendrons avec toute notre énergie, toutes nos forces, en jetant dans la balance toutes nos ressources ; mais, d'autre

part, si l'on ne nous attaque pas, nous entendons n'être ni une menace pour les uns, ni un appoint pour les autres.

Parcil souci d'objectivité, de correction, de loyauté vis-à-vis de tous nos voisins, se concilie d'ailleurs parfaitement avec la reconnaissance et l'affection que nous éprouvons et que nous ne cesserons d'entretenir pour ceux qui ont été à nos côtés aux heures les plus tragiques de notre histoire. . . .

6. DOCUMENTS EXCHANGED BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE FRENCH GOVERNMENTS AND THE BELGIAN GOVERNMENT, CONCERNING THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF BELGIUM, APRIL 24, 1937¹

(a) *Joint Communication to M. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, by the British and French Ambassadors at Brussels, April 24, 1937.*

In accordance with instructions received from their respective Governments, His Majesty's Ambassador and the French Ambassador have the honour to make the following communication to the Belgian Government:

1. The Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the French Republic have not failed during the last few months to give their full attention to the desire of the Belgian Government to have the international rights and obligations of Belgium clarified in certain respects where this is rendered necessary by her geographical position and by the delays which may still occur before the negotiation and conclusion of the general Act intended to replace the Treaty of Locarno.

2. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic, being anxious to give full expression to their sympathy with this desire of the Belgian Government, have agreed to make the following declaration:

3. The said Governments have taken note of the views which the Belgian Government has itself expressed concerning the interests of Belgium, and more particularly—

- (1) the determination expressed publicly and on more than one occasion by the Belgian Government: (a) to defend the frontiers of Belgium with all its forces against any aggression or invasion, and to prevent Belgian territory from being used, for purposes of aggression against another State, as a passage or as a base of operations by land, by sea or in the air; (b) to

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5437.

organize the defence of Belgium in an efficient manner for this purpose;

- (2) the renewed assurances of the fidelity of Belgium to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the obligations which it involves for Members of the League.

4. In consequence, taking into account the determination and assurances mentioned above, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic declare that they consider Belgium to be now released from all obligations towards them resulting from either the Treaty of Locarno or the arrangements drawn up in London on March 19, 1936,¹ and that they maintain in respect of Belgium the undertakings of assistance which they entered into towards her under the above-mentioned instruments.

5. The Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the Republic agree that the release of Belgium from her obligations, as provided for in paragraph 4 above, in no way affects the existing undertakings between the United Kingdom and France.

(Signed) ESMOND OVEY. (Signed) J. LAROCHE.

(b) *Communication from M. Spaak, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, to the British Ambassador at Brussels, April 24, 1937.*²

M. l'Ambassadeur,

The Royal Government has taken note with great satisfaction of the declaration communicated to it this day by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It thanks the Government of the United Kingdom warmly for this communication.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) P. H. SPAAK.

7. EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT BY M. SPAAK, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BELGIUM, APRIL 29, 1937³

Madame, messieurs, samedi dernier, M. Laroche, ambassadeur de France, et Sir Esmond Ovey, ambassadeur d'Angleterre, m'ont remis la déclaration franco-anglaise dont vous avez certainement lu le texte dans les journaux.

Je crois cependant qu'il est utile que je vous la rappelle, car je

¹ See above, p. 127.

² A similar communication was addressed to the French Ambassador at Brussels.

³ In the *Chambre des Représentants*. *Chambre des Représentants, Annales Parlementaires*, April 29, 1937, pp. 1284-7.

désire que vous en ayez les termes bien présents à la mémoire au cours de ma déclaration. La voici: . . .¹

Au nom du gouvernement, j'ai remis aux deux ambassadeurs une réponse ainsi rédigée: . . .²

A la satisfaction que j'exprime dans ma réponse, je crois qu'il est juste que je joigne les sentiments de gratitude de la Belgique. Depuis des mois, j'ai rencontré chez les hommes d'État anglais et français, chez M. Eden, comme chez M. Blum et M. Delbos, comme aussi — il y aurait quelque injustice à ne pas le mentionner — chez M. Laroche et chez Sir Esmond Ovey, bons serviteurs de leur pays, mais grands amis du nôtre, le plus loyal et le plus compréhensif esprit d'entente et de collaboration.

M. Eden disait l'autre soir à Bruxelles:

'Chaque pays doit faire face à des problèmes différents; chacun a des soucis intérieurs qui lui sont propres; chacun connaît des difficultés spéciales exigeant une solution particulière. Dans ces conditions, nous avons chacun, en ce qui nous concerne, à faire des concessions, sans lesquelles nous ne réaliserons nul progrès.'

Comment ne pas aboutir, lorsque l'homme d'État avec lequel on discute est animé de tant de conciliante sagesse?

MM. Blum et Delbos n'ont pas été moins clairvoyants, et ce qui s'est passé ces jours derniers est donc vraiment le fruit d'une entente et d'une confiance mutuelle entre la France, l'Angleterre et la Belgique.

Je veux dire encore une fois publiquement devant vous tous, les représentants de la nation, que, s'il est vrai que nous avons été déliés par nos grands voisins de certaines obligations juridiques, ils se sont acquis de nouveaux droits à notre amitié et à notre reconnaissance.

Depuis six jours, une modification importante a donc été apportée à notre statut international.

La première question qui se pose et qui mérite réponse est celle-ci: Y avait-il pour nous des raisons de chercher à définir et à préciser sous une forme nouvelle nos droits et nos obligations internationales?

L'intérêt de la nécessité absolue d'une telle opération me paraît la chose la moins discutable du monde.

Pour s'en convaincre, il suffit de se rappeler ce qu'était hier ce statut. Il suffit de comparer l'époque où il fut conçu et l'époque d'aujourd'hui.

La Belgique a signé avec joie le traité de Locarno, et je crois sincèrement qu'elle a eu raison de le faire, car elle y obtenait une

¹ For text see above, p. 239.

² For text see above, p. 240.

chose essentielle pour sa sécurité : la garantie de la France, de l'Angleterre et de l'Italie.

Pourtant, le traité de Locarno nous imposait des obligations qui, supportables il y a dix ans, apparaissent aujourd'hui comme allant bien au delà de nos possibilités.

Par le traité de Locarno, la Belgique garantissait le maintien du *status quo* territorial résultant des frontières entre l'Allemagne et la France et l'inviolabilité des dites frontières.

La Belgique garantissait donc la France contre une éventuelle attaque allemande, mais chose que beaucoup de Belges semblent avoir oublié, la Belgique garantissait aussi l'Allemagne contre une éventuelle attaque française.

Par le traité de Locarno, malgré la différence fondamentale des situations et des moyens pouvant être mis en œuvre, nous prenions, en Europe occidentale, une attitude et des obligations exactement pareilles à celles de nos plus grands voisins.

C'était incontestablement hardi. Il est vrai que l'atmosphère de l'Europe et certaines conditions particulières expliquaient et justifiaient une telle audace.

L'Allemagne de l'époque était pratiquement désarmée et il était possible d'espérer que le monde, adoptant une politique de sagesse, chercherait son salut dans la voie du désarmement concerté et contrôlé. Cette espérance est aujourd'hui déçue, momentanément je l'espère, mais la vérité nous oblige à constater que l'Allemagne est redevenue une grande nation militaire, et que, dans tous les pays du monde, la course aux armements a repris avec une intensité jamais égalee dans le passé.

Première différence fondamentale entre 1925 et 1937.

En 1925, la zone démilitarisée existait. Les articles 42 et 43 du traité de Versailles conservaient toute leur valeur. L'article premier du traité de Locarno s'y référait explicitement. La zone démilitarisée était pour nous, en cas d'une éventuelle attaque allemande, une sécurité militaire dont il est inutile de souligner l'importance.

En 1936, l'Allemagne a réoccupé la zone démilitarisée, bouleversant les conditions antérieures, et nous plaçant devant un état de fait tout nouveau.

Comment ne pas en tenir compte dans l'élaboration de notre statut international ?

Enfin, en 1925, l'Allemagne s'apprêtait à entrer à la Société des nations et nous nous apprêtions à l'y accueillir, sachant bien que sa présence à Genève allait donner à l'organisme international plus de prestige et plus d'efficacité.

L'Allemagne, en 1925, était disposée à accepter les obligations et les devoirs auxquels nous avons souscrit en adhérant au Covenant; les bases de sa politique allaient être les mêmes que les bases de la nôtre et cela aussi était un élément important de notre sécurité.

Aujourd'hui, l'Allemagne a quitté la Société des nations, l'heure de son retour n'a malheureusement pas encore sonné, semble-t-il. Il faut aussi tenir compte de ce fait.

Ce simple rappel du passé, cette simple comparaison entre 1925 et 1937 montrent combien les problèmes que nous avons à résoudre aujourd'hui sont différents de ceux qu'il fallait résoudre il y a douze ans. Tout cela explique déjà et justifie les solutions différentes.

Cet historique serait cependant incomplet si je ne rappelais les événements du 7 mars 1936. En réoccupant la zone démilitarisée, en répudiant le traité de Locarno, l'Allemagne plaçait la France, l'Angleterre, l'Italie et la Belgique dans une position difficile.

A Londres, les trois pays les plus directement intéressés ont cherché les moyens de faire face à la situation. Ils ont pris des dispositions qu'eux-mêmes ont considéré comme provisoires. Mais surtout, — et je crois pouvoir leur rendre cet hommage, — sans se décourager, malgré l'amertume et la déception bien compréhensibles qui les animaient, ils se sont remis à la tâche, voulant, malgré tout, sans désespérer, travailler pour la paix.

Ils ont repris les négociations, refait des propositions. Ils ont cherché à nouveau la confiance et l'entente.

Cette œuvre, à laquelle ils se sont attelés, est de longue haleine; elle est difficile, elle est longue. Je garde cependant le ferme espoir de la voir aboutir un jour.

Cependant, le régime provisoire adopté à Londres était surtout lourd à supporter pour un petit pays. C'est ce que la France et l'Angleterre ont parfaitement compris; l'une et l'autre ont senti, comme nous le sentions nous-mêmes, que ce qui avait été convenu en mars 1936 dans la nécessité de faire face à une situation brusquement créée, devait être revu et aménagé.

La Belgique avait la hâte légitime d'en revenir à un statut international plus normal, plus conforme aussi à ses possibilités et à ses traditions.

Ce sont ces idées que M. le premier ministre et moi-même nous avons tâché d'exprimer à plusieurs reprises. Ce sont ces idées, auxquelles le Roi a donné une nouvelle force dans son discours du 14 octobre et qu'une opinion publique, quasi unanime, a ratifiées.

Quelles sont les bases de notre politique étrangère?

Je veux les rappeler encore une fois. Nous voulons d'abord, et

avant tout, trouver la formule qui fera notre peuple unanime. Nous ne voulons ni sacrifier à une idéologie qui serait plus spécialement wallonne ou plus spécialement flamande. Nous voulons une politique exclusivement et intégralement belge. Nous voulons une politique solidement basée sur notre tradition nationale, une politique qui nous permette de remplir le rôle qui nous est dévolu en Europe. La Belgique n'a pas d'intérêt direct en dehors de ses frontières ; elle n'a pas d'autre ambition que de rester ce qu'elle est ; elle ne cherche rien, elle ne demande rien d'autre que la paix.

Mais, — et c'est à la fois son malheur et sa grandeur, — elle est, depuis des siècles, un champ de bataille pour l'Europe, une voie d'invasion pour tous les conquérants. Son rôle, celui qui lui a été confié et qu'elle doit remplir, c'est de boucher de tous les côtés, dans tous les sens, la voie d'invasion ; c'est de hérissier le champ de bataille de l'Europe de tant d'obstacles et de tant de difficultés, que même les plus hardis s'en détournent.

C'est à cause de cela que notre politique militaire est si intimement liée à notre politique extérieure. Si, aujourd'hui, l'Europe a plus de confiance en nous, ce n'est pas seulement en raison de la loyauté de notre attitude. C'est parce qu'il y a quelques mois, pour la première fois dans notre histoire, nous avons tous ensemble accepté les lourds sacrifices qui nous étaient demandés.

Mais, en dehors de cette tâche, nous voulons aussi contribuer à l'organisation collective de la paix, à l'élaboration d'un droit international. Malgré les échecs, malgré les désillusions, nous voulons espérer qu'un jour la sagesse et la raison triompheront. C'est pourquoi nous restons fidèles à la Société des nations et que nous lui apportons notre loyale collaboration.

Tout cela, nous l'avons dit et redit. La France et l'Angleterre l'ont entendu et l'ont compris ; dans leur déclaration commune, elles ont donné de notre politique extérieure une définition dont je n'ai pas à changer un seul mot : . . .¹

Notre politique étant ainsi définie, la France et l'Angleterre prennent spontanément une double décision : elles nous délient des obligations de garantie qu'à Locarno et à Londres nous avons souscrites vis-à-vis d'elles, et elles maintiennent les obligations de garantie qu'elles avaient souscrites vis-à-vis de nous.

Telle est notre nouvelle situation. Je crois très sincèrement qu'elle est meilleure que la précédente et que nous pouvons nous en féliciter.

Pourquoi meilleure ? Parce qu'il est simple, parce qu'il est clair,

¹ Here follows the text of paragraph 3, §§ 1 & 2, of the Declaration. (See above, p. 239.)

parce que nous savons exactement quelles sont nos obligations; parce que, dorénavant, il n'y a plus qu'une seule hypothèse dans laquelle nous pouvons être contraints à faire la guerre, une seule hypothèse qui ne peut susciter aucune discussion, aucune controverse, une seule hypothèse qui nous trouverait tous unis et tous résolus: la défense de notre territoire devant une attaque ennemie.

La déclaration du 24 avril n'est pas un traité au sens propre du mot. C'est un acte spontané de la France et de l'Angleterre; mais cet acte trouve sa justification dans la définition de notre politique extérieure. Il découle de là que, si un jour, usant de notre liberté, nous entendions modifier notre politique, c'est tout à fait légitimement que la France et l'Angleterre pourraient être amenées à nous retirer leur garantie.

Sur ces principes, aucun doute n'est permis.

Je pense donc sincèrement que tout le monde reconnaîtra que notre position est aujourd'hui plus forte qu'elle ne l'était hier, puisqu'en supprimant certains de nos devoirs, nous avons conservé tous nos droits.

Mais cette formule m'amène à rencontrer l'objection que pourraient me faire ceux qui estiment que nous avons une position égoïste, ceux qui, traduisant ce sentiment dans le langage du droit international, affirment que nous manquons de fidélité aux principes de la sécurité collective et de l'assistance mutuelle.

Franchement, je ne crois pas. Mais pour nous entendre et nous comprendre, il faut que nous franchissions la barrière, le paravent des mots, pour toucher la réalité des idées.

Si la sécurité collective est une notion qui implique que tous les États, quelle que soit leur importance, leur force, leurs traditions, leur position géographique, doivent prendre la même attitude, souscrire aux mêmes engagements; si cela veut dire que la politique de la Belgique doit être identique à celle de la France, de l'Angleterre ou de l'Allemagne, alors, je le déclare, la sécurité collective est une idéologie fumeuse dont on ne tirera jamais rien, car elle est profondément contraire aux réalités et aux possibilités. Mais si sécurité collective veut dire, qu'en vue du bien commun à tous les peuples, l'organisation et le maintien de la paix, chaque État doit faire l'effort maximum dans le cadre de ses moyens pour remplir sa mission, alors je dis: d'accord, et j'ajoute: telle est la position de la Belgique, car ce qui importe, ce ne sont pas les engagements que l'on prend, ce sont les engagements que l'on tient. Et je répète encore une fois qu'en organisant sa défense nationale, en faisant un grand effort militaire, en ne chicanant sur aucune forme d'agression qui pourrait

être dirigée contre elle, en prenant les risques cruels que tout cela comporte, la Belgique donne à l'Europe tout ce qu'elle peut lui apporter, tout ce que l'Europe peut légitimement lui demander.

C'est donc de cette manière que l'Angleterre, la France et la Belgique ont réglé entre elles les obligations du passé.

Reste l'avenir.

Les efforts entrepris depuis des mois vont continuer. La déclaration franco-anglaise s'exprime clairement à cet égard. C'est notamment parce que les pourparlers en vue de l'élaboration du pacte occidental peuvent être longues encore, qu'une solution immédiate à certains problèmes a été cherchée et trouvée.

Dans ces pourparlers, la Belgique entend jouer son rôle. Le gouvernement sait bien que sa tâche ne sera vraiment terminée que lorsque des formules auxquelles l'Allemagne pourra souscrire auront été trouvées.

J'ai déjà dit tout le prix que j'attachais à la dernière déclaration du chancelier du Reich: elle était le témoignage d'un état d'esprit qu'il faut approuver, elle indiquait des possibilités auxquelles je n'entends nullement renoncer. Les difficultés ne sont pas insurmontables. L'état d'esprit avec lequel on les aborde est un facteur essentiel de réussite ou d'échec. L'état de l'Europe est meilleur aujourd'hui qu'il y a six mois et la déclaration franco-anglaise est un nouvel élément d'apaisement.

La bonne volonté pacifique de la plupart des hommes d'État européens est certaine. Il faut avoir confiance.

Nous avons franchi une première étape. C'est avec optimisme que j'envisage celle que nous allons aborder.

Ici se terminent les commentaires de la déclaration franco-britannique que je devais à la Chambre.

Il reste cependant deux problèmes qui n'ont pas été abordés dans cette déclaration, mais sur lesquels j'entends dire quelques mots, car, je le sais, ils retiennent l'attention de l'opinion publique belge et l'attention de l'opinion publique européenne. Il s'agit de l'interprétation de l'article 16 du pacte de la Société des nations et de la question dite des accords d'états-majors.

Ma déclaration sur l'article 16 sera brève, car j'estime que c'est à l'assemblée de Genève elle-même qu'incombe la tâche d'interpréter officiellement les textes. Mais, étant données les discussions actuelles, la Chambre comprendrait sans doute difficilement que le ministre des affaires étrangères n'ait pas d'opinion ou, qu'en ayant une, il refuse de la lui communiquer.

J'espère d'ailleurs que ce que je vais dire contribuera à clarifier

un problème que trop de prudence ou trop de subtilité rendrait finalement plus confus et plus difficile à résoudre.

Je ne ferai d'ailleurs en cela que suivre l'exemple de M. de Graef, l'honorable ministre des affaires étrangères des Pays-Bas, qui vient de faire au parlement néerlandais d'importantes déclarations qui retiennent toute notre attention.

Ce qui, dans l'article 16, apparaît comme le plus important et le plus délicat, c'est l'avant-dernier paragraphe, dans lequel est abordée la question du droit de passage :

'Les membres de la Société des nations prennent les dispositions nécessaires pour faciliter le passage, à travers leur territoire, des forces de tout membre de la Société, qui participe à une action commune pour faire respecter les engagements de la Société.'

Quand et comment peut jouer cette éventuelle obligation ?

Il est assez extraordinaire et même, je l'avoue, un peu inquiétant, qu'un texte aussi important dont l'application peut avoir de si graves conséquences, soit encore laissé, aujourd'hui, à l'interprétation individuelle de chacun des membres.

En ce qui concerne le gouvernement belge, il y a, à l'application éventuelle du droit de passage sur le territoire de notre pays, deux conditions essentielles. La première, c'est qu'en aucune hypothèse le droit de passage ne peut être imposé à la Belgique en dehors de son consentement. La seconde, c'est que ce consentement n'est concevable que s'il s'agit de l'exécution d'une action commune.

Il ne me semble pas que ces deux conditions peuvent être sérieusement discutées. . . .

En ce qui concerne les accords des états-majors, ma réponse sera claire. La déclaration franco-anglaise du 24 avril clôt pour nous cette période, que l'on pourrait appeler l'ère des accords militaires, et je m'en réjouis.

Ici, une explication est indispensable.

Je m'en réjouis, non parce que ces accords étaient mauvais, mais parce que, malgré la réalité, malgré les affirmations dix fois, vingt fois répétées par tous mes prédécesseurs, ils étaient, chez nous et en Europe, sujets à confusion et sujet de méfiance.

Les uns, chez nous, y voyaient la preuve de notre inféodation à un de nos grands voisins. Les autres y voyaient l'élément essentiel de notre défense nationale. Les deux idées étaient aussi fausses l'une que l'autre.

Au moment où ces accords militaires ne sont plus, je répète encore une fois solennellement qu'ils n'avaient aucun caractère politique, qu'ils laissaient entière l'indépendance de notre pays et que l'esprit

dans lequel ils avaient été conçus est resté l'esprit dans lequel ils ont été appliqués.

Ceci dit, où en sommes-nous ?

Le mérite de la déclaration franco-anglaise, je l'ai déjà dit et je le répète, est d'avoir clarifié les choses. Il n'y a plus pour nous aujourd'hui qu'une seule hypothèse de guerre possible: la 'défense nationale'.

Ceci me permet d'affirmer que les problèmes militaires qui se posent aux autorités responsables sont maintenant débarrassés de toutes les complications superflues dont pouvaient les encombrer les garanties dont nous étions comptables.

Ce problème simplifié est purement et simplement un problème technique.

Notre politique extérieure coïncide maintenant exactement avec nos possibilités militaires.

Ce problème technique, nous restons libres de le résoudre en toute indépendance, en toute liberté; nous n'avons consenti et nous ne consentirons jamais à cet égard la moindre entrave ou la moindre restriction.

Nous en prenons une nouvelle fois l'engagement formel, tout ce qui doit être fait pour assurer la défense nationale, dans le cadre ainsi tracé, sera fait. . . .

8. COMMUNICATION FROM H.M. GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE, MAY 26, 1937¹

We have the honour to make the following communication:

The preparatory exchange of views which has recently been taking place between the signatories of the Treaty of Locarno, with a view to the negotiation of a new Western European Security Pact to replace that instrument, has shown, on the one hand, that in any new treaty Belgium would wish to give no guarantees to other States and, on the other hand, that the other four Governments concerned in the negotiations would be prepared to agree that Belgium should not undertake to guarantee other States in the new treaty. In view of the delay experienced in negotiating the new treaty, it was decided to give effect to the wish of the Belgian Government to be released in advance from their remaining obligations under the Locarno Treaty and the arrangements of March 19, 1936.

The joint Note addressed by the Government of the French Republic and by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, May-June 1937, p. 310.

to the Belgian Government on this subject has been registered in accordance with the terms of the Covenant. In this Note the French Government and His Majesty's Government declare that they consider Belgium released from all obligations towards them resulting from the Treaty of Locarno and the arrangements of March 19, 1936, and that they have taken note of certain views expressed by the Belgian Government relating to their fidelity to the Covenant of the League of Nations and their determination efficiently to organize the defence of Belgium against any aggression or invasion.

This exchange of Notes in no way affects the obligations of any other country but Belgium. It is, indeed, expressly stated therein that neither the undertakings of France and the United Kingdom towards Belgium, nor the existing undertakings between the United Kingdom and France, are affected.

The Government of the French Republic and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regard the arrangement thus concluded as a means of facilitating, with the collaboration of the other interested Powers, the settlement of those problems the solution of which is essential to the peace of Europe.

(Signed) YVON DELBOS. (Signed) ANTHONY EDEN.

9. EXTRACT FROM STATEMENTS MADE AT THE NINETY-SEVENTH SESSION OF THE LEAGUE COUNCIL, MAY 27, 1937¹

(a) *M. Delbos (France).*

Our purpose in laying the Franco-British Declaration of April 24 officially before the Council was partly to inform the Council of the new character henceforth attaching to the legal relations between France and Belgium, there having been no change—on this I desire to lay stress—in the friendship between the two countries. Our purpose was, further, to make before the Council two affirmations of our intent.

Whatever the obstacles which, for the last fifteen months, have stood in the way of the negotiation of the Western Agreement to replace the Treaty of Locarno, the French Government's determination to succeed has been in no wise affected. The French Government is continuing its efforts, and does not by any means despair of reaching a satisfactory solution.

But in so doing—this is the second affirmation I have to make—the French Government never forgets the connexion between security

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, May–June 1937, p. 311.

in Western Europe and the security of Europe as a whole. The former cannot be secured at the cost of the latter; on the contrary, the French Government conceives the proposed settlement as a contribution to the consolidation of peace as a whole. It hopes to arrive, with the collaboration of all concerned, at a wide European understanding; to that end, inspired by the unvarying ideals of France, it will continue to give its most sincere and determined support.

(b) *The Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden (United Kingdom).*

I have little to add to the joint Note¹ which has been communicated to the Council by the Foreign Minister of France and myself. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hopes that the negotiations with the Belgian Government which have been so happily concluded may prove to be a step towards negotiations of a wider scope and may make possible the establishment of a closer collaboration between all the interested countries. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will continue to persevere in its efforts to bring about a settlement which it earnestly desires to see realized, and which, it is convinced, would be a good augury for the future of Europe.

(c) *M. Spaak (Belgium).*

I desire to express my entire agreement with the declarations made by M. Delbos and Mr. Eden in interpretation of the Franco-British Note of April 24 last.

I have already had occasion, in a speech delivered in the Belgian Chamber, to thank the French and United Kingdom Governments for the attitude of clear-sighted friendship with which the Belgian standpoint has been met. I am happy to be able to repeat my thanks to-day before the Council of the League of Nations.

The Note of April 24 relieved Belgium of the obligations contracted at Locarno and in London. The Franco-British guarantee of Belgium is, on the contrary, maintained. That guarantee is based on a definition of the foreign policy of my country. I have already had occasion to say that I accept that definition in its entirety. It embodies two fundamental assertions:

- (1) The determination of Belgium to defend her frontiers with all her forces against any aggression or invasion, to prevent her territory being used for aggression against another State, for the passage of armed forces, or as a base of operations, by land, by sea or in the air, and to organize effectively her defence to that end;

¹ See preceding document.

- (2) The assurance of Belgium's loyalty to the Covenant of the League of Nations and to the obligations which the Covenant entails.

Such is the exact meaning of the Franco-British Declaration of April 24, which the Belgian Government has noted with very great satisfaction.

I should add that the Belgian Government believes, in common with the Governments of France and of the United Kingdom, that this Declaration should be regarded as a step towards the elaboration of a new Western Pact, the conclusion of which cannot fail to facilitate a solution of other problems arising in the world.

IV. DECLARATIONS OF BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

Certain declarations by the British Foreign Secretary of policy in relation to Germany's action in the Rhineland and the denunciation of the Locarno Treaty are printed in preceding sections.¹ Other statements of policy in 1935 and 1936 in connexion with the Italo-Abyssinian dispute are printed in *Documents* for 1935, vol. ii. In the following section are grouped together extracts from the important series of speeches made by Mr. Anthony Eden in September,² November,³ and December,⁴ 1936, in which British foreign policy was clearly restated. Substantial portions of these speeches were devoted to Spain, but are not printed here as they are to be included in a subsequent volume, together with the other documents on that subject.

DECLARATIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY BY THE RT. HON. ANTHONY EDEN, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER, 1936

(a) *At Geneva, September 25, 1936.*⁵

At this our annual Assembly it is our habit, indeed our duty, to review the events of the past year.

None of us can feel satisfaction at their course, nor is there in the international scene that confronts us any room for complacency. Indeed, the seriousness of the times is such as to command frank speech, so that I shall not apologize to you for using less guarded language than is usual at our Assembly.

What picture does the world present to us to-day, in September 1936? Nationalism is strong, its antagonisms are vibrant. Challeng-

¹ See above, pp. 52, 99, 133, and 159.

³ See below, pp. 260, 263.

² See below, this page.

⁴ See below, p. 263.

⁵ At the Seventeenth Session of the League Assembly. *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 155, p. 44.

ing enthusiasms for rival forms of government hurl defiance at one another. What must be the ultimate consequence of so much licence? Inevitably a general weakening of confidence throughout the world. And this in turn must be the cause—is indeed already the cause—of another disturbing element which no one can ignore. Each nation—and this applies even to the smallest and most peace-loving—is expending an ever-increasing proportion of its national wealth upon armaments to the ultimate detriment of its economy. The recovery of world trade is hampered by many obstacles, both economic and political; a standard of living may even find itself sacrificed for a standard of armament. There is restlessness, there is restriction; the barriers of frontiers grow harder to pass. There is an insufficiency of free intercourse between people and people, while nationally controlled propaganda for rival theses confuses criticism and stifles the free development of thought.

Not a pleasant picture; but not a hopeless one either. There need be in all this no fatal seeds of war. It should be, it can be, perfectly possible for nations to live together, however divergent their forms of government. How is it to be done? In the first place, by the practice, the national practice, of a certain toleration and restraint. I do not believe that we increase respect for our own forms of government by pouring scorn on those of other nations.

Perhaps there is the more excuse for me to say this because it is a British tradition to distrust extremes. Maybe that tradition can be of service to Europe and to peace in the next few years.

I would not have you believe that because we in the United Kingdom proclaim less loudly than others our faith in the democracy that we practise and in the institutions we have developed that our faith in them is therefore weakening and that we should not be willing to make sacrifices in their defence. We are profoundly attached to our liberties and to our traditions and we shall not yield them up, nor should we allow any one to wrest them from us. We believe in democracy and in its survival, if only because its ideals lie too near to the spirit of the British race ever to be quenched. For us no system, of whatever extreme, could ever be acceptable if it brought in its train the suppression of our liberties and the destruction of our traditions. After centuries of experience, democracy appears to us, not effete, but enduring; the epitome of man's endeavour to create a civilization wherein he can find freedom, individuality, and peace.

Though such are our national sentiments, they do not prevent us from realizing that other peoples feel just as strongly about the

form of government they practise, that they are just as determined to uphold their traditions. Of course we accept that fully and completely. The last thing we would wish to see is the nations divided into camps, their alignment determined by the forms of government they practise. This would be an added and a wholly superfluous complication in a world complicated enough already. The first rule of ordered life between nations is then surely this: faith in one's own national tenets, toleration for those of others. Unless we fix that rule firmly in our minds and in our conduct, we can scarcely hope to put order into the present disordered state of international relations. Moreover, in international affairs, conditions do not remain static. If they are not improved, they will further deteriorate.

We must all of us be conscious of the significance of our world economic problems in relation to our present difficulties, and I shall have something to say on this subject in a moment. And yet do we not each one of us know that the indispensable element in all economic recovery is confidence in the political future? And how can there be such confidence unless we show a respect and toleration for each other's national faiths and traditions? The responsibility upon us all to observe this first rule of toleration and respect, of good temper and good-will in our international dealings, is thus very heavy, but by itself it is not enough.

We have also need of an international order, the authority of which shall finally supersede the arbitrament of conflict between States. Mankind has made many attempts to set up such an order, attempts which have so far met with only a moderate measure of success. Yet these attempts must be continued. By our signature of the Covenant, every nation here, by its signature of the Pact of Paris, almost every nation in the world, has repudiated war as an instrument for the settlement of international disputes. Civilization has to put its promises into practice or perish. The best method so far devised for that purpose is this League of Nations, which can yet achieve, if the nations of the world so intend, the aims of its founders; which can yet realize the fervent desire of most of mankind: the permanent establishment of peace.

So far as His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is concerned, its policy will continue to be based upon its membership of the League of Nations. More than that, its whole-hearted co-operation can be counted upon in order that the League may be strengthened for the work it has to do, both by the enlargement of its membership and by the more confident loyalty of its Members.

How are we to achieve these results? For let us not delude

ourselves. Unless we can achieve them, the League may still retain some value, but that value will only be secondary. In considering the problem of the future of the League, let us recognize clearly that there are two essential elements to its solution: the League's machinery and the will to work that machinery. Of the two, the second is without doubt infinitely the more important. But this is not to say that the machinery cannot be improved. At the last Assembly, it will be recalled, governments were asked to send in their observations on the lessons to be learned from the experiences of the past year. Since His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom did not do that in writing, perhaps you will allow me to make certain comments on this subject on its behalf.

The underlying motive for the work on which we are now engaged, of examining the Covenant and the procedure of its application, is the recent failure of the collective action of the Members of the League to achieve the prime object for which it was undertaken.

The principal causes of the failure of the League in this instance were twofold: the lack of universality of the League itself and its failure, for whatever reason, to play a more energetic and effective part in the earlier stages of the crisis.

The former of these two causes—a lack of universality—has unfortunately been operative to some degree ever since the inception of the League. It has been aggravated by defections in recent years; and the authority of the League has without doubt been greatly impaired by the fact that its pronouncements do not have the weight of a verdict of universal world opinion. In all, therefore, that we may do, we should bear in mind the necessity of winning the widest possible acceptance, so that we may reinvest the League to the greatest possible extent with that universality which alone can give it full authority and effect. For it is clear that, in any crisis, an early and unmistakable indication of world opinion must inevitably carry the utmost weight, and may avert the necessity of special measures to prevent or to arrest a disturbance of the peace.

If we examine, as we should, and frankly, the causes of the abstentions and defections from the League, we may find that these are based on two principal objections: first, that the Covenant invites signatories to assume obligations and commitments which all the governments of the world are not ready in present circumstances to accept; and, secondly, that the League stands, so it is alleged, for the maintenance of an order of things with which some governments are not content.

It would therefore seem appropriate that all nations should

examine the present incidence of their commitments and the possibility of making them more applicable to the realities of the world situation as it exists to-day. We must also seek to encourage and facilitate the use of the League's machinery for adapting situations to changing circumstances and for the remedy of what may be recognized to be legitimate grievances.

The first of these two objects might be brought nearer achievement if we could find some method of enabling the League to intervene more effectively in the early stages of a crisis than recent experience has shown to be possible.

It is to be observed that the framers of the Covenant were wise in that they produced an elastic document which did not exclude any form of action in an emergency. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, machinery should be devised which would facilitate the effective intervention of the League earlier than is now to be expected in any dispute which arises.

The first paragraph of Article 11, the Assembly will recall, provides that: 'Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.' This paragraph therefore gives wide opportunity for useful action, but the activities of the Council have, in the past, been hampered by the assumption that the rule of unanimity must apply to this provision of the Covenant, and that the consent of the parties to the dispute is thus necessary before the Council can make any recommendation.

It is for consideration, therefore, whether the Council should not be given more latitude, enabling it to make recommendations under the first paragraph of Article 11 without the consent of the States in controversy. His Majesty's Government attaches importance to this proposal. If it were to find general acceptance, then in the examination of any case that arose, and in any steps which such an examination might show to be practicable and desirable, the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to play its full part.

It seems to us all-important that the members of the Council should, in any dispute, clearly express their views at an early stage and should be asked to indicate the measures that they would be prepared to take to give effect to them. Discussion of such measures would show clearly how far the Powers represented on the Council would be prepared to intervene in any given case. If, at the outset,

or at an early stage in the dispute, the parties are left in no doubt of the will of the Council and of the determination of member-States to enforce it, this must act as a powerful deterrent to any party contemplating aggression in violation of the Covenant. And the earlier such party is brought to realize the situation, the easier it will be for him to modify his attitude and to conform to what the Council may recommend. Delay too often means that one or both of the parties commit themselves to military preparations which become increasingly difficult to revoke, and that the other Members of the League are thus faced with a situation in which it is more difficult and more hazardous for them to intervene with effect. The best way to serve peace is to ensure, so far as possible, that governments know where they stand. If, on the other hand, it appears that Members of the League would not be prepared in the circumstances contemplated to intervene effectively, then it is better that the realities of the situation should be understood.

I turn now to another aspect of the same problem. In the view of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, there is every advantage in the negotiation of regional pacts devised to strengthen general security. One of the great advantages of regional pacts is that their terms are known in advance, as are the conditions in which they will apply. The value of agreements for collective action, as a deterrent to an aggressor, depends largely on the certainty that they will be applied. The uncertainty of the operation of wider and more ambitious schemes may tempt an aggressor to hazard the risk that they will not be operated.

His Majesty's Government is therefore in favour of regional pacts, provided that they are consistent with the Covenant. It is for consideration whether such regional pacts should be submitted to the Council or the Assembly for approval. The approval of the Council or Assembly might even perhaps be dependent on compliance with certain conditions to be defined. Under such regional pacts, those who were parties to them would, of course, be free to assume definite obligations beyond those at present embodied in the Covenant. His Majesty's Government is resolved to endeavour to negotiate such a pact in respect of Western Europe.

Such, in broad outline, are the directions in which His Majesty's Government considers that we might seek improvement of our machinery for dealing with disputes and with breaches of the peace. But that is not, however, the whole of our task. Reflection shows one thing clearly—there is nothing essentially wrong with our charter, the Covenant of the League of Nations. Its general principles are

right: it forms a logical and reasonable system which should not be incapable of practical application.

Well, then, the moral to be drawn is that its shortcomings have been due to the failure on the part of States Members of the League to apply the system loyally and integrally. Unless the League evidently commands the complete and ultimate loyalty of all its Members, and unless its membership be truly representative if not universal, it cannot have the authority which the peace of the world so clearly demands.

If nations are to be prepared to co-operate fully and loyally for the maintenance of peace, that peace must rest on a basis that appears to them desirable or at least acceptable. They will only strive to maintain a *status quo* that has won general acceptance, or to prevent forcible change of that *status quo*, if they are convinced that there exist peaceful methods whereby just changes can be effected.

That is, let us admit it, in the judgment of some, a principal failing of the League; it has come to be regarded, rightly or wrongly, as an attempt to stereotype a state of things that can hardly be expected to endure for all time. It is true that Article 19 of the Covenant recognizes the impracticability of a rigid maintenance of the *status quo*. Moreover, there is, in the view of His Majesty's Government, nothing to prevent the Assembly, should it think fit, from embarking on the discussion of matters arising under that article, though, of course, the powers of the Assembly do not extend to decisions on the substance of such matters. It would plainly be impracticable, for example, to seek to give the Assembly power to impose changes against the wish of the parties concerned. Human life, however, is not static, but a changing thing; and it would be a mistake to try to encase world affairs in a rigid mould of a particular date. A frank discussion of grievances may go some way towards removing misconceptions, and a clear expression of opinion on the part of a great majority of the Assembly would undoubtedly exert moral pressure on the side of remedy of injustice. The ideal, I suggest to the Assembly, for which we should strive is a balanced system wherein justice is done to all and where none should have a sense of hurt or grievance. Therefore, our peace-preserving machinery would lose something of its point and of its efficacy unless we are sure that the peace which we aim to preserve is one that by its justice commends itself generally to the nations of the world.

In proposing modifications of our procedure, His Majesty's Government does not deceive itself—and I am sure not one of you in this

Assembly deceives himself or herself—into thinking that, by modifications of machinery alone, we can vitalize the League. It is for that reason that His Majesty's Government has sought, in accordance with the terms of the *communiqué* agreed on in London towards the end of July,¹ to draw together representatives of certain governments, to see whether the first steps can be taken towards a European settlement. We are persisting, and we shall persist, in that endeavour. Let us not be blind to the fact that, without the co-operation of all the principal Powers, the League can have no full authority, and that we shall not get that co-operation unless all are convinced that it will be possible for them to obtain justice from the League and that it will therefore be in their interests to enforce peace through the League.

So much for the question of the application of the Covenant. But, if you will allow me, I wish before concluding to refer briefly to certain other points.

First, it might be thought desirable and calculated to remove a cause of misgiving if the Covenant could be separated from the Treaties of Peace in which it now remains incorporated, and were to take the form of a self-contained convention. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would favour such a course.

So far, I have dealt with political considerations; but, as the years pass, we must all become increasingly conscious of the close and, indeed, inextricable connexion which exists between the political and economic factors of our problem.

Economic considerations are matters, of course, of the deepest concern to the people of the United Kingdom, not only because of their commercial and industrial activities, but also because they realize how profound an influence economic factors exercise upon the peace of the world. I therefore wish to affirm the desire of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to assist, so far as it possibly can, in dealing with this aspect of the situation. The present situation has been summarized in the Secretary-General's Note;² an indication of the ways and means of dealing with it has been given in the admirable report of the Economic Committee;³ and this report has been fully endorsed by the Financial Committee. His Majesty's Government wishes to express its appreciation of the work which these reports represent.

Economic recovery, and more especially the recovery of inter-

¹ See above, p. 218.

² League Document A. 6 (a) 1936, Annex II.

³ League Document C. 378. M. 249. 1936. IIB.

national trade, is an aid to peace. There is a growing realization of the significance of this factor in the solution of our international problems. That is all to the good. But, as the Secretary-General points out, recovery is 'uneven and perhaps insecure'. I believe that some steps can be taken, here and now at this present Assembly, to promote the smoother and surer progress of that recovery. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will willingly give what help it can to further this endeavour, for it is an object of its policy to seek to re-establish normal commercial and financial dealings between the nations of the world.

What I have said as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government is in relation to the wider aspects of international economic co-operation. I now mention one subject in particular on which there may be some misconception, and which appears now ripe for discussion and inquiry. This is the question of access to certain raw materials in regard to which some observations were made by the United Kingdom delegate in his speech at the last Assembly.¹ This is a matter which seems suitable for discussion at Geneva, and, indeed, for impartial expert inquiry under the auspices of the League on the lines suggested by the United Kingdom delegate last year. His Majesty's Government would be prepared to support the taking of steps in this direction by this Assembly.

One other subject I must mention before I close—the subject of armaments. I have said—and we know it—that most nations are now engaged in increasing their expenditure upon armaments. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is among this number. We have, indeed, made no secret of it. We are engaged upon fulfilling a very considerable programme for the re-equipment of our three services—navy, army, and air. We are making good progress with that programme. We have entered upon this re-equipment of our defences because we thought it a national duty. Though I do not conceal from you that there are other ways in which I believe the majority of our people would prefer, were it possible, to spend their wealth, we shall persist in it unless and until the nations of the world reach an international agreement for the limitation and reduction of armaments. This assurance I can give. In any attempt to secure such an agreement, our full co-operation is assured. I must, however, add one word of caution. If disarmament is to be real, it must be not only military but mental, not only weapons but the war mentality must be laid aside. A standstill in armaments calculated to give a permanent advantage to nations which had

¹ See *Documents for 1935*, vol. ii, pp. 240-2.

urgently concentrated upon achieving the most intensive measure of armament within their power would be no service to peace. We could have no lot or part in that.

In connexion with the problem of disarmament, I have seen a recent reference to the question of publicity in relation to national defence expenditure. I understand that there is already in existence a draft Convention which was drawn up by one of the sub-committees of the Disarmament Conference. I should like to emphasize that if a convention on these lines could be generally accepted, it would meet with the warm support and approval of His Majesty's Government.

In the course of my remarks to-day, I fear I have detained you long and covered a wide field. I have put forward, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, certain suggestions for altering the methods by which we work. If the modifications we have suggested could be incorporated in our machinery, they would, we believe, further the dual objective which I mentioned to you at the outset—the enlargement of our membership, the more confident loyalty of our Members.

But I have also sought to put before you wider considerations than those of machinery, for in the last resort it is not the machinery but the will to work it that counts. Do the nations of the world wish to establish an international machinery for the settlement of disputes between them without recourse to force? If all nations so will it, it could be done, and it must be done, unless we are prepared to watch with folded hands the final calamity which is the drift of humanity to war. Let this Assembly then make its effort. Let it frankly consider the possibility of improvement from within. Let it endeavour to make allowances for criticism from without. Let it determine to do all in its power to facilitate the collaboration of others in a task which is a task for all.

(b) *At Leamington, November 20, 1936.*¹

. . . It is now eighteen years since the Armistice was signed. We should surely recall what were the objectives which we had before us during the War years. They were these: Freedom and democracy at home; Peace abroad. Such should still be our objectives to-day. . . .

I have spoken of our belief in democracy and our determination to maintain it as our own system of government. I would not, however, have you believe that on that account I consider it either necessary or desirable that our likes or dislikes for foreign forms of

¹ Text furnished by the Foreign Office.

government should prejudice our international friendships or influence the course of our foreign policy. We have said many times of late that we are opposed to the formation of *blocs* in international affairs. That phrase formed part of the *communiqué* agreed by the Polish Foreign Minister and myself during M. Beck's recent visit to London.¹ What do we mean by that phrase? We mean that we do not want to divide the world into democracies and dictatorships. Nor do we want to divide the world into any antagonistic camps, the followers of which owe allegiance to rival creeds. These, we believe, are not real divisions. Our objective is international co-operation throughout the world—co-operation in which all the States shall participate. It would be wrong and foolish to pretend that nations can only co-operate in international affairs if their systems of government are similar. That is not true, nor is it desirable. There are at Geneva to-day States co-operating in the organization of peace who have every variety and form of government. That is no hindrance. They can none the less all work together. It would be a tragedy if the League of Nations were to become the home of any ideology, except the ideology of peace. All that we in this country require and expect is that the rule of law should govern international relations, and not the rule of war.

As we observe the present agitated international scene we should do well to bear in mind the system which remains to-day, at once the largest, the most freely supported, and the most peaceful political system in the world—the British Commonwealth of Nations. This Commonwealth is in itself the most daring experiment of the twentieth century. The War, which brought us so close together in a spirit of common endeavour and sacrifice, gave a great impetus to the growth of the Commonwealth, the basis of which is the spirit of co-operation. It was no accident that that same spirit of co-operation should have been extended in the British mind from its own miniature League of Nations to the wider League of Nations. The defections from the League which have taken place in recent days have not changed our view that the principles of the League are the best yet devised for the conduct of international relations. These principles are entirely in accord with British ideas, and it would not be our nature to abandon them merely because in some parts of the world they have fallen on rocky ground, and we shall certainly not do so. A League which does not include all the more powerful nations must necessarily be different, be less effective than a universal League, but the fact that we know that we cannot do everything is no excuse for doing nothing.

¹ See below, p. 406.

If, however, our ideals are to prevail in a re-arming world, we, who hold them, must see to it that we are strong. Let us therefore put first things first. Let us be perfectly clear in our own minds that the spirit of co-operation between nations must be preserved and practised by ourselves. Let us also be equally clear that our first task is to equip ourselves as a nation so thoroughly and so strongly that the whole world may see that we mean what we say, and that our conceptions of international order have behind them adequate force. There can be no doubt that attempts to uphold international law have not benefited from the comparative decline of British strength in arms which has existed in recent years. The equilibrium is now being restored—nobody but a would-be aggressor will complain.

But, it may be asked, for what purpose will these arms be used? Let me once again make the position in this respect perfectly clear. These arms will never be used in a war of aggression. They will never be used for a purpose inconsistent with the Covenant of the League or the Pact of Paris. They may, and if the occasion arose they would, be used in our own defence and in defence of the territories of the British Commonwealth of Nations. They may, and if the occasion arose they would, be used in the defence of France and Belgium against unprovoked aggression in accordance with our existing obligations. They may, and, if a new Western European settlement can be reached, they would, be used in defence of Germany were she the victim of unprovoked aggression by any of the other signatories of such a settlement. Those, together with our Treaty of Alliance with Iraq and our projected treaty with Egypt, are our definite obligations. In addition our armaments may be used in bringing help to a victim of aggression in any case where, in our judgment, it would be proper under the provisions of the Covenant to do so. I use the word 'may' deliberately since in such an instance there is no automatic obligation to take military action. It is, moreover, right that this should be so, for nations cannot be expected to incur automatic military obligations save for areas where their vital interests are concerned.

Such are the bases of our policy. I would now turn to a more immediate issue. We are at present engaged in negotiations, confidential and diplomatic at this stage, for repairing the damaged structure of European security. We are attempting as a first stage in that endeavour to replace the Locarno Treaty by a fresh settlement. I will say no more at this stage, except that we yesterday circulated a note to our fellow signatories of the previous Locarno Treaty advocating what we regard as reasonable and mutually accept-

able conditions in the light of the replies which we have already received from them. . . .¹

(c) *In London, November 27, 1936.*²

. . . It is no exaggeration to say that Belgium has a special place in the friendship of the British people. We have many ties in common—ties of history, ties of comradeship, ties of memory for a generation in both countries not yet grown old. In many respects our outlook on world affairs is similar. We are both of us democracies. We are proud of our traditions. We cherish our freedom, both individual and national, and we will not yield it up. M. van Zeeland and I, and probably the majority of you in this room to-day, belong to a generation which took an active part in the struggle for those principles in which our two countries jointly believe. We have no more sacred trust than to ensure that the cause for which hundreds of thousands of people in our two countries were sacrificed is not lost. How on our part can that be achieved? I believe, in the present state of the world, there is no greater service that can be done by our country to the cause of peace than clarity. Let us therefore once again affirm that the independence and integrity of Belgium is a vital interest for this nation, and that Belgium could count upon our help were she ever the victim of unprovoked aggression. I say these words deliberately, because I am confident that they represent the will of the British people and that to make this plain is a contribution to peace.

It is peace which is the joint objective of our two countries. Nor are all our traditions and our memories and our methods of government, proud though we both are of each of them, the sole basis of our friendship. We share also the same conception of international order, a renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, a willingness to settle disputes by peaceful means, the acceptance of certain agreed canons of international law. But let there be no mistake: these conceptions are tokens neither of softness nor of cowardice. We believe them to be tokens of civilization.

(d) *At Bradford, December 14, 1936.*³

. . . You will wish me, I am sure, to give you to-night some impressions of the international situation. In recent speeches I have endeavoured to outline as clearly as possible the foreign policy of

¹ The remainder of the speech was devoted to Spain.

² At a luncheon given in honour of M. van Zeeland by the International Chamber of Commerce. Text furnished by the British National Committee.

³ Text furnished by the Foreign Office.

His Majesty's Government, to recall our commitments, to re-emphasize our objectives. I have done this deliberately because of a profound conviction that in the restless and anxious state of present-day Europe this country has an especial part to play, and that the best service that it can render to the world is by making its purpose clear and pursuing that purpose with a calm but vigilant perseverance. But that is not all. If the Government of this country is to exert its maximum influence in world affairs it is imperative that it should speak for a united nation. Time was when the broad lines of this country's foreign policy were not the subject of party controversy. I believe that to-day we are making progress towards a return to such conditions, despite differences of emphasis and detail. An impartial observer must have been impressed by the steady growth during the last few months of united opinion on vital matters of foreign policy. I welcome each and every manifestation of such unity, for without unity there can be no strength.

But if the Government is to preserve that national unity and to deserve it, it is incumbent upon us to take the people of this country as far as possible into our confidence, to tell them plain truths in plain language, so that there can be no misunderstanding between us. I have spoken of the value to Europe of this country's calm. By that I mean a calm based not upon ignorance of the facts, which might be dangerous, but calm due to a full knowledge and understanding of the position. This is the best possible spirit in which to meet difficulties.

Events abroad are speeding on their course, and they compel our serious and vigilant attention. In the face of these let me endeavour to name a few points on which unity of understanding and unity of action seem to me important. Let us first win an ever larger body of opinion to reject those dangerous doctrines which would have us divide the world into dictatorships of the right and left. This country will have none of either. Nor will it align its foreign policy with any group of States because they support the one or the other. We do not believe that we should be serving either internal peace in this country or external peace in Europe or elsewhere by so doing. To further our own national interests—the greatest of which is peace—we need no such doctrines and no slogans. Man is surely too intelligent for his scope and opportunity to be limited to a choice of such crude alternatives. Therefore I repeat that we reject these extreme doctrines for our own home consumption. We are, however, not only willing, but sincerely anxious, to live on peaceful—more than that—on cordial terms with those who practise these

doctrines in their own countries. In our view the test of co-operation in foreign affairs is not the form of government of this or that country, but the country's willingness to co-operate sincerely for peace in the international sphere. Our relations with other nations are thus guided by their willingness to keep peace with their neighbours and to observe the treaties which are framed to keep the peace.

Observance of treaties, and willingness to resort to free negotiation in case of disagreement, constitute together the only true basis of international confidence. That is assuredly one of the lessons the world should have learnt in the last few months. Admittedly treaties in themselves which are made by human hands are not sacrosanct. They are capable of improvement as are all human things, but there must be some sanctity about the observance of solemn undertakings. There must be a limit to unilateral denunciations or we shall reach a point where force and force alone is to be the sole arbiter of international relations, and where no treaty will be worth the paper on which it is written. Tearing up a scrap of paper led to the war of 1914. If Europe is to be littered with scraps of paper in 1936 and thereafter, nobody can look ahead with any confidence. I repeat therefore that international relations are guided not by forms of governments, but by the manner in which governments observe their undertakings.

Now let me speak for a moment of events in Western Europe. You will, I am sure, have learned with the utmost satisfaction of the declaration made by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Chamber of Deputies on December 4.¹ M. Delbos stated in the name of the French Government that all the forces of France on land, on sea, and in the air would be spontaneously and immediately used for the defence of Great Britain in the event of an unprovoked aggression. He added that this declaration applied also to Belgium.

It has been suggested in certain quarters that this declaration, and my statement at Leamington on November 20 that, if the occasion arose, our arms would be used in the defence of France and Belgium in the case of unprovoked aggression, in accordance with our existing obligations, represent some new departure or imply some alliance, or that declarations of this kind were incorrect in the course of a negotiation involving other Powers.

This, however, is not so. My statement was but a repetition of the undertaking His Majesty's Government gave to France and Belgium after the denunciation by Germany of the Treaty of Locarno last

¹ See below, p. 274.

March ; and, so far as the French Government's declaration is concerned, it reaffirms the undertaking given in the proposals which were agreed to in London on March 19 last, in order to deal with the situation created by Germany's repudiation of the Treaty of Locarno and of the Rhineland demilitarized zone.

Thus, neither M. Delbos' statement nor mine represents any new departure, nor do they conceal any hidden intention to form any exclusive alliance, nor do they suggest a policy of *blocs*. Let me emphasize once again, it is not in our minds, nor, I am convinced, is it in the minds of the French Government, to seek to come to any exclusive arrangement. Far from it ; we desire, and should cordially welcome, the co-operation of Germany not only in a Western agreement, but in European affairs generally. This country has made that clear many times in these post-War years, not only by words, but by deeds. So far are we from wishing to encircle Germany that we seek for her co-operation with other nations in the economic and financial as well as in the political sphere. We want neither *blocs* nor barriers in Europe, nor, we are convinced, were there freedom of thought, of speech, of trade across the frontiers would there be any.

In my recent speech at Leamington, I emphasized the urgent need for again bringing our defences up to a standard commensurate with our world-wide interests and responsibilities, and sought once again to define the occasions on which those arms might be employed. There are in the world certain vital British interests and it is a contribution to peace that those should be clearly made known to all. This I sought to do at Leamington and I have nothing to add or subtract from the definition there given. Yet if I were to say that Britain's interests in peace are geographically limited, I should be giving a false impression. If our vital interests are situated in certain clearly definable areas, our interest in peace is world-wide and there is a simple reason for this. The world has now become so small—and every day with the march of science it becomes smaller—that a spark in some sphere comparatively remote from our own interests may become a conflagration sweeping a continent or a hemisphere. We must therefore be watchful at all times and in all places. We cannot disinterest ourselves from this or that part of the world in a vague hope that happenings in that area will not affect us. We must neither mislead others nor be misled ourselves by any of those comfortable doctrines that we can live secure in a Western European glass-house. It is for this reason that I have again and again insisted that the foreign policy of our country with its many and comprehensive interests must work for a comprehensive settlement. Nothing

short of that will give us the peace and the confidence that we so ardently desire.

How then is this settlement to be achieved? Detailed instruments and limited agreements will no doubt help towards this result, but the realities of the problem go even deeper than that. If the world is to enjoy an assurance of lasting peace there must be a reversal of certain tendencies which dominate world politics to-day. Too large a part of the world's wealth is now being spent on armaments. It is never wholly convincing to be told by this nation or by that 'We are poorer than we should be', when at the selfsame time vast sums are being spent on rearmament, or maybe the whole national economy is being strained and twisted to that end. If the world means to persist in rearmament it will persist in its own impoverishment. The world would act wisely were it to turn from armaments competition to economic co-operation. That is a change which we wish to see and to which we are prepared to contribute our share. We showed by the part we played in the recent three-Power Monetary Agreement the basis upon which we thought progress was possible. We are anxious to see those lines followed up, and to see international conditions created in which economically all nations can have greater opportunities, can hope to raise their standard of life. If a lasting settlement of world difficulties could be reached, including—and this is indispensable—an arms agreement, our help would be willingly and indeed wholeheartedly given. But—and this is fundamental—this country cannot be expected to render help to others either in the economic or in the financial sphere if the only result of such action is to be the further piling up of armaments and a consequent further stress and strain upon the fabric of world peace. . . .¹

V. DECLARATIONS OF FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

Statements of policy in relation to the Locarno Treaty, the Franco-Soviet Pact, and German action in the Rhineland are printed above in preceding sections.² Other speeches made in 1936 and the final portion of M. Delbos' comprehensive statement of December 4³ dealt with the Spanish situation and are to be included in a subsequent volume. The Popular Front administration of M. Léon Blum was formed on June 4, 1936, with M. Yvon Delbos as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Government's declaration of foreign policy was read in the Senate by M. Blum and in the Chamber by M. Delbos on June 23.⁴

¹ The remainder of this speech was devoted to Spain.

² See above, pp. 15, 22, 46, 61, 120, 137, 171.

³ See below, p. 274.

⁴ See below, p. 268.

1. EXTRACTS FROM DECLARATION BY M. LÉON BLUM, PRIME
MINISTER OF FRANCE, JUNE 23, 1936¹

... Nous faillirions au mandat que nous avons reçu du pays, si nous ne proclamions tout d'abord sa volonté de paix. Un peuple qui a donné tant de preuves de son courage peut la manifester sans craindre qu'elle apparaisse comme un signe d'abandon. Il le peut d'autant mieux que jamais ne fut plus réelle, plus efficace, la force dont il dispose pour assurer sa défense, pour tenir ses engagements, pour collaborer au renforcement nécessaire de la sécurité collective. . . .

La paix que nous entendons ainsi défendre n'est pas une paix conditionnelle, subordonnée à des affinités ou à des antagonismes politiques. Nous la voulons pour tous les peuples, avec tous les peuples, sachant qu'elle est indivisible et que nul ne serait à l'abri de l'incendie qui s'allumerait, si la vigilance des nations pacifiques n'était pas partout présente et active. Nous n'entendons prêcher d'autre croisade que celle qui a pour objet la réconciliation des peuples, sans aucune exclusion. La propagande ou la lutte pour ou contre tel ou tel système politique ou social ne doivent pas être des prétextes de guerre.

Nous ne voulons pas non plus d'une paix craintive sous la loi du plus fort; ni d'une paix passive, égoïste, dans le repli sur soi-même. Notre volonté pacifique est trop sincère pour n'être pas agissante. C'est pourquoi nous tenons à proclamer bien haut notre fidélité à la Société des nations. Les épreuves qu'elle traverse, loin de nous détourner d'elle, stimulent notre résolution de la raffermir par une organisation plus efficace de la sécurité collective, qui exige deux conditions: le respect de la loi et des contrats internationaux; le rétablissement d'une confiance mutuelle ébranlée par trop de secousses, de déceptions et de craintes. Nous voulons contribuer à les restaurer par l'évidence de notre bonne foi et de notre loyauté. . . .

La paix ne peut être consolidée que par le renforcement de la sécurité des nations. C'est à ce renforcement que nous consacrerons tous nos efforts. Nous ne pensons pas qu'il soit opportun, dans les circonstances actuelles, de proposer un plan trop vaste et trop ambitieux. Une réforme d'ensemble du pacte n'est d'ailleurs pas justifiée, si l'on veut bien réfléchir que ses échecs sont beaucoup plus imputables aux erreurs et aux défaillances d'exécution qu'aux prescriptions mêmes qu'il stipule. Cette réforme risquerait en outre, dans l'état momentané des esprits, de s'opérer sur des lignes de moindre résistance. Nous ne croyons pas non plus qu'il convienne de recourir à la procédure interminable des amendements. Nous pré-

¹ In the Senate. *Le Temps*, June 24, 1936.

férons des textes interprétatifs qui apportent sans délai des correctifs précis et efficaces, inspirés des leçons de l'expérience.

Si le mécanisme de la sécurité collective s'est avéré insuffisant, ce n'est pas la faute du pacte, c'est parce que le pacte a été appliqué tardivement et d'une manière incomplète. On ne fait pas sa part à la guerre, et le recours exclusif à des sanctions économiques progressivement appliquées ne saurait arrêter un conflit déjà engagé. Pour réprimer une agression il faut mettre en œuvre le plus tôt possible le maximum des moyens dont la communauté internationale peut disposer. Pour assurer une application efficace de l'article 16 du pacte, l'idéal serait que la totalité des membres de la Société des nations s'engageât à mettre en œuvre, dans toutes les circonstances, des moyens de force contre l'agresseur. Mais il serait pour le moment chimérique d'espérer ce concours total de la part de peuples qui ne seraient pas directement intéressés dans le conflit. Dès lors la sécurité collective doit comporter deux aspects. D'abord un groupe de puissances — que ce groupement résulte d'une situation géographique donnée ou d'une communauté d'intérêts — sera prêt à employer lui-même toutes ses forces contre l'agresseur. Moyennant quoi, la collectivité tout entière de la Société des nations devra obligatoirement appliquer les sanctions économiques et financières.

Ces accords régionaux d'assistance mutuelle, conçus pour la paix, ne comporteront de menaces contre personne. Ils ne devront jamais devenir des alliances à la manière d'autrefois. Ouverts à tous, leur jeu devra toujours dépendre d'une décision du conseil de la Société des nations.

Mais il ne suffit pas d'arrêter l'agresseur par l'application ainsi renforcée de l'article 16. Le but essentiel de l'organisation collective, c'est de prévenir l'agression. Mais les moyens de prévention dont dispose la Société des nations sont encore insuffisants. La manière dont a été interprété à Genève le principe de l'unanimité inscrit dans le pacte paralyse le jeu de l'article 11. Il n'est pas admissible, il est contraire au bon sens, qu'un État, dont l'action a créé une menace pour la paix, se trouve par son vote en mesure de paralyser l'action de la communauté. Tant que l'on interprètera de cette manière l'article 11 du pacte, le conseil de la Société des nations sera impuissant à prévenir la préparation d'un conflit et l'agresseur éventuel aura tout loisir pour choisir son heure. Le gouvernement français proposera de mettre fin à cette situation paradoxale.

Nous n'entendons pas pour l'instant présenter dans ce domaine un programme plus vaste. Il faut aller au plus pressé et à l'heure où, pour toute l'Europe, s'aggrave le sentiment d'insécurité, il s'agit

de ranimer chez tous les peuples de bonne volonté la confiance, si rudement ébranlée, dans le système collectif.

Au cours des prochains mois la négociation des pactes régionaux devra donc être hâtée, et le gouvernement ne négligera aucun effort dans ce sens. Les raisons qui recommandent la conclusion d'un pacte entre tous les États danubiens que leurs souvenirs peuvent parfois opposer, mais que leurs véritables intérêts rapprochent, ont plus que jamais leur pleine valeur. Ouvert à toutes les puissances de l'Europe centrale, il ne sera dirigé contre aucune d'elles ; nous-mêmes y sommes intéressés par les liens d'affection qui nous unissent à la Petite-Entente.

Il n'est pas moins nécessaire d'associer tous les États méditerranéens, de l'Espagne à l'Entente balkanique, dans un accord leur apportant la garantie que nulle hégémonie ne puisse s'instituer dans une mer dont les riverains sont liés par une civilisation commune.

Quant à l'Europe occidentale, nous souhaitons qu'un accord puisse intervenir dont la conclusion mettrait fin à la crise ouverte le 7 mars, mais cette conclusion ne dépend pas de nous seuls. En attendant, et comme les représentants de la Belgique, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne et de l'Italie l'ont reconnu à Londres le 19 mars, Locarno subsiste avec les obligations et les garanties qu'il stipule pour notre défense et pour celle de la Belgique.

A ces tâches nous sommes persuadés que l'Italie apportera l'appui de sa nécessaire collaboration ; nous serons heureux que ses efforts se conjuguent cordialement avec les nôtres, et avec ceux de toutes les puissances intéressées.

Dans notre effort pour reconstruire la sécurité collective, nous ne doutons pas de l'appui sans réserve de la grande démocratie anglaise, que tant de souvenirs et d'efforts communs unissent à la démocratie française. Nous y tenons d'autant plus que la coopération étroite et confiante de nos deux pays est la garantie essentielle de la paix en Europe. La France compte, au delà de l'Atlantique, sur les sentiments cordiaux de la démocratie américaine, amie naturelle des nations libres. Elle est assurée du puissant concours de nos amis de l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétistes auxquels nous unit un pacte d'assistance ouvert à tous, que nous a dicté notre commun souci de la paix. L'amitié franco-polonaise recevra une nouvelle consécration dans une recherche cordiale et directe des meilleures formes de coopération entre deux peuples solidaires. Avec la Belgique, la Roumanie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Yougoslavie, la France se sent unie autant que par les traités, par une étroite intimité de pensée et de cœur. Leur sécurité constitue un élément de notre propre sécurité comme notre sécurité fait partie intégrante de la leur.

Nous comptons aussi, pour la grande tâche à accomplir, sur l'Entente balkanique, sur la démocratie espagnole, sur tous les peuples qui du Portugal aux États scandinaves, en passant par la Hollande, ont donné tant de gages de fidélité à la Société des nations.

Les partis unis aujourd'hui dans le Rassemblement populaire ont toujours lutté pour l'entente franco-allemande. Jaurès a payé de la vie son action passionnée pour la paix. Briand a connu la calomnie et l'outrage pour avoir voulu, lui aussi, que le Rhin unisse, au lieu de les séparer, la France et l'Allemagne.

Nous avons applaudi aux accords de Londres, négociés par Herriot, et qui rendirent possible Locarno. Nous ne regrettons rien de l'action que nous avons poursuivie durant quinze ans. Nous sommes résolus à la poursuivre encore, dans la sécurité et dans l'honneur des deux pays. A diverses reprises le chancelier Hitler a proclamé sa volonté d'accord avec la France. Nous n'entendons pas douter de sa parole d'ancien combattant qui, pendant quatre ans, a connu la misère des tranchées.

Mais, si sincère que soit notre volonté d'entente, comment oublier les leçons de l'expérience et les faits ?

Le réarmement allemand se développe selon un rythme dont chaque jour accélère la cadence. Le 16 mars 1935, l'Allemagne répudie les clauses militaires de Versailles dans des conditions que ne suffisent pas à justifier certaines erreurs par elle invoquées. Le 7 mars 1936, elle viole et répudie le pacte rhénan de Locarno librement signé par elle et dont le chancelier Hitler avait affirmé à plusieurs reprises qu'il constituait une garantie essentielle de la paix européenne. Depuis cette date, la situation demeure sérieuse : le 19 mars, les puissances locarniennes soumettent à l'Allemagne un plan contenant des propositions concrètes qui doivent servir à l'instauration d'un nouvel accord de sécurité ; le 24 mars, l'Allemagne présente des contre-propositions qui rejettent tout système d'accord fondé sur l'assistance mutuelle, dans les relations de l'Allemagne avec ses voisins autres que les puissances locarniennes ; le 10 avril, les puissances locarniennes, désireuses d'épuiser toutes les chances de conciliation, chargent le gouvernement britannique d'élucider un certain nombre de points contenus dans le mémorandum allemand. C'est l'objet d'un questionnaire britannique remis à Berlin le 6 mai. A ce questionnaire, le Reich n'a pas encore répondu. Le fera-t-il demain ? En tout cas, la France examinera les suggestions allemandes avec le sincère désir d'y trouver une base d'accord. Mais cet accord ne peut être réalisé que s'il répond au principe d'une paix indivisible, sans menace contre personne.

A l'évolution des relations franco-allemandes se trouve étroitement lié le succès des efforts dans l'œuvre internationale de désarmement qui est subordonné aussi aux garanties de sécurité collective. Les déceptions qui ont marqué les échecs de la conférence de Genève n'ont point découragé le peuple français. Il sait en effet que la course aux armements conduit fatalement à la guerre ; il voudrait par un effort collectif arrêter cette concurrence, rendre possible un désarmement progressif, universel, contrôlé par la communauté des nations. Le gouvernement a le devoir, sans jamais négliger aucune des nécessités de la défense nationale, d'engager avec lui tous les peuples dans cette voie. Il répondrait ainsi au vœu de tous les Français, à la plus profonde, à la plus justifiée des aspirations humaines ; il interpréterait, il le sait, la pensée des anciens combattants de la grande guerre, qui, après avoir été fidèles au devoir pendant le combat, sont aujourd'hui, par-dessus les frontières, fraternellement unis pour un devoir supérieur, celui d'éviter au monde une effroyable catastrophe.

Pour dissiper le mystère dont s'entoure la course aux armements, pour prévenir les surprises qu'elle prépare, le gouvernement réclamera tout d'abord la publicité préventive et le contrôle des fabrications de guerre par une commission internationale et permanente siégeant à Genève. Il proposera la reprise en seconde lecture du projet voté par une majorité d'États en avril 1935. Dès maintenant, en déposant devant le Parlement une loi sur la nationalisation de la fabrication des matériels de guerre, il marquera sa volonté de préparer la France à assumer, dans le domaine national, toutes les responsabilités de contrôle qu'impliquerait ce système international. Mais ce contrôle et cette publicité préalables ne sont qu'une première étape qu'il faut rapidement dépasser. Le gouvernement s'associera avec une entière loyauté à toute mesure prise unanimement pour contrôler, limiter et réduire les armements. Et il saisira toutes les occasions opportunes pour en prendre l'initiative.

Depuis le mois de février 1935, la question d'un pacte aérien d'assistance mutuelle entre les puissances occidentales, pacte qui, pour être efficace, devrait être complété par un accord de limitation aérienne, se trouve posée par l'initiative qu'ont prise d'un commun accord les gouvernements britannique et français.

Malgré tous nos efforts, la négociation n'a pu progresser, le gouvernement allemand ayant, jusqu'à ce jour, différé sa réponse. Dans son dernier mémorandum il s'est bien, en principe, montré encore favorable à la conclusion du pacte, mais en s'abstenant de dire si, dans son esprit, ce pacte devrait recevoir le complément

nécessaire d'un accord de limitation. Une question à ce sujet a été posée par le gouvernement britannique: la réponse est attendue.

Est-il besoin de le dire? pour arrêter une course aux armements qui prend, dans le domaine aérien, une allure de plus en plus précipitée et fait peser sur toute la civilisation européenne une menace de plus en plus grave, un accord de limitation des aviations demeure hautement souhaitable: la France, pour sa part, y est prête, qu'il s'agisse seulement des aviations occidentales ou de l'ensemble des aviations européennes.

Pour dresser le bilan de la situation économique générale, des besoins des peuples, et des mesures qui pourraient être prises pour ranimer les échanges, nous demanderons la convocation de la Commission d'étude pour l'union européenne, qu'avait créée Aristide Briand. Cette Commission comprend tous les États européens, qu'ils soient membres ou non de la Société des nations: l'Allemagne pourra donc y participer et y apporter ses suggestions comme y participa, à l'origine, l'Union soviétique qui n'était pas alors membre de la Ligue.

Messieurs, quelle que soit la ténacité de notre effort, la tâche à réaliser est une tâche de longue haleine. L'œuvre entreprise à Genève dépendra avant tout de la volonté des gouvernements et des peuples. Nous devons défendre un patrimoine qui n'est plus seulement français, un patrimoine humain, celui de la libre expression de la pensée, celui du progrès des institutions démocratiques dans l'ordre et la liberté. Une ombre d'angoisse s'étendrait sur le monde si de telles conquêtes et de tels idéaux n'étaient plus soutenus par une France forte et résolue. Mais tous les hommes qui siègent aujourd'hui sur les bancs du gouvernement sont unis dans la pensée commune que l'état de paix armée, générateur de catastrophes, doit être temporaire, que tous les efforts doivent être tendus pour en abrégier la durée, et que la sécurité des peuples ne peut être assurée que par les organismes collectifs de la communauté internationale.

Les peuples devront s'acheminer avec toute l'indispensable prudence vers un état de paix désarmée, où la conscience universelle dressera automatiquement contre tout agresseur, toutes les forces matérielles et morales des peuples pacifiques, préalablement et méthodiquement organisées. C'est cette foi dans l'avenir de la sécurité collective qui orientera notre action. En se fixant cette ligne de conduite, le gouvernement demeure fidèle à la politique constante de ceux qui, à cette tribune, ont toujours proclamé que les intérêts de la paix sont inséparables de ceux de la France. Il veut animer cet effort constructif de tout l'élan que le peuple français

vient de conférer à ses représentants pour l'organisation dans le domaine international comme dans la vie nationale, d'un avenir de justice et d'humanité.

A l'édification de cet avenir nous consacrerons, avec l'appui que nous attendons de vous, toute notre activité.

Nous ne commettrons pas l'imprudence de proportionner dès maintenant à nos espérances l'état de nos forces défensives, qui doit être toujours tenu au niveau des nécessités immédiates de la défense nationale. Tant que n'aura pas été arrêtée la course aux armements, tant que les mécanismes internationaux n'auront pas donné la preuve de leur efficacité, le devoir de la France envers elle-même comme envers ses amis est de rester en mesure de décourager toutes les agressions. Mais nous appelons à la collaboration internationale tous les peuples et tous les gouvernements qui sont dévoués à la paix; qui pensent qu'elle doit se fonder sur le respect des engagements librement consentis; qui veulent substituer aux transformations du monde par la violence son évolution sous l'égide d'une justice et d'une moralité internationales, tous ceux qui sont résolus, comme nous, à prendre solidairement toutes les charges, toutes les responsabilités de la sécurité collective, parce qu'ils y voient, comme nous, la meilleure garantie des sécurités nationales.

2. EXTRACT FROM STATEMENT BY M. DELBOS, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF FRANCE, DECEMBER 4, 1936¹

Messieurs, M. Paul Reynaud nous disait tout à l'heure que l'arbre espagnol ne devait pas nous cacher la forêt européenne, et il ajoutait que cette forêt n'était pas sûre.

En effet, une anxiété qui n'est que trop fondée pèse sur l'Europe, encore que nous puissions heureusement apercevoir, à côté des difficultés qui la suscitent, et parfois dans ces difficultés mêmes, en raison des réactions salutaires qu'elles provoquent, de sérieux motifs d'espérer.

La cause profonde de ces difficultés, en dehors de circonstances momentanées, est la différence, chaque jour aggravée, entre l'état de choses actuel et celui qu'avaient instauré les traités de paix.

Sans doute, les frontières demeurent, menacées d'ailleurs par l'impérialisme ou par le révisionnisme de certains pays. Mais il manque la base commune à tous les États sur laquelle reposait l'organisation de la paix: celle de la démocratie, c'est-à-dire de la liberté des peuples, de leur indépendance, de leur volonté de ne jamais recourir à la force pour modifier le statut international.

Si la plupart des pays sont heureusement restés fidèles à cette

¹ In the Chambre des Députés. *Le Temps*, December 6, 1936.

conception, elle a été soumise par d'autres à de dures épreuves. Les violations successives de traités, les attaques contre la Société des nations, la course accélérée aux armements, ont créé un état d'inquiétude qui accroît lui-même le danger dont il résulte.

Il l'augmente par la croyance à la fatalité de la guerre, qui est déjà une résignation à la guerre, et aussi par la tentation, non seulement d'éviter, comme il est légitime, de se laisser engager dans un engrenage de guerre, mais encore de se dérober aux devoirs de la sécurité collective.

A ces périls déjà suffisants en eux-mêmes, s'ajoutent la crise économique, les tentations désespérées de la misère et le développement d'un esprit de propagande et de croisade dont la virulence croissante tend à diviser l'Europe en deux camps ennemis.

Un traité dont on a parlé tout à l'heure vient d'être signé, dont l'inspiration évoque celle des guerres de religion et de la Sainte-Alliance.¹

Et la guerre civile qui ensanglante la malheureuse Espagne tend à devenir le ferment d'une guerre civile généralisée. Alors que tous les efforts devraient tendre à circonscrire et à éteindre l'incendie, nous constatons qu'il exerce une sorte de fascination, que des solidarités, intéressées ou généreuses, entrent en jeu pour l'alimenter, au risque d'embraser l'Europe tout entière.

Une telle situation exige du gouvernement une politique de prudence et de sang-froid, mais qui n'exclut ni les initiatives ni la fermeté. La France est assez sage pour se garder des violences ; elle est assez forte pour défendre, en toutes circonstances, ses intérêts et ses droits.

C'est sans doute — et sur ce point je suis d'accord avec certains de ceux qui nous critiquent — le plus sûr moyen de vivre en bonne entente avec tous les autres pays. Si nous n'y avons pas réussi toujours et partout autant que nous le souhaitons, nous avons du moins le réconfort de constater que notre action se conjugue de plus en plus avec celle d'autres nations éprises du même idéal de liberté et de paix.

Au premier rang se trouve l'Angleterre, avec laquelle, comme le notait M. Eden à la Chambre des communes, 'nos relations sont à la fois étroites et cordiales'.

'Il serait difficile — ajoutait-il — de rappeler un temps où elles aient été meilleures.'

Je suis heureux, messieurs, de saisir l'occasion qui m'est offerte de dire ici avec quelle joie profonde je fais, nous faisons tous, j'en suis sûr, la même constatation.

¹ See below, p. 297.

Le Parlement, le gouvernement et le pays tout entier sont attachés à la Grande-Bretagne par les liens les plus solides de la raison et du cœur.

Ils savent que l'amitié franco-anglaise est la clef de voûte de la paix européenne. Elle l'est à la fois en vertu des principes sur lesquels elle repose et aussi — sur ce point, je suis plus optimiste que M. Paul Reynaud — de la force que représentent nos deux pays.

Certains attribuent aux doctrines de violence un dynamisme qui éclipserait les doctrines démocratiques et paralyserait les pays qui s'en inspirent.

Mais croit-on que l'idéal de liberté, de justice, de droit, qui est celui de la France, de l'Angleterre et de nombreux autres pays, grands et petits, est sans rayonnement et sans efficacité ? Il brille comme un exemple et comme une espérance dans la grande République des États-Unis.

Il est loin, malgré certaines craintes ou certaines espérances, d'être éteint en Europe.

Les démocraties, dont je ne dirai pas qu'elles sont les seuls pays pacifiques, sont en tout cas les plus résolument dressés contre la guerre, et dans cette résolution il y a la volonté de défendre la paix de toute leur énergie, avec toutes leurs forces, contre ceux qui la menaceraient.

Leur pacifisme ne signifie pas qu'elles soient résignées, comme certains paraissent le croire, à tout subir pour empêcher la guerre ; mais il signifie qu'en offrant la paix à tous elles entendent ne pas offrir une prime à l'agression et être en mesure de se défendre victorieusement si elles étaient attaquées.

Tel est l'objet essentiel de la solidarité franco-anglaise, dont M. Eden soulignait, dans son récent discours de Leamington, qu'on aurait tort de la croire purement platonique.

Parlant des armes que possède et que forge la Grande-Bretagne, il déclarait que 'si l'occasion s'en présentait elles pourraient et devraient être utilisées pour la défense de la France et de la Belgique'.

Ces paroles n'ont rien d'imprévu, puisqu'elles sont conformes à nos engagements réciproques. Mais leur accent, l'écho qu'elles ont rencontré en Angleterre et les circonstances dans lesquelles elles ont été prononcées, leur confèrent une particulière valeur.

Je tiens à déclarer, au nom du gouvernement, que de même toutes les forces de la France, sur terre, sur mer et dans les airs, seraient spontanément, immédiatement utilisées pour la défense de la Grande-Bretagne, dans le cas d'une agression non provoquée.

J'en dirai autant en ce qui concerne la Belgique.

Je n'oublie pas que des conceptions un peu différentes des nôtres s'y manifestent pour un futur règlement locarnien. Mais ces différences sont loin d'être irréductibles, et notre volonté commune en viendra à bout au mieux des intérêts de nos deux pays.

D'ici là, la France et la Belgique sont d'accord pour affirmer que le pacte de Locarno et l'accord du 19 mars gardent toute leur valeur. Et nous demeurons liés à la Belgique, autant que par des textes, par une amitié éprouvée, par le souvenir des sacrifices communs et par notre commune confiance dans la loi internationale.

S'agissant du nouveau Locarno, j'ajoute enfin, comme le secrétaire d'État de la Grande-Bretagne, que nous ne demandons qu'à voir l'Allemagne rentrer dans ce réseau de garanties, au même titre et avec les mêmes assurances.

Mais, en attendant, le meilleur gage de notre sécurité et de la sécurité générale, c'est, je le répète, la réalité et l'efficacité du resserrement de l'amitié franco-britannique.

Sur ce point, je m'étonne des insinuations qui ont été faites, en France d'ailleurs comme en Angleterre, accusant tel ou tel gouvernement de se laisser trop influencer par l'autre de ces deux gouvernements.

Non, messieurs! Il s'agit d'une collaboration constante et confiante, d'où résulte notre accord, qui vient d'une harmonie préétablie et de notre volonté de nous entendre, accord sur les divers problèmes qui se posent et que nous examinons dans un commun souci de défendre la paix et de faire face aux périls qui pourraient nous menacer les uns et les autres.

Dans l'admirable discours qu'il a prononcé mardi à Buenos-Aires, le président Roosevelt a fait entendre des paroles qui ont eu en France et dans le monde entier, encore qu'elles n'aient pas eu partout toute la publicité désirable, le plus grand, le plus heureux retentissement.¹

Avec l'autorité qu'il tient à la fois, comme le rappelait M. Paul Reynaud, de son élection triomphale, de sa personnalité si rayonnante et du grand pays qu'il dirige, M. le président Roosevelt a invité les républiques du nouveau monde 'à aider l'ancien continent à éviter la catastrophe qui le menace'.

Je n'en veux tirer aucune conclusion indiscrete ou excessive. Mais j'ai bien le droit de constater qu'il n'a pas dissimulé ses préférences et d'affirmer, après lui, que la démocratie reste l'espoir du monde.

Il ne s'agit pas, messieurs, d'imposer ou d'exclure telle ou telle

¹ See below, p. 563.

forme de gouvernement, car la démocratie, étant la liberté, ne saurait avoir, ni admettre, de pareilles intentions. Mais elle a une pleine confiance dans le rayonnement pacifique de son idéal.

J'en reviens, messieurs, à l'Europe, où la volonté de sécurité et de paix qui nous anime préside à nos relations, toujours si amicales, avec la Petite-Entente, dans la fidélité réciproque à nos engagements.

Sachant, au surplus, que les réalités économiques et financières, dans la vie des peuples, jouent un rôle non moins important que les sentiments et la politique, nous nous préoccupons d'améliorer nos échanges avec ces trois pays en tenant le plus grand compte possible de leurs besoins. Des résultats sont déjà acquis, que nous avons à cœur de développer et d'étendre là où se manifeste quelque retard.

Nous avons le même désir amical de maintenir nos bons rapports avec l'Union des républiques socialistes soviétiques, ce grand pays si attaché comme nous à l'œuvre de la Société des nations.

Les campagnes dirigées contre le pacte franco-soviétique n'entament aucunement notre fidélité au traité de mai 1935. C'est un pacte de paix auquel nous restons attachés et auquel les passions politiques ne sauraient enlever ni son caractère ni sa valeur.

M. Paul Reynaud — je cite toujours de bons auteurs — disait tout à l'heure qu'un ministère moins influencé par les communistes et même anticommuniste serait plus qualifié que le nôtre pour pratiquer le pacte franco-soviétique.

Je n'en suis pas bien sûr, et, en tout cas, si je regarde à l'heure actuelle du côté de l'Allemagne et de l'Italie, je ne constate pas que l'anticommunisme soit un élément de rapprochement avec les Soviets.

Enfin, messieurs, est-il besoin d'ajouter que, parmi les peuples européens auxquels nous sommes unis par des accords, la Pologne amie et alliée est pleinement associée à nous pour toutes prévisions intéressant en Europe la sécurité de nos deux pays ?

Le voyage à Varsovie du général Gamelin, puis la venue à Paris du maréchal Rydz-Smigly, suivie de celle de M. Beck, ont consolidé nos liens et avivé la sympathie ancienne et éprouvée de nos deux pays.¹

Ce simple tour d'horizon est, me semble-t-il, la meilleure réponse à ceux qui nous accusent de manquer de vigilance ou de rayonnement et qui annoncent chaque jour des renversements d'alliances et des constellations nouvelles. Je crois pouvoir dire que nous n'avons pas perdu de terrain, que nous en avons même gagné, bien que nous n'ayons pas orchestré chaque progrès réalisé.

Nous n'aimons pas, en effet, je l'avoue, les attitudes spectaculaires, qui accusent des antagonismes que nous souhaitons au contraire

¹ See below, p. 405.

atténuer. Mais on aurait tort de voir dans cette réserve un signe de faiblesse ou d'inaction. A ceux qui, comme le faisait le précédent orateur, parlent du prétendu isolement de la France, je réponds que la France peut, avec fierté, faire le compte des sympathies et des appuis qui l'entourent.

Les pays européens que je viens d'énumérer, et que rejoignent heureusement sur ce point la plupart des nations du monde, ont en commun avec nous leur attachement à la Société des nations. Ce m'est une première raison de ne pas prendre trop au tragique l'hostilité ou le scepticisme dont certains prétendent l'accabler.

J'en trouve une seconde dans la vertu de ses principes, que l'on a pu méconnaître ou enfreindre, mais qui n'en gardent pas moins une valeur que nous sommes toujours résolus à affirmer et à faire prévaloir.

S'il est vrai qu'à l'heure actuelle il serait peut-être imprudent de trop présumer de ses possibilités, son avenir ne dépend que de la confiance et surtout de la volonté des peuples qui la composent. L'efficacité de ses méthodes, malgré le pessimisme qu'on affiche, a été démontrée récemment encore quand la Turquie, donnant un exemple qui contraste heureusement avec certaines attitudes d'autres pays, a provoqué la conférence de Montreux, laquelle a abouti à un règlement satisfaisant du problème des Détroits, que beaucoup, jusque-là, croyaient presque insoluble.

Mais c'est — je le sais bien et je l'aperçois à certains sourires — le sort des idées qui ont d'abord étonné par leur audace d'être ensuite critiquées pour leur conformisme.

Je n'ai cependant pas le sentiment de céder à l'attrait d'une idéologie désuète, en déclarant que la politique de la France, comme celle de l'Angleterre, qui ne passe pas, n'est-il pas vrai, pour négliger le fait expérimental, et comme celle de tant d'autres pays, reste fondée sur la Société des nations.

Je n'en conclus pas qu'il faille s'interdire des efforts de rapprochement avec ceux qui se tiennent, momentanément je l'espère, à l'écart de l'institution de Genève. Mais n'est-il pas vrai — sans vouloir reprendre des formules, je constate des réalités — que l'organisation juridique de la paix est la condition de son maintien ?

Il n'est pas moins vrai que les nations pacifiques sont solidaires.

Comment nier enfin, bien que l'on raille quelquefois l'idée de la paix indivisible, que, si la guerre éclatait, elle pourrait difficilement être circonscrite ? Comment nier qu'en armant les peuples, en les surarmant comme on le fait, on les pousse à la ruine et aux conflits ?

C'est pourquoi, sans devancer imprudemment les autres dans la voie du désarmement, et les suivant même dans la voie opposée

autant qu'il sera nécessaire à notre sécurité, l'accroissement des périls doit nous conduire d'autant plus à le souhaiter et à le proposer.

Ici encore, les paroles prononcées à Buenos-Aires par le président Roosevelt, qui est loin, mais que l'on entend lorsqu'il parle, nous sont un précieux réconfort et un encouragement.

C'est, messieurs, dans cet esprit de fidélité à la Société des nations que nous avons préparé, dès notre arrivée au pouvoir, des initiatives, que nous les avons proposées à Genève et que nous persistons dans ces initiatives. Dans quelques jours, devant une commission convoquée par la dernière assemblée, nous défendrons les propositions que nous avons présentées en juin d'abord, en septembre ensuite.

Elles tendent, d'une part, à renforcer la prévention de la guerre et, d'autre part, à préciser les obligations qui incombent aux États membres de la Société des nations en vertu de l'article 16 du pacte.

Un peu plus tard — et cette fois notre initiative s'adressera, en même temps qu'aux peuples groupés à Genève, à toutes les nations, — nous proposerons, dans une première étape, un plan limité, pratique, de réduction des armements, qui comportera essentiellement la publicité des dépenses militaires et la limitation des forces aériennes.

J'ai dit que nous la proposerons, je n'ai pas dit que nous l'accomplirions tout seuls.

Si vous avez bien voulu écouter le début de la phrase, il n'y a place pour aucune équivoque, et la France ne court aucun péril, au contraire, à prendre de pareilles initiatives.

Je répète que ce plan comportera essentiellement la publicité des dépenses militaires et la limitation des forces aériennes, c'est-à-dire des possibilités d'agression les plus immédiates et les plus redoutables.

Ce ne sont pas là des appels théoriques, lancés dans le vide. Ils s'adressent à des gouvernements qui seront responsables de leur silence comme de leur acceptation ou de leur refus.

C'est ainsi que nous entendons donner l'exemple de la confiance et de l'action qui doivent renforcer l'institution de Genève et, plus largement encore, préparer, en y associant les États qui sont en dehors d'elle, l'organisation universelle de la paix, dont nous ne voulons pas, nous, désespérer.

Si je parle de l'organisation universelle de la paix en faisant appel à tous, c'est que, quel que soit notre attachement à la Société des nations, nous n'en souhaitons pas moins une entente avec ceux qui n'en font pas partie ou qui peuvent parfois paraître s'en détourner.

Dans le discours qu'il a prononcé à Milan,¹ M. Mussolini a mis un

¹ See below, p. 343.

point d'interrogation sur les relations franco-italiennes. Elles sont, en effet, obscurcies d'une ombre, d'autant plus regrettable qu'aucune cause profonde de discorde n'existe entre nos deux pays, que doivent rapprocher au contraire leurs affinités, leurs souvenirs et leurs intérêts communs. Nos désaccords tiennent précisément au souci qu'a la France de remplir ses devoirs envers la Société des nations. Il n'y a là aucun parti pris désobligeant pour notre voisine et il n'en résulte pour elle, du point de vue pratique où elle aime à se placer, aucun préjudice réel. Pourquoi dès lors demander à la grande nation qu'est la France des initiatives qu'on ne demande pas à d'autres, et qu'elle ne saurait prendre seule sans se déjuger et sans s'amoindrir ? Il nous paraît plus opportun — et j'espère que cette opinion sera comprise et partagée — d'examiner pratiquement les questions où nos intérêts respectifs sont en jeu, en cherchant une solution générale. Elle sera facilitée dans la mesure où nous serons de part et d'autre plus attentifs à ce qui doit nous nuire qu'à ce qui peut nous diviser.

Messieurs, rien n'est plus nécessaire, pour la tranquillité de l'Europe, qu'un rapprochement franco-allemand. Psychologiquement — et ce n'est pas parce que les circonstances peuvent paraître, à certains moments, moins favorables que la volonté d'un pays doit cesser de se manifester et de s'orienter dans le sens où elle s'était dirigée, — psychologiquement, je pense que ce rapprochement est possible, car nous avons appris sur les champs de bataille à nous estimer mutuellement, — et, politiquement, aucune contestation de frontière ne nous divise désormais. Enfin, s'il serait vain de nier que des différences de régime aussi accusées que les nôtres peuvent créer entre nous des malentendus, ces malentendus peuvent être dissipés, à la condition que nous respections ensemble le principe de la non-immixtion dans les affaires intérieures. Mais, pour s'entendre, il faut éviter de part et d'autre les menaces ou les froissements. Ce n'est pas l'impression qu'on nous donne quand on déchire unilatéralement les traités d'où dépend notre sécurité, quand on annonce avec une insistance qui parfois pourrait ressembler à un souhait que nous sommes à la veille des pires désordres, et quand on prétend s'ériger en juge de nos relations avec d'autres peuples. Ce sont là les vrais obstacles au rapprochement que nous souhaitons, et qui deviendra possible s'ils disparaissent, car rien, dans notre volonté et notre attitude, ne peut inquiéter l'Allemagne. Nous ne contestons aucun de ses droits légitimes, nous n'avons aucune arrière-pensée d'hégémonie ou d'encerclement et nous ne demandons qu'à trouver un terrain d'entente, notamment par notre participation commune — et certaine entrevue dont on parlait, il y a un instant, marquait

précisément cette tendance — à un effort général de rénovation économique et de désarmement.

Ce terrain d'entente, nous le cherchons aussi dans l'élaboration d'un nouveau pacte destiné à remplacer celui de Locarno. Ici, la difficulté principale tient à ce que l'Allemagne n'est pas membre de la Société des nations. Nous sommes disposés à tenir compte de cette situation. Mais il faut qu'en retour elle comprenne la nôtre.

La fidélité aux engagements contractés, engagements généraux du pacte de la Société des nations et du pacte de Paris, ou engagements résultant d'accords particuliers reliés à ces pactes, aussi bien que nos intérêts les plus certains, nous créent des obligations. Elles nous interdisent d'admettre qu'un traité de non-agression à l'ouest de l'Europe puisse constituer, pour l'un quelconque de ses signataires, un blanc-seing l'autorisant à poursuivre ailleurs une politique d'agression.

La confrontation des points de vue, qui a fait apparaître, une fois de plus, la concordance spontanée des conceptions anglaises et françaises, n'exclut heureusement pas, malgré de sérieuses divergences qui se manifestent par ailleurs, toute possibilité d'entente.

Nous souhaitons sincèrement, nous ne négligerons pour cela aucun effort, qu'un accord s'établisse dans un esprit total de non-agression, et nous souhaitons qu'il s'élargisse dans un accord européen qui écartera l'immense péril de la politique des blocs.

Cette politique des blocs, messieurs — j'en ai déjà parlé, mais je dois redire la même chose, parce que, malheureusement, c'est de plus en plus la même chose, — nous la condamnons résolument, car nous l'avons connue avant la guerre et nous l'avons jugée à ses fruits.

Elle tend à renaître aujourd'hui, sous une autre forme, en prenant appui sur des affinités et des oppositions de doctrines. Elle crée ainsi une menace supplémentaire, que celle d'avant-guerre du moins ne comportait pas: l'esprit de croisade, c'est-à-dire un impérialisme spirituel qui n'exclut d'ailleurs pas les autres, qui peut même les servir, et qui, aujourd'hui, tend à déchaîner une guerre civile européenne.¹ . . .

VI. DENUNCIATION BY GERMANY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS RÉGIME ESTABLISHED BY THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

On November 14, 1936, the German Government gave formal notice to the sixteen Powers concerned that Germany resumed full sovereignty

¹ The rest of this speech was devoted to Spain and will be printed in a subsequent volume.

over the German rivers and the Kiel Canal which had been placed under an international régime by Part XII of the Treaty of Versailles, and that they no longer considered themselves bound by any of the international conventions concerned.¹ For the future, national treatment would be accorded on the basis of reciprocity. The rivers affected were the Elbe, Oder, Danube, and Niemen, governed by Articles 331-53 of the Treaty of Versailles, and the Rhine and Moselle, governed by Articles 354-63. On the same date, the German Minister in Prague informed the Czechoslovak Government that Germany would continue to adhere to the Pact of Barcelona of April 20, 1921, and to the Agreement of November 2, 1929, which gave Czechoslovakia the right to establish her own zones in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin on long-lease terms. Mild protests were lodged in Berlin by certain of the Powers, and, on November 16, Mr. Eden expressed his regret at Germany's unilateral action at a time when negotiations were proceeding with a view to reconciling Germany's desiderata with the interests of the other Powers concerned.² The German Government rounded off its work of revision on January 16, 1937, when, in defiance of Articles 380-6 of the Treaty, a regulation was promulgated by the German Naval High Command that in future the Kiel Canal would no longer be open for free passage to warships and naval craft of foreign Powers, who would from now on have to obtain authorization through diplomatic channels in good time beforehand.³

1. PROCLAMATION OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT RELATIVE TO INTERNATIONAL RIVERS, NOVEMBER 14, 1936⁴

The German representatives on the International River Commissions for the Rhine, Danube, Elbe, and Oder have to-day delivered to the other Governments represented on these Commissions a Note which reads as follows:

Freedom of navigation on all waterways, and equality of treatment on all waterways for all States who were at peace with one another, provided for almost a hundred years before the Great War the elements of a fruitful co-operation between the countries adjacent to navigable rivers. In opposition to this and in contradiction to the fundamental ideas of the principle of equality of rights, there was created at Versailles, with regard to this question, a one-sided artificial system which operated to the disadvantage of Germany and of the practical requirements of navigation. This system sought to impose upon Germany a permanent international supervision of her waterways, by transferring German sovereign rights more or less completely to International Commissions which were subject to the extensive participation of non-riparian States.

The German Government have earnestly endeavoured to replace

¹ See below, this page.

² See below, p. 285.

³ See below, p. 286.

⁴ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, November 15, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

this intolerable arrangement by other agreements. The German plenipotentiaries on the Commissions have attempted by lengthy negotiations to establish—at the latest by January 1, 1937—a position compatible with the German point of view. These efforts have been unsuccessful because the other interested Powers could not bring themselves to renounce a system which is fundamentally irreconcilable with German sovereign rights. Moreover Holland, which, next to Germany, is the most important State contiguous to the Rhine, has not adhered to the agreements concluded in May of this year; and it is precisely in regard to this river that a clear situation is necessary. As regards the Elbe, it has been found impossible to separate the new administration from its Versailles basis, and, more especially, to put an end to the situation whereby four non-riparian States, with no particular interests in Elbe shipping, still claim to be guarantors of the freedom of navigation on this river. For the German Oder there still exists to-day an international commission in which Germany does not even participate, and which has a French secretary who was provisionally appointed in 1920 without Germany's concurrence. With regard to the Danube, Germany—a country through which the Danube flows—has endeavoured for ten years without success to regain her seat on the Danube Estuary Commission. Since the end of May the revision of the Danube administration has been persistently demanded by the German Government, but has made absolutely no progress in spite of the conciliatory attitude assumed by Germany. Finally, with regard to the Kaiser Wilhelm (Kiel) Canal, the other Powers consider themselves bound to maintain the arbitrary limitation of German sovereign rights, which was imposed on Germany at Versailles.

The German Government cannot take the responsibility of submitting any longer to the state of affairs described above. They find themselves therefore compelled to declare that, for their part, they no longer recognize as binding the provisions of the Versailles Treaty which concern the German waterways, nor the international acts which depend on those provisions. The German Government have consequently decided, in accordance with Article 3, paragraph 2, of the Convention in question, to give notice of the termination as from to-day of the provisional convention (*modus vivendi*) for the Rhine concluded on May 4; and they have similarly decided to refrain from signing the proposed convention for the Elbe which is of the same nature. Therewith any further German co-operation in the International River Commissions ceases. The powers of the existing German representatives cease to exist.

At the same time the German Government communicate the following provisions which they have drafted: Navigation on waterways situated in German territory is open to the ships of all States who are at peace with the German Reich. There will be no discrimination in the treatment of German and foreign ships; and the same is true of the question of shipping dues. The German Government thereby assume that reciprocal treatment will be granted them on the waterways of the other interested countries. The German Government will in addition instruct the German waterways authorities to discuss questions of common interest with the existing authorities of the other riparian States and to conclude agreements on such points, should the occasion arise.

2. STATEMENT BY THE RT. HON. ANTHONY EDEN, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NOVEMBER 16, 1936¹

On November 14 a Note was received from the German Embassy stating that the German Government no longer considered itself bound by those Articles of the Treaty of Versailles relating to the internationalization of rivers and to the administration of the Kiel Canal, nor by any of the international conventions flowing therefrom. The Note justifies this step on the ground that the Articles in question were dictated to Germany and not freely negotiated, but concludes by saying that for the future national treatment will be accorded on a basis of reciprocity on German waterways, to the vessels of all States living at peace with Germany, and that the German waterways authorities will be ready to discuss and enter into agreements with the like authorities of other riparian States in matters of common concern. The German Government also complain that they have not been re-admitted since the War to the European Commission of the Danube, which controls the estuary of that river.

The river Commissions affected by this declaration are the following: International Commission of the Danube, the Central Commission of the Rhine, the International Commission of the Elbe, and the International Commission of the Oder. His Majesty's Government and France are represented on all these Commissions as well as the riparian States, Italy on all except the Oder Commission.

The German Government had on many occasions since the signature of the Treaty of Versailles signified its dissatisfaction with numerous aspects of the international rivers régime set up by the Peace Treaties; but on May 21, 1935, the German Chancellor stated publicly that as regards the remaining Articles of the Treaty, including,

¹ In the House of Commons. *Hansard*, November 16, 1936, coll. 1334-5.

it was understood, those relating to international rivers and the Kiel Canal, the German Government 'will only carry out by means of peaceable understandings such revisions as will be inevitable in the course of time'. This statement was confirmed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin on May 31, 1935. Protracted negotiations had been in progress for many years with a view to reconciling German desiderata with the interests of the other Powers concerned, and with a considerable measure of success; for instance, in May last a convention regulating the navigation of the Rhine was initialed by all the Powers concerned, including Germany, excepting the Netherlands, which still entertained certain objections of a purely technical kind. The convention would, notwithstanding the Netherlands abstention, have been brought into force on January 1 by virtue of the *modus vivendi* which Germany has now denounced. Again direct negotiations between the German and Czechoslovak Governments recently led to an agreement in regard to the Elbe, which it had been hoped to bring into force at a very early date.

In these circumstances it is a matter of regret to His Majesty's Government that, at a time when discussions were proceeding and despite the assurances given last year, the German Government should once again have abandoned procedure by negotiation in favour of unilateral action. These regrets are not due to fear that any important British trading interests have been jeopardized by the German Government's decision, but to the fact that action of this character must render more difficult the conduct of international relations.

3. REGULATION PUBLISHED BY THE GERMAN NAVAL HIGH COMMAND, JANUARY 16, 1937¹

Warships and naval craft of foreign Powers may pass through the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal only with authorization to be obtained in good time beforehand through diplomatic channels.

VII. THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN AGAINST BOLSHEVISM²

From its inauguration the National-Socialist movement waged a relentless war against Bolshevism and the Communist party in Germany. During the period following the conclusion of the Treaty of Rapallo in April 1922, co-operation between Germany and the Soviet Union was

¹ *The Times*, January 18, 1937.

² See *Survey* for 1936, Parts III (ii) & VII (vi) (b).

close, particularly in military and economic matters. This co-operation was not entirely broken off after January 30, 1933, when National-Socialism came to power in Germany; liaison between the Reichswehr and the Red Army was maintained, and trade credits were renewed even during the violent campaign which was launched against the Soviet Union in March 1936 and continued throughout the year. The particular aim of this campaign was apparently to justify, first, the denunciation of Locarno and the reoccupation of the Rhineland, and, later, German intervention in Spain, and to attempt to mobilize opinion, especially in Great Britain, against the Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet Pacts.

It is significant that throughout the campaign the object of denunciation was 'Bolshevism' or 'Jewish-Bolshevism' or the 'Moscow clique', and not Russia. In view of this the extract from Herr Hitler's speech of March 7,¹ in which he drew a distinction between 'Russia' and 'Bolshevism', is of some importance, especially when estimating the possibility of a return by Germany to the Rapallo policy of the years 1922-33.

The Soviet decree of August 11² reducing the age of conscripts received a swift answer on August 24,³ when the period of compulsory service in Germany was raised from one to two years. The Annual Congress of the National-Socialist Party was opened at Nuremberg by Herr Rudolf Hess, the *Führer's* deputy, on September 9.⁴ Herr Hitler's proclamation⁵ denouncing Bolshevism, claiming colonies, and announcing the inauguration of a Four-Year Plan of Self-sufficiency, was read by Herr Adolf Wagner on the same day. Dr. Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, delivered a characteristic address on September 10,⁶ when he accused Czechoslovakia of being an advance base of Bolshevism in Central Europe. Herr Hitler spoke on each day, and extracts from his speeches to the Labour Front on September 12,⁷ to representatives of the foreign press on September 13,⁸ and from his final speech to the Congress on September 14,⁹ are printed below.

To these declarations Marshal Voroshilov replied on September 16.¹⁰

On November 17 reports, which had circulated in January, were again current that some agreement had been, or was on the point of being, concluded between Germany and Japan. Italy, it was believed, would adhere to it or conclude a separate agreement with Japan, thus completing the triangle of which the Italo-German understanding of October 25,¹¹ and the German-Japanese Agreement, formed the other two sides.¹² On November 25 it became known that an agreement had been signed that day.¹³ This provided for co-operation against the activities of the Com-

¹ See below, p. 288.

² See below, p. 289.

³ See below, p. 290.

⁴ See below, p. 291.

⁵ See below, p. 294.

⁶ See below, p. 295.

⁷ See below, p. 341.

⁸ In the event, however, conversations between Italy and Japan resulted in the establishment of an Italian Consulate-General at Harbin and of a Japanese Consulate in Addis Ababa. This action implied recognition of Manchoukuo and of the Italian Empire of Abyssinia.

⁹ See below, p. 297.

¹⁰ See below, p. 289.

¹¹ See below, p. 290.

¹² See below, p. 292.

¹³ See below, p. 294.

¹⁴ See below, p. 296.

munist International¹ and it was agreed that the participation of third States might be invited. A supplementary protocol provided for the establishment of a permanent committee to consider the measures to be taken. It also provided for severe measures 'against those who at home or abroad are engaged directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist International or promote its subversive activities'.

The Agreement was signed by Herr von Ribbentrop, who returned to Berlin from the London Embassy with this express purpose, and by the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, who made statements after the formal procedure of signature had been completed.²

On November 26 Dr. Goebbels spoke at Ludwigshafen on the aims of the Agreement.³

On the same day M. Luhchenko, the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian S.S.R., spoke his picturesque word of defiance at the Congress of Soviets,⁴ and on November 28 M. Litvinov hinted that there was more behind the Agreement than had appeared in the printed text.⁵ Herr Hess replied on November 29.⁶

The unfavourable reception given to the Agreement, and its failure to impress Great Britain or to induce the British Government to adopt an attitude hostile to the Franco-Soviet Pact, caused disappointment to Germany, and in Japan a tendency to explain away the Agreement made itself apparent. On January 5, 1937, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Mr. Arita, broadcast an address⁷ in which he was at pains to point out that Japan's signature did not represent the adoption by the Imperial Government of a policy opposed to Great Britain or the United States by promoting a united front with Germany. The Agreement did not affect the desire of the Government to adjust their relations with the Soviet Union.⁸

1. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY HERR HITLER, MARCH 7, 1936⁹

... If my international opponents reproach me to-day that I have refused this co-operation with Russia, I make them the following declaration: I do not and did not reject co-operation with Russia but with Bolshevism, which lays claim to a world rulership. I am German. I love and am attached to my nation. I know that this nation can be happy when it can live a life in accordance with its

¹ The text of the Resolution adopted by the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International regarding its tasks 'in connexion with the preparations of the Imperialists for a new world war' is printed below; see p. 453.

² See below, pp. 299 and 300.

³ See below, p. 301.

⁴ See below, p. 301.

⁵ See below, p. 302.

⁶ See below, p. 303.

⁷ See below, p. 303.

⁸ This view, however, was not taken in Moscow, and negotiations for the conclusion of a new Fisheries Agreement, which was understood to be ready for signature, were broken off. A protocol, however, was initialed on December 28 renewing the existing Agreement of 1928 (already prolonged in May 1936 until the end of the year) until December 31, 1937.

⁹ *Völkischer Beobachter*, March 8, 1936. Translation by Dr. F. J. Berber in *Locarno*, 1936, pp. 212-13.

own nature and in its own way. The German nation has not only wept but has laughed heartily throughout its life, and I will not see it descend into the gloom of international Communism and the dictatorship of hate. I tremble for Europe at the very thought of what would happen to our old and over-populated continent if this Asiatic concept of the world, which is destructive of all our accepted ideals, should be successful in bringing upon us the chaos of the Bolshevik revolution. Perhaps I am looked upon as one who is accustomed to issue fantastic or at any rate inconvenient warnings. But it is for me a great honour and a justification of my conduct in the eyes of posterity that I am looked upon by the Bolshevik oppressors as one of their greatest enemies. I cannot prevent other States from going the way they think they ought to go or at least can go, but I shall prevent Germany from taking this road to ruin. And I believe that the first step to this ruin is taken when the government of a State itself enters into an alliance with the doctrine of destruction. Should I myself, as a leader of the nation, enter into close relations with this menace, then I do not see how it would be possible for me to convince the German worker as to the danger of a misfortune falling upon Germany in the shape of Bolshevik chaos. With respect to such matters, as statesman and *Führer* of the German people, I shall myself do everything that I expect and demand from each of my fellow countrymen. . . .

2. DECREE OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE U.S.S.R. LOWERING THE AGE OF CONSCRIPTS FOR ACTIVE MILITARY SERVICE, AUGUST 11, 1936¹

Considering the improved physical fitness of Soviet youth, due to the increased welfare of the population and the widespread development of sport and physical culture in the U.S.S.R., and taking into account that the calling to the colours of youths at an earlier age will render possible their subsequent work in chosen careers or study to proceed without intermission, the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars decree:

1. That in amendment of Article 10 of the Act on Compulsory Military Service of August 13, 1930 (Laws of the U.S.S.R., 1930, No. 40, Article 424), the age for the conscription of citizens for active service in the Red Army of workers and peasants be fixed at 19 years by January of the year of conscription (instead of 21 years).

2. That it be proposed to the People's Commissar for Defence of the U.S.S.R. to effect the transition to the conscript age of 19 years

¹ *The Slavonic and East European Review*, April 1937, p. 705.

within four years—from 1936 to 1939 inclusive—by calling up annually one and a half classes, namely: in 1936, the whole of the 1914 and half of the 1915 contingents; in 1937, the remaining half of the 1915 and the whole of the 1916 contingents; in 1938, the whole of the 1917 and half of the 1918 contingents; in 1939, the remaining half of the 1918 and the whole of the 1919 contingents. From 1940 to revert to the normal conscription of a single class.

President of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.

M. KALININ.

Deputy-President of the Council of People's Commissars of
the U.S.S.R.

V. CHUBAR.

Secretary of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.

S. AKULOV.

3. COMMUNIQUÉ ANNOUNCING THE DECREE OF THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT EXTENDING THE PERIOD OF MILITARY SERVICE TO TWO YEARS, AUGUST 24, 1936¹

The *Führer* and Reich Chancellor has signed the following decree concerning the period of compulsory active service in the armed forces from August 24, 1936.

Under paragraph 8 of the Defence Law of May 21, 1935, I direct, in revocation of my decree of May 22, 1935:

The period of active compulsory service in the three branches of the armed forces is fixed at two years.

The Reich War Minister and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces shall decree the necessary administrative and transitional regulations.

Berchtesgaden,

August 24, 1936.

(Signed) ADOLPH HITLER,

VON BLOMBERG.

4. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECHES AND STATEMENTS MADE AT THE NATIONAL-SOCIALIST PARTY CONGRESS, NUREMBERG, SEPTEMBER 9-14, 1936

(i) *Herr Hess, September 9, 1936.*²

... This Party Congress is dedicated more than were former Congresses to the task of demonstrating the danger which menaces the world. This Congress, therefore, will develop the great thesis and anti-thesis of the century—Bolshevism and National-Socialism. Germany

¹ *The Times*, August 25, 1936.

² *Frankfurter Zeitung*, September 10, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

appears at this Party Congress as the dynamic factor in the struggle against Bolshevism. The growing cultural urge of National-Socialism is given practical expression by word and deed in this struggle with Bolshevism and its destruction of cultural values. Political leaders and the youth movement are on the march as the living proof of the inspiration of our people with National-Socialist ideology. The hundred thousands who in the streets of Nuremberg greet the *Führer* and those who fight with him, demonstrate the complete immunity of the Germans from the Bolshevist contagion. So also do . . . the S.A. and S.S., which afford us a guarantee that never again can the revolutionary agents of Moscow raise their fists against Germans. The real power for the protection of the nation against attack by Bolshevist militarism—the young German army—gives visible proof of its strength.

The stronger the Party, the greater our spiritual defensive power against Bolshevism. The stronger the Army, the greater our actual power of defence. We know and demonstrate here that the Party and the Army are stronger than ever before. We thank the *Führer* for having made them so strong. We thank the *Führer* for having saved us from civil war and pillage, from murder, hunger, and distress, for having preserved from ashes and ruin all that is fine and noble, possessed by Germany in such full measure, and for having made us strong to resist those who seek to foment unrest and disturb the peace of the world. . . .

(ii) *Proclamation by Herr Hitler, September 9, 1936.*¹

. . . Unrest, hatred, and mistrust fill the world about us. With the exception of one major Power and a few other States, we encounter throughout Europe the convulsions of Bolshevistic rioting and revolution. . . .

We National-Socialists have never been afraid of Communism. Only we recognized the real character of this shameful Jewish doctrine of world-incitement. We studied its abominable methods and warned others against its results. Besides, I, as the leader of the Nazi movement, even when it had only one hundred members to place against the million followers of Communism, never doubted that we would be able to overthrow them and root them out of Germany. We warned Germany against this Party for fifteen years while the bourgeoisie laughed. We are not afraid to-day of a Bolshevik invasion of Germany, not, however, because we think it

¹ Read by Herr Wagner. *Völkischer Beobachter*, September 10, 1936. Translation by *International Conciliation*, No. 324, November 1936.

impossible, but because we are determined to make the nation so strong that it will be able, like National-Socialism within our boundaries, to face this doctrine of world hate and to resist fiercely every foreign attack.

That is the reason for the military measures we have taken. These German measures will be larger or smaller in proportion to the dangers surrounding us. It is for us no pleasure to lock up these forces of our people in armaments and barracks. We are simply men enough to look these facts coolly in the face.

I want to state in this proclamation before the whole German people that I am profoundly convinced that it is necessary to preserve Germany's external peace in the same manner as I guaranteed its internal peace. I will not avoid any measure calculated to give the nation a sense of security, and above all to secure for ourselves the sense that the complete independence of the Reich is guaranteed.

The Moscow Communist propagandists, Neumann, Bela Kun, and their associates, who to-day are destroying Spain in the interest of the Communist movement, will play no role in Germany, and the summons of the Moscow radio to transform Spain into a heap of ashes will not be repeated in Germany. That the National-Socialist Party and the National-Socialist Army of the Third Reich guarantee. The German people, however, have no other wish than to live in peace with those who wish to live in peace and friendship with us.

I, therefore, after discussions with the Reich War Minister, decreed the immediate introduction of a two-year term of military service.¹ I know that the young German, without moving an eyelash, will obey this necessity. The present German régime has the right to ask this of Germans, for we all served in the greatest war of all times, not for two but for four years. We did it for Germany, for the German nation, for our German homeland. The National-Socialist movement fought for fifteen years and required great sacrifices from its followers for the salvation of Germany from the internal Bolshevik enemy. In this love for our people, and in this readiness to sacrifice ourselves for the freedom and independence of our nation, we feel ourselves bound to all nations with similar principles and ideals. . . .

(iii) *Dr. Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, September 10, 1936.*²

. . . The problem of Bolshevism is the problem of the continuance of Europe. Here doctrines clash, here one must take sides for or

¹ See above, p. 290.

² *Völkischer Beobachter*, September 11, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

against, and one must be prepared for all the consequences which accompany such a decision. . . . Bolshevism must be exterminated if Europe is to regain its normal state of health. . . .

The peace strength of the Red Army is being raised to 2 millions through the lowering of the conscript age-limit.¹ In addition, there are between 9 and 10 million trained reserves. In the event of war, therefore, 11 millions could be mobilized and within a short time as many as 14 millions. At the outbreak of the war the Red Army could put in the field from 160 to 180 infantry divisions and 25 cavalry divisions. Marshal Tukhachevsky lately estimated the increased number of tanks as 2,475. The strength of the Red Air Force is 6,000 aeroplanes. The first line machines consist of 3,100 light and heavy bombers and scouts, and 1,500 fighters. . . . In the opinion of Soviet strategists the next war will be fought without a previous declaration. It is also not generally known that the Soviet Union already possesses the largest submarine fleet in the world. . . .

A Soviet airman and member of the Communist Party gave the following information on December 15, 1935, to a representative of the French paper *Gringoire*: 'The building of aerodromes on both sides of Prague would be ideal for us. From there we could halve our flying-time and our fuel, which would enable us to carry 3 tons more of explosives.' In the meantime these Red aerodromes have actually been built in large numbers on Czechoslovak territory.² They were recently increased to thirty-six. . . . From these thirty-six aerodromes Red bombers will start for the invasion of Europe. How serious this threat is, can be seen from the fact that the most important strategical points of Central Europe can be reached and destroyed by the bombers of the Red battle squadrons in less than an hour.

¹ See above, p. 289.

² On September 11 the Czechoslovak Government issued the following *démenti*: 'In the speech made by Dr. Goebbels there is a repetition, amongst other pieces of inaccurate or false information, notwithstanding all the denials made by official Czechoslovak circles, of the myth about the existence of Soviet aerodromes on Czechoslovak territory.'

Authoritative circles in Prague declare once more that all talk relative to military collaboration between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union directed against any other Power whatsoever, as well as all suggestions that the Soviet Army possesses aerodromes, bases of operation, flying clubs, &c., in Czechoslovakia, are imagination pure and simple.

This morning's press reports, practically without comment, the passage of Dr. Goebbels' speech, and contents itself with recalling all the *démentis* already given to the campaign which has been directed for some time past by a certain foreign press against Czechoslovakia, and above all against the Czechoslovak-Soviet pact of mutual assistance.'

(*Le Temps*, September 12, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.)

From the aerodromes of the Red Army on Czechoslovak territory, Dresden can be reached in 20 minutes, Chemnitz in 11, the industrial district of Silesia in 9, Berlin in 42, Vienna in 9, the armaments factories in Steyr in 17, and the industrial district of Styria in 27. Budapest can be reduced to ashes 6 minutes after the aeroplanes have taken off. That is the true aspect of Bolshevik 'peace policy'. . . .

It is to the lasting credit of the *Führer* that the whole world has already acknowledged that he has set up on the frontier of Germany a barrier against the assaults of Bolshevism in the East, and has thereby become the spiritual pioneer of Europe in his crusade against the subversive forces of destruction and anarchy. . . . The Red Kremlin has sensibly increased the effective strength of the Bolshevik army by lengthening the period of military service. The *Führer* has not failed to make a reply. Through the introduction of the two-year period of service, he gave back to Germany the security which is so necessary to protect us from Red anarchy. . . .

(iv) *Herr Hitler, September 12, 1936.*¹

. . . If the Urals with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, the rich forests of Siberia, and the unending cornfields of the Ukraine, lay in Germany,² under National-Socialist leadership the country would swim in plenty. We would produce, and every single German would have enough to live on. . . .

(v) *Herr Hitler, September 13, 1936.*³

. . . People wonder why we are fanatics against Bolshevism. It is because we—and Italy too—have lived through much the same sort of thing as that which is happening in Spain. Why, here in Nuremberg in 1923, 4,500 war veterans who were marching here were set upon by Communists, and in Munich during the Soviet régime hostages were shot by Bolsheviks just as they are to-day in Spain.

Of course we no longer fear Bolshevism in Germany. I have only one fear—and I say it quite openly—that countries around us into which this Bolshevik poison is eating its way will succumb one

¹ To representatives of the Labour Front. *Völkischer Beobachter*, September 14, 1936.

² As reported in the British press of September 14–15, this sentence was variously translated as follows: 'If he could command' (*The Times*), 'If we had at our disposal' (*Daily Telegraph*), 'If we had' (*Manchester Guardian*). In the official text of the speech, published in the German press on September 14, it was noted that the sentence had been modified and issued in the form printed above.

³ Statement to foreign press representatives. *Manchester Guardian*, September 14, 1936.

after the other. To that we could not be indifferent, for, after all, we are a European nation. . . .

Naturally we and Italy sympathize with Nationalists in other countries for the reason that we can only deal with countries which are organized on a Nationalist basis. A Europe led by a cultural régime—that one could understand. But that Moscow of all countries should seek to dominate Europe—that is something we Germans could never accept. What Europe needs is friendly rivalry of well-organized States. A Europe dominated by Bolshevist bureaucracy would go under. . . .

(vi) *Herr Hitler, September 14, 1936.*¹

. . . We fear that other nations may become the prey of that philosophy which we regard without reservation as our most deadly enemy—namely, Bolshevism.

We see in Bolshevism a bestial, mad doctrine which is a threat to us. In the past Bolshevism tried to work on our territory just as it is now trying to push its military forces ever closer to our frontiers. We exterminated Bolshevism on our own ground. We warded off the attempt to infect Germany from Moscow. We know that the Moscow Jews will never stop their activity.

Therefore we must regard Bolshevism abroad as our enemy. We shall fight it as a world power if it tries to transfer its Spanish methods to Germany. It is not the aim of Bolshevism to free the nations from what is sick in them, but to exterminate all that is healthy. I cannot make a pact with a régime whose first act is not the liberation of workmen but of the inmates of gaols. . . .

We oppose Bolshevism for economic reasons. . . .

We oppose Bolshevism because we are Socialists. . . .

Moscow remains Moscow and Germany remains Germany.

Finally, we oppose Bolshevism because we do not want the German people to be slaughtered for Jewish Bolshevist aims. Our army does not take an oath to spread Nazi ideas in other nations, but to defend Germany against the attacks of others. We cannot negotiate with Jewish Communist leaders. Wherever we look we see Bolshevism inciting to intervention, to the supply of arms. We can regard all this calmly, but if they endanger the Reich the German people will sweep away from their frontiers those who imagine that they will have a walk-over with the German army.

It must be known by all in these times of revolution that the Germans are masters in their own house. . . .

¹ *Manchester Guardian*, September 15, 1936.

These are only some of the things which divide us from Communism. I admit that they cannot be bridged over. Here we actually have two different worlds which can move farther away from each other but which can never be brought together. When, in an English newspaper, a supporter of parliamentary government complains that we want to divide Europe into two parts, I am afraid that we shall have to break the unpleasant news to this Robinson Crusoe on his happy British island that this division has already been made. Not only this, but all those States which have not sought and made a definite decision for one side or the other are inwardly divided against themselves. If people will not see a thing, that does not mean that it is not there. . . .

We believe that, sooner or later, no nation, whatever its bourgeois reasonableness and political wisdom, will be spared from making a clear-cut decision. For it is not our fault if Europe is divided into two parts; it is Bolshevism that has attacked the principles of our whole human system of the State and of society, our culture, our beliefs, our morality, and that has called all these principles in question. If this Bolshevism only fostered its doctrines in one single country, other countries would not need to trouble about it. But the first principle of this doctrine is its internationalism, that is to say, the belief that it must triumph throughout the whole world, which means turning the world as we know it upside down. The fact that a British leader writer will not admit this means just about as much as if a humanist, living in Vienna in the fifteenth century, had simply denied that Islam intended to spread over Europe and had hinted that any one who asserted such a thing was dividing the world into two parts, the East and the West. I am sorry to say that I cannot help feeling that most of those who doubt that Bolshevism is a danger to the world come from the East themselves. English politicians have not yet become acquainted with Communism in their own land, but we have. Since it was I myself who fought, routed, and extirpated this Jewish-Sovietic world of ideas in Germany, I imagine that I understand the nature of this phenomenon better than people to whom it has only been a matter of literature. . . .

5. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY MARSHAL VOROSHILOV, PEOPLE'S
COMMISSAR FOR DEFENCE, SEPTEMBER 16, 1936¹

. . . I can assure you that the Soviet Ukraine will remain an impregnable outpost of our Great Socialist Fatherland. The Soviet Union, particularly the Soviet Ukraine, has very many enemies.

¹ *The Times*, September 18, 1936.

These enemies are preparing to try once more to turn our flourishing Socialist country into ruins and to make its workers once more slaves under the yoke, as they were nineteen years ago.

Our enemies are miscalculating. This country, solid, mighty, 170,000,000 strong, is advancing in all directions in Socialist reconstruction, and it is able to rebuff any enemy. The workers of Kiev remember well the hatefulness of those mad capitalist dogs who were here in Kiev, and their insolence, brutality, dullness, and barbarity. This past will never return. However much certain gentlemen abroad dream of trying to step once more on Soviet soil they will not succeed. If anybody attempts to attack our country, our workers, men and women, our collective farmers, our intellectuals—the whole country—will take up arms. We are ready for war, comrades.

I can assure the workers of the Ukraine that our Red Army will be fully able to meet the enemy wherever he prefers or whenever he turns his crazy attacks on Soviet territory. We have one firm intention, that, if the enemy attacks the Soviet Ukraine, Soviet White Russia, or any other part of the Soviet Union, we shall not only not admit him into the confines of our Fatherland, but we shall beat him in the territory from which he comes.

War now will be very formidable, very cruel, with the use of the most terrible weapons, which have never before been seen anywhere in the world. You can imagine that if this struggle unfolds in the territory of our country, the destruction in all areas will be terrifying. Therefore, not only we of the Red Army, but also all you workers must bring yourselves up in such a way and so organize the defence of our country that, if the enemy appears, he will be beaten without fail in his own territory. He should be beaten in such a way that, having learned his lesson from us once for all, he should abandon his wild dreams about turning the workers and collective farmers of our great land into slaves. We should prove good teachers, we Bolshevik tutors, and should teach those gentlemen in such a way that they will forbid their grandchildren to attack Soviet territory.

6. GERMAN-JAPANESE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, NOVEMBER 25, 1936¹

(i) *Agreement.*

The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist International,

¹ *Reichsgesetzblatt (Teil II)* January 15, 1937, pp. 28–30. Translation by *The Times*, November 26, 1936.

known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of co-operating in the defence against Communist subversive activities; have agreed as follows:

Article I

The High Contracting States agree to inform one another of the activities of the Communist International, to consult with one another on the necessary preventive measures, and to carry these through in close collaboration.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties will jointly invite third States whose internal peace is threatened by the subversive activities of the Communist International to adopt defensive measures in the spirit of this agreement or to take part in the present agreement.

Article III

The German as well as the Japanese text of the present agreement is to be deemed the original text. It comes into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for a period of five years. Before the expiry of this period the High Contracting Parties will come to an understanding over the further method of their co-operation.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly and properly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at Berlin on November 25, 1936—that is, November 25 of the 11th year of Showa Period.

(Signed) VON RIBBENTROP, Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the German Reich.

(Signed) MUSHAKOJI, Imperial Japanese Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador.

(ii) *Supplementary Protocol.*

On the occasion of the signing to-day of the agreement against the Communist International, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have agreed as follows:

- (a) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will work in close collaboration in matters concerning the

exchange of information over the activity of the Communist International as well as investigatory and defensive measures against the Communist International.

- (b) The competent authorities of the two High Contracting States will within the framework of the existing laws take severe measures against those who at home or abroad are engaged directly or indirectly in the service of the Communist International or promote its subversive activities.
- (c) In order to facilitate the co-operation of the competent authorities provided for in paragraph (a) a permanent committee will be set up. In this committee the further defensive measures necessary for the struggle against the subversive activities of the Communist International will be considered and discussed.

(Signed) VON RIBBENTROP.

(Signed) MUSHAKOJI.

7. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY HERR VON RIBBENTROP, NOVEMBER 25, 1936¹

At the Seventh Comintern Congress, Bolshevism declared a fight to the death against all law-abiding States, and proclaimed as its goal the accomplishment of revolution in all States and the establishment of the Bolshevik world dictatorship. The latest victim of the desire for destruction, shown by the Bolshevik virus, is Spain. This country, which possesses an ancient European civilization, is to-day torn by civil war; her towns and villages lie everywhere in ruins and ashes, and the Spanish people are exposed to trials and torments—a situation which is almost without parallel in history. These are the terrible results of the interference of the Communist International in pursuance of the decisions taken at the Seventh Comintern Congress. The Comintern had no other object in view than to set up by propaganda and force of arms the 'Soviet Republic of Spain', in order further to undermine Europe from there. Who will be the next victim? Several States, as for instance America, have made energetic protests against the decisions of the Seventh Comintern Congress²—these have remained ineffective.

Germany and Japan, being unwilling to tolerate any longer the machinations of the Communist agitators, have now taken active steps. The conclusion of the Agreement signed by Germany and Japan against the Communist International is an epoch-making event. It

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, November 27, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

² See below, p. 461.

is a turning-point in the struggle of all law-abiding and civilized nations against the forces of disintegration.

With the signing of this Treaty, our *Führer* and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan have consummated an historical act, the full significance of which will only be appreciated by future generations. To-day a strong line of defence has been formed by two nations who are equally determined to bring to destruction every attempt at intervention in their two countries by the Communist International. Japan will never permit the dissemination of Bolshevism in the Far East. Germany is creating a bulwark against this pestilence in Central Europe. Finally Italy, as the *Duce* informs the world, will hoist the anti-Bolshevist banner in the south. I am convinced that those nations, which are to-day still unaware of the dangers of Bolshevism, will one day thank our *Führer* for his clear and seasonable recognition of this unique world-menace.

Provision is made in the Agreement for invitations to other countries to participate in the struggle. We hope and wish that the other civilized nations may recognize the necessity of universal co-operation against the activities of the Communist International and may adhere to this Agreement. In this fashion we shall succeed in finally warding off this universal enemy, in preserving peace at home and abroad, and in saving our ancient civilization.

8. STATEMENT TO THE PRESS BY THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AT BERLIN, NOVEMBER 25, 1936¹

I am herewith giving frank expression to my pleasure at the conclusion to-day of the Agreement between Japan and Germany against the Communist International. The Communist International is, as is well known, an international organization which has its cells all over the world, and sets up as its goal the oppression and disintegration of existing States.

As the intervention of the Communist International in the internal affairs of particular States not only imperils the internal peace and social well-being of those States, but also threatens the peace of the whole world, it is a matter of course for every civilized country, following the dictates of self-preservation, to protect the lives and welfare of its people against this danger. In this connexion I must emphasize that there is only one method of effective defence against this international Communist organization—namely co-operation between States.

Japan and Germany, against whom, above all, the decision of the

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, November 27, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

Seventh Comintern Congress is directed, feel that they are very seriously threatened by the process of disintegration initiated by the Communist International; and they are therefore the first countries to decide to unite against this danger.

I am convinced that the Japanese Empire, under the glorious rule of His Majesty the Emperor, and the new Germany, under the heroic leadership of the *Führer* and Chancellor, will by this step contribute their share, as guarantors of world peace in the East and in the West, to the pacification of the world.

9. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY DR. GOEBBELS, GERMAN MINISTER OF PROPAGANDA, NOVEMBER 26, 1936¹

. . . A new war would be the greatest misfortune for the whole of Europe, and even the victor in this war would not gain as much from it as he would lose. We should be more than short-sighted if we were to wish that France should be ruled by a Bolshevik régime. Fundamentally the disputes between European peoples, as compared with the advancing Bolshevik danger, are only a kind of family quarrel. If France were prepared to act honourably it would be easy to establish peaceful relations with Germany. The crisis arose when France entered into a military alliance with the Soviet Union; in the face of that we could not remain passive.

. . . We cannot suffer Bolshevism to play its atrocious game with Europe. . . . The *Führer* is to-day not only the *Führer* of the German nation but also the spiritual awakener of Europe. . . . For fourteen years we have cried 'Germany awake!'; we were laughed at and mocked, but Germany is awake. To-day we send our warning cry to the civilized nations and call 'Europe awake!'.

10. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY M. LUBCHENKO, PRIME MINISTER OF THE UKRAINIAN S.S.R., NOVEMBER 26, 1936²

. . . Our answer to the Nazi dream of invading the Ukraine is an old Ukrainian saying: 'Just as a pig can never look at the sky, so Hitler will never be able to see our cabbage patch.' . . .

The Ukrainian people are ready to defend the Socialist Republic by force of arms. If a Fascist army dares to approach the Soviet Union our army under Voroshilov will deliver such a blow as has never been seen before. . . .

¹ At Ludwigshafen. *Völkischer Beobachter*, November 27, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

² At the 8th All-Union Congress of Soviets in Moscow. *New York Times*, November 27, 1936.

11. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY M. LITVINOV, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR
FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, NOVEMBER 28, 1936¹

. . . Failing to obtain allies among the Members of the League of Nations who still adhere to the idea of collective security, Fascism, finding itself isolated, turned towards those few countries which also pursue aggressive aims, and formed a *bloc* with them allegedly for a fight against 'the international Communist danger'.

For the sake of precision I will state that the *bloc* which was formed is not a common one for the three States, but exists separately between Germany and Italy and between Germany and Japan. We have definite information, however, that Italy proposed to Japan the conclusion of an agreement with her similar to the published part of the Japanese-German Agreement.

Well-informed people refuse to believe that for the drawing up of the two scanty published articles of the Japanese-German Agreement it was necessary to conduct negotiations for fifteen months, and that on the Japanese side it was necessary to entrust these negotiations to an army general and on the German side to an important diplomat, and that it was necessary to conduct these negotiations in an atmosphere of the strictest secrecy.

As regards the published Japanese Agreement, it is only a camouflage for another agreement which was simultaneously discussed and initialed and in all probability signed, but which has not been published and is not intended for publication.

I assert, being conscious of all the responsibility of my words, that negotiations were carried on for fifteen months between the Japanese military attaché and the German diplomat, and were devoted precisely to the elaboration of this secret document in which the word 'Communism' is not even mentioned.

German Fascism asserted that in principle it was opposed to any international alliances and combinations except non-aggression pacts, and even these were to be concluded only with neighbouring States. It has concluded an agreement, and by no means a non-aggression agreement, with Japan, which is thousands of miles away, and separated from it by several States.

German Fascism swore that it adhered to the principle of localization of war. The Agreement with Japan has a tendency to spread war arising in one continent to at least two, if not more, continents. . . .

¹ At the 8th All-Union Congress of Soviets in Moscow. *Manchester Guardian*, November 30, 1936.

12. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY HERR HESS, NOVEMBER 29, 1936¹

. . . The events in Spain have shown the whole world the dangers which result from the activities of the Comintern, not only for the country immediately concerned, but also for peace and order between all nations. On that account the conclusion of a treaty for joint and effective defence against the activities of the Comintern is a significant contribution to the safeguarding of peace. . . .

We desire a union of the peoples against criminals who are consciously and intentionally spreading poisonous germs among the nations. I say criminals, because in Soviet Russia it is not the people that are Bolshevist by nature, but a Jewish clique that has forced the strait-jacket of Bolshevism on them by terror.

We do not inquire what is the system of government of those peoples who stand together to preserve themselves against this universal pestilence, we do not inquire whether it is authoritarian or democratic. We have no intention of recommending our system of government to other nations, much less of trying to gain recognition for it among them. But we do know that the Comintern intends to force upon other nations the system of government of the country in which it flourishes, and we hope that the nations will stand together against these attempts to interfere in their internal affairs—against these attempts to oppress their sovereign rights. . . .

13. BROADCAST ADDRESS BY MR. ARITA, MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, JANUARY 5, 1937²

The most important diplomatic event of the past year for this country was, I believe, the Agreement guarding against the Communist International, which was signed between Japan and Germany on November 25. The conclusion of this so-called 'Japanese-German Anti-Communist International Agreement' is said to mark an epoch in the present international situation. Certainly it has produced visible reactions all over the world.

In order to explain the need of this anti-Communist Agreement, it should be recalled, in the first place, that the activities of the Communist International, which is carrying on insidious operations against all countries for undermining their national foundations and their social stability, with the ultimate end in view of sovietizing the whole world, constitute a grave menace to world peace. In the

¹ At Goslar. *Völkischer Beobachter*, November 30, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

² *International Gleanings from Japan* (Tokyo), January 15, 1937.

second place, not only is Communism incompatible with the national polity of Japan, but its further penetration into China and its destructive operations in Manchoukuo are bound to destroy the peace and stability of East Asia. The Agreement is therefore intended to suppress Communist operations and to combat the Communist movement, and thereby to promote world peace as well as to ensure the security of East Asia.

The campaigns of the Comintern at one time swept the whole world. In countries such as Italy and Germany, Communism was so rampant that a Communist revolution seemed imminent. However, the Fascist régime was later set up in Italy by Mussolini, while the Nazi régime under Hitler came into power in Germany. These régimes, by opposing Communism and suppressing relentlessly all Communist activities, were barely able to save their countries from the Red menace. Anti-Communist forces were gradually strengthened also in other countries, and a general opposition came to prevail against the Communist movement.

Thus after 1928 the campaigns of the Comintern appeared to have abated to the relief of not a few people. But men with eyes quickly recognized that the Comintern had not abandoned its doctrine of world revolution, and that the relaxation of its campaign was nothing but tactics—a temporary camouflage—that required the utmost vigilance. Sure enough, the Seventh Congress of the Comintern convened in Moscow in July 1935 declared Japan and Germany to be the objects of its operations respectively in the East and in the West, and decided upon a sudden and drastic change in its campaign methods. It passed a resolution to co-operate with its avowed antagonist, the Second International, that is to say, to join hands with various Social-Democratic elements in the moderate Leftist camp and to form a common front with them throughout the world. The Comintern has taken this step merely in order to conceal its creed of proletarian dictatorship by hoisting the banner of pro-democracy, and to carry on destructive operations under the guise of legitimate measures. The so-called 'people's front' movement that has since appeared in France, in Spain, and in many other countries is the fruit borne of the new strategy adopted by the Comintern. In China the movement, combined with the anti-Japanese agitation, has led to the formation of an 'anti-Japanese people's front', which, under the pretext of an anti-Japanese campaign, is pushing forward the operations for the sovietization of that country.

As for Spain, you know, perhaps, from the newspaper reports how the entire country has been turned into a scene of destruction and

carnage by the conflict between the Leftist Government that was formed in February last and the Rightist faction led by General Franco.

Now let us turn to China. The Comintern, soon after it was formed, picked China out of all countries of East Asia as the most fruitful field of operation, because here the Nationalist movement and the anti-imperialist movement were already active, and to that extent the ground had been prepared for the propagation of Communism. The Chinese Communist Party was organized under the direction of the Comintern, and the Party served as the major weapon for the Red invasion of China. The Comintern, taking advantage of the internecine wars and the widespread misery and suffering in China, carried on its agitations among the masses and whetted its fangs. As the result of the policy of the Kuomintang to tolerate the Communist Party, men like Borodin, dispatched to China by the Comintern, dominated the inner councils of the Kuomintang at Canton and elsewhere. Later Chiang Kai-shek severed all connexions with the Communists and established the Nanking Government. Even then, the central-south of China was infested with Communist armies, and the so-called 'Soviet Areas' were set up here and there. The Nanking Government, realizing the gravity of such a situation, launched upon a campaign of suppression, and, after several years and at an enormous cost, has finally succeeded in dislodging the Communists from central-south China. The Red armies now driven to the north-west of China near the Siberian border are waiting and watching for a chance to come back. There are indications that they are endeavouring to win over to their side the expeditionary troops of the Chinese Government. Of course, contact is being maintained always between the Communists and the Comintern headquarters by way of Sinkiang or Outer Mongolia. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in July last a resolution was adopted that the Chinese Communists should join forces with all anti-Japanese elements in China regardless of party or faction and fight against Japanese imperialism. In conformance with this new order the Chinese Communist Party has since altered its methods of propaganda and campaign tactics. That is to say, the Party, forming a united front with anti-Japanese elements, and under the pretence of opposing Japan, is now engaged in the work of sovietizing China as assiduously as ever. It is not without reason that the Comintern is supposed to be the villain in the Sian Incident drama enacted recently by Chang Hsueh-liang. 4

It was in the light of circumstances such as these that in the

Sino-Japanese negotiations of last year our Government proposed to the Chinese Government the matter of joint defence against Communism. Our proposal was made exactly for the same purposes as those which the Japanese-German Anti-Communist International Agreement is intended to serve. It is to be greatly regretted for the sake of Japan and China and the peace of East Asia that the Chinese Government, despite all possible explanations given by us, has so far failed to understand the true intentions of our Government. The sovietization of China is bound to affect all the countries of the world. Because the Communist movement is linked with anti-Japanese agitations, it affects us doubly, and we cannot but have a grave concern over the development of the present situation.

The foreign policy of Japan is directed, as I have already said, towards the maintenance of peace in East Asia, the promotion of concord and harmony with all nations, and the preservation of world peace. Even if we may ignore for the moment the disturbances in Spain and the general unrest in Europe, it is impossible for us to remain indifferent to the Red penetration of Manchoukuo, and the sovietization of China carried on in the name of an anti-Japanese front, and the aggravation of Sino-Japanese relations and the consequent menace to the stability of East Asia. To us it is a problem of vital importance.

The Comintern possesses a secret organization which, regardless of national boundaries, is spread like cobweb all over the globe, and whose operations are extremely ingenious. In order to put up an effective resistance to such a body, there must be an international organization and international co-operation. The Powers have only themselves to blame for having overlooked this obvious point so long.

On the other hand, it is more than natural that when the Comintern is attempting to create a world-wide allied front with Japan and Germany as the objects of its campaign, these two countries should unite, and invite others to join, in the common defence against the Red menace.

Regarding the Japanese-German agreement there have been circulated abroad various rumours based upon either misconstructions or distortions. I avail myself of this opportunity to say a few words in this connexion.

Since Japan's immutable policy is aimed at the stability of East Asia, it is quite natural that we should take such measures as are deemed suited to rescuing East Asia from the menace of Communism. It goes without saying that our foreign policy has undergone no change through the conclusion of our anti-Communist agreement with

Germany. The Japanese-German agreement is simply an expression—a concrete manifestation—of one of the aims of our foreign policy, namely, the stabilization of East Asia. And it does not affect in the slightest degree the other aims of our policy such as the adjustment of our relations with the Soviet Union and China and the promotion of friendship with Great Britain, the United States, and other Powers in the spirit of universal concord and harmony. Therefore, the view that Japan, with the conclusion of the agreement, has adopted a new policy to oppose Great Britain and America by presenting a united front with Germany can only be attributed to either malice or misunderstanding.

I hear that there are some people who harbour the groundless apprehensions that Japan, by concluding the agreement with Germany, has entered the so-called 'Fascist bloc' and is about to transform her government into a Fascist régime. The Japanese-German agreement, which simply provides for the co-operation between the two countries in guarding against the activities of the Communist International, has nothing to do with the polity, the form of government, or the machinery of administration of Germany even if she happens to be under the Nazi rule. Moreover, Japan has a national policy of her own. Our country is ruled according to the Constitution granted by the Emperor Meiji. Those who speak of Japan's entry into the Fascist bloc, or of her Government's taking on a Fascist colour, are totally ignorant of what is really our national polity or our form of government.

VIII. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

1. ROME PROTOCOL BLOC¹

The three States—Italy, Austria, and Hungary—forming the so-called Rome Protocol *Bloc* which was established by the Protocols signed in Rome on March 17, 1934,² held one conference in 1935, when at Venice on May 4-6 their representatives met to discuss the proposed Danubian Pact—a project which had been blessed by France and Italy in the Rome Pact of January 7, 1935, by France and the United Kingdom in the Anglo-French Declaration of February 3, 1935, and by all three Powers at the Stresa Conference on April 14, 1935.³

Two meetings were held in 1936. The first in Rome, on March 21-3,⁴ assembled with the object of discussing the projected commercial treaty

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part III (iv) (a) 3.

² See *Documents* for 1933, p. 396.

³ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. (i), pp. 23, 26.

⁴ See below, p. 308.

between Austria and Czechoslovakia and the plans of Dr. von Schuschnigg and M. Hodza¹ for an economic Danubian Pact as a precursor of a political agreement, embracing the Rome Protocol *Bloc* and the Little Entente. The treaty and the scheme were viewed with disfavour by Hungary, Yugoslavia, and Germany; Hungary was opposed to co-operation with the Little Entente and had not abandoned hope of revision; Yugoslavia was anxious lest Italy's position in Central Europe might be strengthened; Germany was opposed to any agreement in South-Eastern Europe which might prove an obstacle to her plans for political and economic penetration. A permanent organ was set up and a pledge given that no negotiations with third States should be initiated without consultation.

The second meeting held in Vienna on November 11–12² was apparently arranged to discuss developments during the year, and particularly the Austro-German compromise of July 11, 1936,³ and the Italo-German Understanding of October 25, 1936.⁴ The meeting was preceded and followed by great diplomatic activity and an exchange of visits between statesmen of the three States of the Rome *Bloc*.

The reference in the *communiqué* to the equality of rights in the matter of armaments claimed by Austria and Hungary—coming as it did after the unilateral action of Austria on April 1, providing for the introduction of conscription⁵—caused a flutter in the Little Entente dovescotes, and an official *communiqué* was issued on November 14⁶ recalling the settled policy of the Little Entente in regard to these problems.

(i) *Additional Protocols, supplementary to the Rome Protocols of March 1934, March 23, 1936.*⁷

(1) The Head of the Italian Government, the Federal Chancellor of Austria, and the President of the Council of Hungary having met together in Rome on March 23, 1936, take note with satisfaction of the favourable results attained by the continuous collaboration of the three Governments for the maintenance of peace and for the economic readjustment of Europe; reaffirm solemnly their will to remain faithful to the political, economic, and cultural principles of the Protocols of Rome of March 17, 1934;⁸ recognize it to be the interest of the three countries to harmonize their action to an ever greater extent, in all fields, with such ulterior developments of which the European situation may be susceptible; and decide to form themselves into a group and to create to this purpose a permanent organ of reciprocal consultation.

(2) Basing themselves on the purposes referred to in (1), the three Governments confirm anew their decision not to undertake any im-

¹ See below, pp. 312 and 314.

² See below, p. 320.

³ See below, p. 315.

⁴ *The Times*, March 25, 1936.

⁵ See below, p. 309.

⁶ See below, p. 341.

⁷ See below, p. 310.

⁸ See *Documents* for 1933, p. 396.

portant political negotiation appertaining to the Danubian question with the government of a third State without having previously established contact with the other two Governments with whom the Protocols of Rome of March 17, 1934, were signed.

While the three Governments are completely in agreement on the utility of the development of their economic relations with other Danubian States, they recognize that for the moment such an intensification could only be brought into effect through bilateral agreements.

(3) The permanent organ of reciprocal consultation contemplated by (1) will be constituted by the Foreign Ministries of the three signatory States. This organ will assemble periodically and when the three Governments shall judge it opportune.

(ii) *Communiqué issued after the Conference of the Rome Protocol States, November 12, 1936.*¹

On the occasion of the meeting which took place at Vienna on November 11 and 12, in accordance with the Rome Protocols, between the Federal Chancellor, Dr. von Schuschnigg, Dr. Guido Schmidt, [Austrian] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Count Ciano, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and M. de Kanya, Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the complete agreement of the three Governments, on problems of general interest as well as on those of particular interest to the three States, was once more demonstrated.

The representatives of the three Governments examined most carefully the economic relations between the three States and reinforced their intentions to continue in the complete co-operation hitherto pursued. They further confirmed their decision to develop their economic relations with other States along the lines of bilateral agreement.

The Austrian Federal Chancellor and the Hungarian Foreign Minister took this opportunity to express in the names of their Governments their grateful satisfaction over the results which have already been achieved, thanks to the effective support which in recent months has been accorded to the national economy of Austria and Hungary alongside that of Italy. The representatives of the three Governments with great satisfaction emphasized the harmonious functioning of the Rome Protocols and their perfect appropriateness to the aim of rehabilitating the Danube basin.

The Italian and Hungarian Foreign Ministers noted with pleasure the communication of the Austrian Federal Government regarding

¹ At Vienna. *Manchester Guardian*, November 13, 1936.

the development of relations between Austria and the German Reich on the basis of the agreement of July 11.¹ The Italian Foreign Minister personally informed the representatives of Austria and Hungary of his talks with the *Führer* and Reich Chancellor.² The representatives of Austria and Hungary expressed their lively gratification at the decision reached on the part of the Italian and German Governments to treat the problems relating to the Danube basin in the spirit of most friendly co-operation, in which connexion the provisions of the Rome subsidiary Protocols of 1936³ remain in force for the three Governments.

The representatives of the three Governments announced their complete agreement that the attitude of Austria⁴ and Hungary with regard to equality of armaments is justified and that this equality springs from the basic principles of justice. The three Governments will keep one another informed regarding its realization.

The Austrian Federal Chancellor and the Hungarian Foreign Minister informed the Italian Foreign Minister—who expressed the very great satisfaction of the Italian Government at the news—of the decision of the Governments formally to recognize the Italian empire in Abyssinia. The Italian Government will take into account the wish of the Austrian and Hungarian Governments to take part in the economic exploitation of Abyssinia according to the dispositions of their national economy.

The questions discussed and the results achieved were set down in a Protocol. The representatives of the three Governments have decided to hold their next meeting in Budapest at a time to be agreed on.

(iii) *Communiqué issued by the Little Entente regarding Hungarian rearmament, November 14, 1936.*⁵

With regard to that section of the *communiqué* issued by the three States at the Vienna Conference, which deals with equality of rights in armaments,⁶ the States of the Little Entente consider it necessary to recall in that connexion that, as long ago as May 1933, they expressly accepted the principle of equality of rights in armaments, but with the proviso that this principle should be applied on the lines of a reciprocal agreement and that strictly defined guarantees of security should be offered.

¹ See below, p. 320.

² See above, p. 308.

³ *Prager Presse*, November 15, 1936.

⁴ See preceding document.

⁵ See below, p. 341.

⁶ See below, p. 315.

2. AUSTRIA¹

On January 16-17 Dr. von Schuschnigg, the Federal Chancellor, paid a visit to Prague for the ostensible purpose of delivering a lecture at the Prague Industrialists Club.² During his visit he had the opportunity of conversations with M. Hodza, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister. The possibility of economic, to be followed by political, co-operation between the States of the Rome Protocol *Bloc* and the Little Entente was, it appears, discussed and also the details of a commercial treaty between the two countries.

On March 12-16, Dr. von Schuschnigg, accompanied by his Foreign Minister, Baron von Berger-Waldenegg, visited Budapest for an exchange of views on the eve of the meeting of the Rome Protocol *Bloc*. In a statement to the press on his arrival Dr. von Schuschnigg referred to his talks with M. Hodza and emphasized the fact that the Rome Protocols were no final goal but might 'with proper understanding' be 'the starting-point of a positive development for Central Europe'.³

On April 1, 1936, Dr. von Schuschnigg announced in the National Assembly that compulsory service for all males between 18 and 42, 'with or without arms', would be introduced. The bill was passed the same day.⁴ Five days later the representatives of the Little Entente handed identical notes of protest to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs,⁵ who made public a brief reply on the same day.⁶ On May 4, the Federal Government issued a lengthy memorandum⁷ explaining that the law provided for 'compulsory service' (*Dienstpflicht*) not for 'compulsory military service' (*Wehrpflicht*). The provision for 'service with or without arms' allowed the Government to employ conscripts in public works or in military training, or, in an emergency, in the defence of their country. The law was also justified on grounds of health, training, economy, and defence.

During May and June, preceded by a bitter campaign against Austria in the German press, negotiations proceeded with Germany for a *modus vivendi*. According to Signor Mussolini's own statement,⁸ the terms of a proposed compromise agreement between Germany and Austria were submitted to him and the approval of Italy was obtained on June 5. On July 8-9 Major Baar-Baarenfels visited Budapest to communicate details of the agreement to the Hungarian Government. On July 11 an official *communiqué*, broadcast simultaneously in Berlin and Vienna by Dr. Goebbels⁹ and Dr. von Schuschnigg,¹⁰ announced the terms to the public. In Vienna an official commentary was also published,¹¹ while in London an official explanatory statement was issued by the Austrian Legation.¹² On the following days telegrams were exchanged between Dr. von Schuschnigg, and Herr Hitler, Signor Mussolini, and General Gömbös.¹³

But in spite of the measures taken by the Austrian Government in accordance with the agreement and announced in an official *communiqué* issued on July 11,¹⁴ the pact did not put an end to friction between the

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part III (iv) (a).

² See below, p. 312.

³ See below, p. 314.

⁴ See below, p. 315.

⁵ See below, p. 316.

⁶ See below, p. 317.

⁷ See below, p. 317.

⁸ See below, p. 317.

⁹ See below, p. 317.

¹⁰ See below, p. 317.

¹¹ See below, p. 317.

¹² See below, p. 317.

¹³ See below, p. 315.

¹⁴ See below, p. 316.

¹⁵ See below, p. 317.

¹⁶ See below, p. 317.

¹⁷ See below, p. 317.

¹⁸ See below, p. 317.

¹⁹ See below, p. 317.

²⁰ See below, p. 317.

²¹ See below, p. 317.

²² See below, p. 312.

²³ See below, p. 316.

²⁴ See below, p. 316.

²⁵ See below, p. 345.

²⁶ See below, p. 322.

²⁷ See below, p. 322.

²⁸ See below, p. 323.

²⁹ See below, p. 323.

³⁰ See below, p. 323.

³¹ See below, p. 323.

two Governments or to trouble between the Austrian Government and National-Socialists in Austria. Dr. Guido Schmidt, Secretary of State at the Foreign Office in Vienna, visited Berlin on November 20-21 to discuss political, economic, and cultural questions. It was agreed that the development of commercial relations between the two States should be taken in hand as soon as was convenient. Little, however, was done.

On November 26 Dr. von Schuschnigg in an outspoken speech¹ defined the three dangers to Austria as Communism, National-Socialism, and pessimism. He re-emphasized Austria's determination to maintain her independence and permit nothing contrary to her interests. Even though Austrian National-Socialism stood before them as an enemy, they were not, he said, anti-German.

(i) *Extract from an Address by Dr. von Schuschnigg, Federal Chancellor of Austria, January 16, 1936.*²

... With regard to the anxieties of the middle European States there can be no doubt that the distribution of production in the Europe of to-day is not satisfactory and has within it elements of danger. The last 15 years show that the world turn-over has fallen considerably while the total turn-over of overseas States has increased. On our continent 29 customs frontiers separate 300,000,000 people from one another; who would not be inclined to remember Frederick List when he complained of the 38 tariff walls which existed within the Germany of his time?

What is true in general for Europe with regard to the existing restrictions of the exchange of production has a special significance for the States which lie in the middle European region and whose fate is decisive for the development of Europe. With regard to the economic situation brought about by the post-War period, the erection of higher tariff walls and the repercussions of the economic crisis, it seems comprehensible that within the framework of all the pan-European attempts at settlement in the interests of general stabilization, the problem of middle Europe has a very special position. The significant role in the world played by the foreign trade relations, especially of the Danubian States, within the framework of the foreign trade of Europe, can best be shown by some figures. Hungary draws 43.7 per cent. of her imports from Danubian States, while of her total exports 37.3 per cent. is directed to the same States. Austria with 38.5 per cent. of her imports and 31.2 per cent. of her exports, Yugoslavia with 28.7 per cent. of her imports and 32.2 per cent. of her exports, Czechoslovakia with 13.1 per cent. of her imports

¹ See below, p. 327.

² Delivered at the Auto Club in Prague by invitation from the Prague Industrialists Club. *Neue Freie Presse*, January 17, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

and 20 per cent. of her exports, Rumania with 23 per cent. of her imports and 19 per cent. of her exports, are closely interested in their trade connexions with the Danubian States. The significance of these figures becomes especially clear if one remembers that Germany, for example, exports 8 per cent. of her total exports to the five Danubian States while her total imports from these same States stands at about an equivalent figure. The position with regard to Italy and Poland is approximately the same. . . .

The economic relations between Austria and Czechoslovakia have, in the resumed attempts to reach a reciprocal satisfactory settlement, come up against not inconsiderable difficulties which in the very nature of the problem arose principally out of the different tariff levels of the two States. As far as Austria is concerned the evident and considerable unfavourable balance of trade which at present exists is a matter for complaint. The shrinkage of the total volume of trade which has taken place during the last ten years shows particularly that in the interests of both parties the continuation of the negotiations which have been initiated, and their conclusion at the earliest possible moment, are clearly desirable. While the total imports into Austria in the year 1927 from Czechoslovakia were valued at 780,000,000 sch. the trade statistics of the year 1934 show a reduction of this amount to a value of only 159,000,000 sch., while exports in the same period of 217,000,000 sch. have dropped to 64,000,000 sch. Although the Austrian unfavourable balance has dropped from 563,000,000 sch. in the year 1924 to 95,000,000 sch. in the year 1934, this development is hardly to be regarded as satisfactory—here, I believe, I agree completely with you.

An attempt at settlement, if in this connexion it were attempted to reduce the Austrian unfavourable balance by a further restriction of imports, cannot be considered desirable. On the contrary, our efforts are directed, if possible, to securing an increase in the total volume of trade, without import restrictions and other quotas. . . .

The unsatisfactory position of the economic situation and developments in middle Europe have already led to an attempt to find ways and means of securing a reorganization. In this connexion we must not forget that the problem of middle Europe, as such, did not arise first as a result of the War and of the territorial changes occasioned by it. When the Peace Treaties were drafted notice was taken of the special necessities of our States, to the extent that the Czechoslovak Republic, Hungary, and Austria were permitted during the following five years to conclude commercial agreements between them on a preferential basis. But there was no possibility of making

use of this advantage, not at any rate in accordance with the prevailing ideas of that time, which often revealed a strong protectionist tendency. Increasing difficulties and the growing burden of the crisis led to attempts at solution by regional agreements, which even to-day still constitute a useful and attainable goal, and the success of which can be described without undue optimism as the first step towards a general European settlement of our burning economic problems. I will, if I may, recall to mind the various stages on that difficult road. From the first Act of Restoration of the deceased Austrian Chancellor, Dr. Seipel, at Geneva in August 1922, Austria's road led her, by way of the attempts to conclude an Italo-Austro-Czechoslovak Customs Agreement in 1925, to the signing of the Rome Protocols in March 1934.

This attempt to conclude a regional agreement proved of value, and resulted in the course of 1935 in repeated extensions and finally in Italy's proposal to prepare for a Danubian Conference, which was to be attended not only by the Danubian States but also by the Great Powers—Italy, France, and Germany. It is to be hoped that in the near future this thoroughly constructive attempt to reach a solution will be again discussed. With regard to such regional plans of a politico-economic nature we have so far seen materialize the tripartite Rome Protocols and the Agreement of the Little Entente in 1933, concerning the organization of an economic council.

Experience shows that these regional economic agreements may be a vital factor in the reconstruction of the Central European financial system. . . .

(ii) *Statement to the Press by Dr. von Schuschnigg, Federal Chancellor of Austria, March 12, 1936.*¹

It was natural that the two adjacent States of Austria and Hungary, first of all in their own particular region, should embark on a new commercial policy based on the recommendations of the Stresa Conference. The Rome Treaties were created by the constructive ideas of Dollfuss and Mussolini with the active co-operation of Hungarian statesmen. When they were signed, we emphasized the fact that the Rome Pact constitutes no final goal, but with sufficient understanding can be the starting-point of a positive development for Central Europe. The assumptions made at that time have not yet been realized: but, on the other hand, it is a fact that the knowledge of the beneficial results of the Rome Treaties is continually spreading,

¹ In Budapest. *Reichspost*, March 13, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

and quite recently, in the course of my conversations with Dr. Hodza, I was able to note this knowledge with satisfaction.

In Budapest, Rome, and Vienna we can point out with a certain pride that it was these very capitals which explored new avenues in their commercial policy at the price of various sacrifices. But this new system gives rise to the necessity of testing the existing results from time to time, and of considering whether and by what means progress can be made along the road of politico-economic co-operation. All our meetings, whether they have taken place in Vienna, Budapest, or Rome, have been marked by this positive and productive spirit, and I do not doubt that our recent conferences and the meeting in Rome of the signatories of the Rome Pact, which took place soon afterwards, will have beneficial consequences for all participants.

(iii) *Introduction of Compulsory Service.*

(a) *Text of Conscription Law, April 1, 1936.*¹

Article 1

(1) Citizens of male sex between 18 and 42 years of age can, according to their mental and physical condition, be called to the colours by the Federal State for a limited period of service for public purposes, either with or without arms, and can be employed by the commands (*Befehls(Dienst)stellen*) established for this purpose.

(2) General compulsory service also includes the obligation to undergo an official examination as to mental and physical fitness.

Article 2

Disciplinary measures and special penal regulations shall be applicable to those who are called up for compulsory service; these regulations shall be valid for those serving with the commands (*Befehls(Dienst)stellen*), through which the system of general compulsory service will be organized.

Article 3

The Federal Chancellor in agreement with the Federal Ministers concerned shall decree further regulations in regard to general compulsory service. In particular he may issue orders as to:

- (1) the details of compulsory service, the manner and duration of service, and the just treatment of conscripts;
- (2) the compensation for conscripts and the maintenance of their conditions of service.

¹ *Reichspost*, April 2, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

Article 4

By the decrees to be published under this Federal constitutional law, fines to the amount of 10,000 schillings and terms of imprisonment up to one year can be imposed, and both these penalties may even be inflicted at the same time.

Article 5

By the decrees to be published under this Federal constitutional law, the local council can also be compelled to collaborate.

Article 6

The Federal Chancellor in agreement with the Federal Ministers concerned is entrusted with the execution of this Federal constitutional law.

(b) *Protest by the Little Entente, April 6, 1936.*¹

The diplomatic representatives of the Czechoslovak Republic, Rumania, and Yugoslavia have to-day handed jointly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs identic *Notes Verbales*. The text of the Czechoslovak Note is as follows:

On April 1 the Austrian Parliament passed a Bill, by which the military regulations for Austria, laid down in Part V of the Treaty of St. Germain, are altered. This alteration, which has been effected by a unilateral denunciation of the relevant portion of the Treaty of St. Germain [Article 119], represents a manifest infringement of the military clauses of the above-mentioned Treaty. In these circumstances Czechoslovakia, as a signatory of the Treaty of St. Germain, feels compelled to lodge a vigorous protest against the announcement of this Bill. Further, as a Member of the League of Nations, she deeply regrets that Austria, who is likewise a Member of the League of Nations, has thought fit to take a course which, in similar circumstances, the Council of the League of Nations solemnly condemned by its resolution of April 17, 1935. The Government of the Czechoslovak Republic cannot in any case admit that Austria should be allowed to take the law into her own hands by this unilateral step, which represents a negation of international obligations. For this reason Czechoslovakia reserves to herself the right to express a further opinion on these measures, in order to protect her own interests.

¹ *Prager Presse*, April 7, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

(c) *Reply of the Austrian Government, April 6, 1936.*

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has received this *Note Verbale*. The Austrian Government do not intend to take into consideration the joint step taken by the Czechoslovak Republic, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. When they drafted the new Bill, they did so deliberately and with the knowledge that they had thereby fulfilled their obligations with regard to providing the Austrian people with the necessities of life and to safeguarding the existence of the Austrian State.

(d) *Memorandum of the Austrian Government, May 2, 1936.*¹

Approximately four weeks have elapsed since Parliament passed the Bill for compulsory military service. In this interval many criticisms of the Bill have been openly expressed abroad. . . . Therefore in the interests of a lessening of the tension in the general European situation, which is to-day decidedly inauspicious, the Austrian Government consider it expedient to recapitulate the motives, already stated and explained, which have caused them to take these measures and to bring them to the notice of the interested Governments, with the request that they be willing to subject these arguments to a fresh, unprejudiced, and objective analysis.

(a) In the first place, it may be repeated that the Bill in question has introduced general compulsory service and not general military service with arms, as has been repeatedly but incorrectly asserted. . . . If the Bill also provides for the possibility of calling up the conscripts to 'service with arms', this means that the Federal Government is constitutionally empowered in accordance with the exigencies of the situation to employ detachments of conscripts either in public works or military training or, if need be, the defence of their country.

(b) The factor of national education takes first place in the considerations of the Federal Government. . . . A State which, like Austria, is destined by geographical, geo-political, and strategical considerations to represent as it were the centre of the European nervous system, and which in spite of various shortcomings . . . is firmly resolved of its own free will and in the interests of the general peace to preserve and defend its independence on all sides—such a State can far less than any other shirk the duty of teaching all its people the consciousness of nationhood and the firm determination at all costs to defend their country. But a conscientious Government

¹ *Reichspost*, May 5, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

must lay especial stress on the training and calling up of all male citizens to preserve the common weal and in the event of danger to defend the State. . . .

(c) . . . The maintenance of a regular army naturally necessitates an exceedingly large expenditure. But, on the other hand, the introduction of conscription makes it possible with the same expenditure as before to carry out the physical and patriotic training of a far larger number of the male population, and also to relieve the budget to a considerable extent from expenses under the heading of Voluntary Labour Service for work which is beneficial to all. Furthermore in consideration of the restricted resources of the Austrian budget, the Austrian Government do not intend in normal circumstances to maintain a proportionately bigger peace-time strength of the Austrian army than that proposed by Great Britain in the course of the negotiations of the Disarmament Conference.

(d) The Austrian Government solemnly repeat their conviction . . . that by the passing of the conscription law, which provides for the calling up of a number of the conscripts for service with arms, they are solely pursuing peaceful and defensive objectives. . . .

(e) In case the procedure of the Austrian Government is criticized in view of the provisions of the Peace Treaty, the following observations must be made:

(1) The Treaty of St. Germain imposes on Austria a series of compulsory measures of a military nature, but with the express promise in the introduction to Part V that the almost complete unilateral disarmament and demilitarization of Austria would be followed by limitations in the sphere of military armaments on the part of the other signatories of the Treaty. It appears superfluous to the Austrian Government to draw attention to the fact that, in contrast to the thorough fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by Austria, this promise has not been kept by the other signatories, that the development in all the States concerned has rather tended to take the opposite direction to an alarming degree, and that the basic idea of the above-mentioned Treaty—namely the gradual reduction of the disparity between the defensive capacities of the European countries—has thus been rendered completely illusory.

(2) The realization by the other signatories of this development, which runs counter to both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty, appears equally unambiguous in the declaration by the Four Great Powers of December 11, 1932, and in Point 6 of the *communiqué* of the Stresa Conference of April 14, 1935 and finally in the fact that in the so-called Macdonald Draft (Conf. D. 157 Table I of Article 13),

submitted to the Disarmament Conference, Austria was from the first granted a peace-time strength of 50,000 men.

(3) If, on the other hand, the concessions which were promised in the official documents mentioned under Point (2), and which concerned Austria's equality of military rights and the abolition of the military clauses of the Peace Treaty, were bound up with the necessity for the conclusion of security treaties, then it may be remarked that it was and still is Austria above all who most eagerly seized upon the idea of a treaty system effectively guaranteeing security in Central Europe—an idea which was finally laid down in the Rome Agreement of January 7, 1935—who has actively pursued this idea in numerous diplomatic negotiations with the Great Powers and her neighbours, and who has striven to achieve its speedy realization. There is unquestionably no blame attaching to Austria, if these efforts, which have as their object the conclusion of a treaty system to ensure the permanent pacification of Central Europe, have not so far made noticeable progress and even threaten to p^éter out. Austria for her part regrets this unsatisfactory development all the more because, by virtue of the assurances given to her and mentioned under Point (2), she would automatically have recovered her full equality of rights, if such a treaty system were concluded. In this connexion the Austrian Government consider that they should express their candid conviction . . . that a lasting peace in Europe is in any circumstances only possible on the basis of the complete abolition of discrimination between former victors and vanquished, and of the elimination of all compulsory measures against the natural rights of any one country—measures which humiliate the feelings of the people and which had their origin in the accursed psychology of the War.

(4) Whereas the military clauses of the Treaty of St. Germain are accompanied, as mentioned above, by express promises to be fulfilled by the other signatories, the obligation to preserve her independence imposed on Austria, without any *quid pro quo* by the other signatories, remains binding and has been reaffirmed on several occasions by the chief interested States, including Austria. This obligation represents one of the pillars of the existing system which was set up by the Peace Treaties. It is Austria's firm resolve to do justice to it both in her own interests and also in the interests of the peace of Europe. This means therefore the scrupulous observance by Austria of that most essential provision of the Treaty of St. Germain and of the existing European system, if, in face of a world situation threatened by serious dangers, she desires to be able to contribute, in

case of need, everything that lies in her power to the preservation of her general independence, and if she first offers to those other countries, which are interested in the independent existence of an autonomous Austria, a guarantee that their efforts and readiness to preserve this independence are consistent with the will of an Austrian people who are ready to defend their country.

(f) The conscription law, which was drafted by the Government in recognition of the cogent arguments set out above, represents an expression of Austria's sovereignty. The Austrian Government have performed this sovereign deed, fully conscious of the fact that it in no way encroaches upon the interests of those States with whom Austria wishes to collaborate in a friendly spirit for the maintenance of peace. . . .

A conscientious Government cannot ignore the situation in Europe to-day and the swiftly growing discrepancy which, with regard to the possibility of defending the country's nationhood and independence, exists between the Austrian people and the peoples of many other European States. A régime which did not understand how to do instant and absolute justice to these rudimentary necessities could not undertake any responsibility for the subsequent development of the history of the Austrian people.

(iv) *The Austro-German Compromise.*

(a) *Official communiqué broadcast by Dr. Goebbels, German Minister of Propaganda, July 11, 1936.*¹

I have been authorized by the Reich Government to make known the following *communiqué* about an agreement which was concluded yesterday between the German and Austrian Governments. It represents a considerable practical step towards a peaceful disentanglement of and relaxation of tension in the European situation. I will now read the text of the official *communiqué*:

‘Convinced that they are thereby rendering a valuable contribution towards the peaceful development of Europe, and believing that they are thereby doing the best service to the various common interests of the two German States, the Government of the German Reich and the Government of the Austrian Federal State have decided to restore normal and friendly mutual relations.

It is therefore declared:

(1) In the sense of the statement made by the *Führer* and Reich

¹ *The Times*, July 13, 1936.

Chancellor on May 21, 1935,¹ the German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria ;

(2) Each of these two Governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National-Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence ;

(3) The Austrian Federal State Government's general policy and its policy towards Germany in particular shall be constantly guided by the principle that Austria recognizes herself to be a German State. The Rome Protocol of 1934, together with its additional clauses of 1936, and the relations of Austria to Italy and Hungary as partners in the said Protocol are not hereby affected.

Recognizing that the relaxation of tension desired by both parties can be brought about only if in addition certain preliminary conditions are established by the Governments of both countries, the Reich Government and the Austrian Federal Government shall in a series of detailed measures create these required preliminary conditions.'

(b) *Broadcast Address by Dr. von Schuschnigg, Federal Chancellor of Austria, July 11, 1936.*²

I know that I speak in the name of all sincere and discerning Austrians when, in regard to the text of the Agreement which is now made public in Austria and which at the same hour is being published in Germany, I express the sure hope that the return of normal friendly and good-neighbourly relations with Germany is not only a reason for rejoicing for both the German States and the whole German people, but also represents a valuable contribution to the assurance of European peace, to serve which has always been the object of our policy, not only in the interests of our own country.

Far be it from me at this hour to indulge in polemics. I will only express my sincere joy and satisfaction that on this side and on that sufficient proof has been given of a consciousness that the fates of the two countries are linked together and that they tread a common road, in spite of all the incidents of history, so that one may take up the attempt, with a justified prospect of success, to remove obstacles and barriers which still appear to be insuperable. This can happen and will always be possible so long as on this side and on that there is a will to respect the rights and characteristics of the other party, and so long as here as well as there there exists the

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 171.

² *Reichspost*, July 12, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

knowledge of a great heritage which overrides all the differences of opinion and all antagonisms the existence of which it would be senseless to deny. . . .

Engelbert Dollfuss declared, when he resumed office on May 27, 1932: 'The whole world must understand that we are conscious of being an independent German State bound by blood, by history, and by geography to the closest contact and friendship with Germany—a friendship which carries rights as well as duties.' When the struggle had already been raging for some time he expressed the same idea in April 1933, when he declared: 'We Austrians are fully conscious of the common destiny which binds us to the whole German people.' At the time of the first appeal of the Fatherland Front on the Trabrennplatz in Vienna on September 11, 1933, Dollfuss introduced the new Constitution into Austria with the significant words: 'We Austrians are German and possess a German land.' . . .

Moreover, the guiding principle of my address on May 29, 1935, to the Austrian Federal Assembly was: 'Austria has never allowed any doubt to exist—nor, as long as we live, will she do so in the future—that she recognizes herself as a German State.' To-day I have nothing to add to that. . . .

Regard for the maintenance of peace has always been the guiding line of our policy. For this reason Austria identified herself with the ideas of the League of Nations; on this point there will be no change in the future. For the same reason Austria has for several years taken her stand upon the Rome Pact. The relations which link us with our two neighbours, Italy and Hungary, and which from every point of view have had beneficial results, remain now as before entirely unchanged; we are glad that with the conclusion of the present Agreement account appears to have been taken of the idea for the development of which the Rome Protocols made provision. If the Agreement which henceforth governs the relations between Austria and Germany gives us that which we expect from it, then it will prove its value not only to the great German nation and to our Austria, that is to say to the two German States, not only to the whole German people, but also to the peaceful development of Europe. . . .

(c) *Text of Official Commentary on the Austrian Chancellor's Speech, July 11, 1936.*¹

The Agreement between Austria and Germany, which has been concluded and published to-day, clearly answers a series of questions

¹ *Reichspost*, July 12, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

which hitherto have not been altogether clear. The declarations of the Chancellor of the German Reich which are referred to in the official *communiqué*, read as follows: 'Germany has neither the intention nor the wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria or to annex Austria or bring about the *Anschluss*.'¹ These declarations unequivocally confirm from the most authoritative source in Germany the fact which certain circles have felt themselves constrained to doubt. At the same time it is affirmed by the Agreement, once and for all, that Austria as well as Germany reciprocally recognize and respect each other's internal political conditions, and that, in so far as National-Socialism in Austria is concerned, direct or indirect intervention or interference is to be stopped.

By these statements a real contribution to the assurance of Austria's independence and a valuable contribution to the maintenance of peace in Europe have been made. The conduct of Austria's foreign policy will, in the future, as in general in the past, have regard to the peaceful direction of German foreign policy. No change, however, is contemplated in the relations of Austria to the Rome Protocols or to her partners in them.

The text of the Agreement makes it particularly clear that peace between the two German States has been secured upon the basis of full equality of rights and complete respect for the institutions on either side. In this way a situation has been brought about for which Dr. Dollfuss and, since his death, others have continuously striven.

It is naturally understood that the position of the Fatherland Front, as the sole organ for the formation of political opinion in Austria, is unaffected by the Agreement.

(d) *Summary of Official Communiqué issued by the Austrian Foreign Office, July 11, 1936.*²

The Single Front (*Einheitsfront*) will continue to be the sole political institution tolerated in the country.

The amnesty announced by the Chancellor for Nazi offenders will not on any account extend to people who have been convicted of common crimes. Civil servants disciplined for political offences may not expect reinstatement. Negotiations for the return home of Austrian emigrants will be initiated. Austrian fugitives to Germany who have been deprived of their Austrian citizenship and those wanted on capital charges cannot hope to return home.

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 171.

² *The Times*, July 13, 1936.

Notice is drawn to the fact that a new Austrian law for the defence of the State, promulgated yesterday, makes it clear that illegal propaganda for political parties provides for the energetic prosecution of those engaging in it. Propaganda for the *Anschluss* will not be tolerated. In regard to tourists, no precise agreement has yet been reached.

The German State symbol, the Swastika, on flags and badges, may in future be displayed only to the extent laid down in the regulations. Austrian citizens may not display it.

The circulation in Austria of certain Reich German newspapers is contemplated. Reciprocity will be observed and attention given to the fact whether or not the spirit underlying the new Agreement is being violated.

The *Deutschland Lied*, the Horst-Wessel Song, and others will continue to be forbidden in Austria. They may be sung by Reich Germans at entertainments given by them for their countrymen alone.

Both countries are to refrain from all aggressive uses of the wireless, films, news services, and the theatre.

The Austrian Chancellor will invite persons enjoying his confidence as representatives of Austrian nationals to collaborate with him and share in Austrian political responsibility.

The German Government is quite prepared to restore normal economic relations with Austria.

The foregoing are the principal measures so far discussed between the two Governments. The Agreement lays down that, as the desired relaxation of political tension can be realized only if certain conditions are fulfilled by each, both Governments undertake to create the necessary conditions.

(e) *Statement issued by the Austrian Minister at London, July 12, 1936.*¹

As the words used by the Austrian Chancellor, 'Austria recognizes herself to be a Germanic State,' appear to have caused some misgivings, it may perhaps be pointed out that Dr. Schuschnigg, like his predecessor, the late Dr. Dollfuss, has always emphasized that Austria, by virtue of her language, culture and tradition, is an essentially Germanic country.

In Austrian official circles the main features of the Agreement concluded with Germany are considered to be the recognition by Germany of the independence of Austria and of the principle of non-

¹ *The Times*, July 13, 1936.

interference in the internal affairs of that country, and the acceptance of the Rome Protocols as the basis of Austrian policy. Considerable importance is also attached to the decision to take measures to bring about a settlement of various outstanding questions between the two countries, such as the control of the press, wireless, cinema and theatre, the future activities of the Austrian colony in Germany and the German colony in Austria, the future of the Austrian National-Socialist emigrés in Germany, the removal of political control over trade between the two countries, the gradual return to normal tourist traffic, &c.

The Austrian Government is determined not to relax its vigilance to prevent the undermining of the State by any political party, and will therefore, if necessary, continue to take strong measures against National-Socialist propaganda. Within the next few weeks a law for the protection of the State is to be introduced, making every attempt to endanger the continued existence of an independent Austria illegal, forbidding propaganda in favour of an *Anschluss*, and so on. The Austrian Government, moreover, do not intend to allow the internal development of Austria to be modified by National-Socialist ideology, for instance, in regard to the racial question, &c.

The contemplated amnesty for National-Socialist prisoners is regarded as more or less the counterpart to the amnesty accorded to Socialist prisoners last Christmas. The Austrian Government will welcome the collaboration of every Austrian, whatever his political views may be, provided he declares his loyalty to the independent Austrian State.

No change is to be made in the composition of the Austrian Cabinet, but its basis may be broadened by means of the appointment of one or two additional Ministers.¹

(f) *Exchange of telegrams between Dr. von Schuschnigg and Herr Hitler, July 12, 1936.*²

Dr. von Schuschnigg to Herr Hitler:

The conclusion of this Agreement, the aim of which is to restore neighbourly relations between the two German States, affords me the welcome opportunity to greet your Excellency as *Führer* and Chancellor of the Reich, and, at the same time, to give expression to the conviction that the effect of this treaty will bring profit to Austria and the German Reich and thus prove a blessing to the entire German

¹ On July 12 President Miklas nominated Dr. Glaise-Horstenau as Minister without portfolio and Dr. Guido Schmidt as Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

² *The Times*, July 13, 1936.

people. I believe myself to be of one mind with your Excellency that, beyond this, we have by the Agreement between the two States rendered valuable service to the general peace.

Herr Hitler to Dr. von Schuschnigg:

The greetings which your Excellency has transmitted to me on the occasion of the conclusion to-day of the Austro-German Agreement are reciprocated sincerely. I join to it the wish that by this Agreement the traditional relations resulting from a community of race and historic identity through hundreds of years may again be restored, in order to clear the way for a further common task to the advantage of the German people and for the consolidation of the peace in Europe.

(g) *Exchange of telegrams between Dr. von Schuschnigg and Signor Mussolini, July 13, 1936.*¹

Dr. von Schuschnigg to Signor Mussolini:

I am happy to communicate to your Excellency that I have just signed with the German Minister, duly authorized by the *Führer*, an accord destined to render the relations between Austria and Germany normal and friendly. I recall with joy the repeated conversations which I had with your Excellency at Rocca Delle Caminate. I am convinced that your Excellency will agree with me in being satisfied at the accord, which aims at presenting a new and efficacious contribution to the work of peace. I desire to take this occasion of assuring your Excellency of my sincere friendship and of my firm desire to proceed in future in full accord with your Excellency on the basis of the Protocols of Rome.

Signor Mussolini to Dr. von Schuschnigg:

I thank your Excellency for your courteous telegram. The Agreement which your Excellency has signed with the representative of the *Führer* must be greeted with satisfaction by all those who have at heart the cause of peace. It marks a notable step ahead on the way of European reconstruction, and it is in this spirit—as you will remember—that the question was discussed at the meeting at Rocca Delle Caminate and later examined on the basis of the Italo-Austro-Hungarian accord. I am especially glad to exchange with you assurances of perfect friendship between Italy and the Federal Government, in conformity with the Rome Protocols, which continue to be the basis of the relations between Italy and Austria.

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, July 14, 1936. Translation reprinted from the *Survey* for 1936, p. 351.

(h) *Exchange of telegrams between Dr. von Schuschnigg and General Gömbös, July 13, 1936.*¹

Dr. von Schuschnigg to General Gömbös:

The conclusion of the Agreement between Austria and Germany, the object of which is to restore friendly relations between neighbours, gives me a welcome opportunity to express to you my conviction that the work just completed will be of service to general peace in which Austria and Hungary are especially interested. I am, therefore, convinced that our collaboration on the basis of the Rome Protocols will in this sense bear further fruit.

With sincere wishes for your recovery, and greetings in the name of former comradeship.

General Gömbös to Dr. von Schuschnigg:

Consider conclusion of Agreement between Austria and Germany as an historical event contributing to general peace, in which Austria and Hungary are especially interested. It is in harmony with the Rome Protocols, and will therefore strengthen the ideas underlying them (*Römische Konzeption*).

With every good wish, and greetings in the name of former comradeship.

(v) *Extract from Speech by Dr. von Schuschnigg, Federal Chancellor of Austria, November 26, 1936.*²

... I cannot emphasize clearly or strongly enough that the Agreement of July 11 must remain an unequivocal and clear line of policy, from which, I am firmly convinced, statesmanship must in no circumstances deviate. It is an agreement between State and State, which can have no application to questions of an internal political nature. The Chancellor of the Reich referred to the fact, about which there has never been any shadow of doubt, that in questions concerning our common nationhood there is a common road to tread, along which we Austrians are perfectly willing, as we always have been, to travel with Germany even though, as sometimes has appeared to be the case, in Austria this may not be welcomed by all. In answer to those who, in regard to the Agreement of July 11, have spoken with too much anxiety of a possible danger to Austrian independence (*Gefährdung des vaterländischen Gedankens*) I should like to write

¹ *Frankfurter Zeitung*, July 14, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

² At Klagenfurt. *Reichspost*, November 27, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

in the family album (*Stammbuch*): 'It is essential to have confidence in the vital strength of Austrianism' (*oesterreichische Idee*). This is strong enough to be able to survive. The first hypothesis of any policy for those who are in our camp must be the preservation of our country.

The Agreement of July 11 has given a new assurance to our State. I know as well as you do, my friends, that this political development may mean for you a serious test of endurance. Nevertheless I must ask you not to allow yourselves to be discouraged by the task because of local difficulties. It happens that there are times in a struggle at which the drawn sword is decisive, and then again other times when those who fight have to carry on a spiritual campaign in order to achieve the success of their own ideas. It is in such a time as this that we find ourselves to-day; it must remain one of the foremost tasks of the Fatherland Front to be the standard-bearers and champions of unity. But if any in the country seek to compel us to adopt other methods, they will see us once more in the front rank of those who are determined in no circumstances to allow anything to happen which in the interests of the Fatherland it is our duty to prevent.

Apart from this the essential fact of the moment is for us to persevere (*Kleinarbeit*) untiringly and undaunted. National-Socialism in Austria—with which alone we are concerned—stands opposed to us as an enemy. To settle with it is clearly and unequivocally an exclusively domestic affair, which nevertheless does not prevent us from welcoming gladly and with satisfaction any alleviation obtained or success scored by the leaders of the German Reich. . . .

3. HUNGARY¹

(i) *Speech by M. de Kanya, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, May 28, 1936.*²

As I take the floor in the parliamentary discussion of the budget of the Foreign Office, I intend to place three questions in the forefront of my statements. First I propose to deal briefly with the agitated and ever feverish ferment which prevails in Europe and which has been causing considerable pessimistic comment. The second matter I intend to take up is the steadfast peaceful endeavour on the part of Hungary to create for herself a situation permitting of a satisfactory

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part III (iv) (a) 3 and 5, and also Introductory Notes on pp. 307 and 311 above.

² In the Chamber of Deputies. *International Conciliation*, No. 326, January 1937. Translation by Professor Francis Déak.

development in the midst of the chaotic currents running through Europe. Lastly I would like to throw some light on the present situation of the League of Nations which, during the past year, had to withstand considerable strain and the reorganization of which has been talked about a lot recently.

I do not wish to go into details and do not intend to unfold before you the political history of the past eighteen years, as it is well known to all of us. On the contrary, I shall confine myself to the elucidation of the most important impulsive forces and to the indication of the guiding ideas, which, although working beneath the visible surface of things, have nevertheless imprinted their stamp upon the period, the political struggles of which have been getting their drift from these very impulsive forces and guiding ideas.

At the time the four years' World War came to an end the victorious Entente Powers were so overwhelmingly strong not only in Europe but, we may safely say, in the world as well, that no counter-balance of any consequence was to be found anywhere nor could it have been brought into play since, as every one knows, we had to face the whole world in the last war.

Nor did the countries opposing us hesitate to make the most of their balance of power, as is tellingly evidenced by the several Peace Treaties concluded in the various Parisian suburban towns. By virtue of these Peace Treaties the map of Europe and the destiny of her peoples was reshaped exclusively from the point of view of the Allied and Associated Powers. It is a matter of common knowledge that this reshaping was dictated primarily by considerations of politico-military and strategical expediency, with utter disregard of the economic and other essential aspects.

Such a one-sided *modus procedendi* was bound to have a twofold result. The countries which emerged victorious, though only after an enormously strenuous struggle, and saw all their wishes fulfilled to a degree which transcended even their most ambitious expectations, were most vitally interested in maintaining the *status quo* arrived at in Paris. On the other hand the vanquished States began, as they gradually managed to overcome their impotence resulting from the lost war and the sundry revolutions, to voice their protests against the many harsh provisions of the Peace Treaties.

Even a perfunctory study of Europe's post-war history shows running through it like a red thread the endeavour on the part of certain States to maintain the new state of affairs indefinitely and unalterably, while voicing at the same time the catch-word of an organized peace and of universal security. This endeavour manifested itself as

the years went by, in ever-changing forms and under different labels, according to the circumstances obtaining at the given moment, but no material changes in the objective have been discernible.

The negotiations preparatory to the Geneva Protocol of 1924 and the Protocol itself were intended to serve the ends of those endeavours; the same was the case with disarmament conferences and the negotiations preliminary to the Disarmament Conference which went on for years.

Such catch-words as universal and collective security and mutual assistance, at this moment again extremely popular with certain people, as well as the endeavours to make Article 16 of the League of Nations' statute mandatory, are all more or less also aiming at the objective of rendering the present *status quo* permanent.

The Little Entente and the Balkan Entente originated from a similar trend.

Because of a rather arbitrary interpretation of Article 21 of the League of Nations' statute, there are manifesting themselves at present endeavours aiming at the conclusion of regional pacts, such as was for instance the intended Eastern Pact which, however, came to naught because of opposition on the part of some of the interested Powers. Incidentally speaking, this Eastern Pact shrivelled down to an agreement guaranteeing mutual military assistance among three States, which fact only intensified the already existing considerable agitation.

It has well-nigh become a slogan that the maintenance of the present state of affairs in Europe was such a sacred and lofty objective that, since the institution of the League of Nations offered no complete supplementary guarantee thereof, not enough of readily armed alliances could possibly be grouped around that objective. Since, on the one hand, the purposeful evolution of the new Germany would make it appear as if the ramparts supporting the present *status quo* needed additional reinforcement and, on the other hand, considerable shifts in the alignment of the victorious States have occurred as the result of the Italo-Abyssinian war, this trend in the political activity aiming at the salvaging of the *status quo* made itself manifest with renewed vigour. According to my opinion Soviet Russia owes her recent paramount importance in the conduct of European affairs primarily to the above-mentioned fact, and not solely to her materially strengthened military establishment developed during the last few years.

Briefly summarized, the political situation of Europe presents the following picture:

The period which elapsed since the end of the War bore the stamp of a so-called organized peace, based on the conception that the Peace Treaties made in the various Parisian suburbs were intended 'to last for all eternity', that their objective was to guarantee the existing state of affairs and the military ascendancy of the victorious States. Their sequel, however, according to a brilliant French author, was that Europe is no longer a continent but a complete chaos in which no one any longer knows on whom he may depend.

It affords me both pleasure and satisfaction that, when passing on to the second part of my exposition, namely to the discussion of the ideas and principles which during the period in question were determinative for Hungary's policy, I shall be in the position to present to you a somewhat brighter picture.

After emerging from the nebula of revolutions Hungary strove steadfastly and with tenacity of purpose to secure for herself real peace. By real peace Hungary meant of course not the maintenance for all time to come of the two categories, the victors and the vanquished, but a peaceful compromise. Such kind of peace Hungary strove for exclusively through a pacific evolution. Not only did the Hungarian Government proclaim it time and time again but actually conducted its foreign policy in this very spirit. You gentlemen are familiar with the efforts made by the previous Governments to establish a *modus vivendi* with our several neighbour States. The present Hungarian Government, right upon coming into power, struck such a pacific note that it could not possibly have escaped being noticed by those who earnestly strive for a lasting peace. I wish to quote the following from Prime Minister Gömbös' speech delivered on May 14: 'I hope', said the Prime Minister, 'that, once we sit down at the green table and with manly sincerity bring the difficulties which obstruct an economic co-operation in the Danube basin up for discussion, the desired solution will not fail to result.'

We have thus far waited in vain for an echo to these words.

I do not deem it necessary to prove the soundness of my assertion by citing numerous actual instances, and I believe I am justified in limiting myself to the mention of two incidents from the recent past which constitute splendid examples of Hungary's desire for peace.

The peaceful liquidation of the Hungaro-Yugoslav controversy which one and a half years ago reached an acute stage was, as is commonly known, due to the calm attitude displayed by the Hungarian Government during the negotiations. The merit of this attitude is still more enhanced by the fact that the situation at the time

was not such as to compel the Government to give in at any price either because of weakness or of fear.

The other incident occurred in the very recent past and afforded the Hungarian Government the opportunity to give proof of its pacific disposition. By this incident I understand the fact that Hungary did not follow suit when Germany and Austria made their re-armament declarations, but, with due consideration for the high-tension atmosphere obtaining in Europe, carefully refrained from making a similar step. I sincerely deplore the fact that this conciliatory attitude inspired by a sincere love of peace met with so little understanding and appreciation on the part of some of our neighbours.

The loyalty of Hungary's foreign policy along these lines went so far that, when during the past year the idea of regulating the relations among the Danubian States on a new basis was conceived, the Hungarian Government declared its readiness to participate in the pertinent negotiations in the best of faith, although it was hardly subject to any doubt that we would, the misleading catch-words of safeguarding the peace and universal security notwithstanding, rub up once more against the idea of making the *status quo* permanent. Although last year's negotiations failed to materialize, due to events which are a matter of common knowledge, the Hungarian Government continues to abide by its decision of standing ready to subject any definite proposition to bona fide scrutiny and consideration. I am laying particular emphasis, gentlemen, on the fact that in the matter of the reorganization of the Danube basin it is the Hungarian Government's point of view not to claim any privileges. The Hungarian Government, however, steadfastly and under all circumstances adheres to the principle that Hungary's situation must not change for the worse through a possible readjustment in the Danube basin. Hungary stands prepared, if given a basis of full legal equality, to examine any serious proposal of solution which would offer the possibility of a pacific evolution, keep open the door for a discussion of the Peace Treaty, guarantee protection to Hungarian minorities by legal means, and would not impose upon Hungary any obligations transcending the provisions of the Peace Treaties. Into this category falls also the oft-discussed question of reciprocal assistance.

I need not, I believe, lay particular emphasis on the fact that Hungary could not possibly adopt the principle of reciprocal assistance. We could not do it since it would be tantamount to an obligation of rendering assistance, if need be, to those States which aggrandized themselves at Hungary's expense. This thesis we could

not possibly accept because there would be no reciprocity if such a contingency arose. I am unable to imagine a situation where the Little Entente States could offer us any fully commensurate countervalue for such an enormous sacrifice on our part. What is more, we have considerable doubt, quite justified by our experiences thus far, whether we could, in the event of a conflict, depend on a fully unbiased decision as to who was the aggressor.

This being premised, I wish to emphasize that if Hungary could take part in the negotiations as a full-fledged partner and her afore-stated modest and natural claims were recognized by the other side, we would not impede an economic and possible future political co-operation among the Danubian States nor a real security and genuine peace along the Danube, a peace which we wait and wish for from the bottom of our hearts.

I shall now proceed with the presentation of the situation obtaining at this moment with regard to the League of Nations. To obviate misunderstandings I wish to state beforehand that my remarks on this subject do not in any way alter the attitude of the Hungarian Government with regard to the League of Nations, which attitude I had the honour to present on October 16 last. As you gentlemen know, the primary object of the League of Nations is, in keeping with President Wilson's idea as embodied in the preamble to the League Covenant, to promote the co-operation among peoples and to bring about international peace and security. In conformity therefore with this basic idea, the League of Nations Covenant rests on three fundamental principles, to wit: (1) general disarmament; (2) pacific settlement of every international conflict through international tribunals or through the League of Nations Council; and (3) in extreme cases, should arbitration produce no results, the applying of sanctions against the State which violated the provisions of the League of Nations Covenant. If we analyse the activity of the League of Nations with full objectivity and without fault-finding, we are bound to see that, not only were the endeavours towards disarmament unsuccessful, but the second problem as well, namely the free use of international arbitration tribunals, has been sadly neglected, and that the League of Nations from its very inception has been busying itself primarily with retaliatory measures, that is, with the developing and strengthening of Article 16.

It is to be regretted that the tendency to widen the scope of sanctions rather than to seek a solution which would render possible the settlement of international conflicts by pacific means has prevailed. However, in the course of the highly important events which occurred

during the last year this function of the League of Nations was productive of no results whatever. For this reason the severest attacks against the League of Nations are being made by the very people who until now saw in the League of Nations the strongest and the most powerful bulwark of international security. In this connexion I would like to quote a few examples of this dissatisfaction.

In its much-discussed statement anent the fortification of the Dardanelles, the Turkish Government included among the reasons for its action also the fact that the machinery of the League of Nations, intended to safeguard the general security, functioned so sluggishly that any State might find itself in a situation where it would be compelled to look out for its own security.¹

The increasingly accentuated endeavours of the Little Entente in the very recent past to make the mutual relations among its members more close than before seems to be inspired by analogous considerations.

But even France, which for years on end has been considered, and justly so, as the principal protector of the League of Nations, is dissatisfied. We saw it happen, gentlemen, that a semi-official French newspaper recently broached the question whether it would not be better for France to withdraw therefrom. A very popular French writer, Count d'Ormesson, dealt with the same problem in a similar vein. The erstwhile French Prime Minister Herriot, embittered over the League of Nations' impotency during the military occupation of the Rhineland zone, characterized the League as 'an international billiard club and a factory of scraps of paper'.

Madariaga, the delegate of neutral Spain, a great believer in the idea of the League of Nations and perhaps the best versed person in so far as the League of Nations Covenant is concerned, levelled, in his Geneva speech of April 20, considerable criticism at the work of the League of Nations. The criticism, while cautious and mild in form, was nevertheless very severe in substance. He first states that Article 11 of the Pact, which, as is well known, provides that in the event of a war or of an impending war it is the duty of the League to take all the measures for the preservation of the peace which might appear proper and efficacious, was not applied in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict, which fact must be charged to a continued misapplication of the Covenant. The misapplication was best evidenced by the failure to apply Article 8 of the statute, to wit, the so-called disarmament article, which was not only not applied but even violated. As the result thereof the remaining articles lost considerably in weight.

¹ See below, p. 645.

It would not be a difficult task to support or to amplify the statements of the Spanish delegate by additional actual examples. I do not wish, however, to recriminate; all I want is to establish several important facts. I am satisfied therefore with establishing the fact that the few articles not only of the League of Nations Covenant but of the Peace Treaties properly speaking as well, which protected the interests of the vanquished States, have not been lived up to. Article 250 of the Trianon Treaty, which placed the protection of the property and of the rights of Hungarian citizens under the guarantee of international arbitration tribunals, fared particularly badly. This Article, very important from the Hungarian point of view, was treated in a manner which rendered its practical application impossible.

In this connexion we are being brought face to face with a *de facto* revision of an important article of the Trianon Treaty.

Referring back to Madariaga's Geneva speech, I would like to emphasize particularly the Spanish delegate's statement to the effect that in international politics it was much more difficult to heal than to prevent an illness. In other words Spain's delegate took a stand in favour of the principle of prevention.

A similar attitude was taken by Italy's delegate, Baron Aloisi, who, in his address of April 20 before the League of Nations Council, elaborated the thesis that the Italian Government was holding fast to the principle that the League of Nations Covenant should be applied in its entirety; in other words, that all its provisions without exception be made use of and not only individual, arbitrarily selected articles. It was the Italian Government's particular desire, continued Baron Aloisi, that not only the letter of the League of Nations Covenant be applied but its spirit as well. This spirit means not only respect for justice but also the fact that the League of Nations Covenant, both in its theory and in its practice, views history as a living actuality, constituting not a static but a dynamic function of human civilization.

The British Foreign Secretary Eden, in his speech of May 6 in the House of Commons, discussed the failure of the League of Nations and raised the question of the possibility of organizing it in such a way that it should function preventively rather than punitively.

Years ago already Mussolini recommended that the statute of the League of Nations be changed accordingly.

The German Chancellor also discussed this subject in his speech delivered on March 7. He declared his readiness to re-enter the League of Nations but he also expressed the hope that the question

of equal rights in so far as colonies are concerned would be cleared up through pertinent negotiations in not too distant a future. He also set up the condition that the League of Nations statute be severed from the Versailles Treaty.

The demands for a reform of the League of Nations are becoming increasingly numerous in France as well.

In other words we have arrived at a point where not only the vanquished but the victors as well, and even more so, desire the reform of the League of Nations, which was formed in conformity with their wishes; to be sure the reasons prompting the two categories of States are quite different.

It has always been Hungary's point of view, and it could not have been otherwise, that the League of Nations statute required certain changes. Should it be possible now to bring about a reform of the statute, such reform would prove a valuable and lasting achievement only if the measures intended to prevent armed conflicts emerged from the shadows and become as strong as the punitive measures provided by the Covenant against conflicts which have already broken out.

We are of the opinion that this was the only way of strengthening the so-called international method of security which aims at upholding peace by a collective organization of all the Powers. It is to be apprehended that a miscarriage of, or a mistake in, the endeavours to change the League of Nations Covenant would again put into operation the so-called national security system, such as existed before the War, and within which the individual countries would endeavour to secure peace either separately or through alliances with other countries.

In the introductory part of my address I already called attention to the fact that some Powers not only evolved the theory that one could never have enough allies but endeavoured to put it into practical operation. It even actually came to pass in some parts of Europe.

While this has been going on, the Hungarian Government, in keeping with its pacific intentions, had been seeking friends rather than allies.

To Italy, which only recently emerged victorious from her Abyssinian campaign, we are bound by countless old and new ties of sincere sympathy and serious interests. Our friendship with Italy and our erstwhile partner, Austria, received a new impetus and vigour through the protocols signed in Rome on March 23 last.¹

¹ See above, p. 308.

With Germany we are on sincerely good terms, as is best evidenced, not only by intensified economic and cultural relations, but also by the visit which Prime Minister Gömbös paid last autumn to Berlin.

To Poland, whose Prime Minister visited us but recently, we are bound by ties resulting from an old traditional friendship and from a mutual sincere sympathy uniting the two peoples. These ties have been further strengthened during the past year. The strength of the Polish-Hungarian pacific co-operation consists in the fact that, in addition to old friendship, it is being sustained by considerations of common-sense.

The Hungarian nation shared in England's great bereavement with that sincere sympathy and respect which has been at all times felt in our country for the British Empire. Although the political interests of Great Britain centre primarily on distant regions, it nevertheless shows, because of its solicitude for universal peace and for world economics, interest in the problems of the Danube basin and therefore in Hungary's problems as well.

The Prime Minister of Yugoslavia declared on March 6 in his exposition on foreign policy¹ that 'he would like, for the sake of economic consolidation in the Danube valley, to co-operate with Hungary, and that it was his desire that in this way the causes for mutual uncertainty and for differences of opinion be made to disappear'. The Hungarian Government received these words of M. Stoyadinović's with understanding, and stands of course prepared to do its share in the interest of reaching this common objective.

I have reached the end of my statements. Before closing I deem it my duty to make the following declaration:

The programme of European politics includes at this moment exceedingly important questions. Let us hope that the liquidation of the military part of the Abyssinian conflict will bring in its wake a speedy diplomatic liquidation of this problem as well; it would satisfy the fondest wishes of every true lover of peace to see a gradual restoration of good relations between England and Italy.

In connexion with the Rhineland question new and very momentous negotiations have been started; their objective is the revival of the spirit of Locarno.² Should these negotiations meet with success it might be possible and even probable to bring up, after a while, in connexion with endeavours to secure the peace of Europe, the idea of convening a Danubian conference. I have already taken the liberty of expressing the point of view of the Hungarian Government with regard to this matter.

¹ See below, p. 402.

² See above, pp. 121-220.

The disappointments we thus far experienced notwithstanding, we did not and we shall not give up hope that sooner or later the sense of fair play and better judgment will assert themselves on the other side as well, thus making possible an opening for a pacific solution which would be satisfactory to the various justified interests and aspirations.

Should, however, this hope of ours fail to materialize, we will, nevertheless, with the support of our sincere and loyal friends continue our pacific foreign policy as heretofore, avoiding any and all provocation. And we shall not be diverted from this decision of ours by certain diplomatic demonstrations directed against the alleged Hungarian peace-disturbing designs.

In the event of another disappointment our policy will undergo a shift, only to that extent that we shall draw back to a purely Hungarian point of view, there to wait patiently and with a clear conscience for a better time, when our erstwhile enemies shall learn to understand and appreciate the full value of co-operating with Hungary.

(ii) *Extract from Ministerial Declaration by M. Darányi, President of the Council of Hungary, October 21, 1936.*¹

. . . The principles of Hungarian foreign policy are unchanged, as I had the opportunity of explaining some days ago. We shall continue to keep the same basis of that constructive peace policy which has enabled us so far to co-operate successfully with the whole range of European nations.

We try to develop and further as much as possible those bonds which link Hungary to the other two signatories of the Rome Pact: Italy and Austria. At the same time the Hungarian Government will pursue with the greatest interest the furtherance of the traditionally good relations with the German Empire, and will always bear in mind with gratitude those nations which—like Poland and Bulgaria—sympathetically shared in our recent national grief.²

The co-operation between the Hungarian nation and its friends is not directed against anybody. On the contrary, we consider as one of the most important objectives of Hungarian foreign policy the promotion of general reconciliation. The entire Hungarian nation without dissent wishes to secure England's friendship and would welcome the establishment of a friendly atmosphere with France acknowledging mutual interests.

¹ In the Chamber of Deputies. Translation by the Hungarian Foreign Office.

² The Prime Minister, General Gömbös, died on October 6, 1936.

We continue to follow with the greatest attention the (unfortunately) very disquieting destiny of Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring States. Although we readily admit that the League of Nations acted successfully from an international standpoint in certain complicated questions, nevertheless I must state very positively that the Geneva organization does not fulfil its noble mission in regard to the protection of the interests of minorities. Sufficient if I point to the fact already mentioned by the chief Hungarian delegate to the last Assembly of the League of Nations, that up to May 31, 1935, out of 451 minority petitions only 7 found their way to the Council.

Under such circumstances the plan allegedly emanating from Geneva, according to which they intend to reduce the Minority Section of the Secretariat of the League of Nations because of lack of occupation, sounds really farcical to us. Besides, the circumstance that the League of Nations showed only slight interest towards the fate of minorities was used lately by certain States simply to avoid replying to the questions put to them by the League of Nations.

In spite of these facts the Hungarian Government will not discontinue its energetic efforts to urge improvement in the fate of the Hungarian minorities both through the League of Nations and all other available legal means. Perhaps I do not have to emphasize especially that the Government will endeavour to promote the fulfilment of other legitimate desires in a similar way.

Our inland minorities are handled with a considerateness which secures the advancement of their legitimate, cultural, and economic interests.

We can promote our foreign interests successfully only if peace and order rule within the country, and this I shall maintain because it is my legal duty. . . .

(iii) *Statement issued by M. de Kanya, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Hungary, October 29, 1936.*¹

The tendency to fit all international affairs into a rigid framework, with the help of the system of sanctions and of pacts of mutual assistance, is, in fact, contrary to the idea of evolution; moreover, it does not take into consideration the argument which Mr. Eden elaborated in connexion with Article 19 of the Covenant, and in which he affirmed that life is not static but dynamic.

The tightening of the bonds which unite us to our friends, Mr. Eden

¹ Issued after his address to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber. *Le Temps*, November 1, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

stated, does not by any means prove that we want to bar the way to establishing correct relations with other States. Hungary cherishes no hostile feelings towards any country, and she is always seeking after peace. This is equally true as regards the Little Entente.

If Hungary can take part in negotiations round a table with the advantage of complete equality of rights, and if her modest and reasonable claims are recognized by the other side, she will not offer any opposition to an economic collaboration of the Danubian States, and after a given time, to a political collaboration.

Nevertheless, a reconciliation cannot be an end in itself; it cannot mean that we would risk our present economic and political position, which is on the whole not unfavourable, for insufficient political and economic compensations; it cannot mean the perpetuation of our inferior status nor the injuring of the interests of our friends.

4. ITALY¹

For the greater part of the year 1936 the attention of the Italian Government was devoted to the Abyssinian War and the question of sanctions.² Austria and Hungary had refused to apply sanctions against Italy, and relations between the three members of the Rome Protocol *Bloc* were developed by the signature of additional protocols on March 23.³

On June 5 Signor Mussolini was informed of the negotiations in progress between Austria and Germany which resulted in the Agreement of July 11.⁴ As between Italy and Germany this Agreement represented a compromise, upon the maintenance of which good relations between the two countries depended. In a sense also it represented a truce in the struggle for influence in the Danube Basin, which was not unwelcome to Italy in view of her fresh commitments in Abyssinia and the harvest of difficulties, political and economic, reaped from the sanctions conflict.

Italy's new-found friendship with Germany was cemented by Count Ciano, during a visit to Berlin and Berchtesgaden at the end of October; an official *communiqué*⁵ was issued on October 25 and on the same day Count Ciano made a statement to the press.⁶ The details of the Italo-German Agreement were drawn up in the form of a *procès-verbal* which was not made public. The five principal points discussed were: the negotiations for a new Locarno; the situation in Central and South-Eastern Europe, with special reference to Austria; the League of Nations; the situation in Spain; the recognition of the new Italian Empire. This recognition was announced in Berlin on October 24.

On November 1 at Milan Signor Mussolini delivered a speech which was notable not only for the proclamation of the establishment of the 'Rome-Berlin axis', but also for the encouragement given to Hungarian hopes of revision, at the expense of Czechoslovakia and Rumania, and for a chal-

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part III (vii).

² For the relevant documents see *Documents* for 1935, vol. ii.

³ See above, p. 308.

⁵ See below, p. 341.

⁴ See above, p. 320.

⁶ See below, p. 341.

lenge to Great Britain in regard to the Mediterranean.¹ Another conference of the Rome Protocol *Bloc* was held in Vienna on November 11-12, the purpose of which was to discuss relations with Germany.² On November 18 the Fascist Grand Council met in Rome to examine the international and internal situation, political, economic, and strategic, of Italy. Their deliberations lasted from 10 p.m. until 4 a.m., after which a somewhat colourless *communiqué* was made public.³

(i) *Official Communiqué issued after the visit to Berlin of Count Ciano, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, October 25, 1936.*⁴

In the course of the visit of the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, to Germany, the current political, economic, and social questions of major importance, especially those which affect both countries directly, were discussed in his conversation with the *Führer* and in his various talks with leading German personalities. The conversations took place in an atmosphere of friendly cordiality. To the satisfaction of both parties there have been established a concurrence of views and the intention of the two Governments to devote their joint activities to the promotion of general peace and reconstruction. The two Governments have decided to remain in touch for the accomplishment of these aims.

(ii) *Statement by Count Ciano, October 25, 1936.*⁵

During the last few days in conversations with the *Führer* at Berchtesgaden, and with Baron von Neurath in Berlin, I have had a thorough exchange of views on the political situation in general, and this exchange of views has emphasized the determination of our two Governments to co-operate in the interests of peace and reconstruction. This joint activity finds a solid basis not only in the common interests of our two countries but in the supreme obligation assumed by Germany and Italy to defend the great institutions of Europe.

In this connexion we examined the negotiations now proceeding to replace the Treaty of Locarno. As you know, the German Government, as well as the Italian, have already sent their reply to the British memorandum, and both Governments have emphasized their specific desire to collaborate in establishing such conditions of security as may arise from a guarantee pact for Western Europe.

We also examined with Baron von Neurath various aspects of the problem of the League of Nations. As in the past our two Governments will continue to remain in close and friendly contact.

¹ See below, p. 343.

² See below, p. 347.

³ *The Times*, October 26, 1936.

⁴ See above, p. 309.

⁵ *The Times*, October 26, 1936.

As regards the situation in the Danube Basin I can say that, after examining this situation in the light of the Protocol of Rome and the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, we were able to state to our mutual satisfaction the practical and positive results to the benefit of Austria which this policy has already brought about. Both Governments will treat the problems concerning the Danubian Basin in a spirit of friendly collaboration.

We have also taken into consideration the situation in Spain and have agreed to recognize the fact that the National Government of General Franco is supported by the firm will of the Spanish population in the larger part of the national area, where it has succeeded in re-establishing order and civil discipline in contrast with the anarchical conditions prevailing there hitherto. At the same time we have once more confirmed the principle of non-intervention in Spanish affairs, as well as the maintenance of the international obligations entered into in that spirit. It is superfluous to add that we have agreed in affirming that Italy and Germany have no other wish than that Spain shall as soon as possible resume, with absolute national and colonial integrity, her due place in the community of nations.

With regard to the serious dangers which threaten the social structure of Europe, the *Führer* and Baron von Neurath on the one side and I on the other have renewed the firm determination of the Italian and German peoples to defend with all energy the sacred inheritance of European civilization in its great institutions based on family and nation. In this spirit we have decided with Baron von Neurath to further the cultural relations between Germany and Italy, and, immediately after my return to Rome, we shall initiate conversations which will lead to an agreement for cultural exchanges between the two countries.

As was announced yesterday, the *Führer* has decided to recognize the Italian Empire of Ethiopia. I need not tell you with what satisfaction I have taken cognizance of this decision. We have now regulated Italo-German trade relations with regard to Ethiopia, and the various unsettled questions will be solved to the mutual satisfaction of both countries. All these points were laid down verbatim in a *procès-verbal* which was drafted after the conclusion of the conversations.

I return to Italy with a feeling of sincere admiration for everything I have seen in Germany, a feeling which, in the first place, is directed towards the *Führer*, to whom I convey the greetings of the *Duce* and of Fascist Italy.

I did not know Germany, and therefore, as you can well imagine, I have in recent years and almost day by day followed the Nazi movement and the great work of national reconstruction carried out under the guiding inspiration and creative impulse of the *Führer*. All that I have seen has given me a vivid and clear impression, and the contacts which I have made with your statesmen, the institutions which I have visited, and the demonstrations at which I have been present, have completed in my mind the general picture of Nazi Germany, to which go out my deep and sincere good wishes. The cordial contacts between our two Governments will be maintained, and our collaboration for the general peace and reconstruction of Europe will be continued, in Rome as well as in Berlin, in the same spirit and with the same determination with which we have begun it during these last few days.

(iii) *Speech by Signor Mussolini, November 1, 1936.*¹

Blackshirts of Milan!

With the speech that I am going to deliver here before you and for which I request, and you will certainly give me, a few minutes of your attention, I intend to fix the position of Fascist Italy in so far as concerns her relations with the other people of Europe in this turbid and disquieting moment.

The high level of your political education permits of my laying before you those problems that elsewhere are debated in the so-called Parliaments or at the end of so-called democratic banquets.

I will be extremely succinct, but I must add that each of my words has been meditated.

If it is desired to clarify the European atmosphere, it is necessary first of all to make a *tabula rasa* of all the illusions, of all the common-places, and of all the conventional lies which still constitute the relics of the great shipwreck of Wilsonian ideology.

One of these illusions is aground: it is the illusion of disarmament. No one wants to be the first to disarm, and general disarmament is impossible and absurd. And yet, when the Disarmament Conference met at Geneva, this question was in full function. It consisted in inflating bladders until they became mountains, and on these mountains all the limelight from the searchlights of world publicity is concentrated for a few days, so that at a certain moment a diminutive mouse emerges from them and is lost in the labyrinths of a procedure that as regards fertile expedients is without precedent in history.

¹ At Milan. Translation issued by the Committees of Action for the Universality [*sic*] of Rome.

For us Fascists, accustomed to examine with a cold eye the reality of life and of history, another illusion which we refute is that passing under the name of collective security. Collective security has never existed, does not exist, will never exist. A virile people brings about its own collective security on its frontiers and refuses to entrust its destiny into the uncertain hands of third parties.

Another commonplace which must be refuted is indivisible peace. Indivisible peace could only have this meaning: indivisible war; but nations refuse, and rightly too, to fight for interests which do not concern them.

The same League of Nations is based upon an absurdity which consists in the criterion of the absolute juridical parity of all the States, whereas States differ from each other, at least according to the point of view of their historical responsibility.

As far as the League of Nations is concerned the dilemma is placed in the clearest of terms: either to be renewed or to perish.

Since it is extremely difficult that it can be renewed, as far as we are concerned, it can calmly perish. In any case we have not forgotten, and we will not forget, that the League of Nations organized, with methods of diabolical diligence, the iniquitous siege against the Italian people; attempted to starve this people in its concrete living reality of men, women, and children; sought to break our military effort and the work of civilization that was being carried out at about 4,000 kilometres away from the mother country. It was not successful, not because it did not wish to be, but because it found facing it the solid unity of the Italian people, capable of all the sacrifices and also of waging war against fifty-two States in coalition.

After all, to pursue a policy of peace it is not necessary to pass through the lobbies of the League of Nations. Here, O Comrades, I make what in navigation is called a point. After seventeen years of of polemics, friction, misunderstandings and of questions left in abeyance, in January 1935 Agreements with France were concluded.

These Agreements could and should have opened up a new era of really friendly relations between the two countries. But sanctions intervened. Naturally the friendship was frozen for the first time.

We were on the threshold of winter. Winter passed and spring came and with spring our triumphant victories. Sanctions continued to be applied with a truly meticulous rigour.

We had been at Addis Ababa for at least two months and still sanctions continued. A classic example of the letter that kills the spirit, of formalism strangling the living, concrete reality of existence.

France still to-day holds her finger pointing to the age-yellowed

archives of Geneva and says: 'The Empire of the very much former Lion of Judah is still alive.'

But beyond the registers of Geneva what is the message of the reality of our victory? That the empire of the Negus is more than dead.

It is plainly evident that so long as the French Government maintains towards us an attitude of waiting reserve we cannot but do likewise.

One of the countries bordering on Italy with which our relations have been, are, and will always be extremely friendly, is Switzerland. A small country, but of the greatest importance both because of its ethnology and of the geographical position it occupies at the cross-roads of Europe.

Following the Agreements of July 11 a new era was opened in the history of modern Austria. The Agreements of July 11—hasty and misinformed commentators should make a note of this—were known to me and approved since June 5, and it is my conviction that these Agreements have strengthened the statal structure of that country and have also further guaranteed its independence.

Until justice is done to Hungary there can be no definitive systematization of the interests in the Danubian Basin.

Hungary is truly the great *mutilé*: four million Magyars live beyond its present frontiers. In order to follow the dictates of an abstract justice, another injustice has been committed, perhaps even greater.

The feelings of the Italian people towards the Magyar nation are based on the sincere recognition, which after all is reciprocal, of its military qualities, its courage, and spirit of sacrifice.

Perhaps before long there will be a solemn occasion during which these feelings of the Italian people will be publicly and clamorously manifested.

The fourth country bordering on Italy is Yugoslavia. During recent times the atmosphere between the two countries has greatly improved. You remember that two years ago in this same square I made a clear allusion to the possibility that cordial friendly relations between the two countries could be established. I resume to-day this argument and I declare that by now necessary and sufficient conditions exist, of a moral, political, and economic character, to place on a new basis of concrete friendship the relations between the two countries.

Besides the above which are the four countries bordering on Italy, a great country during these last few days has earned extensive sympathy from the masses of the Italian people. I allude to Germany.

The meeting at Berlin resulted in an Agreement between the two countries on certain questions, some of which are particularly

interesting in these days. But these Agreements, which have been included in special statements and duly signed—this vertical line between Rome and Berlin is not a partition, but rather an axis around which all the European States animated by the will to collaboration and peace can also collaborate. Germany, although surrounded and solicited, did not adhere to sanctions. With the Agreement of July 11 an element of dissension between Berlin and Rome disappeared, and I may remind you that even before the Berlin meeting Germany had practically recognized the Empire of Rome.

It is not a matter for surprise that to-day we hoist the flag of anti-Bolshevism. For this is our old flag; we were born under that sign; we have waged war against that enemy and we conquered him by means of our sacrifices and our blood.

Because what is known as Bolshevism or Communism does not date from to-day—pay attention to what I say—but is a State super-Capitalism raised to its fiercest extreme: it is not, therefore, a negation of the system but the continuation and the sublimation of that system. And it is high time to end placing in contrast Fascism and Democracy. It can truly be said that this great Italy of ours is also the great unknown.

If many of these Ministers, members of Parliament, and people of the same kind who speak on hearsay, would decide at last to cross the Italian frontier, they would be convinced that if a country does exist where true Democracy has been realized, that country is Fascist Italy. Because we, O reactionaries of all the countries, real and authentic reactionaries of all the countries, we are not the embalmers of a past: we anticipate the future.

We do not extend to the extreme limits the capitalistic civilization, above all in its mechanical aspect, almost anti-human; we created a new synthesis and through Fascism we open the door to the human and true civilization of labour.

So far I have dealt with the Continent. But Italy is an island. Italians must gradually acquire an insular mentality because this is the only way to place on the right level the questions relating to the naval defence of the nation.

Italy is an island that emerges from the Mediterranean.

This sea (here I also speak to the British who perhaps at this moment are listening on the wireless), this sea for Great Britain is a route, one of the many routes, or rather a short-cut, through which the British Empire can reach more rapidly the territories at its circumference. It may be said incidentally that when an Italian,

Negrelli, planned the cutting of the Isthmus of Suez, in England more than anywhere else he was considered a madman.

If for others the Mediterranean is a route, for us Italians it is life.

We have said a thousand times, and I repeat it before this magnificent crowd, that we do not intend to threaten this route. We do not propose to interrupt it, but we expect on the other hand that our vital rights and interests also be respected. There are no alternatives: it is necessary that the thinking minds in the British Empire should realize that the fact is accomplished and irrevocable. The sooner the better. A bilateral clash is not to be thought of, and much less a clash that, from being bilateral, would immediately become European.

Consequently there is only one solution: a sincere, rapid, and complete agreement based on the recognition of reciprocal interests.

But if it were otherwise; if in truth—a thing that I exclude from to-day on—it is the intention to choke the life of the Italian people in that sea which was Rome's, well then! let it be known that the Italian people would jump up like one man ready for combat, with a decision that would have few precedents in history.

Milanese Comrades, let us turn to ourselves. The orders of march for the Year XV are the following: peace with every one, with those near and far, but armed peace.

Hence our programme of armaments in the sky, in the sea, and on land will be regularly developed.

The productive energies of the nation will be speeded up in the fields of agriculture and industry. The corporative system will be continued until its definitive realization.

But there is an order that I will entrust to you, O Milanese of this most ardent and most Fascist Milan, that has revealed in these days its great soul, that I will entrust to you, O Milanese of this generous, laborious, and indefatigable Milan. This order, which I feel sure will become to you at the same time that I pronounce it an imperative duty, is that you should place yourselves, as you will do, at the vanguard of the exploitation of the Empire in order to render it, in the shortest possible time, an element of welfare, power, and glory for the country.

(iv) *Communiqué issued after the Session of the Fascist Grand Council, November 18-19, 1936.*¹

The Fascist Grand Council met, under the presidency of the *Duce*, for its first session in Year XV of the Fascist Era, on November 18 at ten o'clock at the Palazzo Venezia . . .

¹ *Corriere della Sera*, November 20, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

The *Duce* made a full report, lasting more than two hours, on the political, international, and internal situation, both military and economic, at the end of which the Fascist Grand Council approved the following declarations:

The Fascist Grand Council, after the reading by the *Duce* of the report of the Viceroy, Graziani, on the political and military situation in Italian East Africa, dated November 14, sends to Rodolfo Graziani, Marshal of Italy, its warm congratulations on his work—congratulations which extend to Generals Nasi, Geloso, Tessitore, Gallina, Tracchia, Mariotti, Cubeddu, and to Colonel Malta, who at the head of their invincible columns of national and native troops have occupied the whole territory of the Empire and pacified the population:

The Fascist Grand Council, having heard with great interest and satisfaction the details furnished by the *Duce* regarding the military preparations of the nation, expresses its conviction that at this special moment these must be accelerated, especially as regards the air force and the navy:

The Fascist Grand Council reaffirms, on the first anniversary of sanctions and in the most imperative manner, that it is the duty of the Régime, as laid down by the *Duce* in his speech on March 23, XIV, to achieve immediately the greatest possible measure of economic self-sufficiency, especially in the spheres affecting national defence, and declares that any resistance, active or only in theory, will be regarded as sabotage meriting severe punishment. The Council pays a tribute to the producers of the nation—both those who give employment and those who work—whose efforts during the period of sanctions have been such as to shatter the offensive of the League of Nations:

The Fascist Grand Council, after considering the activity of the Party in recent months, expresses its satisfaction at the work done in controlling prices, and invites the Party to develop these activities with due regard to internal and external considerations.

It invites the Secretary of the Party to render even more efficient the organization of the *Fasci giovanili di combattimento* and to give the maximum impulse to Fascism through Italian womanhood:

The Fascist Grand Council, after an examination of the situation from an economic and foreign exchange point of view, pays a tribute to the Under-Secretary for Exchanges and Currencies for his work.

The Fascist Grand Council heard a report from Comrade Galeazzo Ciano and approved the *procès-verbal* signed at Berlin and the Protocol of Vienna which were laid before it.

Placing on record with satisfaction that the bases have now been established for an effective collaboration between Fascist Italy and the German, Austrian, and Hungarian peoples, the Council warmly congratulated Minister Ciano on the concrete results reached.

The Fascist Grand Council heard and approved a report from Comrade Grandi on his activities in the Committee for Non-Intervention in the Spanish Civil War and on the present phase of Italo-British relations . . .¹

The meeting terminated at 4 a.m.

5. LITTLE ENTENTE AND BALKAN ENTENTE

(i) *Official Communiqués issued after the meetings of the Permanent Council of the Little Entente.*

(a) *At Belgrade, May 7, 1936.*²

Après avoir procédé à une discussion sur la situation internationale actuelle et examiné à fond toutes les questions concernant la politique étrangère intéressant les trois États de la Petite-Entente, le Conseil permanent indique de la manière suivante les directives de la politique commune à ces trois États:

1. Depuis deux ans, les États de la Petite-Entente s'efforcent de défendre avec dévouement, dans le cadre de la Société des nations, la paix et le respect des engagements internationaux, en essayant de remanier, en Europe, la collaboration pacifique entre les peuples par un esprit de compréhension mutuelle;

2. Désirant sauvegarder la paix, le plus grand bienfait de tous les peuples, ils se sont opposés avec la plus grande énergie à tout ce qui aurait pu bouleverser l'état actuel des choses en Europe centrale. C'est pour cette raison qu'ils ont toujours soutenu la politique des puissances occidentales, qui aidaient au maintien de l'indépendance de l'Autriche et qu'ils s'opposent aux changements de frontière par un révisionnisme malfaisant, ainsi qu'au retour au trône de la dynastie dont la puissance provoquerait inévitablement la guerre, un jour, dans le bassin danubien;

3. Nous déclarons solennellement, aujourd'hui, à un moment particulièrement difficile pour la politique européenne, que les États de la Petite-Entente n'ont aucune raison de modifier en quoi que ce soit cette politique pratiquée avec esprit de suite, avec une fidélité

¹ The remainder of the *communiqué* dealt with the arrangements made for the submission to the next session of the Council of proposals for the composition and functioning of the new Chamber of Fasci and of Corporations, and also recorded the Council's approval of miscellaneous proposals of a Party and financial nature. .

² *Le Temps*, May 9, 1936.

et une fermeté absolument inébranlables. Ils y tiennent aujourd'hui plus que jamais; ils la poursuivront, dès à présent, avec la même énergie et jusqu'à la dernière conséquence, dans l'intérêt de la paix européenne;

4. C'est pour cette raison qu'ils déclarent avec une vigueur toute particulière que les intérêts vitaux et la compréhension des nécessités historiques d'hier, d'aujourd'hui et de demain, les forcent à rester à jamais indissolublement liés les uns aux autres. Cela est plus vrai que jamais, aujourd'hui que la situation internationale fait surgir de grandes difficultés et même des menaces graves pour la paix en Europe;

5. C'est aussi pour ces raisons qu'ils soulignent le fait de l'unité profonde et totale de toute leur politique internationale. Qu'il s'agisse de leur attitude à l'égard de la Société des nations, de l'indépendance de l'Autriche ou du retour de la dynastie des Habsbourg, du respect des frontières et des dispositions des traités concernant les engagements militaires et, en général, du respect des engagements internationaux, qu'il s'agisse de leurs rapports vis-à-vis de la France, de l'Angleterre, de l'Italie et de l'Allemagne, de la Hongrie, de la Bulgarie, de l'Autriche ou de la Pologne, qu'il s'agisse des États balkaniques ou de l'Union soviétique, leur politique reste absolument identique et basée sur le même principe, sur la même estime et sur les mêmes intérêts communs. Les États de la Petite-Entente tiennent à le proclamer pour éviter le jeu des malentendus et des erreurs. L'attitude des trois pays de la Petite Entente vis-à-vis de n'importe lequel de ces pays, sera donc toujours la même, commune et entièrement solidaire;

6. Les États de la Petite Entente continueront de poursuivre la politique de la Société des nations avec la plus grande fidélité, espérant fermement que celle-ci réussira à surmonter la grave crise actuelle. Ils sont partisans du principe de la sécurité collective efficace et sont prêts à participer à la mise en pratique effective de ce principe. Ainsi qu'ils l'ont fait dans le passé, ils sauront donner, à l'avenir, par d'autres moyens aussi, la force et l'efficacité nécessaires à la politique de leurs peuples;

7. Dans la question du traité de Locarno et des conséquences qui ont suivi sa dénonciation, ils désirent voir se terminer rapidement la discussion préparatoire entre les puissances locarniennes, pour la sécurité européenne, afin que la Petite Entente puisse apporter sa contribution à la consolidation de la paix générale aussi bien en Europe occidentale qu'en Europe centrale et orientale. N'étant pas signataires directs du pacte du Rhin, ils suivent néanmoins avec

attention l'évolution de ces négociations, sachant bien quelles conséquences découleraient, pour eux aussi, d'un conflit à ce sujet ;

8. Ils soulignent leur intérêt vital, quant au respect des traités de Saint-Germain, de Trianon et de Neuilly. Ils ont déjà fait connaître leur point de vue à ce sujet et ont pris une attitude bien connue.¹ Ayant décidé, dans leurs négociations actuelles, de leur attitude pratique pour l'avenir, afin de sauvegarder entièrement leurs intérêts et leurs droits, ils déclarent avec fermeté qu'ils feront, le moment venu, tout ce qui sera nécessaire pour faire respecter ces droits et ces intérêts vitaux. Ils se réservent donc, pour l'avenir, toute la liberté d'action, constatant, en outre, une fois pour toutes, qu'ils ne donneront jamais leur assentiment à la législation d'un changement des dispositions internationales par lesquelles ils sont liés en commun avec les autres signataires, si cette modification n'est pas discutée, avec eux, suivant les principes du droit international ;

9. Cette attitude touchant le respect des traités en vigueur n'empêche en rien les États de la Petite Entente de poursuivre avec énergie la tentative pour amener la collaboration économique entre les États du bassin danubien, voulant ainsi donner, par des actes, des preuves manifestes de leur bonne volonté pour amener une véritable entente. A ce sujet, ils ont déjà plusieurs fois indiqué leur adhésion au principe de la collaboration économique avec le bloc de Rome et avec l'Allemagne ;

10. Les États de la Petite Entente sont conscients que la situation internationale est très sérieuse. Comme États fondateurs de la Société des nations, ils sont profondément attachés à la paix. Comme États ayant participé à la guerre de 1914-1918, ils savent apprécier les bienfaits de la paix et de l'entente entre les peuples, mais considérant la nécessité d'une ligne politique droite, menant véritablement à la collaboration sincèrement pacifique, ils sont décidés à prendre en commun, devant le danger, toutes les mesures afin de défendre leur patrimoine national, par tous les moyens qui sont et seront à la disposition de leurs peuples, amis et alliés ;

11. Vu les négociations approfondies au sujet de toutes ces questions qui se dérouleront tout prochainement soit à Genève, soit par la voie diplomatique ordinaire, les trois ministres resteront en contact permanent entre eux.

(b) *At Bratislava, September 13-14, 1936.*²

Le Conseil permanent des États de la Petite Entente s'est réuni à

¹ See also above, p. 316.

² *Journal des Nations*, September 15, 1936.

Bratislava les 13 et 14 septembre 1936 sous la présidence de M. Kamil Krofta, ministre des affaires étrangères de Tchécoslovaquie.

1. Après un examen détaillé de la situation générale et de tous les problèmes intéressant particulièrement les trois pays, le Conseil a constaté que les lignes fondamentales de la politique commune demeurent telles qu'elles ont été définies et proclamées à la dernière session du Conseil tenue à Bucarest au début du mois de mai. Les trois États restent décidés à pratiquer avec le plus grand effort la politique traditionnelle de la paix générale et de leur propre sécurité. Ils restent de même fermement attachés à l'idée de la collaboration pacifique sur le terrain aussi bien politique qu'économique et sont disposés à travailler à la réalisation de cette idée avec les pays animés de la même volonté.

2. Un des principaux éléments de cette politique demeure pour eux la Société des nations. Malgré les difficultés que celle-ci traverse en ce moment, les trois États restent fidèles à ses principes, étant persuadés que l'institution genevoise garde toute son importance en vue du règlement durable des rapports entre les États. C'est pourquoi les trois pays de la Petite Entente se déclarent prêts à s'associer à tous efforts susceptibles de renforcer l'autorité de la Société des nations en vue du maintien et de l'organisation de la paix.

3. Les ententes régionales que la Petite Entente a préconisées dès l'année 1921 constituent, à son avis, un élément important à cet effet. Le nouveau règlement de l'ensemble des questions en relation avec le pacte de Locarno fera l'objet de l'attention particulière des États de la Petite Entente. Le système de sécurité ainsi établi ne saurait cependant être limité à l'occident, car une telle solution partielle ne résoudrait en aucune manière le problème de la sécurité européenne en général et n'apporterait pas, par conséquent, l'apaisement indispensable à la reconstruction économique dont l'Europe et le monde ont tellement besoin.

Les trois États de la Petite Entente ont toujours plaidé la nécessité d'un système qui complète l'organisation de la paix. Ils maintiennent cette manière de voir. Comme toutefois il est incertain que l'on puisse aboutir à bref délai à ce résultat si désiré, les trois États, n'abandonnant en rien les principes dont s'est toujours inspirée leur politique commune, ont pris la décision de renforcer leur sécurité en joignant encore plus intimement et plus effectivement leurs efforts, tout en continuant, bien entendu, à entretenir avec d'autres pays les rapports de vive et étroite coopération que chacun d'eux a réussi à établir.

4. Quant aux autres pays, les trois États ne cesseront de continuer leurs efforts afin de maintenir avec eux les relations les meilleures.

Cela vaut en premier lieu pour les États limitrophes avec lesquels ils désirent entretenir et développer le plus possible des rapports de bon voisinage. Le maintien de cette situation dépend aussi toutefois de l'attitude de ces autres pays. Les États de la Petite Entente regrettent donc profondément que leurs relations avec l'Autriche aient eu à souffrir de la répudiation militaire du traité de Saint-Germain. Le procédé auquel a eu recours la Turquie dans la question des Détroits prouve qu'il y a aussi d'autres méthodes que celle du fait accompli qui ne peut que nuire aux bons rapports entre les États. D'ailleurs les pays de la Petite Entente, tout en exprimant l'espoir que de semblables infractions aux engagements existants ne se renouvelleront pas, se sont mis d'accord sur les dispositions à prendre en pareil cas.

5. Vu les discussions au sujet du régime intérieur dans divers pays européens, surtout à la suite des événements d'Espagne, les États de la Petite Entente, d'une manière catégorique, ce qu'ils ont déjà souligné entre autres à plusieurs reprises, continuent à pratiquer scrupuleusement la politique de non-immixtion dans les affaires intérieures de n'importe quel pays. Ils ne toléreraient en aucun cas l'immixtion des autres pays dans leurs propres affaires et dans n'importe quelle question de leur politique intérieure, comme ils s'abstiennent rigoureusement de pratiquer dans n'importe quelle circonstance la politique d'intervention vis-à-vis des pays étrangers. Ils affirment ainsi la politique du respect intérieur de chaque pays, car toute autre politique pourrait accentuer davantage la tension entre les différents pays européens.

6. Une attention particulière a été consacrée par le Conseil à la question de l'intensification des rapports économiques au sein de la Petite Entente, à celle du rapprochement dans le même domaine avec les autres pays de l'Europe centrale, rapprochement dont M. Hodža, président du Conseil de Tchécoslovaquie, avait pris précédemment l'initiative.

Le Conseil économique de la Petite Entente, qui se réunira à Bucarest, au mois d'octobre prochain, examinera les projets établis par les experts ainsi que d'autres possibilités d'extension des rapports économiques au sein de la Petite Entente. Le Conseil économique aura également à s'occuper de la question du rapprochement économique en Europe centrale.

7. L'institution existante des conférences périodiques des services officiels de presse ayant donné de bons résultats, le Conseil permanent décide de la transformer en un organe permanent auxiliaire du Conseil permanent de la Petite Entente.

8. La prochaine session ordinaire du Conseil sera tenue à l'occasion de l'Assemblée de la Société des nations.

(ii) *Official Communiqué issued after the meeting of the Permanent Council of the Balkan Entente, May 6, 1936.*¹

Le Conseil permanent de l'Entente Balkanique a tenu du 4 au 6 mai, à Belgrade, cinq séances sous la présidence de S.E. M. Rüstü Aras, ministre des affaires étrangères de Turquie, président en exercice de l'Entente Balkanique.

Toutes les questions inscrites à l'ordre du jour ont été discutées dans l'esprit le plus amical et ont trouvé la solution que commandent l'intérêt national des quatre pays intéressés, ainsi que celui de la sécurité balkanique et le maintien de la paix générale à laquelle l'Entente Balkanique entend rester fidèle plus que jamais. Le plus parfait accord a été constaté entre les quatre ministres des affaires étrangères sur toutes les questions qui ont fait l'objet de leurs délibérations.

La Grèce a précisé sa position vis-à-vis des États balkaniques dans le sens d'un accroissement de solidarité entre ces signataires à la satisfaction unanime des membres du Conseil permanent.

La politique de l'Entente Balkanique étant basée sur l'intangibilité des frontières actuelles et sur le respect de la sécurité, le Conseil permanent a envisagé les moyens les plus efficaces pour en assurer la stricte application dans la région de l'Europe où vivent les États balkaniques.

Le Conseil permanent a aussi précisé le point de vue de l'Entente Balkanique sur les grandes questions internationales à l'ordre du jour. Le Conseil permanent a décidé de se réunir à nouveau d'abord à Genève, au moment de l'Assemblée de la Société des nations en 1936, puis quelque temps après à Athènes.

6. CZECHOSLOVAKIA²

Soon after his assumption of office as Prime Minister in November 1935, Dr. Milan Hodža set to work on a scheme for the reorganization of Danubian Europe. In Dr. von Schuschnigg he found a potential collaborator who, during a visit to Prague on January 16, gave his views on the same problem in a lecture delivered before members of the Prague Industrialists' Club.³ Shortly after this Dr. Hodža had an opportunity, in his visit to London to attend the funeral of King George V, to discuss with British Ministers, and with French Ministers on his return journey, his proposals for a solution. These he described in interviews granted to correspondents in Paris.⁴ The proposals and also the results of subsequent visits by Dr.

¹ At Belgrade. *Journal des Nations*, May 7, 1936.

² See *Survey* for 1936, Part III (iv) (b).

⁴ See below, p. 355.

³ See above, p. 312.

Hodža to Vienna, Belgrade, and Bucarest during March were dealt with by M. Krofta, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in his statement to the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Chamber of Deputies and Senate on May 28.¹

Following the success of Herr Henlein's *Sudetendeutsche* Party in the elections of May 1935, relations between the Prague Government and the German minority steadily grew worse. These strained relations were further aggravated by the deterioration in relations between Czechoslovakia and Germany, following the signature of Franco-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet Mutual Assistance Pacts in May 1935. The reoccupation of the Rhineland by Germany in March 1936 marked the beginning of an even more violent campaign against Bolshevism, in which Czechoslovakia was included.² To meet the danger of an invasion the Czechoslovak Government passed in May a law for the defence of the State, which, in the interests of national security, placed restrictions upon members of minorities in various ways, e.g. employment in key industries and armament works. In view of the external danger it was essential, in the Government's view, that potentially unreliable elements (*Staatsunverlässliche*) should not be in positions where they might be a source of weakness to the State. Severe penalties were prescribed for any cases of high treason of whatever degree. Further, certain frontier zones were drawn in which the Government took power to evict minority populations if necessary, replacing them by Czechs or Slovaks.

Feeling among the minorities ran high over this law and other forms of discrimination by officials against them, and the internal situation deteriorated. The law, however, though passed, was not wholly applied. President Beneš decided that steps must be taken to remedy the situation, and with this purpose in view undertook in the month of August a tour of German towns in Bohemia, visiting Liberec (Reichenberg), Železný Brod, and Jablonec Nad Nisou (Gablonz). During this tour he made important speeches dealing with the internal and external aspects of the problem of relations with Germany.³

On October 22 M. Krofta reported once more on the foreign situation to the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Chamber and Senate and took the opportunity to discuss the fundamental lines of Czechoslovak foreign policy.⁴

In his speech at Milan on November 15 Signor Mussolini significantly referred to the justice of Hungary's case for revision. Further, he mentioned his desire for good relations with Yugoslavia, while omitting all reference to Rumania or Czechoslovakia. To this implied threat M. Krofta replied on November 3.⁵

(i) *Extracts from Statements to the Press in Paris by Dr. Hodža, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia, February 12-14, 1936.*

(a) *February 14, 1936.*⁷

. . . Speaking of the Paris talks, Dr. Hodža declared that he was

¹ See below, p. 357. ² See above, p. 293. ³ See below, pp. 367, 372.

⁴ See below, p. 375. ⁵ See above, p. 343. ⁶ See below, p. 392.

⁷ In an interview granted to the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian* in Paris. *Manchester Guardian*, February 15, 1936.

satisfied with them, as they showed that there were no obstacles left, as far as France was concerned, in the way of a political or an economic understanding between the countries in Central Europe. There was a period, he said, when there were some misgivings, particularly over the difficulties that might arise in connexion with the revision of certain international commercial obligations that an economic reorganization of Central Europe would necessitate.

'When the time comes,' Dr. Hodža said, 'we also propose to consult London, Rome, Berlin, and Moscow, and it will, of course, also be necessary to adjust the Central European understanding with all existing outward commercial relations. This, unfortunately, is not possible at once, for the problem is also political, and some of the big countries are naturally looking at the matter from a mainly political angle.'

'The fact that Italy is engaged in Abyssinia must not, however, be a reason for stopping the work of organizing Central Europe, though I wish it to be understood that nothing can or will be undertaken against Italy's interests, Italy being not only a neighbouring Power but also an initiator in the establishment of new economic relations in that part of Europe.'

'As regards Germany, the German press is giving to our efforts in Central Europe an interpretation which is false and unfortunate. The German press is speaking of an attempt to encircle Germany. This is absurd, for the whole conception is part of a system of collective security. It would be a grave responsibility for any country to take if it were to oppose the political and economic consolidation of Central Europe. . . .

'Our plan will be the object of deliberations and decisions in Prague, Belgrade, and Bucarest, and I propose to go shortly to Belgrade, and possibly to Bucarest. Our aim is twofold—political and economic. Politically the system of Central European collaboration could be based on a network of arbitration treaties.'

'As for the economic basis, I think we must bring together the economic systems of the Little Entente and of the Rome Protocol (Italy, Austria, and Hungary). As far as they wish to enter the system certain members of the Balkan Entente might also be considered. Bulgaria and Turkey, in particular, appear to be interested in the scheme.'

Speaking of Austrian independence, Dr. Hodža said that this must be guaranteed internationally on the basis of the League Covenant, though 'the first line of defence' should be provided by the regional organization that will exist round Austria.

(b) *February 12, 1936.*¹

. . . It has been said that there are only two courses open to Vienna: restoration or *Anschluss*. But there is a third way—namely, participation in a system of collective security guaranteeing the frontiers of Austria. My conversations on this subject with the Federal Chancellor, Dr. von Schuschnigg, in Prague, produced many good results. Now something must be built upon the foundations which we have laid. . . .

(c) *February 14, 1936.*²

. . . The economic organization of Central Europe can be carried out most effectively by the formation of a regional *bloc* consisting of Austria as well as the States of the Little Entente. It goes without saying that Hungary also will be welcome if she is prepared to join us.

The ideal at which we are aiming is the collaboration of the three States forming the Rome Protocol *Bloc* and the Little Entente. Czechoslovakia is anxious to bring about a close friendly relation with Austria. Economic and political misunderstandings of recent years have been removed; nothing stands in the way of co-operation. That is the assurance which Chancellor Schuschnigg and I exchanged in Prague. It would be particularly desirable that the Austro-Czechoslovak Arbitration Treaty, which is somewhat unsatisfactory and altogether too vague, should be replaced by a more precise and effective diplomatic instrument. In my view there is no obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty of friendship. . . .

(ii) *Extracts from Statement by Dr. Krofta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, May 28, 1936.*³

. . . CENTRAL EUROPE: THE HODŽA PLAN, THE ROME PACT,
THE LITTLE ENTENTE

Up to the year 1929 the whole world enjoyed economic prosperity. Even the Central European States, although for the most part only recently established on their own territories and only then beginning to function as independent units, gave during this period of prosperity proofs that their political and economic existence was fully justified. It is only natural that the economic crisis which so profoundly

¹ In an interview granted to a correspondent of the *Figaro*. *Prager Presse*, February 13, 1936.

² In an interview granted to the Paris correspondent of the *Neues Wiener Journal*. *Prager Presse*, February 16, 1936.

³ Before the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Text furnished by the Czechoslovak Legation in London.

affected countries whose territories had for centuries represented well-proven economic entities should have still more seriously shaken the economic organism of new States. When we see how even the big and economically powerful States, at the first onset of a currency devaluation crisis, introduced a system of exchange restrictions, strove to remedy the unfavourable character of their trade balance by limiting imports and by preventing the free outflow of exchange, how they suffered, and still suffer, through inability to find work for their millions of unemployed, we cannot wonder that all these things caused even greater losses to the smaller States, especially those which had not had time to accumulate reserves enough to sustain them through the period of emergency.

Since one of the external signs of the crisis, at least in the early stages, was an unusual decline in agricultural prices, countries in which agricultural output is one of the main economic factors naturally suffered twofold. It stands to reason that measures which such countries were compelled to take to alleviate the crisis had to be more radical than those adopted elsewhere, but that this again hindered the normal interchange of goods with other countries dependent upon that interchange.

The economic crisis gave a considerable impulse to the idea that much could be gained by economic co-operation in Central Europe, and that one of the causes of the aggravated severity of the crisis in that part of the Continent could be eliminated. Czechoslovakia has always been in favour of such co-operation, but she desired a purely economic co-operation, free of all specific political influences, from whatever quarter they might come; she wished Yugoslavia and Rumania to be partners, and she desired first to secure the approval of the Western European Great Powers, that is, not only of France and Great Britain, but also of Germany and Italy.

I will make only a brief reference to the more important schemes put forward:

1. The plan of the French Government of 1931 proposed the establishment of a Central Sales Bureau for Central European grain, with special advantages for Austria, an international agreement among the industries, and loans for the Central European States.

2. The Tardieu plan of 1932 included a proposal for preference among the Central European States for both agricultural and industrial output. This plan failed because only the small States of Central Europe and not the Great Powers were to participate in the preferences.

3. Following the failure of the Tardieu plan, the Lausanne Con-

ference in July 1932 appointed a committee entrusted with the task of elaborating for the European Commission of Study proposals for the economic rehabilitation of Central and Eastern Europe. The committee met at Stresa early in September 1932, and drew up a series of recommendations. Among other things they recommended the conclusion of an agreement for the disposal of Central and Eastern European grain. The proposal for this agreement was based on the idea that the Central European States should, by means of bilateral treaties, either grant preferences in favour of this grain, or should contribute to the so-called 'Revalorization Fund' which was to be established.

The European Commission of Study in October 1932 accepted the recommendations of the Stresa Conference, but they were not put into effect. Only two treaties granting preferences to Austria were concluded. These were the Franco-Austrian commercial agreement of December 29, 1932, under which France granted preferences in favour of Austrian timber, and the Polish-Austrian agreement of November 11, 1933, under which Poland granted preferences in favour of a number of Austrian industrial products.

4. The Italian plan of 1933 recommended for Central Europe a preferential system by means of bilateral agreements, not only for certain categories of agricultural products, but also for industrial output with, however, certain limitations which proved the death of the plan.¹

The failure of these schemes, which had the support of the Great Powers, shows how difficult it is to solve the problem of economic co-operation in Central Europe. The difficulties lie in the circumstance that the questions to be solved are complicated not only from the economic but also from the political angle, that is to say, for the reason that the economic problem of Central Europe has also an important political aspect.

The Czechoslovak Government is well aware of this fact, and therefore collaborates with the Yugoslav and Rumanian Governments with the object of making the Little Entente alliance, originally a political alliance, into an economic alliance, too. By the establishment of an Economic Council of the Little Entente, and the elaboration of a plan for the economic *rapprochement* of the States of the Little Entente—a plan which is now being systematically carried out—a basis was formed which can prove the starting-point for their collaboration in the economic sphere with the other Central European States.

¹ See *Documents* for 1933, p. 410.

It was on this basis that the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, Dr. Hodža, in his then function of Minister of Foreign Affairs, began early this year a series of consultations on economic collaboration in Central Europe. The Prime Minister has himself formulated on more than one occasion his views of Central Europe in this connexion, and I shall therefore confine myself to the main outlines of his observations.¹

Visible elements of Central European economic consolidation, says Dr. Hodža, already exist in the form of co-operation between several groups of States, as illustrated by the efforts made by the Baltic States, the Little Entente, the States of the Rome *bloc*, and those of the Balkan *bloc*. It is essential first of all to devote attention to economic *rapprochement* between the States of the Little Entente and those of the Rome Pact, that is, the Danubian States. It is advisable to proceed from the partial to the general in this case, for the reason that the fate of Central European economic consolidation rests upon agreement between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania on the one side, and Hungary and Austria on the other.

These States should agree upon the following minimum programme:

1. Not to increase the existing customs duties, and not to levy duties on goods that have hitherto been exempt from duty.
2. To maintain the *status quo*, that is, not to worsen the conditions for mutual exchange of merchandise, and to preserve the preferences already granted.

Dr. Hodža's ideas found an echo in the lecture given by Dr. Kurt von Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, on the occasion of his visit to Prague on January 16 last.²

Dr. Hodža availed himself of the Austrian Chancellor's visit to Prague to discuss with him several questions of interest to both countries, particularly questions of an economic nature. Both agreed that it was in the interests of the two States that the negotiations for a commercial treaty between Czechoslovakia and Austria should be concluded as speedily as possible, that the Treaty of Conciliation and Arbitration signed some years ago should be prolonged, and steps taken to extend its provisions.

At the beginning of February last the Prime Minister paid a visit to Paris where he was in touch with the leading personalities concerned with French foreign policy, and informed them of his views on the questions of the consolidation of conditions in Central Europe. In Paris the Premier also met M. Titulescu, the Rumanian Minister

¹ See above, pp. 355-7.

² See above, p. 312.

of Foreign Affairs, and the chairman of the Balkan Entente, M. Rüstü Aras, the Turkish Foreign Minister.

On February 22-4 Dr. Hodža paid a visit to Belgrade and conferred with Dr. Stoyadinović, the Yugoslav Premier. The two Premiers, with the approval of the Rumanian Foreign Minister, agreed that experts representing the Governments of their three countries should, on the occasion of the Conference of the Economic Council of the Little Entente at Prague, discuss the concrete proposals put forward by Dr. Hodža, and this was done on March 7-8 last. The consultations of the experts will be continued in due course.

During the visit of the Austrian Chancellor, Dr. von Schuschnigg, to Prague, the Czechoslovak Premier, as already noted, conferred with him concerning the Commercial Treaty for which negotiations had for some considerable time been proceeding in Vienna. Early in March the Prime Minister visited Vienna to return the visit paid by the Chancellor to Prague, and on this occasion the two statesmen signed, on March 10, a protocol in which it was stated that they had examined the progress made in the negotiations, had come to agreement on outstanding points, and decided that the Treaty should include preferences according to the recommendations made by the Stresa Conference.

The Commercial Treaty between Czechoslovakia and Austria which was signed on April 2, 1936, is an important and extensive document which has taken the place of the already obsolete treaty of the year 1921. The Treaty, which settles all the open questions of economic contact between the two countries, includes on the part of Austria preferential treatment for a number of Czechoslovak agricultural products, while Czechoslovakia in return grants preferences for certain Austrian industrial output.

The negotiations themselves, and then the signature of the Treaty, attracted great attention on the part of public opinion both here and abroad. The German Government has even made a protest against the preferences which Czechoslovakia and Austria have granted one another reciprocally, on the ground that they were granted without agreement with Germany. The Czechoslovak Government, recognizing the interest which all countries with whom Czechoslovakia has concluded commercial treaties based on most-favoured-nation treatment, have in the Czechoslovak-Austrian Treaty, informed them of the contents of that Treaty and asked for their consent to the preferences. This request was also made to the German Government, but a reply has not yet been received.

THE ROME PROTOCOLS

Shortly after the occupation of the Rhineland by Germany, an event occurred of importance for Central Europe: the conclusion of the Supplementary Protocols to the Rome Protocols of the year 1934. Three such Supplementary Protocols were signed on March 23 last by Signor Mussolini, the Italian Premier, Dr. von Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor, and M. Gömbös, the Hungarian Premier.¹ In the first of them the Premiers express their satisfaction at the favourable results produced by the continued collaboration of their three Governments in the cause of preservation of peace and of the economic adjustment of Europe, they confirm their determination to abide faithfully by the undertakings binding Italy, Austria, and Hungary, and they decide to constitute themselves into a group and to establish for this purpose a standing organ for mutual consultation.

In the second Supplementary Protocol the representatives of the three States respectively confirm their resolution not to undertake any important political action concerning the Danubian question with the government of any third State without previously consulting the other two Governments that signed the Rome Protocols of March 17, 1934. Although all the three Governments are completely unanimous in their view of the value of an expansion of economic contacts with the other Danubian States, they realize that an intensification of those contacts is possible only by means of bilateral agreements.

The third Supplementary Protocol contains the resolution that the standing organ for mutual consultation shall be composed of the Foreign Ministers of the three signatory States. This organ will meet periodically, and at times when all the three Governments regard a meeting as advisable.

The countries of the so-called 'Rome Bloc' have, it will be seen, laid down in these Supplementary Protocols hard and fast rules for the mutual contacts, the foundations of which were laid by the Rome Protocols as early as March 1934.

It is of interest to us that what has happened in this case is similar to the action of the Little Entente in constituting its Statute of Organization. One of the very important provisions of the Protocols is that the three States have founded their standing organ for mutual consultation, and that the meetings of this new organ are to be obligatory within certain but not actually defined periods. Not less important is the provision that none of the States of this group may

¹ See above, p. 308.

enter upon important political negotiations with the government of a third State without previous agreement with the other two Governments. For negotiations of an economic character the provisions are not so strict, for bilateral agreements are recommended, approval thus being indirectly expressed of the Czechoslovak-Austrian Commercial Treaty.

The Rome Supplementary Protocols do not lay down any new directives for the policy of the States of the Rome group. We must therefore assume that the fundamental trend of the foreign policy of Italy, Hungary, and Austria has undergone no change, and that the Supplementary Protocols are an expression of a determination to continue that line of policy. As a member of the Little Entente, the aim of which is political and economic collaboration among all members, Czechoslovakia welcomes concentric efforts in Central Europe, efforts which are directed towards the same goal as those of the Little Entente. Czechoslovakia does not therefore look with disfavour upon the fact that the States of the Rome group have drawn closer together, though she does not shut her eyes to the fact that the Rome group differs from the Little Entente in having a great Power within its ranks.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE

The meeting of the Standing Council of the Little Entente was held on May 6 and 7 last in circumstances of special gravity from the political point of view.¹ From many sides voices were heard—in some cases prompted by good will, in others, however, by the desire to cause confusion in a situation already full of tension—raising doubts whether the Little Entente possessed enough inner force to enable her as an entity to meet all the problems of the present situation and to maintain the unity she has hitherto manifested. The answer which the Little Entente gave European public opinion must satisfy all who have recognized in the Little Entente throughout her existence a bulwark of peace and democracy in Central Europe, and may be taken as a warning by those who have looked forward to exploiting for their own ends any dissolution of the Little Entente. Once again, and more emphatically than ever before, the Little Entente has demonstrated that she wishes, as she has wished for the sixteen years of her existence, to uphold within the scope of the League of Nations the peace of the world and respect for international obligations, to collaborate in the work of peace, and to stand on guard against all attempts at upheaval in Central Europe.

¹ See above, p. 349.

The Little Entente desires now, as in the past, to co-operate with the Western Powers in preserving the independence of Austria, and is determined to make a firm stand equally against revisionism as against the restoration of a dynasty, the presence of which in Central Europe would provoke most grave conflict in the Danubian basin.

The Little Entente has further declared that she will persevere with inflexible firmness in her efforts to preserve the peace of Europe. United by common aims, conscious of their duties, the Little Entente States are indissolubly bound one to the other. The policy of the Little Entente is profoundly and completely one, whether it be a matter of the relation of the three States to the League of Nations, their attitude to the question of Austria's independence, to a return of the Habsburg Dynasty, to the question of treaty revision, or whether it is a matter of their relations to France or England, to Italy, Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria, Austria, or Poland, to the Balkan States or to Soviet Russia. The three Little Entente States will thus act in absolute unity in their attitude to any of these countries.

In expressing a desire that the preparatory work of the Locarno Powers should be quickly concluded, the Little Entente emphasized the fact that she has a vital interest in the preservation of the Treaties of St. Germain, Trianon, and Neuilly, and will do everything in her power to see that her rights and interests are respected. The States of the Little Entente will never give their approval to the legalization of any act altering international agreements of which they are among the signatories, unless such alteration is discussed with them and agreed upon according to the principles of international law.

The Little Entente intends to persevere in efforts towards the *rapprochement* of the Danubian States, and once again proclaims her approval of the principle of economic co-operation with the Rome bloc and Germany.

The Foreign Ministers of the Little Entente, after thus emphasizing the principles of their joint foreign policy, discussed the individual concrete questions, and on all points arrived at complete agreement as regards their unity of action.

Demonstrating thus her complete unity, the Little Entente once again declared in clear and decisive terms her determination to persevere in joint creative effort with her allies and with all countries prompted by good will.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES

In the concluding portion of my speech I will briefly mention Czechoslovakia's relations with one or two other countries. It is un-

necessary to say that we continue to be bound to France not only by the traditional ties of long friendship but also by the bonds of practical interests, strengthened as they are not only by political treaties but also by the convictions that it is one of the foremost tasks of our State to labour with all its strength in the defence of right and justice and for the preservation of peace. Our treaty with Soviet Russia links up with the treaty between Russia and France, and, falling as it does within the scope of the League of Nations, represents, in our opinion, another important factor of peace in Europe. The joint endeavours of these three countries threaten no one, for they have expressly and exclusively the character of a defence against unprovoked attack.

Their friendly collaboration is to be regarded as constructive activity, the sole aim of which is to ensure peace and to strengthen the idea underlying the League of Nations. Any one who asserts that Czechoslovakia with her allies is designing an attack against any party whatsoever is either deceiving himself or is attempting to deceive others.

An official refutation has likewise been forthcoming of all the fabricated reports, spread with obvious design, concerning the alleged presence of Soviet troops in Slovakia and the construction of hangars for the Soviet air-fleet, and so on. The States interested have received from us unequivocal and official information on these points. Mention is made of the matter in this place mainly, too, for the purpose of informing international public opinion of the origin of these unsupported rumours and of the object with which such reports are being spread. It is, of course, only natural that our relations with the Soviet Union have, since the conclusion of the Treaty of 1934, steadily grown in friendly character.

It was once said by Dr. Beneš that Czechoslovakia has no direct conflicts with Germany, and that she can only come into conflict with Germany as a reflex of all European disputes, for the European States are so mutually dependent on one another that general European peace is really indivisible. I am glad to-day to be able to state that as far as direct contacts between Czechoslovakia and the German Reich are concerned, our mutual relations continue to be good. In discussing the occupation of the Rhine zone I could not, of course, be silent on the subject of the dark shadows which that unsettled question is throwing on the international situation as a whole. We are not direct participants in that dispute, but we may perhaps be allowed to express the hope that a solution acceptable to all countries may be found which will disperse the tension that so gravely affects Europe now.

Relations with our eastern neighbour, Poland, have of late improved slightly. I am glad to be able to appreciate the fact that the wireless propaganda at Katowice directed against Czechoslovakia has ceased, and that the conditions at the Polish Consulate at Moravská Ostrava have taken a turn for the better. On the other hand, expulsions of Czechoslovak subjects from Poland still continue, and they include cases where the victims have been settled for long years in Poland, and for whom a violent severance from the environment in which they have lived for years and become identified represents great moral distress and irreparable material damage. When it is answered on the Polish side that Czechoslovakia similarly expels Polish subjects, it is not out of place to remember that we waited long to see if the Polish authorities would cease to expel Czechoslovak subjects. When they did not cease, we had no alternative but to have recourse to a similar procedure, if only to be able to provide employment for our subjects banished from Poland.

Dr. Beneš, while still Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his speech to Parliament on November 5, 1935, said that our sincere willingness to submit all questions in dispute to an appropriate international forum continued. Two days later the Polish Press Bureau issued a *communiqué* in which the idea of arbitration was rejected on the Polish side. Arbitration, it was said, cannot be applied to a problem which is clearly and in binding form defined in the Czechoslovak-Polish Treaty of April 23, 1925. In view of the fact—so ran the *communiqué*—that on the Czechoslovak side the obligations undertaken in that Treaty have not been fulfilled, the proposal of arbitration cannot but arouse the impression that the matter is to be protracted, while oppression of the Polish population in Czech-Silesia is to continue. Dr. Beneš's declaration thus introduced no positive element into the mutual relations and was unsuccessful in removing the difficulties then existing. An improvement in these relations, it was stated at the close of the Polish *communiqué*, can only be achieved by a change in the attitude of the Czechoslovak Government to the Polish population, and not by any tactical gestures, the aim of which is to arouse in the minds of the foreign public, and also in the minds of the Czechoslovak public who are uninformed as to the real state of affairs, the appearance of good will.

This statement by the Polish Press Bureau was answered by the Czechoslovak Press Bureau on November 9, 1935, by a statement in which the false Polish view was refuted, substantially in the following terms: When Poland asserts that Czechoslovakia does not fulfil her obligations to the Polish minority, and when, on the other hand,

Czechoslovakia contends that she does fulfil those obligations, and that it is actually Poland that is guilty of a breach of her duty to the Czech and Slovak minorities, these are precisely the 'conflicts of opinion', and the 'disputes' which fall within the treaties that provide for their settlement by a parity commission and court of arbitration. The Polish standpoint therefore means that Poland refuses to carry out a treaty which she has signed, violating it first of all on the formal side by refusing to apply it in disputes to meet which it was signed. Every State is able to appeal to the international forum to determine who is keeping the terms of a treaty. Czechoslovakia has hitherto preferred that this should be done by mutual agreement. She is convinced, however, that in any case all these questions will appear before the international forum, and also acts accordingly. This is the best proof of her sincerity and her good will.

Since then nothing substantially new has occurred in Czechoslovakia's relations with Poland, and therefore we are awaiting Poland's final answer.

Our relations with Austria I have mentioned already in speaking of economic *rapprochement* in Central Europe and of the standpoint of the Little Entente to Central European problems. I would only like to add briefly that the Little Entente adopted a common standpoint towards the Austrian conscription law, and that the representatives of the Little Entente jointly protested in Vienna in this matter.

Although we cannot regard the explanation of the actual sense of this law given to us by the Austrian Government as fully satisfying, we continue to hope that it will be possible to find the way to a satisfactory and friendly settlement of this matter.

Our relations with Hungary are, on the whole, unchanged. I am glad to note that so far Hungary has not followed the example of Germany and Austria in rejecting the obligations imposed upon her by the Peace Treaty, and that apparently she has no intention of doing so. I do not hesitate to hope that with good will on both sides we shall succeed in gradually improving our mutual relations, especially in the economic sphere. . . .

(iii) *Extracts from Speeches by Dr. Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia, August 19, 1936.*¹

(a) *At Liberec.*

I have more than once in the past given my opinion on the relations of the German population to our State. What I say to-day will

¹ Text furnished by the Czechoslovak Legation in London.

merely be supplementary and an emphasis of what I have already said.

1. In this land Czechs and Germans have lived side by side for centuries. In the Hussite struggles and in the Thirty Years War, which caused shifts in the areas of settlement of the two races, it was religious and social rather than national questions which were at issue. It was not until the nineteenth century that, with the evolution of the national idea, a nationality struggle in the modern sense of the term arose. That struggle, in addition to a clash of ideas and politics, was in particular a fight for the soul of the individual. It would be interesting to ascertain what was the result of this struggle in the various periods. I shall hardly be wrong in asserting that during the last few decades the number of actually Czechized or Germanized persons was not such as to suggest any far-reaching effect upon the general position of the two peoples in our State *inter se*. Official statistics provide no entirely reliable picture in this connexion, as they had to take account of administrative conceptions which did not always allow of a precise presentation of the actual conditions of life. Nationality conflicts are natural and inevitable on all ethnographical frontiers, but our two peoples are to-day mature enough not to allow themselves to be denationalized.

The numerical proportion between our two nations can only change to an inconsiderable extent even over very long periods, and to-day such changes are taking place only by way of natural processes as a result of sociological laws and the natural demographic conditions in the country. On these the political struggle has not, and indeed cannot have, any influence worth speaking of.

This is my first point, and the conclusion to be drawn is: Let us work together in the political and economic spheres, let us not exaggerate racial struggles and differences, let us keep them within reasonable bounds and reasonable forms.

2. The questions of our national policy and also the question of our Germans have of late become a subject of attention both inside our country and beyond its frontiers. Let us say at once that the reasons for this are to be sought in the chaotic conditions prevailing in the international sphere, in the high tension of national sentiment in Germany, and in a certain radicalization of the racial minorities not merely with us but in all countries. On the part of Czechoslovaks this has aroused closer attention to these facts and resulted in a more serious study of them.

According to universally recognized international law, nationality questions are an internal concern for all countries without exception.

Czechoslovakia adheres unconditionally to this principle, acts upon it, and will continue to act, without any deviation, upon it in future. No European State has therefore any right to intermeddle in these questions, and Czechoslovakia, as a sovereign State in complete consciousness of its dignity and its rights, will in no wise suffer such intervention.

The sole influence from outside which our State allows of in these matters is the supervision exercised by the League of Nations. Our State will in every case respect that. Such supervision, however, applies to other States, indeed to all States. Only by virtue of that do the nationality and minority questions in the various countries assume a certain international aspect. League of Nations control is carried out under the terms of treaties concluded by Czechoslovakia with other States, and by methods agreed upon with Czechoslovakia. We permit of no other pressure, no other intervention in either the juridical or political sphere, and so cannot discuss our national questions with any one else. We voluntarily signed the minority treaties at the Peace Conference with the express object of avoiding every other direct intervention calculated to be a hindrance to good relations between us and our neighbours, and in order to secure the existence of an objective, disinterested tribunal which, in case of a conflict in this connexion, could step in and give its verdict.

If in the past Czechoslovakia has sometimes resolved to discuss this question with another State, such step was always taken on the basis of complete reciprocity and mutual equality. No State that enjoys respect can allow any unilateral discussion to take place concerning questions of its internal policy.

That is the purely juridical status of the nationality problem and the minority policy in Europe and also in Czechoslovakia. This status ensures for all nationalities in our country their own national and cultural existence. I emphasize the fact that Czechoslovakia is a State in which no nationality is menaced in its national or cultural existence, and that the struggle of the minority nations here is not a fight for existence but merely a struggle for political power and co-rule in the State. This state of affairs is expressed by both Czechoslovaks and Germans in the fact that the Germans are spoken of as equals among equals. I regard it as essential that no one, either here or abroad, should be led astray in this connexion by any foreign propaganda or other political manoeuvre.

3. Here we arrive at the internal political aspect of our national problem. It was always my view that Czechoslovakia should solve her national problems in her own way and by her own methods, that

the legal basis to which I have just referred should always—as is to-day the actual case with us—represent merely a certain juridical minimum, a basis which at all times—even in the worst days—would guarantee the minorities in our State their national existence, that our Constitution and our practical internal policy should proceed further and regulate these matters according to the internal needs of the State. This is something over and above our international obligations; these are matters of exclusively internal consideration in which we allow no one to interfere from outside, and which depend exclusively upon mutual agreement and co-operation between Czechs and Germans, upon direct, open, and loyal discussion, without pressure, without threats, without nervousness and radicalism, without strong words and exaggerations, and without any tendentious representation of matters contrary to actual facts. . . .

At Znojmo I said: ' . . . In the search for the right way to fair collaboration I have confidence in the Germans and in the Czechs, and in this matter I have specially faith in my own efforts. I am convinced that the Czechs and the Germans will in the fairly near future come to a definitive political understanding in the State. I am in favour of the Germans in our Republic receiving all that they require for their cultural and economic prosperity, and I am convinced that by a gradual and steady evolution and the maintenance of the democratic system of government this can be given them.' . . .

For this there exists with us a single theoretical foundation, the only one which provides a common meeting-ground for us all. Our Constitution is of so liberal a character that it suffices to meet all these problems. Our political philosophy and morality takes the form of democracy, a democracy that provides us with the key to a solution of all our problems, since it postulates in all political negotiations a respect of the human personality and complete civic equality irrespective of diversity of class, nationality, or religion. If there is a general formula of concrete and practical application to be noted with us as trend of development, it is that which I have more than once emphasized on previous occasions, that is to say:

We stand for the principle of a reasonable decentralization combined with an expedient economic and administrative regionalism. . . .

5. I know that our Germans have complaints, desires, and demands of a practical character. In the language and educational spheres these are not matters of a fundamental character, and are easy of disposal by reasonable practice. In economic matters, too, the question is substantially one of reasonable practice. I do not hesitate to say that in these matters mistakes have been made which

must not be repeated, such as, for instance, that contractors and workmen have been called from Czech or from Czech-German districts into German districts where unemployment prevails. The German parties that support the Government have already discussed all these matters, and in the forthcoming activities—as Dr. Hodža, the Premier, has declared—a right course of action will certainly be pursued.

The greatest difficulties arise in matters concerning the State officials and other employees. A number of the German wishes are in this connexion justified. But precisely in this matter is it necessary to consider two points. In the first place there is the question of confidence. It is comprehensible that a democratic State does not wish to entrust its administration to officials who profess Fascist, Totalitarian, or Communist principles. That applies in all directions, equally for Czechoslovaks as for Germans. This menace—as the situation presents itself to-day—is the greater from the German side.

Let us further ask ourselves, in a candid and friendly spirit, whether perhaps just of late all kinds of things have not happened that have again necessarily justified the fears on the part of Czechs concerning the development of the State and of conditions in the State.

I am glad to state that in general the German officials and employees and the German soldiers fulfil their duties to the Republic very satisfactorily, that the greater part of the German population are loyal to it as their Fatherland, and that the German parties adhering to the Government fulfil their duties to the State in self-sacrificing fashion. It needs only a fraction of the population, however, to come forward with alluring if impractical watchwords to provoke distrust on the other side. It becomes, then, very difficult to substitute confidence for that distrust, the confidence that is an essential primary condition wherever something of value is to be entrusted to the hands of another to be administered in common.

For this reason I stress the fact of confidence, I stress the fact of patience and of time, and I should like to see that on the German side nothing should happen, either in public declarations or manifestations, or in private intercourse or in the course of the daily political discussions, that is calculated with just cause to affect confidence on the Czech side, or that could serve as a justification for postponing the achievement of a seasonable settlement between Czechs and Germans.

I am speaking candidly and forthright. It is a friend who is

addressing you, and one whose duty it is to deal with facts on all sides as they are, and in so fulfilling his duty towards the State, to seek in common with you a remedy for shortcomings. . . .

(b) *At Železný Brod.*

. . . THE PILLARS OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S POLICY

In the period after the War, when the international situation was, as it were, laden with revolutionary material, those responsible for our foreign policy had always a clear aim in view: they sought some firm points which were pillars of support in every situation, and which were at the same time no hindrance to adapting the country's foreign policy to every changed European situation.

Czechoslovakia is situated—in the true sense of the word—in the heart of Europe, in close proximity to three of the Great Powers of Europe, at the cross-roads of three European cultures and therefore of three trends of political expansion; she is the most westerly of the smaller countries of Central Europe, while of all the Slavonic peoples the Czechoslovaks are the farthest advanced towards the West. From the political, cultural, and geographical standpoints we are a much exposed State, but precisely for that reason of immense importance, and indeed an indispensable State for the equilibrium of Europe. In this connexion Bismarck was right when he declared 'the master of Bohemia is the master of Europe', at any rate if this master were a strong Great Power. Czechoslovakia does not intend to get into the hand of any Great Power, she simply desires to fulfil her European, that is, her peace mission—the mission for which her situation in Europe and her character predestine her.

For this reason the first pillar of her peace policy has always been, and will always continue to be, the League of Nations as the expression and the agent of the policy of peace and of European collaboration, as the focus of the policies that seek mutual agreement and equilibrium among the Great Powers, and as a guarantee of the position and influence of the smaller States and nations.

For this reason the policy of the Little Entente has been, and will continue to be, the second pillar of Czechoslovakia's peace policy. Rumania and Yugoslavia, too, find themselves in close proximity to three Great Powers who have interests in Central Europe and who on that account could easily come into conflict from which our three States might suffer. The Little Entente desires now to take up consciously those European and peace tasks which Austria-Hungary should have fulfilled of old, and in which the Little Entente now

wishes to co-operate with Austria and with Hungary. For this reason the constellation of the Little Entente is permanent, immovable, and will become stronger with the lapse of time.

For this reason Czechoslovakia has finally sought a third pillar of support for her policy—in those States that comprehend and would be willing to support this European policy of hers, that would help us to carry the policy through and would enable us to preserve the new status in Central Europe, and, by ensuring us peace for long into the future, give us the opportunity in some forty to fifty years of consolidating our State, of building up its international position, of solving its inner political, social, economic, national, and administrative problems—in short, an opportunity for definitive consolidation and for making adequate preparation for any and every development in Europe.

That—and nothing else—is our real orientation, and therefore there can be no question of any change in our point of view. Every country that will help us in this, or at least be no hindrance to us therein, will be our friend, and possibly our ally, no matter what State or what nation it may be.

Every one knows that in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of our people these opportunities are given us through our collaboration with France. We have therefore built them up into a system. It stands to reason that the Balkan Entente is also a pillar of support for our policy, for it is natural that the friends of our friends are our friends, too. Finally, for that reason, we have sought co-operation with those others who are ready to respect and support the interests and needs of our State, its integrity, and its undisturbed development for the future.

Our attention has always been particularly directed towards four European factors: Poland, Italy, Germany, and the Soviet Union. Our relations with England have always been flawless, and found their solution in the relations and collaboration that have existed between England and France. We long sought, with loyalty and genuine good will, collaboration with Poland, and then with Italy. I hope that in the course of the further European development we shall come together again with those countries. We succeeded in this in 1934 and 1935 as regards the Soviet Union. In doing so we accomplished a good work for the maintenance of peace in Western and Eastern Europe—we had no other aims in that connexion. All the fantastic rumours of what is going on between us and Moscow are tendentious inventions. The deductions that we have become the instrument of Communist politics in Europe are simply ridiculous. I have already

explained at Liberec why Communism has no foothold and can have no success amongst us.

RELATIONS WITH GERMANY

The problem of our relations with Germany is for us the most important problem of all. Already last year I said at Most, Ústí and Teplice that we well understand that our German population desire good and friendly relations with Germany, and that the overwhelming majority of the Czechoslovaks cherish the same sincere wish.

The difficulties between us and Germany were always of a general European character as a consequence of the relations of Germany—in her function as the most important Central European Power—with the other countries of Europe. It is the lot of Czechoslovakia, as a State of medium size and importance, a State which, as I have already said, is situated in close vicinity to three Great Powers, at the cross-roads of three civilizations, and at a spot which is co-decisive for the possibility of dominating over the whole of Central and South-east Europe—it is the lot of Czechoslovakia that she is powerless to isolate herself from the policy of Europe as a whole, that she cannot incline merely to this or to that country, but that she must seek with all in common an equilibrium in Central and South-east Europe and with it satisfactory relations with all, and that she must contribute to a collaboration among all with a view to preventing rivalries that are calculated to lead to wars. Therein lies the sense of what we say about our policy—that it is European, that it cannot be otherwise, and that those who call for a different orientation either do not understand our situation or follow some other aims, such as wishing to place us in a condition of international isolation or of dependence upon one or another of the important European Powers. In this connexion let me emphasize an outstanding fact, namely, that Czechoslovakia has a vital interest in seeing a German-French agreement achieved. Agreement between Paris and Berlin signifies an automatic solution of many difficulties, too, between Berlin and Prague, which arise as a consequence of the general European tension. Our whole policy hitherto has been conducted in the light of this fact.

For this reason I have always maintained that antagonism between Germany and Czechoslovakia, whatever its nature may be, is not an inevitable something imposed by Fate, that a condition of lasting and respectable peaceful collaboration is possible, essential, and perfectly natural. In none of the responsible circles in Czechoslovakia does there exist either bias or prejudice or any feeling of hostility or hatred towards Germany. The assertion, too, as made

here and there in the European press, to the effect that Germany intends to menace the existence of our State, I regard as simply absurd. To attempt to-day to lay a hand upon the existence of a fifteen-million State and a ten-million nation in the middle of Europe would mean to evoke a European catastrophe. Nobody can wish that. . . .

(iv) *Extracts from Statement by Dr. Krofta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, October 22, 1936.*¹

. . . The failure of the League of Nations in the Italo-Abyssinian conflict has revived the old efforts at a revision of some of the provisions of the Covenant of the League.

The last Assembly of the League, under the influence of the events in Abyssinia, decided to invite the Governments of the member-States to advance their views on the question of amending or supplementing the articles of the Covenant of the League on the basis of the experiences of the past year. The Autumn session of the League had an opportunity of hearing the views of Mr. Anthony Eden, M. Delbos, and M. Litvinov. Mr. Eden's speech was particularly interesting.² . . .

Mr. Eden's remarks concerning Article 19 of the Covenant, in which he expressed the opinion that a revision of the provisions of the Peace Treaties that are incapable of execution is possible, have aroused a considerable echo. Mr. Eden expressed the view that the nations sincerely endeavour to preserve peace only if they are content with the existing state of affairs, or if they are convinced that the things with which they are dissatisfied can be rectified by peaceful methods. He therefore desires to give the nations that are, or may be, dissatisfied with this or that point in existing conditions, the hope that they may achieve the remedy in question by the help of the League of Nations in virtue of Article 19. He expressly recognizes that on this basis it would not be possible to force upon any one a change demanded by another, but if the Assembly of the League recommended such change by a large majority, the effect would be a powerful moral pressure in the direction of removing injustice.

Although it was known to us, and has been confirmed, that Mr. Eden, in making these remarks, was not thinking of territorial revision, the Little Entente nevertheless took up an unequivocal stand-

¹ Before the Foreign Affairs Committees of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Text furnished by the Czechoslovak Legation in London.

² See above, p. 251.

point to the question of amending or supplementing Article 19 of the Covenant—a question on which M. Litvinov, moreover, has expressed himself very emphatically in agreement with us—so that there should be no doubt in any quarter as to our views on this matter. As far as Article 19 is concerned I myself, speaking in the name of the Little Entente in the plenum of the Assembly of the League, stated: ‘The standpoint of the Little Entente is too clear to need any detailed repetition. We contend that no change is possible without the free and solemn agreement of the parties concerned. Moreover, we assume that to bring before the Assembly any territorial question whatsoever, no matter what country it concerned, would be poor service to the cause of peace, and would gravely disturb the good harmony among the nations upon which peace depends. While the Little Entente is, on the one hand, ready to collaborate in all that could strengthen the League of Nations, she would, on the other hand, oppose everything calculated to weaken the League.’

To this I would add that we have never upheld the view that the legal order created by the Peace Treaties is absolutely perfect, permanent, and immutable. We have never stubbornly insisted on the principle that the various provisions of the Peace Treaties could not be changed, could not be accommodated to the development of conditions. We cannot permit, however, that the Assembly should by virtue of Article 19 arrogate to itself the right of touching upon—be it only by theoretical discussions—the territorial integrity and the inviolability of our States. Nor can we consider it right that the Assembly should take upon itself the task of satisfying the discontented, under the illusion that it may be possible to satisfy all the nations, forgetting that it is not always wrongs done to some one that are the causes of dissatisfaction, but also the exaggerated egoism of the discontented. We are, on the contrary, afraid that ostentatious discussions of imaginary injustices and efforts to remove them by moral pressure would in no way serve the cause of peace, but would introduce disquiet and uncertainty into the life of nations, and inflict wrong upon those whose concessions are intended to pacify the discontented. The result would be that new malcontents would be added to the ranks of the old malcontents who could hardly be perfectly satisfied, no matter what concessions were made them. We are not afraid, as we have more than once declared, of a practical investigation of the complaints which may perhaps be brought forward against any one of us. We are convinced that a just and effective examination of them will show up their groundlessness. We do not believe that such an examination would advance the cause of

peace, but on the contrary, we are afraid that no small menace to peace could issue from it.

NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NEW LOCARNO. THE CHANGE IN
BELGIAN POLICY

In the speech which I made on May 28 last I described the negotiations conducted by the Western Powers with Germany after the occupation of the Rhineland by German troops and the denunciation of the Locarno Treaty, and I referred to the fact that these negotiations had not proceeded beyond a preliminary exchange of views. Events which have occurred from May up to the present moment have produced no improvement in the situation—in fact the contrary is rather the case. . . .

The situation has been to a considerable extent altered, however, by the King of the Belgians' speech of the 14th of this month.¹ . . .

The pronouncement of the King of the Belgians, whichever interpretation we may adopt, may mean a serious deflection on the part of Belgium from the obligations imposed by the Covenant of the League of Nations and could have an unfavourable influence upon the relations of other States to the League.

It is not, I think, necessary to explain why we cannot, and shall not, follow Belgium's example. Our geographical situation is entirely different from that of Belgium. We have neither the assurance, nor any real hope, that any European State would seriously take up our defence if we had not in advance secured its aid by undertaking to render it similar aid to the best of our power should it be attacked. We must, therefore, not only abide by our existing treaties of alliance but we must, over and above that, strive to strengthen and extend them. We must also, not only for ideological and moral reasons but mainly with a view to our practical vital interests, remain faithful to a policy which finds outstanding expression in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

THE LITTLE ENTENTE

During the period with which I am dealing in my speech to-day the Little Entente has had two meetings, the first on September 13–14 at Bratislava,² and the second on September 30 in Geneva. At the ordinary session of the Standing Council of the Little Entente at Bratislava, at which current political and economic questions were discussed, we agreed to keep in contact also during the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva, and in pursuance of our Organization

¹ See above, p. 223.

² See above, p. 351.

Pact a fresh meeting of the Little Entente was held only a few days after the first.

The Bratislava meeting of the Standing Council of the Little Entente was followed with great interest, for the usual antagonistic propaganda, which prior to each session of the Little Entente announces conflicts among its members and its inevitable collapse, based its pessimistic views as to the future of the Little Entente this time with particular emphasis on the argument that the departure of M. Titulescu from the post of Rumanian Minister of Foreign Affairs signified a change in Rumanian policy, and thus a change in the relations of Rumania to the Little Entente. M. Titulescu would himself reject all such insinuations. Many people do not understand, or decline to understand, that the Little Entente is a political structure which arose out of definite political facts, and that the Little Entente will endure so long as there is practical foundation for its existence. At the Bratislava meeting, which was preceded by the visit of the three Foreign Ministers to the President of the Republic at Topolčianky, with whom they had lengthy conversations on the general international situation, all the questions of foreign policy that have special significance for the Little Entente were discussed in detail under my chairmanship. In the course of these discussions we were able to note with satisfaction that our views on both the general and the special questions of international policy are wholly identical. We proclaimed once again our fidelity to the League of Nations and our determination to strengthen the League, and we expressed ourselves in favour of a policy of regional pacts. As I have already said, I spoke for the Little Entente in this sense in the plenum of the Assembly of the League of Nations, where our pronouncement met with much approval.

At the Bratislava meeting we also took up a positive standpoint to the efforts of the Western Powers to bring about a new adjustment of security in the West, and we came to the conclusion that the organization of peace in the West will not of itself suffice for the assurance of peace in Europe, for such a partial solution would by no means solve the problem of European security as a whole. As, however, it is uncertain that a general solution of European security could be achieved in the near future, the States of the Little Entente decided to take of themselves a further step on the path of organization of peace by a closer and more effective union of their own forces and a more precise formulation of their mutual obligations in case of a threat to their own security. The Little Entente States do not see in this effort to strengthen their ties and their duties anything that

would be calculated to hinder any of them from fostering good relations with those countries with whom they have succeeded in establishing such relations. In stating this principle we had particularly in mind the treaties which the individual States of the Little Entente have concluded with other countries. At the same time, of course, it never occurred to any of us to abandon the fundamental principle of our bond of alliance which lays upon each of us the obligation of not contracting any new political ties without the cognizance and the consent of the other two.

The Little Entente further discussed relations with its neighbours—it is prepared to collaborate with them all—and the question of non-intervention, a principle which the Entente recognizes for others while claiming the same consideration for itself. Special attention was devoted to expanding the economic contacts of the Little Entente States *inter se*, and closer contact in the same sphere with the other countries of Central Europe on the lines of the initiative put forward by Dr. Milan Hodža, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister.

As you will know from the daily press, a session of the Economic Council of the Little Entente was just now concluded. This Council was called upon to carry out the economic programme of the Little Entente. During the session discussion was devoted to the mutual exchange of merchandise and to a number of questions relating in particular to transport by rail, water, and air, to postal communications, tourist traffic, standardization, unification of laws, co-operation among the export institutes of the three States, and so on. An agreement was reached on all these questions. In addition to that, the Economic Council also discussed details of the organization of the 'Central Economic Bureau' (*Centre économique*) which has been inaugurated on the initiative of Dr. Hodža, the Prime Minister. The aim of this Bureau is, as the Premier himself expressed it, to function as the economic centre of the Little Entente at Prague. It will be charged with the practical establishment of commercial bases for the economic contacts among the Little Entente countries, it will supervise the imports of raw materials, and will find a basis for the improvement of the economic relations between the Little Entente and other countries, first and foremost the countries of the Rome Pact, and of course Germany too. In view of the fact that the work of this Central Bureau in Czechoslovakia is in the hands of persons of great experience in economic life and enterprise, and persons who at the same time are perfectly acquainted with conditions in Central Europe and with the needs of close economic unity among the

countries of the Little Entente, it may confidently be expected that this central body will fulfil all the tasks delegated to it.

THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN TREATY OF JULY 11, 1936

On July 11 there took place in our immediate vicinity an event the importance of which extends beyond the frontiers of the two participant States, and touches upon the interests of Central Europe as a whole. Austria, who in the spring of this year had strengthened her ties with Italy and Hungary through the so-called Supplementary Rome Protocols, came to an agreement with Germany on that day, concluding a Treaty of mutual understanding with the Reich. This event certainly marks an important date in the history of post-War Central Europe, for, in addition to Italy who was already interested in alliances with Austria and Hungary, Germany, too, now proclaimed herself ready to co-operate with Austria, thus removing the obstacles which had been placed in the way of agreement. Germany recognized Austrian independence and came to terms with Austria in the matter of friendly relations.

The German-Austrian Treaty is a welcome proof not only of the fact that a conviction of the viability of present-day Austria is gaining ground, but also of efforts to settle the mutual relations of the countries of Central Europe along peaceful paths.

The introductory portion of the Treaty speaks of the desire of the contracting parties to adjust the mutual relations of the two German States once more upon a normal and friendly basis.

In Article 1 the German Government recognizes the complete independence of the Federal State of Austria, and in Article 2 agrees to regard National-Socialism in Austria as an internal affair of that country in which Germany will neither directly nor indirectly intermeddle. On the other hand, Austria in Article 3 undertakes that in her policy generally, and in particular in her policy towards Germany, she will be guided by the fact that Austria regards herself as a German State. This principle, however, is restricted by the fact that it does not apply to the Rome Protocols or to Austria's relations to Italy and Hungary. Austria here thus binds herself unilaterally to deduce from the fact that she is a German State certain non-defined political consequences in her relations to the German Reich. The scope of this provision is, however, considerably restricted not only by the absence of criteria according to which a decision could be arrived at as to what are the practical effects of a State declaring itself a German State, but also by the fact that complete liberty is given to Austria in her policy in so far as concerns her obligations

arising from participation in the Rome *bloc*. Germany expressly deduces no consequences for her policy and in particular for her relations to Austria from the fact that she is a German State.

From this brief analysis of the Treaty we may draw the conclusion that in it is reflected the influence of two Great Powers, Germany and Italy, and that the two influences in it balance each other. The Treaty obviously expresses the desire of the two States to preserve Austria in her existing form and not to allow her to disappear. If we understand the German-Austrian Treaty in this sense the conclusion which we at once drew after its conclusion is obviously the right one, namely, that the Treaty can for a time at least bring about a certain measure of pacification in Central Europe, when the two main sources of disquiet—the efforts to bring about *Anschluss* and restoration of the old dynasty—are for the moment stopped. This pacification is a gain for us, too, for it gives us an opportunity on the one hand to proceed in the work of enhancing the political, economic, and military strength of our State and of strengthening our well-proved ties of alliance, while on the other hand it enables preparations to be made for possible further European negotiations.

I believe it would not be right to imagine that the more remote effects of the Austrian-German-Italian agreement can be only unfavourable for us. It is unnecessary to refute the fears that are expressed here and there—more in other countries than among us—that the States that have come together by agreement, or some one or another of them, might employ, or wish to employ, the freedom they have acquired on one side for the purpose of some attack or other upon our State, or upon some one of the States which we number among our friends. Equally to be refuted are the reports spread after the 11th of July—for the most part transparently tendentious—to the effect that there was arising before our eyes a powerful and united *bloc* of States hostile on principle to us and to the States that hold with us, and that from this arose the danger of a complete upheaval in Central Europe. The groundlessness of these reports is apparent to every one who is aware how deep and unbridgeable are the differences in certain matters among the States of which, according to rumour, such a united *bloc* is to be composed, and how powerful, one may say vital, the interests which unite the individual States of this alleged *bloc* with some of the countries against which it is supposed to be directed.

For these reasons it is unnecessary to assume that the relations of the States, who have just drawn closer to one another, with other countries must be of an inimical character, or that those relations must

in the near future lead to conflicts. On the contrary, it is possible to express the hope that the approach achieved between Germany and Italy could facilitate the upbuilding of the economic organization of Central Europe to which the German-Italian rivalry has hitherto been an obstacle. And to-day, now that the war in Abyssinia is over, Italy in particular is concerned for the preservation of peace in Europe.

Czechoslovakia, who has not had any serious disputes with Germany or Italy or Austria in the past, nor has any now, would welcome every serious and sincere effort towards economic collaboration in Central Europe in so far as such efforts were in harmony with the general line of policy of all her Allies and conducted with their participation.

PROPAGANDA AGAINST CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Czechoslovakia's sincere endeavours to achieve peaceful and fruitful co-operation with all the States of Europe has of late come up against a systematic propaganda abroad designed to convince the world that Czechoslovakia is aiming at quite other goals. I think it well, therefore, to say a few words about this hostile propaganda, which for some time past has been directed towards poisoning public opinion throughout the world by spreading untrue reports concerning Czechoslovakia. You have no doubt heard all that this propaganda asserts about us: that, for example, Czechoslovakia is preparing to make an armed attack on neighbouring States, or that we are establishing bases here for the Soviet air force, that Czechoslovakia is a taking-off ground for the military forces of Bolshevism, that this country is practically swarming with Soviet officers, that Bolshevism is expanding on all sides, and similar stories. All these are stupid ideas spread abroad with a wholly obvious [design], but if the same thing is reiterated day after day to credulous people, it is no wonder that it often comes to be believed. This campaign, therefore, despite the complete absence of truth in its fundamental points, is not without its dangers for us, especially if it is permitted, or even encouraged, in places where, with a little good will, the inaccuracy of the reports could easily be ascertained.

Reverting to what I said in the June session of the Foreign Affairs Committee, when replying to Deputy Birke, about the foolishness of the fears that Czechoslovakia might succumb to the infection of Bolshevism, I would here like to recall what two of the leaders of our State have said just of late. The President of the Republic, Dr. Eduard Beneš, on the occasion of his visit to Liberec on August 19 last said: 'For the benefit of all those at home and abroad who oppose

our collaboration with Soviet Russia in support of peace in Europe, and who envisage alarming pictures of a Communist menace here, I repeat: Czechoslovakia is a solid, indestructible lighthouse of democracy and of quiet, progressive evolution to ever higher grades of social, economic, and national justice in Central Europe; a country which, in these present days of convulsion, will unyieldingly abide by the middle path of development between the extreme Left and the extreme Right, for she is, and will continue to be, as our Prime Minister recently said, a country of the happy mean in internal politics, just as she is a country that stands in the middle between the West and East of Europe in the sphere of foreign affairs. That is Czechoslovakia's great strength and her justified pride to-day; it is that which gives her all the opportunities and the means to emerge sound and successful as before from the existing international crisis, without revolution within and without conflicts outside.' And Dr. Milan Hodža, the Premier, in his speech to foreign newspaper correspondents on September 30 last addressed himself to those who spread similar reports about us, and said: 'Nothing is more ridiculous than for any one abroad to speak of Czechoslovakia as if it were a Bolshevized country. It is a fact that, of all European countries, Czechoslovakia is the one that possesses in its democracy the strongest guarantees of immunity from all types of extreme trends. Czechoslovakia has built up for herself a democracy that has overcome all internal and international crises, and which to-day feels itself not less strong—indeed stronger—than any of the democracies of Western Europe.'

To this I would like to be permitted to add some few words about our law for the defence of the State, a law which is not infrequently made a pretext for spreading inaccurate conceptions about our Republic. The Defence Act is an expression of the sovereign rights of the nation to defend the State and to prepare it for defence in case of danger. While other countries frequently fix the conditions of their defence by secret measures, this is done in our country by means of legislation openly passed by Parliament. Parliament by this law gave the Government authority to organize and increase the defence of the State, but not any right to organize an attack on other countries.

The importance and the scope of the law touching the defence of the State is, in many quarters, not rightly understood. The Act has been described abroad sometimes as being an exceptional measure which even in times of peace places whole frontier zones under military control. This interpretation of our Defence Act is incorrect, for great portions of the law only come into effect when the State

prepares to defend itself, that is, they are not general nor immediately applicable, as foreign propaganda would imply. Provisions such as those contained in our Defence Act exist in many other countries without arousing so much stir as our law has aroused. A great difference is to be found, however, in the fact that in other countries the duties of the citizens in case of essential defence of the State are adjusted by mere decree, whereas in our case this has been done by a law duly passed by the legislative chambers. Our military and civil authorities and our legislative bodies made a careful study of foreign legislation, and drafted a measure which is in harmony with the principles of international law. The defence measures of other States subject aliens to various restrictions in the matter of the acquisition and ownership of real property and of rights connected therewith. I would, moreover, like to point out that the provisions of our law are very liberal, for they give the authorities an opportunity of considering the complaints of foreigners who may regard themselves as being adversely affected in their rights.

I think that it will be sufficiently plain from these few remarks how unfounded and unjust are the slanders spread abroad about Czechoslovakia in regard to her Defence Act.

OUR RELATIONS WITH THE INDIVIDUAL STATES

From what I have already said in general of our course of action in respect of the main international questions of to-day, it is clear that our foreign policy has in no regard departed from the fundamental direction taken by it in the preceding period. This means, too, that there has been no change in our relations with the countries to whom we are bound by ties of alliance and friendship, nor has there been any fundamental change in our relations with other countries. A few remarks will therefore suffice to explain the present state of our relations with several of these countries.

But for the shadows cast on the relations between ourselves and *Germany* by the propaganda of which I have just spoken, our relations with the Reich could be not only entirely correct, but even those of friendly neighbours. Proof of this is to be seen in the fact that not only have various little misunderstandings, inevitable from time to time owing to our direct contiguity, been quietly settled as a rule, but even negotiations, so difficult under prevailing conditions, in respect of mutual trade and economic contacts, have been conducted smoothly and in a friendly spirit, and have practically without exception culminated in a positive and satisfactory result. Thus, an agreement concluded on December 22 last laid the foundations for an

exchange of merchandise this year to such extent as made it possible gradually to wipe out the clearing balance that had accumulated in favour of Czechoslovakia. The quota of mutual imports agreed upon was, it is true, not wholly reached; nevertheless, a more favourable relationship from the point of view above indicated was attained, and the clearing balance steadily reduced. On March 14 an adjustment of tourist traffic was arrived at, and funds were secured for the financing of tourist traffic from Germany to Czechoslovakia to an extent that is to be considered relatively satisfactory.

Negotiations of great importance not only from the economic but also the political standpoint were those conducted with Germany for a revision of the Elbe Navigation Act and the Oder navigation régime, initiated by and at the wish of Germany, and carried out in complete accord with the other countries concerned. Here, too, agreement was achieved, being made possible to a large extent by our own readiness and goodwill.¹

Our relations with *Austria* are, as is well known, of friendly character. We were among the first to come to the aid of Austria at the time of her crisis, and again just recently when we provided new proofs of our sincere good will for collaboration and Central European *rapprochement* by giving, on the one hand, our approval to lifting the financial control over Austria, and on the other hand by concluding a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with her. This Treaty, signed early in the present year, is the most extensive commercial instrument ever negotiated, not only by the two contracting parties, but by any Central European State whatsoever. The customs tariff agreement included mutual preferential duties of particularly extensive character for Austrian goods. Before this agreement could be put into effect, however, serious obstacles arose preventing its application, and the two Governments decided to make some changes in it which would enable it to be put into force. This was done by means of a supplementary protocol of July 9. At the same time the mutual import régime and tourist traffic conditions were adjusted. A very important new feature in the economic relations of the two countries is the fact that all payments between them are now settled by clearing arrangement on the basis of the protocol of April 30. While noting these welcome features I cannot pass over in silence the pronouncement made by the Standing Council of the Little Entente at the Bratislava Conference in September last, to the effect that we were compelled to express our regret that our relations with Austria had suffered through Austria's breach of the military provisions of

¹ See above, p. 282.

the Treaty of St. Germain, In pointing to the example of Turkey who chose a different course, we expressed the hope that a similar breach of valid obligations would not occur again, and we agreed upon measures which it would be necessary to take in such a case.

Nothing of disturbing character has occurred of late in our relations with *Hungary*. On the contrary, it can be stated with satisfaction that a readiness has been again expressed in competent quarters in Hungary to take part in a conference of the Danubian States, on the basis of which it might be possible to negotiate, as M. Kanya, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, wrote on September 23 last, 'for the establishment of economic and indeed political co-operation with the Danubian States in the interests of true security and real peace, for which every one yearns'. We believe that such a standpoint is calculated to create an atmosphere in which it would at length be possible to achieve the *rapprochement* among the Danubian States so sincerely championed by the Little Entente.

The reservations which M. Kanya at the same time put forward against pacts of mutual aid in Central Europe are well known to us from earlier times, and they are certainly not of such character as to be incapable of being surmounted.

The speech made by General Tanczos, the Hungarian delegate to the League of Nations, was also moderate and to the point, and although it adumbrated the possibility of Hungary's rearmament, it may be permitted to hope that the Hungarian Government does not intend to proceed to a solution of this question on its own initiative.

In the speech which I made here on May 28 last I expressed satisfaction that our relations with *Poland* had of late somewhat improved.¹ Although even subsequently some outbursts of mutual tension, in some cases violent enough, occurred, I do not hesitate to declare that the improvement noted at the beginning of May not only continues but is gradually increasing and intensifying. The extraordinary meeting of the League of Nations in June last gave me a welcome opportunity not only of making the personal acquaintance of Colonel Beck, the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, but also of discussing the mutual relations of our countries with him in some detail. I was glad to hear from his lips that he saw nothing in the sphere of foreign policy that could be a source of misunderstanding between us, and I took cognizance with pleasure of the expression of his willingness in principle to attempt to remove the disputes that have arisen between the two countries touching minority questions

¹ See above, pp. 366-7.

by direct and friendly discussion of the points at issue upon their merits. On this occasion I received from Colonel Beck a spontaneous explanation of the fact that lengthy delay in filling the post of Polish Minister in Prague is not due to any matter of principle but merely to technical difficulties connected with the appointment of the new Minister. At the last session of the League of Nations, too, in September, I had the pleasure several times of meeting Colonel Beck, but owing to chance obstacles of external nature we unfortunately had no opportunity for a fresh exchange of views.

The clarification which has meanwhile occurred in Franco-Polish relations, which had hitherto been under somewhat of a cloud, a clarification that manifested itself outwardly in the August visit of General Gamelin to Warsaw, and shortly afterwards (in September) the visit of General Rydz-Śmigły, the Inspector-General of the Polish Army, to Paris, can certainly only be welcomed by us. This open emphasis on, and concrete strengthening of, the bond of alliance between France and Poland should logically lead to an alleviation of the temporary tension between Poland and Czechoslovakia, the second close ally of France. We certainly all sincerely hope that this may be the case, and we are determined most emphatically to do our utmost to that end, though of course we do not lose sight of the fact that the success of our sincere effort in this direction does not depend solely on good will on our part.

Relations between *Italy* and Czechoslovakia in this period have developed quite satisfactorily. The fears of those who asserted that the sanctions against Italy, in which we participated in pursuance of the decision of the League of Nations, would provoke retaliations on the part of Italy, have proved unfounded. Negotiations which we opened with Italy immediately on the raising of sanctions concluded successfully in an agreement signed on August 31. It is not impossible that the exchange measures taken by Italy of late will somewhat affect the future development of mutual trade between Czechoslovakia and Italy, and that fresh negotiations will take place before long.

Italy's relations not only with Czechoslovakia but also with the other Little Entente States have of late appreciably improved. From this we may deduce the satisfactory conclusion that approval is forthcoming on the part of Italy for the efforts which we are putting forward for *rapprochement* among the States of Central Europe.

In the tragic conflict which now ravages *Spain* we adopted from the very outset the standpoint that we would not intermeddle in the internal disputes of that country, and even prior to the French

initiative for non-intervention in Spain we had drawn all the logical conclusions from that standpoint. We adhered to the French initiative by an official declaration on the part of the Czechoslovak Government of August 21 last, and we put that declaration into practice by prohibiting the direct or indirect export, re-export, and transit of arms, munitions, war material, and aircraft material destined for Spain or the Spanish colonies.

Czechoslovakia recognizes the existing Madrid Government, to which her diplomatic representatives are accredited, as the legal Government, and could not therefore recognize the revolutionary Government in Burgos that lacks international recognition. We therefore received the new Minister sent by the Madrid Government, and negotiated with the only remaining officer of the prior Spanish diplomatic offices at Prague for the handing over of the Spanish Legation to the new representative. I am glad to be able to state that the officer in question, M. Sanz y Tovar, the Legation secretary, appreciably facilitated this task by his tactful and conciliatory conduct.

At Geneva I was able to note the great power of attraction which the Little Entente exerts upon other countries, whose representatives frequently expressed a desire for joint action with us on various questions. In addition to the two States of the Balkan Entente, Turkey and Greece, who, though they are not members of the Little Entente, are accustomed to arrive at agreement with the Little Entente delegates on all general questions dealt with in the League Assembly, I am thinking particularly of *Bulgaria*, whose Prime Minister, M. Kiosseivanov, in repeated conversations with me manifested a decided determination to labour for permanent *rapprochement* and systematic collaboration with the Little Entente. The representatives of the Baltic States, too, make no secret of a desire for permanence in their collaboration with the Little Entente in questions of general character.

CONCLUSION

Of late, arguments have appeared in our press and have also been put forward by several politicians, in favour of the necessity of revising, or even directly changing, the main principles of our foreign policy as hitherto pursued. . . .

I do not wish, nor am I here able, to deal in detail with all that has been of late written and said as to how, and in what directions, we ought to change our foreign policy. I will refer only briefly to the main points. The reproach is made against our foreign policy as pursued hitherto that it has over-estimated, and that it continues to

over-estimate, the importance of the League in the matter of the security of our State; that it has taken no steps, nor is taking any steps, to obtain other more reliable guarantees of this security which are essential, especially at this moment when the League of Nations has shown itself in so many cases to be practically powerless. At the same time our treaties of alliance with the Little Entente States and France and our treaty of mutual aid with the Soviet Union are declared to be of little value and inadequate. It is demanded, indeed, that they be maintained and perhaps strengthened and intensified, but it is at the same time recommended that we seek to establish improved relations with the countries that are geographically nearer to us, in particular with Germany, Poland, and Italy, and to achieve a solution of the Central European question. I am sure that to those who have given only a modicum of study to the course of our foreign policy, all these opinions and suggestions must for the most part appear but a reiteration, in a slightly changed version, of what has long and frequently been said and is therefore well known. What is said to-day, for example, about the inadequacy of the League of Nations as a guarantor of our State security was stated long ago, and very frequently and emphatically laid down by Dr. Beneš himself when Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although himself convinced of the great importance and mission of the League of Nations and himself one who has so often played an important role in the League's activities, he never concealed its weaknesses and imperfections, and never hesitated to admit that he did not regard it as so strong that we could entrust it entirely with the fate of our nation and State. From the very outset, therefore, he endeavoured to ensure the security of our country by other means, above all, by the whole system of treaties of defensive alliance which we have concluded. Precisely because objections were here and there raised against this treaty policy in the early years of our independent existence as a State, because it was said to be superfluous, because it was argued that it sufficed for the security of our State to depend upon the League of Nations, the now President said in a speech in the Chamber of Deputies in 1924: 'The strength of the League of Nations to-day is not such that its decisive aid could be looked for with absolute certainty in the moment of gravest danger for us.' When we recall these unequivocal words of him who then conducted our foreign policy and who was the main creator of its young tradition, words spoken twelve years ago, we can hardly admit that to-day it should be necessary to sound the warning that in our foreign policy we must not light-heartedly rely upon the League of Nations and upon the so-called collective

security, but must strive to ensure the security of our State by other means.

Nor have we ever regarded the system of our treaties of alliance, which has been built up by our foreign policy for the express purpose, as an adequate and absolutely reliable guarantee of our State security. Dr. Beneš again and again as Minister of Foreign Affairs emphatically called attention to the fact that the best guarantee of our security was our own military strength. 'Time after time in the course of Geneva negotiations it was seen', he said in his address on 'How to Work for Peace', 'that a nation which did not defend itself against attack to the utmost of its powers would in the end be abandoned even by Geneva, even if it pursued a right policy and had justice fully on its side'; and he added, 'a nation and State which did not persevere to the very end in defence of its independence and its territories could easily be sacrificed'. It is obvious that our foreign policy, even while striving to guarantee the security of our State by treaties of alliance, did not at any time blindly and unreservedly rely upon those treaties. It also did not escape attention that the practical value of our main treaties of alliance—those with France and the Little Entente countries—would lose in importance through the gradual armament of Germany if they were not supplemented by a more precise formulation of our mutual obligations, or even by treaties of mutual aid concluded with other countries. We therefore endeavoured to negotiate the so-called Eastern and Danubian Pacts. The first was intended to embrace not only Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and the Baltic States, but also Germany and Poland, and to insure us, by the aid of all the rest, against attack on the part of any one of them. In analogous fashion all the States of Central Europe, together with Italy, were to assume obligations of this nature under the Danubian Pact. When the attempt to negotiate these pacts failed, we concluded a treaty of mutual aid with Soviet Russia, practically as a partial substitute for the proposed Eastern Pact. Immediately afterwards, however, we also began to prepare to extend our obligations within the Little Entente alliance so as to meet the case of an attack on any of the Little Entente States.

The strengthening of the bond of the Little Entente alliance, achieved precisely at a moment when there was so much talk about the decline of that alliance, is not directed against any State that entertains no aggressive designs against any of us. On the contrary, we all desire to cultivate the best of relations with all our neighbours. This of course applies also to our relations with Germany, Poland, and Italy. In our foreign policy we have always striven, and still continue to strive, to

maintain, and as far as possible to improve, good relations with each of those three countries. We have had more than one success in these endeavours, and it is not a just reproach to our foreign policy that various causes arising out of the general external and internal policies of those States, and thus independent of us, have frustrated, and still continue to frustrate, the complete success of our efforts. I showed in my last speech here on May 28 what systematic effort we had devoted in the sphere of foreign policy to a solution of the Central European problem. And from my speech to pressmen on July 15 last it will be seen that we were determined to continue those efforts. Moreover, the energy and interest of our Prime Minister, Dr. Hodža, in this matter is an adequate guarantee that in our foreign policy we shall not cease to devote the utmost attention to it.

Of late it has been said of this policy—and particularly is it stated by foreign propaganda—that it inclines to one or another line represented by the internal régimes that oppose one another in Europe to-day. I would state with all emphasis that in respect of our entire foreign policy, now as before, we refuse consistently and on principle to adjust our relations with other countries according to the particular internal régime prevailing there, and we shall continue so to act in the future. In this respect our foreign policy is entirely at one with that of the other Little Entente States, as was stated emphatically in our Bratislava *communiqué*. We therefore refuse to identify ourselves with any 'front' either against Fascism or against Bolshevism. We are opposed to the constitution of such fronts; we have not taken part, and shall not in the future take part, in such policy, whether directed towards the Left or towards the Right. We reject the idea of constituting *blocs* in this sense, and are thus opposed to the idea of ideological wars, agreeing fully in this connexion with the repeated pronouncements of both the French and British Governments.

Most decidedly do we reject the suggestion put forward here and there to the effect that our State and our policy are the instrument of some other States. For years it was said of us that we were the vassals of France and the mere instrument of French policy. That was then the fashion. Now the fashion has changed, and it is suggested that we have become the tool of the Soviet Union. If we were to arrive at agreement with Italy to-morrow, the same thing would be said of our relations with Italy. Moreover, the same thing is said of the relations of many other countries with their more powerful friends. These insinuations never had any real foundation, nor have they to-day. Our State has always pursued a Czechoslovak policy and no other. It will pursue the same in the future. It is not, nor

will it be, the instrument of any other State—neither of France, nor of the Soviet Union, nor of Germany, nor of Italy. It is too strong and too proud for that.

Finally, I would point out that our policy as hitherto pursued has been approved on the one hand by the whole Government and by all the Government parties and their deputies, and on the other hand by a Parliamentary majority, and has thus been accepted by those who bear the general responsibility in the sense just indicated. Thus this question is settled for the past. As for the future, I have just indicated our programme: Abiding by our obligations and faithful to our friends, we shall follow present-day developments with great care, so as to see to what extent these developments require our attitude to be accommodated to them in this or that question of our general policy.

From what I have said it is clear that all the things we are now recommended to do, we have long ago endeavoured to carry out. And as it is not asked that we should abandon any of the guarantees of security that we have won, or that we should dissolve our ties of alliance as they now exist, I may assuredly repeat that the fundamental principles of our foreign policy are the right ones, and that there is no need to diverge from them.

I would add, speaking with full conviction, that in so far as the insistence on a change of our foreign policy issues from any feeling that there is a danger of our international situation worsening, or even that our security is menaced, I regard such ideas as wholly mistaken and without any justification whatsoever. I am, it is true, far from wishing to conceal the gravity of the international situation of to-day, nor do I desire, by denying all danger, to dull the vigilance so essential for us, or weaken our manly determination to increase our defensive forces and not shrink from the gravest sacrifices that may be called for. When, however, I think of our vigilance and of this our determination, I do not hesitate to declare that we have no fear for the future of our State, for I firmly believe that it will not only sail safely past the menace of the numerous rocks that mark the international situation to-day, but will also go forward to further and happy progress.

(v) *Statement by Dr. Krofta, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, November 3, 1936.*¹

I did not originally intend to concern myself with Signor Mussolini's address, because it is difficult for the person responsible

¹ Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Czechoslovak Chamber of Deputies. *International Conciliation*, No. 326, January 1937, p. 127.

for the conduct of foreign policy to make a statement about a speech, the authentic and complete text of which has not yet been received and which is, at the present moment, variously interpreted. The Milan address contains a number of things which differ from the Czechoslovak point of view, nay, which are, in many respects, directly opposed to it. This applies especially to the opening part of the address relating to the League of Nations and to the statements concerning disarmament and collective security. The Czechoslovak Republic is directly concerned with the positive statement in favour of Hungarian revision. No statement of this nature can compel us to change the direction of our policy heretofore adopted, which condemns revision most emphatically. Mussolini stated in his address that *rapprochement* and co-operation between Italy and Yugoslavia is possible. This portion of the speech is interpreted in some quarters as aimed at the dissolution of the Little Entente and, at the same time, seeking to assure Yugoslavia that revision is not directed against her but only against Rumania and Czechoslovakia. This is a rather arbitrary interpretation, since everybody knows—especially our Rumanian and Yugoslav allies—that whatever revision is undertaken to the detriment of any one of us would be followed, sooner or later, by revision to the detriment of the two other parties. For certainly Hungary, strengthened by a revision carried out at the expense of the Czechoslovak Republic, would not stop at the present boundaries of Rumania or Yugoslavia, but would demand revision at their expense as well. The fact that Mussolini did not mention either Rumania or Czechoslovakia is interpreted in some quarters to mean that Italy is not prepared to discuss the economic consolidation of Central Europe with these States; but this interpretation contradicts the semi-official report that Italy continues to adhere to her former plan, namely that she must participate in the settlement of Central Europe's economic problems.

7. RUMANIA¹

Foreign relations played an important part in the affairs of Rumania during 1936. While M. Titulescu favoured the conclusion of a Pact of Mutual Assistance with the U.S.S.R., similar to the Pacts already signed by France and Czechoslovakia with that country, the proposal was not popular in Rumania. When the Cabinet was reconstructed on August 29, M. Titulescu was excluded. The new Foreign Minister, M. Antonescu, made a declaration of his policy on September 2.² Pressure from Germany continued throughout the year, its object being to detach Rumania and Yugoslavia from Czechoslovakia and so disrupt the Little Entente. This

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part III (iv) (c).

² See below, p. 394.

edifice, however, in spite of several cracks which were hastily papered over, showed remarkable cohesive power based on certain solid mutual interests. Apart from the regular meetings of the Permanent Council,¹ there was a meeting in Bucarest between the Heads of State of the three countries on June 6-10 at which the unity and indissolubility of the group were stressed by King Carol, who went on to suggest that the meeting of the Heads of State should be an annual event.

On October 29-31 King Carol paid a state visit to Prague to return President Beneš's visit to Bucarest in June.² Once more the opportunity was taken to emphasize the unity and mutual interests of the Little Entente, and of Rumania and Czechoslovakia in particular. This fact had its significance in view of Signor Mussolini's sympathetic references to Hungarian revisionism on November 1.³

On November 15 King Carol opened the new parliamentary session, and in his speech from the Throne expressed his Government's intention of supporting the League of Nations and strengthening Rumania's existing alliances.⁴ In pursuance of this M. Antonescu visited Warsaw on November 25-28, when he discussed with Colonel Beck matters of common interest and the further development of the Rumanian-Polish Alliance.⁵ To this, in relation to the situation in Eastern Europe, Colonel Beck subsequently referred as a 'bastion of peace'.

(i) *Statement by M. Antonescu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Rumania, September 2, 1936.*⁶

Rumania's foreign policy remains the same as that which has been pursued up to the present. This policy is the result of the alliances to which we owe our success in the Great War. The Peace Treaties gave full satisfaction to our legitimate aspirations. To-day we have no other aim but to organize and develop ourselves in peace within inviolable frontiers. I do not think I need make long declarations about our alliance with France, which remains the basis of our foreign policy. The man who, dressed in the uniform of a French soldier, flew in 1917 over enemy lines in a French aeroplane to bring a message from our great ally to Jassy, need not renew to the French people and its leaders his sentiments of confidence and affection. I do not doubt that I shall collaborate in the same spirit of trust and perfect understanding as in the past with the present French Government, which has given us cordial and effective assistance over recent negotiations in Paris for the execution of our armament programme.

Our alliance with the Little Entente constitutes an essential element of our foreign policy. We wish to maintain and develop our active and friendly relations with Poland, to whom we are bound by

¹ See above, p. 349.

² See below, pp. 395-6.

³ See above, p. 343.

⁴ See below, p. 396.

⁵ See below, p. 397.

⁶ *The Times*, September 3, 1936.

an alliance which has its origin in numerous common interests. Our friendly relations with the Balkan Entente States must also develop with a view to more effective activity.

Our relations with Great Britain were strengthened on the occasion of the homage which our Sovereign paid to his cousin, the late King of that country. Recently concluded agreements create a new basis for our economic and financial relations, which we wish to develop in the interests of both countries.

A common origin and memories of the Great War bind us to Italy. The economic interests of the two countries and the sympathy of the Rumanian people for Italy strengthen these connexions. We shall continue to maintain and develop our relations of good neighbours and friendship with Soviet Russia. Finally, we shall maintain the best relations with our neighbours and with all other countries, including Germany, our good relations with whom have their origin in the existence of great economic interests. Loyal to the League of Nations, we shall continue to collaborate actively with that great institution at Geneva.

This policy has been consistently pursued by all parties since the War, and latterly, in particular, by M. Titulescu, with talent, authority, and prestige, which has assured him the well-deserved gratitude of the country.

(ii) *Extract from Speech by H.M. King Carol II of Rumania, October 29, 1936.*¹

... We have fought for the same things and conquered in the same belief. After the War, this belief was strengthened by the formation of the Little Entente and crystallized in it. I subscribe wholeheartedly to what you have said concerning the necessity for, and vitality of, the Little Entente. Recent meetings in Bucarest and Bratislava have emphasized afresh the solidarity which is essential for us and for the political life of Europe. Our solidarity has been further strengthened by the meetings in Geneva, which have been marked by the same confident and loyal collaboration.

In these days when international events move so quickly and there are so many difficult problems to be solved, it is the duty of the Little Entente to confirm its unity anew. I am therefore glad to have the opportunity of doing so by my presence here among my loyal allies. We form an association, which is confident in its right and its

¹ In reply to President Beneš at a banquet given in his honour during a State visit to Prague. *Prager Presse*, October 30, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

power, we constitute a guarantee of order, we are tenacious defenders of our rights and our unity within our national and inviolable frontiers; moreover, we are loyal defenders of peace and the friends of all who are prepared loyally to co-operate with us. . . .

(iii) *Communiqué issued after the visit to Prague of H.M. King Carol II of Rumania, October 31, 1936.*¹

Political conversations between His Majesty King Carol II and the President of the Republic, Dr. Beneš, with the participation of the Head of the Government, Dr. Hodža, and of the two Ministers for Foreign Affairs, M. Antonescu and Dr. Krofta, took place during His Majesty's stay in Prague on October 29, 30, and 31.

The attitude of the three States of the Little Entente during the past year and month with regard to the various problems of their foreign policy was thoroughly discussed, and emphasis was once more laid on the necessity of pursuing in the future, as in the past, a common general policy in full agreement with the Belgrade Government, with the object of increasing still further the unity of the three States. In particular the exact procedure to be followed with regard to each of the political questions of the day was determined. All these questions will also be examined with His Royal Highness Prince Paul and the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Dr. Stoyadinović.

A series of questions concerning Czechoslovak-Rumanian relations was examined and provisions made for their settlement.

Sincere and complete satisfaction was expressed with the results of His Majesty's journey, and with the mutual understanding and complete identity of the interests of the three States of the Little Entente as regards recent changes in Europe, and also as regards the objects of their future policy. In consideration of the existing political situation in Europe, close and intimate contact will be constantly maintained between the representatives of the three countries.

(iv) *Extract from the Speech from the Throne by H.M. King Carol II of Rumania, November 15, 1936.*²

In the confusion which reigns in international life to-day, Rumanian foreign policy, with unshakable determination, calmly and without wavering, has pursued its lofty aim, the maintenance of peace and the preservation of our frontiers, which have been drawn

¹ *Prager Presse*, November 1, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

² At the opening of the Parliamentary session. *Prager Presse*, November 16, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

in perpetuity. My Government is convinced that this aim can be achieved by the friendly collaboration of all States within the framework of the League of Nations and by the strengthening of our alliances. My Government is, therefore, determined to support any act which serves to increase the authority and the power of the Geneva institution, and at the same time to spare no effort to develop and strengthen our existing alliances. With this object in view it will continue the intimate relations and permanent contact which exist between it and the principal statesmen of all allied countries.

An outward sign of these relations is to be found in the regular consultations of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente, which provide an exceptional opportunity of emphasizing the solidarity and unity of outlook which link these two groups of States. The Little Entente was further strengthened during the course of this year through the decision of the Heads of State of the three countries to meet regularly for mutual consultation. . . .¹

Rumania, who has devoted so much attention to the maintenance, strengthening, and development of her alliances, is determined to maintain friendly relations with all other countries, especially with her neighbours, for she is convinced that in this way, and at one and the same time, she can serve both her own interests and her great ideal—the maintenance of peace. . . .

In this difficult hour the forces of our nation must not be wasted in internal strife, but must be mobilized for the defence of the inheritance of rights which with great sacrifices our forebears entrusted to us. In the name of my people I demand that my voice should be heard and obeyed.

(v) *Official Communiqué issued after the visit to Warsaw of M. Antonescu, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Rumania, November 28, 1936.*²

Après avoir examiné toutes les questions intéressant les deux États, MM. Antonescu, ministre des affaires étrangères de Roumanie, et Beck, ministre des affaires étrangères de Pologne, ont constaté la concordance parfaite des vues de leurs gouvernements et se sont déclarés convaincus de la nécessité de maintenir avec vigilance, dans la situation actuelle, le contact le plus intime.

Ils ont constaté notamment que l'alliance polono-roumaine s'est toujours avérée comme correspondant entièrement au sentiment

¹ This decision was taken during the visit of Prince Paul of Yugoslavia and President Beneš to Bucarest in June.

² *Le Temps*, November 30, 1936.

profond des deux nations et aux buts pour lesquels elle a été conclue, et qu'elle constitue un des éléments constructifs efficaces de la stabilisation des relations internationales et de la sécurité en Europe.

Les ministres ont affirmé leur commune décision de maintenir intacts, dans toutes les circonstances, les principes établis dans le traité de garantie polono-roumain, afin de conserver leur pleine efficacité, dans toute nouvelle organisation de l'Europe, aux avantages résultant pour les deux pays de cette alliance.

A cet effet, les ministres se sont déclarés prêts à développer cette alliance sur tous les terrains de la vie pratique en l'adaptant aux intérêts de leurs peuples et aux nécessités impérieuses de la situation actuelle. Ils ont envisagé notamment des visites prochaines à Varsovie du ministre de l'instruction publique de Roumanie, du chef d'état-major de l'armée roumaine et du gouverneur de la Banque nationale roumaine.

Animés d'un esprit d'amitié et de confiance mutuelle, les ministres ont signé une convention de collaboration culturelle polono-roumaine, deux protocoles sur la collaboration des organisations chargées de l'éducation de la jeunesse, et ont échangé les instruments de la ratification de la convention relative à la délimitation des frontières polono-roumaines.

8. YUGOSLAVIA

(i) *Extracts from Statement by M. Stoyadinović, President of the Council of Ministers, March 6, 1936.*¹

. . . Dans les questions de politique extérieure, le gouvernement royal s'est efforcé avant tout de maintenir la continuité et de suivre dans ses lignes principales cette voie qui lui fut indiquée par le Grand Roi Martyr Alexandre Premier et par le bon sens de notre peuple. Le Roi Chevalier Unificateur a tracé durant sa vie des sillons ineffaçables et a laissé un guide d'une valeur durable, tandis que le bon sens de notre peuple a su toujours concevoir également les intérêts généraux, ainsi que défendre ses propres intérêts. Notre peuple a toujours réussi à être au bon moment du bon côté, du côté où se trouvent le droit et la justice internationale, par conséquent, la victoire finale. Dans les nouveaux problèmes également, dans les problèmes et les tâches que ces temps difficiles font surgir à la surface de la vie internationale, et qui se sont par conséquent présentées devant nous pour la première fois, le gouvernement royal s'est efforcé de s'inspirer des

¹ In the Chamber of Deputies. Text furnished by the Royal Yugoslav Legation in London.

mêmes idéaux et, de cette façon, d'aborder leur solution avec le même esprit et dans le même sens.

J'estime que nous pouvons ouvertement affirmer que cet esprit n'est pas mauvais et que notre politique extérieure n'est pas erronée dans ses buts et dans ses méthodes. Les résultats le montrent. L'avenir, je l'espère, le confirmera encore davantage.

L'attitude de principe, l'esprit de suite, la fidélité à l'égard des engagements contractés, furent les principes fondamentaux de notre politique extérieure. Dans les temps orageux et de changements invraisemblables, le gouvernement royal s'est efforcé de trouver la voie moyenne et la plus utile entre un dynamisme exagéré et une passivité nuisible. En vue du maintien de la continuité nécessaire, le gouvernement royal considère de son devoir d'exprimer aussi de cette place sa profonde gratitude à Son Altesse Royale le Prince Régent, qui, mieux qu'aucun autre témoin vivant, connaît l'œuvre et les efforts de son Cousin, le Roi Chevalier Unificateur et qui, par cela, pouvait avec le plus d'autorité représenter notre État dans les importants pourparlers récemment menés à Paris et à Londres avec l'autorité et le succès qui, du reste, pouvaient seulement revenir à son grand nom et à ses brillantes qualités.

Dans la réalisation de ses tendances pacifiques, le Royaume de Yougoslavie s'efforce de donner à ses rapports avec les grandes puissances de l'Europe occidentale et centrale le caractère d'une amitié et d'une collaboration aussi intimes que possible. La Yougoslavie a toujours voulu, et elle veut encore aujourd'hui, arriver avec elles à un accord sincère et loyal dans toutes les questions fondamentales, et mettre autant que possible ses vues en harmonie avec les leurs.

L'amitié traditionnelle et sans nuage envers la France nous tient toujours à cœur et nous nous efforçons, non seulement de la conserver aussi pour l'avenir, mais même, si cela est possible en général, de la développer encore davantage et de la consolider. Nous avons voulu parvenir à une collaboration aussi étroite que possible avec la Grande-Bretagne. Ainsi avons-nous pu constater avec satisfaction, ces derniers temps, l'intérêt et la compréhension que montrent à l'égard de notre pays les milieux compétents de Grande-Bretagne. Avec le Royaume d'Italie voisin, nous nous efforçons des deux côtés de dissiper les malentendus du passé en vue de l'institution de rapports d'une amitié durable dans l'avenir. Les relations étroites de nature économique qui existent déjà entre le Reich allemand et notre État exigent que, dans les limites du possible, nous complétions et élargissions ces relations réciproques.

Je considère cependant qu'il n'est pas nécessaire de vous exposer

particulièrement les rapports cordiaux entre notre Royaume et les pays amis et alliés: le Royaume de Roumanie et la République de Tchécoslovaquie. Ces rapports ont depuis toujours été tels qu'ils doivent l'être et ils resteront, sans aucun doute, dans le cadre de la ferme et inébranlable communauté d'intérêts et de sentiments que représente la Petite Entente.

Ainsi que mes prédécesseurs au ministère des affaires étrangères, j'ai eu également l'occasion de souligner à plusieurs reprises la grande portée de cette réelle communauté d'États et son utilité, non seulement pour les trois pays membres, mais aussi pour les intérêts généraux de la paix en Europe. Quoi que puissent affirmer ceux qui comptent avec l'oubli du monde, la Petite Entente représente un pas historique dans le progrès de cette partie de l'Europe, un progrès vers son organisation meilleure et plus juste. Sur cette voie, nos trois pays sont indissolubles, car ils sont liés par la communauté des intérêts vitaux et l'identité des vues fondamentales.

La visite récente du Président du gouvernement de Tchécoslovaquie et ministre des affaires étrangères, M. le dr. Milan Hodža, nous a donné une agréable occasion de manifester cette communauté d'une façon cordiale et solennelle.

Nous pouvons ouvertement déclarer aussi bien aux amis de la Petite Entente qu'à ceux qui ne le sont pas: La Petite Entente continue dans sa direction et ne cesse pas d'être le gage le plus sûr de la paix et le bastion contre lequel se brisent toutes les illusions de ceux qui ne se sont pas encore réconciliés avec l'état de choses d'après-guerre dans cette partie de l'Europe. En pleine solidarité entre elles, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Roumanie et la Yougoslavie, en commun et comme un tout indivisible, dans le cadre de la Petite Entente, continueront à travailler à la consolidation de la situation dans le Bassin danubien et surtout au rétablissement de la prospérité économique. Sans oublier les leçons du passé, mais aussi sans fermer les yeux devant les exigences du présent, nous accepterons cordialement et saluerons toujours le plus chaleureusement, nous aussi, toute possibilité réelle de collaboration de bonne volonté et utile aussi avec les autres voisins.

Le système de la Petite Entente trouve son complément heureux dans l'Entente balkanique que composent le Royaume de Grèce, le Royaume de Roumanie, la République de Turquie et notre Royaume. Grâce à l'Entente balkanique, la paix est complète aujourd'hui dans cette partie du monde, contrairement aux circonstances qui y régnaient jadis. Les Balkans ne constituent plus un baril de poudre, ni la cause de conflits internationaux. Les peuples balkaniques vivent aujourd'hui entre eux comme de bons voisins.

Le Pacte balkanique est la base de notre politique balkanique et il détermine spécialement nos rapports avec le Royaume de Grèce et la République turque.

Dans les deux ans de son existence, le Pacte de l'Entente balkanique s'est révélé comme un instrument important dans la création de la pleine solidarité des États balkaniques qui ont sincèrement collaboré et adoptent une attitude commune devant tous les événements plus importants de la politique internationale. Cette collaboration sincère des États de l'Entente balkanique ne s'est pas manifestée seulement dans les questions politiques. On a fait également des tentatives sérieuses dans la création de possibilités pour une collaboration économique plus étroite, qui ont donné jusqu'à présent des résultats positifs. Ainsi, lors de la solution des rapports commerciaux, on s'est accordé des facilités réciproques autant que cela fut possible étant donné les engagements à l'égard de tiers pays. On étudie le règlement ferroviaire commun qui est déjà adopté entre les États de la Petite Entente. Depuis le 1^{er} janvier de cette année, est entré en vigueur le nouveau tarif postal réduit entre les États de l'Entente balkanique. Le gouvernement royal considère le travail pour le renforcement de la solidarité balkanique par l'intermédiaire du Pacte de l'Entente balkanique comme un des buts les plus importants de la politique extérieure yougoslave. Je dois constater avec la plus grande satisfaction que, dans ces efforts, nous rencontrons la plus complète compréhension chez les hommes d'État responsables de Grèce, Roumanie et Turquie, ce qui nous donne les plus grands espoirs que le Pacte d'Entente balkanique remplira avec succès son rôle historique dans la vie des peuples balkaniques.

En dehors du Pacte de l'Entente balkanique se trouvent encore deux États balkaniques, nos voisins: la Bulgarie et l'Albanie. Nos rapports sont bons aussi avec eux et nous nous efforçons constamment de les améliorer, car nous sommes conscients que seulement dans la politique de bon voisinage et d'amitié sincère, tous les États balkaniques peuvent trouver la plus forte garantie de leur indépendance, de leur paix et de leur progrès économique et culturel. C'est seulement en suivant cette voie que peut être réalisé cet idéal qui devrait être commun à tous les États balkaniques:

'Les Balkans aux peuples balkaniques.'

La politique de rapprochement et de collaboration avec le Royaume de Bulgarie est fondée sur les bases solides et durables des actes historiques du Bienheureux Roi Alexandre et de S.M. le Roi Boris. La récente rencontre de S.M. le Roi Boris et de S.A.R. le Prince Régent Paul montre que cette politique sera poursuivie. La frontière

bulgaro-yougoslave qui fut jadis le foyer d'innombrables incidents s'ouvre progressivement au trafic des voyageurs et au mouvement commercial de la population frontière de l'un et de l'autre côté. Le traité de commerce conclu offre également aux deux pays la possibilité d'échanges commerciaux plus intenses. Le gouvernement royal demeure résolument attaché à la politique de rapprochement avec la Bulgarie, car il estime qu'il sert ainsi au mieux les idées et aussi les intérêts de l'Entente balkanique et de la consolidation de la situation dans les Balkans.

Avec le Royaume d'Albanie, nous fîmes et nous ferons tous les efforts pour développer le plus possible les relations de communications et les rapports commerciaux mutuels, car nous pensons que c'est là l'une des voies pour la création des rapports les meilleurs possibles entre nos deux pays voisins. Il faut espérer que la bonne volonté de la Yougoslavie trouvera de l'autre côté autant d'attachement sincère à une telle politique dictée par des raisons de solidarité balkanique.

Nos relations avec nos voisins du nord demeurent inchangées.

Nous n'avons jamais pu comprendre ni approuver la propagande légitimiste en Autriche. Le point de vue de la Yougoslavie dans la question de la restauration des Habsbourgs est suffisamment connu. Cette restauration entraînerait inévitablement des complications et aurait certainement des conséquences graves pour la paix en Europe. C'est pourquoi il est de notre devoir, en tant qu'amis sincères de la paix, dans l'intérêt général que nous répétons et pour la seconde et pour la troisième fois notre : *Non* résolu touchant cette question.

Le gouvernement royal désire une collaboration effective et loyale avec le gouvernement de la République autrichienne. Nous estimons que cette collaboration est utile aux deux pays. Nous n'avons laissé échapper, ni laisserons échapper aucune occasion et aucune possibilité de renforcement des relations économiques et culturelles avec l'Autriche. C'est pourquoi et avec juste droit, nous escomptons qu'aussi dans ce pays voisin on évitera tout ce qui paralyse nos efforts et tout ce qui met des obstacles et des entraves sur la voie de notre rapprochement.

Pour la consolidation économique du Bassin danubien nous sommes disposés également à la collaboration avec notre autre voisin du nord, le Royaume de Hongrie, et nous souhaitons que de ce côté aussi disparaissent les causes de méfiance mutuelle et de désaccord.

Nos relations avec tous les autres États aussi sont bonnes et normales.

A la Société des nations nous avons toujours défendu le point de

vue du respect de ce grand instrument de paix qu'est l'institution de Genève.

L'idée de la Société des nations a été et restera pour nous le point de départ de la politique internationale, car elle s'est montrée comme la seule voie pour le maintien de la vie internationale contemporaine, le seul régulateur réel de son fonctionnement normal et l'unique arbitre de tous ses conflits. De telles conceptions et la politique qui en découle donnèrent à notre État et aux relations internationales l'autorité nécessaire et lui permirent aussi de s'élever toujours avec raison pour la défense de ses droits et de ses intérêts justifiés.

Nous n'avons pas de raisons de perdre un seul instant la foi dans la raison d'être et dans l'avenir de cette institution fondamentale de l'humanité contemporaine, qui par ses grands idéaux et par son mécanisme représente l'unique moyen de maintien de la paix et des traités internationaux. Les hésitations momentanées dans l'efficacité de son rôle ne doivent détourner personne de la ligne que la Société des nations trace aux États au sujet de leur activité, car sans le dévouement sincère et sans l'identification de son activité au Pacte de la Société des nations et à son système de sécurité collective, la paix internationale et tous les traités internationaux seraient soumis à une dure épreuve. . . .

Comme vous pouvez, Messieurs les députés, le constater par mes paroles, dans ses lignes fondamentales et les principes essentiels dont elle s'inspire la politique extérieure du Royaume de Yougoslavie reste ce qu'elle a été jusqu'à présent.

Dans la situation internationale actuelle qui comprend outre toutes les garanties, un certain nombre de questions non résolues et de problèmes ardu, il est de notre devoir de rester fidèles aux principes exposés et aux engagements pris. Fidélité à l'idée de la paix européenne, fidélité au Pacte de la Société des nations, amitié avec la France, appui ferme de la Petite Entente et de l'Entente balkanique, demeurent aussi à l'avenir les impératifs de notre politique extérieure.

Dans l'avenir, le gouvernement royal s'efforcera sur cette base immuable de développer et de perfectionner l'organisation et l'activité de notre politique extérieure, contribuant aussi par tout ce qui est en son pouvoir à ce que soient sauvegardées les acquisitions des générations qui nous ont précédés et afin que soit assurée à notre Royaume, dans la communauté internationale, la place qui lui revient de droit et qui lui est reconnue d'une façon universelle.

(ii) *Extract from Speech by M. Stoyadinović, June 1, 1936.*¹

. . . The aim of our foreign policy is to make sure of peace and the Peace Treaties as the guarantee of good and friendly relations with all our neighbours and all other States ; the development of our relations for the maintenance of peace by common effort and for the guarantee of the independence and integrity of the State. The foreign policy of the Party must be based upon the Treaties of Peace existing within the framework of the League of Nations. When one says 'League of Nations' the phrase sounds rather odd. After setbacks in China, Abyssinia and elsewhere, is it any good to speak of the League ? In spite of all this I still regard the League as a useful institution. Abyssinia has succumbed, but she would have done so in any case as she was without military preparations or armaments. Moreover, a war with Abyssinia gives one the impression of a colonial war which one regards in Europe somewhat differently. It would have been an entirely different matter if it had been a question of a European war. It is possible that the support given by the League of Nations to Abyssinia might have been adequate. For these reasons we should not anathematize the League. Nevertheless we should not regard it as constituting our sole support. We have alliances with the States of the Little Entente and the Balkan Entente which between them represent 70,000,000 souls. In our alliances we maintain honourably the role allotted to us. Our policy is a policy of peace. We desire peace because we know what war means. We ask nothing from any one, but we will never yield an inch of the territory which is ours. To-day, by virtue of all the laws human and divine, and by virtue of the Treaties, our opposition to revisionist propaganda or to the return of the Hapsburgs in Austria, is due not to any fear on our part of the results of such propaganda or because we fear young Otto at Vienna, but merely because we know in advance that such measures would lead straight to an armed conflict.

We rely upon the League of Nations and upon our allies, but we depend above all upon ourselves and our own forces. We will equip our army for the defence of our frontiers, our peace and our security.

9. POLAND²

The key-note of Polish foreign policy during the year 1936, as in preceding years, was 'balance'. Situated uneasily between two powerful neighbours, executors with Austria, at the end of the eighteenth century,

¹ At the National Congress of the Yugoslav Radical Union. *Journal des Nations*, June 4, 1936. Translation prepared by the Information Department.

² See *Survey for 1936*, Part III (iii).

of her partition, Poland has to fear as much the consequences of agreement between Russia and Germany, which might result in another partition, as conflict between these two States; in the event of which her territory would in all probability sooner or later become the battle-ground of the opposing forces. During the period of Soviet-German co-operation under the Rapallo policy (1922-33) the first fear was uppermost in the minds of Polish statesmen. The Franco-Polish Alliance of 1921 had been designed to guarantee Poland both against danger from Bolshevism and against the possibility of a war of revenge by Germany and the reoccupation of the Corridor and Upper Silesia. The Polish-Rumanian alliance of 1921 was an added defence against danger from the East.¹

The violent campaign conducted by National-Socialism against Bolshevism during 1936² brought with it the fear of a possible conflict. Troubles in Danzig, following the 'Nazification' of the Free City in 1935, also aroused uneasiness.³ To discuss these questions, and also to safeguard the position of Poland in regard to the possible negotiation of a Western Pact to replace the Locarno Rhineland Treaty, Colonel Beck visited London on November 8-11.⁴

Poland also turned once more to France, after a period of aloofness dating from the German-Polish Non-Aggression Agreement of January 1934. On the invitation of General Rydz-Śmigły (as he then was), General Gamelin, the Chief of the French General Staff, visited Warsaw on August 12-16. The preliminary discussions which took place during this visit were brought to a successful conclusion during the return visit of General Rydz-Śmigły to France, on August 30-September 6, when agreement was reached regarding the form and conditions of the technical and financial collaboration to be afforded by France under the Franco-Polish Alliance. It was emphasized that the scope of the Agreement was purely bilateral and that the military conversations had not gone beyond the limits of a defensive alliance.

The total amount to be received by Poland under the September Agreement was 2,600 million francs. Of this, 1,350 million francs (405 million francs for the Polish Government and 945 million francs for the Franco-Polish Railway Company) were in the form of a long-term loan bearing interest at 6 per cent. This was to be used for national defence purposes, including the development of the Polish armaments industry and railway construction, particularly on the Upper Silesia-Gdynia line. A small portion was also to be employed by the Polish Government to liquidate certain French debts frozen in Poland, thus removing a cause of friction between the two countries. The remaining 1,250 million francs were to be received in the form of credits for the purchase of war material in France.

The final reading of the Bill empowering the Polish Minister of Finance to contract the loan and credits was voted unanimously by the *Seym* on January 5, 1937, when Colonel Beck explained the purpose of the loan and the basic principles of the Franco-Polish Alliance.⁵ The French Chamber approved the Agreement unanimously on December 29.

Meanwhile, on December 18, Colonel Beck had made a comprehensive statement on foreign policy to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate.⁶

¹ See above, p. 397.

² See above, p. 286.

³ See below, p. 417.

⁴ See below, p. 406.

⁵ See below, p. 415.

⁶ See below, p. 406.

- (i) *Official Communiqué issued by the Foreign Office after the visit of Colonel Beck, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, to London, November 11, 1936.*¹

During the last three days M. Beck, the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, has had with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, as well as with other members of His Majesty's Government, a series of conversations on the general situation in Europe and on questions directly affecting Poland and the United Kingdom.

M. Beck and Mr. Eden were glad to find a conformity of views and desires on the part of the two Governments in the matters of common concern to the two countries. They consider it highly desirable that the attempt to promote the settlement of European problems should be pursued. Opportunity was also taken to consider certain points connected with the proposed Western Treaty in regard to which Poland has an interest; and it was recognized that means would require to be found to respect Poland's legitimate interests in this matter.

M. Beck and Mr. Eden are of the opinion that international collaboration can best be maintained within the framework of the League of Nations, and that nothing would be more fatal to the hopes of European appeasement than the division, apparent or real, of Europe into opposing blocs.

- (ii) *Statement by Colonel Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, December 18, 1936.*²

Members of the Committee:

About a year ago I had the opportunity to report to Parliament, in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the *Seym*,³ regarding the methods of work in our foreign policy, as I interpreted that policy to the best of my ability, with the aim of applying to the work of my Department the great ideas of Marshal Pilsudski.

I am speaking at the beginning of this extraordinary parliamentary session because, in my opinion, the number of events necessitates a more frequent analysis of the situation and defining of our attitude.

In reviewing these events and our part in them, I will try to demonstrate the application of those very principles to which I referred last year.

¹ *The Times*, November 12, 1936.

² Before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate. Translation furnished by the Polish Embassy in London.

³ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 230.

There were many events in that year, and our attitude in face of them was not a passive one, therefore chronological material is rather abundant. I did not, however, find it necessary to change any of the principles directing Polish policy.

One apparent fact might strike you: last year I referred also to that feature of our foreign policy which is characterized by a reserve and reluctance to engage ourselves beyond the sphere where we possess means of action and where, therefore, our work has direct weight.

There is no doubt that in the course of the last year we enlarged the range of our contacts and interests. I should like, however, to point out at this stage that we have by no means altered our methods, and the above-mentioned state of affairs is merely the outcome of our anxiety lest our country should become an object of policy instead of formulating its own attitude with respect to any events of which we are not the cause or the inspiration. The defining of such an attitude is certainly not easy nowadays, not only because there is so much happening, but also because there are in existence, side by side, so many different methods of work in international relations.

Our work has been facilitated thanks to the fact that Poland owes allegiance to no ideological doctrine, either in fact or in form.

Believe me, it is no easy task to encounter one method of work on even dates and an entirely different one on uneven ones.

I regret, however, to say that this is so.

For several years we have been asking for uniform methods in international politics and customs. Not in order that such complicated phenomena should be compressed in one rigid form, but in order that all who co-operate with others with goodwill and in good faith should not be faced with the unexpected, and that the knowledge as to the extent to which the interests of the country one represents will be safeguarded should be available in advance. Nevertheless, we must face the fact that the preservation of any *modus vivendi* in Europe requires work on several planes, and that we must at the same time collaborate with those States with which our policy is most concerned, and participate in concerted action of widely differing kinds.

This variety in methods might even become disquieting if it were not for the fact, historically proved, that the basis of international life develops much more gradually than its forms. International policy is governed by a certain community of interests of all States, and cross-currents which temporarily separate one from the others cannot, I assume, hamper permanently this normal growth of

solidarity. I would remind all who are uneasy about the future that there have been periods of peace and co-operation without the League of Nations, and wars when the League of Nations was already in existence. In quoting this example I have no intention whatsoever of implying that our interest in this institution has been diminished, nor have I underestimated the difficulties of our times. I simply desired while discussing positive facts of interest to us to remind you of the principle so dear to our policy: 'Il n'y a que la réalité des choses qui compte.'

To those realities belong evidently in the first instance all the affairs materially affecting our State, that is to say, relations with our neighbours.

The work done by us in co-operation with our Eastern neighbour, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, continues to yield useful results. We transact our common neighbourly business without any shocks or serious misunderstandings.

Public opinion has recently been rather shocked by the utterances of one of the speakers during the VIIIth Soviet Congress.¹ The words in question appeared to contain menaces to the Western neighbours of the Union. Though these utterances did not concern Poland but rather our Baltic friends, I could understand the stir caused in public opinion. This for two reasons: first, because the Non-Aggression Pact which had existed between the Soviet Union and its Western neighbours since 1932 is based on the same principles *vis-à-vis* ourselves as well as those countries; secondly, because nothing that happens on the shores of the only sea to which we have access can be a matter of indifference to us. It gives me great satisfaction to confirm that the explanation received does not give rise to any ground for disquietude. I had the opportunity of hearing that the Soviet Government attaches equal importance to good and normal relations with all the States situated on its Western borders.

A certain nervousness, so common in these difficult times, is apparent in some utterances in the press and in public opinion in the sphere of our relations with our Western neighbour, and this applies to both sides of the frontier. I am nevertheless deeply convinced that the great and bold decision—to put our relations with the German Reich on a friendly basis—continues to retain its value, both with

¹ This referred to the words uttered by M. Zdanov, Secretary of the Communist Party of Leningrad, on November 29, who said: 'We wish to live in peace with the Baltic countries, but if these tiny people allow big adventurers to use their territories for big adventures, we shall widen our little window on to Europe, with the help of the Red Army.' (*Daily Telegraph*, November 30, 1936.)

regard to the direct interests of our country and to relations on the Continent of Europe as a whole.¹

Nerves remain nerves and decision decision.

There are certainly many agencies in the world anxious to deprive us of the fruits of our peaceful and constructive labours, but I am convinced that the largest section of public opinion is so intent on safeguarding those fruits that it will reject any offers coming from outside, lest their value be reduced.

Among the results of the last year we find many encouraging facts which prove that, in our decision with regard to those few political agreements we concluded, we followed the path of permanent and stable principles, and did not seek to derive any benefit from transient opportunities. For that very reason our oldest alliances, concluded in the defence of our interests but featuring a deep loyalty towards the interests of others, have proved during the last few months to be beneficial factors in the European balance of power. Before I start enumerating all the contacts with political heads of other States in their chronological order, contacts which enabled us in the course of the past year to share common anxieties and devise reasonable solutions, I should like to mention, first, certain visits deriving from our alliances. In the course of last summer there took place the exchange of visits between the supreme military commands of France and Poland. No picture of our relations with France would be complete without mentioning that, besides the utmost courtesy met with by Marshal Rydz-Śmigły during his visit to France from the governing circles in politics and the army, we had the opportunity of observing spontaneous and sincere manifestations from the general public during the various stages of the journey. This visit resulted, moreover, in certain agreements connected with defence problems. The details will be given to you by the Minister of Finance. No wonder that, in the atmosphere I mentioned, the relations between us and the Government of the friendly and allied French nation are developing in a most satisfactory manner in spite of many other European problems. I hope that this state of affairs will influence all the future treaties which will be negotiated in Europe.

Co-operation with Rumania, situated much nearer to us, made steady progress in this difficult period. I am convinced that Minister Antonescu and General Samsonovici, during their stay in Warsaw, felt how much real and constant friendship there is for their country. On my part, I should like to point out that the simple and friendly

¹ For text of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Agreement of January 26, 1934, see *Documents* for 1933, p. 424.

tone I adopted at the very first meeting with my Rumanian colleague enabled us to confirm in the most direct way the permanent solidarity of our mutual interests.¹ I hope that I shall be able to continue these conversations in Bucarest. I further think that the personal contact of the Heads of our States will deepen our alliance.

With your leave I will now enumerate the events in their chronological order. Since my last speech in Parliament, we have had several opportunities of proving the usefulness of personal contacts, both with regard to learning more thoroughly the opinions and political tendencies of other countries, and to giving foreign statesmen an opportunity of acquainting themselves directly with our life and thoughts. I confidently state that all the meetings and political visits which took place in the course of last year met with sympathy and lively interest in the widest circles of our public. I am also pleased to say that during those contacts with the outside world we always met a lively response, deepening the understanding of our political work.

Before I enumerate the strictly official visits, I should like to call to mind the stay in Poland of Minister-President Goering in February last. Though not official, this visit was an expression of constant endeavour between our neighbouring States to consolidate the best relations through mutual acquaintance and direct meetings.

Next I will limit myself to the enumeration of visits of a diplomatic character. I have no doubt that my colleagues will find an opportunity of mentioning to you the contacts they made with their foreign colleagues occupying similar positions in their respective countries.

I therefore mention briefly visits and meetings. The exchange of visits with the Belgian Premier, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. van Zeeland, reminded the world of the century-old friendship between our two countries. Its result is a great measure of mutual understanding in facing present problems.

Further I take the liberty of mentioning the visit to Warsaw of M. Munters, the present Minister of Foreign Affairs of Latvia. This visit contributed to the further *rapprochement* between our countries, neighbours on land and water. In the circumstances I was pleased to support Latvia's candidature to the Council of the League at the September election.

The stay in Warsaw of the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hr. Koht, is, I assume, a further expression of the conviction both in Poland and in the Scandinavian countries that there are many

¹ See above, p. 397.

reasons for our countries to find an even firmer basis of solidarity in face of existing European problems.

The visit of Premier Koscialkowski to the capital of our old Hungarian friends resolved itself into a warm-hearted manifestation, bringing to memory our centuries-old connexions in this part of the world.

I was especially pleased that the return visit to Belgrade took place just at the present time, for with great pleasure I was able to realize, there also, that political life does not entirely consist of conflicts and differences, but, on the contrary, that there is a lot of accumulated friendly spirit and a great deal of understanding at various points of our part of the world for constructive work, based on loyal respect for mutual rights and interests.

In the light of actual problems of special interest to us I attach a great importance to the conversations I had in London. An official *communiqué* issued on this occasion,¹ and articles in the English press, informed you about the more important matters under discussion. At this stage I should like to emphasize the appropriate interpretation by the English press of the contents and importance of the conversations. I should like to add that I attach special importance to this matter, in view of the fact that we found our respective views on many important factors in the present situation to be systematically and constantly in harmony as these international problems arose. I have no doubt that the fact that I mentioned during the London conversations the so-called Locarno problems meets with your full appreciation. This takes us to the sphere of collective work in which so many countries are interested.

Already during the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in March last I had the opportunity of defining clearly our attitude to this problem. I was compelled to recall to mind that the Pacts of 1925 upset the balance of the European Continent, from our point of view.

I mentioned this not in order to criticize or express regrets, but because, in the interests of a general European stabilization and in order to afford us an opportunity of collaborating according to our means with the Western Powers for the achievement of this common goal, I wanted to make clear all the necessary conditions which are indispensable if the future Pacts are to retain their positive values, avoiding at the same time certain omissions or negative features as proved by the experience of 1925.

On these lines we shall frame our future attitude to similar negotiations, wishing the highest success due to all constructive work.

¹ See above, p. 406.

Not the least complication in this Pact will be no doubt its relation to the League of Nations. The previous attitude towards this problem provoked on our part far-reaching objections. In general, if we are to speak about the anxieties as to the future of the Geneva institution, it seems to me that now more than ever we should give it an opportunity for quiet progress through this period of grave anxieties, and not burden it with so many complicated tasks.

To-day League reform belongs to problems officially on the list—reform and adaptation to the realities of the present period.

For the time being the matter is being dealt with in the Geneva way. There is a Committee, there certainly will be a Sub-Committee; that is to say, nothing happens very quickly. This is right in so far as all reforms are easy in favourable circumstances. In difficult ones the greatest caution is advisable.

Before returning to the subject of League reform I should like to tell you briefly about its activities during the last year.

In my January statement I gave expression to my anxieties as to the complications caused by the Abyssinian question. This question is settled, as far as we are concerned, from the day we lifted sanctions. I must confess that the fact that this business was not settled in a formal way in Geneva in the autumn caused me anxiety, but I hope that the next meeting will solve the problem.

Another important matter dealt with in Geneva was the Spanish Civil War. In agreement with many other countries represented at Geneva, we were of the opinion that there was no practical basis for engaging the League in this difficult and painful business, especially in the face of other international action undertaken to diminish the dangers in international relations which might result from this war.

I have in view the Non-Intervention Agreement in which we also took part. Though this Agreement might be criticized from the strictly legal point of view, yet the sincere desire for peace on the part of the countries which took up the initiative enabled us to adopt a friendly and positive attitude—spontaneous from the beginning and later formally confirmed.

I cannot maintain silence on the fact that during the current year I put forward in the Assembly of the League of Nations, in the name of Poland, the problem of our colonial interests. This problem might be divided into two parts. First, the securing for our population of territories for emigration. These demographic problems you know well. The question of Jewish emigration constitutes a subdivision of this part of the problem. The latter question has a special significance in view of the widespread tendency amongst the numerous

Jewish populations to create a national home in Palestine. The Jewish question presents special difficulties in the whole of Eastern Europe in view of certain otherwise quite normal economic and social processes connected with it. A great number of Jews who are maintaining their families as small middlemen lose their means of existence in particular countries as soon as the economic life develops, and have no opportunity of assuring to their offspring means of livelihood. Jewish emigration is therefore not only a Palestinian problem; it is equally a European problem on the one hand, and a very important emigration problem on the other.

The second part of the colonial question for Poland is access to raw materials in a better way than by ordinary commercial exchange.

I deemed it necessary to raise this question at Geneva, for I met there with an international movement towards studying means for eliminating the present economic and social difficulties in Europe. There were many discussions about preventive measures against the growing economic difficulties. In the circumstances I thought that silence should not be maintained over problems so vital to us.

I revert to League reform. A press *communiqué* gave you information as to our observations deposited in the League Reform Committee, and I will limit myself therefore to mentioning the chief motives which served as a basis for our answer to the questions.

I do not think it advisable to discuss now paragraphs and regulations. Paragraphs alone will not solve this important problem. I thought it, however, necessary to draw international attention to two great dangers menacing the Geneva institution to-day. The first consists in the possibilities, should the present mechanical continuance of past policies result in a division of world-Powers, and especially those in Europe, into two camps: Powers not bound by any international covenant in their decisions, and Powers hampered more and more, not only by the fundamental provisions of the Covenant, but also by constantly growing 'procedures' of the League.

This would create a danger of upsetting the balance of rights and obligations—an indispensable condition of any sane organization.

The other danger in the same sphere is the formation of *blocs*: for the League and against it. As you know, not only the principles of policy professed by us, but also the basis of collaboration between us and many other important countries, consist of our reluctance to be included in any opposing, if not hostile, camps. Already the discussions about Spain have demonstrated the existence of this danger.

I am pleased to state, however, that so far we have been able to oppose this tendency, in collaboration with some other countries.

I cannot close the chapter concerning the League without discussing at some length the Danzig question.¹ Danzig affairs are for us much more than a mere addition to the League's difficulties.

They embrace a whole series of our every-day and vital interests. To explain, however, the situation of to-day, and present it in a proper light, I have to consider the problem from the League of Nations' point of view. First, because I think that in the discussion of recent events there is, in Polish public opinion, a certain confusion of ideas. Poland possesses in Danzig rights and interests which are known to you and which reach far beyond diplomatic problems.

As far as assuring respect for those vital interests of ours goes, we admit no possibility of any changes and the attitude of our Government is simple and immutable. I am bound, however, to admit that in all public declarations the Senate of the Free City of Danzig acknowledge, in a clear and categorical manner, the existence of our rights. Similarly, we have no intention of interfering in any way with the rights of the Free City. While defending with firmness our own rights, we have to respect the rights of others.

The complications of the last period had their source in the conflict between the Senate of the Free City and the League agencies, and here we have to acknowledge great differences in the opinions of those two factors, and differences in the interpretation of existing agreements. At the wish of the League we undertook twice in the last few months an additional task with a view to finding a practical way out.

One task, namely the liquidation of the incident connected with the visit of a German cruiser to the port of the Free City, ended in the exchange of Notes, the value and importance of which were acknowledged by the League of Nations.

In the present state of affairs we are negotiating intensively in two directions: first, to secure an efficient and practical execution of our rights in the Free City in view of the many new regulations issued by the Danzig Senate, and secondly, to eliminate difficulties which have arisen between the League Representative and the Senate.

For a week these negotiations have been proceeding favourably, and I hope that in this case also we shall be able to fulfil our task. These matters are very delicate. They have been so for several centuries, but I am convinced that mutual interests, well understood, will always enable us to find reasonable forms of co-operation with the Free City, lying as it does on our great trade route. . . .

Once more I should like to claim your attention for some remarks I made in the first part of my statement; the confirmation that the

¹ See below, p. 417.

enlargement of the range of our activities, which has characterized the latest period of our policy, was merely the outcome of necessities imposed on us by the general situation.

I should never like to divert our foreign policy into too many channels, and especially with regard to tasks surpassing our real means of action.

We should be perhaps a happier country if our part in European politics were less important. But it does not depend on us. There are certain clear issues resulting from our position and the general evolution of international relations.

The artificial spreading of our political activities would be certainly contrary to the traditions of our policy. To shrink from the part assigned to us would be a flight from the responsibilities of our heritage.

(iii) *Statement by Colonel Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, January 5, 1937.*¹

. . . The purpose of the proposed [Franco-Polish] Loan is clear. We all certainly rejoice about each new rifle put into the hands of our soldiers, and this statement does not cause me (a Foreign Minister working for peace) any prickings of conscience.

To ensure that peace shall not be a hollow watchword, two conditions are essential: first, sincerity on the part of the State which makes peace a plank in its political platform, and secondly, force, an indispensable asset if the political programme of our State is to receive due respect from others.

Though it might be assumed that the scheme before the Chambers has been thoroughly explained in all its details, yet, in spite of this, the Premier suggested that I should speak to you on the subject, for apart from the merits of the scheme there are certain manifestations which accompany its realization.

Some weeks ago I had the opportunity of reporting to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate on the satisfactory trend of our relations with France during the past year.² To-day I have in mind the external manifestations which accompanied the ratification of the Agreement before you: the debates in the French Chamber, the attitude of the French Government, and finally the unanimous vote of ratification given by Parliament. This result, as it was pointed out during the debates, was the first unanimous vote recorded during the present session. We have to deal therefore with an event of impor-

¹ In the *Seym*. Translation furnished by the Polish Embassy in London.

² See above, p. 406.

tance and not of everyday occurrence. For that reason I deem it necessary to explain the case somewhat at length, an essential condition for the proper understanding of the value and importance of those events.

To achieve this it is necessary to revert to the beginnings of our relations with France. In February 1921 the Head of the State, accompanied by the Ministers M. Sapieha and General Sosnkowski, arrived in Paris where, in the persons of President Millerand and of the Ministers Briand and Barthou, he found statesmen fully conscious of the importance of conferring on our old friendship the lasting seal of a treaty of alliance.

It is worth remembering the situation and atmosphere of 1921. Even though many conferences and committees were being held at that time, it was essentially a period of temporary chaos, following on the collapse of the war machinery of the world and preceding the first attempts at organizing peace. In such conditions, only those questions which were straightforward and simple—and among these I count Polish-French relations—as they were then considered, had any chance of being settled in a short time.

Since then Europe has passed through many disillusionments and disappointments. In the course of these sixteen years there was a ten-year period when it seemed that all the affairs of this part of the world were governed not only by a permanent code but also by a permanent procedure. At a certain stage, politics might have appeared as a series of red-tape proceedings, not entirely free from some attempts to invest our simple Agreement—between two nations feeling a long-standing sympathy for each other—with some new complicated and artificial forms. But a period of heavy trials was to follow. The very foundations of political life in Europe were shaken, and the outward forms collapsed even more disastrously. 'Procedures' failed and not much was left of the 'Code'.

We found ourselves in a transitory period between two epochs: between the failure of the first attempt to organize peace and a new attempt of the same sort which would obviously have to be undertaken.

It was at that very moment that we affirmed the vitality of relations between Warsaw and Paris, culminating in the exchange of visits between General Gamelin and Marshal Rydz-Śmigły.

The unanimity of French public opinion, and the undoubted unanimity of view on this same point in Poland, remind the world to-day of the existence of this alliance.

How far-sighted were the authors of the 1921 Agreement!

You might well ask me: 'And what about the future?' I am in a position to declare that, between the Polish and French Governments, there is a complete agreement as to the point that the Polish-French Alliance should be maintained even in view of any future agreements or negotiations. I had the opportunity of making this point clear in discussions with my French colleague, M. Delbos. Foremost in my thoughts are the negotiations between Western European Powers with a view to replacing the old Locarno Pacts.

Since we are agreed on the principle, let me express the hope that means will be found to safeguard the full value of our alliance, along with possible new agreements, not only as a pledge of security for each of our two countries but also as a factor in the general stabilization of Europe.

10. FREE CITY OF DANZIG¹

In the elections of May 28, 1933, the Nazis obtained an absolute majority in the *Volkstag*, but although in the elections of April 7, 1935, they obtained a few extra seats, they failed to secure the two-thirds majority necessary for the adoption of amendments to the Constitution of the Free City. The opposition parties claimed that the elections were invalid as illegal methods had been adopted by the Nazis, and because the elections had been held under laws claimed to be unconstitutional, in regard to which proceedings were pending before the League of Nations. This view was supported by the High Court of Danzig, which, in November 1935, ruled that irregularities had been proved and that readjustments in the election results should be made. In December the Electoral Commission, acting on the Court's decision, reduced the number of seats held by Nazis and allocated additional mandates to Social Democrats and to members of the Centre Party. With these events, and with developments and incidents of intimidation by Nazis, the High Commissioner, Mr. Sean Lester, dealt in his report for the year 1935, submitted on January 22 to the League Council at its Ninetieth session.² In his report Mr. Lester emphasized the gravity of the situation, and suggested that 'there must be a complete change in the attitude of the local Government or a change in the machinery through which the League's guarantee is made effective'.

The discussions in the Council on January 22 were followed by negotiations between Herr Greiser, President of the Senate, and Mr. Eden, the Council's *rapporteur*, in which Colonel Beck also participated. Herr Greiser eventually agreed to comply with the Council's wishes. A resolution was passed on January 24, 1936, noting the steps to be taken by the Senate.³ The action promised was taken in February 1936, and there followed a short period of relatively satisfactory relations.

By the beginning of June, however, incidents began once more to occur, and a reversion to the previous policy of unconstitutional acts and intimidation became apparent under the leadership of Herr Forster, Nazi

¹ See *Survey* for 1935, vol. i, pp. 227-45; and *Survey* for 1936, Part III (vi).

² See below, p. 420.

³ See below, p. 433.

Gauleiter for the Free City and thus Herr Greiser's superior in the Nazi hierarchy.

On June 25 the German cruiser *Leipzig* arrived at Danzig; in anticipation of this visit a reception had been arranged by the High Commissioner in honour of the German naval officers. At the time when this reception was due to begin, word was sent to Mr. Lester to the effect that instructions had been received by the Commander from Berlin not to call upon him. This deliberate act of discourtesy was aggravated by an attack on the High Commissioner in a newspaper article written by Herr Forster.

The incident was reported to the League Council on June 30 at its Ninety-second session, and the Council decided to place the matter on its agenda, inviting Herr Greiser to attend the meeting on July 4. This he agreed to do and broke his journey to Geneva at Berlin.

Mr. Eden, as President and *rapporteur*, submitted a resolution¹ noting the international character of the *Leipzig* incident and requesting the Polish Government, as responsible for the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free City, to deal with the matter through the diplomatic channel and report to the Council at its session in the autumn.

Herr Greiser then made a speech,² which was significant both for the truculent tone in which it was delivered and for its violent attack upon the High Commissioner. At the conclusion Herr Greiser outlined alternative solutions for the difficulties of the position. The adjournment of the meeting was marked by an incident which caused a stir, for Herr Greiser on leaving the Council chamber gave the Nazi salute, and, on this being greeted by some laughter from the press gallery, replied by 'cocking a snook' and putting out his tongue.

When the meeting was resumed in the evening several representatives expressed their confidence in the High Commissioner, and Mr. Eden stated that, while the Council could not discuss Herr Greiser's proposals at the moment, the Polish representative had reserved the right to revert to them at an opportune time and the Council would, he thought, be content to leave the matter there.³ Herr Greiser noted this in a brief reply,⁴ in which he said that in his previous speech he had opened a 'first offensive in favour of revision of relations between the League of Nations and the Free City of Danzig'. The Council resolution was then adopted.

During the month of July negotiations proceeded between Poland, acting upon the League Council's mandate, and Germany, for the settlement of the *Leipzig* incident. On July 24 a formal exchange of Notes took place between the Polish and German Governments, in which the latter referred to the incident at the High Commissioner's reception in honour of the officers of the German battleship *Admiral Scheer* on September 1, 1935, when Herr Greiser and other Danzig officials left the reception as a protest against the presence of Dr. Rauschning and other Opposition leaders. The Note stated that the German Government 'did not wish to expose the German officers to a repetition of such annoyance'. This exchange of Notes was communicated to the League Council by Colonel Beck in a report which virtually accepted the German Government's case. The report was approved by the League Council on September

¹ See below, p. 441.

² See below, p. 439.

³ See below, p. 433.

⁴ See below, p. 441.

ber 25, thus closing the incident. During the same period the process of 'Nazification' in Danzig was pressed on by a series of decrees; the High Commissioner drew attention to these developments in a report dated September 12, 1936.¹

On July 4 the Council had appointed a Committee of Three to follow the situation in Danzig. At the Ninety-third session on October 5 Lord Cranborne submitted its report.² This drew attention to the systematic obstruction of the Senate. Lord Cranborne submitted a draft resolution³ which was adopted, inviting the Polish Government to seek means 'of putting an end to the situation . . . and thus of rendering fully effective the guarantee of the League of Nations'.

In the meantime, on September 30, the League Council had decided to appoint Mr. Lester to the vacant post of Deputy Secretary-General to the League, stipulating that he should remain in Danzig until the question of a successor had been settled.

During the autumn and winter energetic measures were taken by the Nazi administration against the Opposition parties. The Polish minority also did not escape attention, and relations between Poland and Germany deteriorated to a point at which the Polish Government inquired from Berlin in November whether the German Government still attached importance to the maintenance of good relations with Poland.

Conversations between the Danzig and Polish Governments were concluded on January 10, 1937, and, after consulting the Committee of Three, Colonel Beck drafted his report to be submitted on January 26, 1937, to the League Council at its Ninety-sixth session.⁴ This noted a declaration by the Senate that it 'bases its relations with the High Commissioner on the Legal Statute in force' and suggested that 'the High Commissioner in the performance of his duties laid down in the Statute should take care to see that the internal administration of the Free City of Danzig is not hampered'.

On January 27 Mr. Eden submitted the report of the Committee of Three.⁵ After reviewing the situation and developments during recent years, this went on to make certain recommendations. Dealing with the question of relations between the High Commissioner and the Senate, it recognized the right of the former to ask for information from the Senate, and the latter's duty to furnish it, but stated that the High Commissioner was expected to take into account the terms of Colonel Beck's report, which laid down that the High Commissioner should take care not to hamper the internal administration of the Free City, should differentiate between the sources of information on which he based his action, and give due weight to the authority of that emanating from the Senate. Further, it was recommended that in future the responsibility for asking that questions concerning Danzig should be placed on the agenda of the League Council should rest with the Committee of Three instead of the High Commissioner.

A brief resolution was adopted on January 27⁶ after Herr Greiser had expressed his appreciation of the fairness and tact with which the Polish Government's mandate had been executed. He hoped that tension would

¹ See below, p. 442.

² See below, p. 445.

³ See below, p. 446.

⁴ See below, p. 446.

⁵ See below, p. 448.

⁶ See below, p. 451.

be finally brought to an end and that the principles enunciated in the report 'would undoubtedly enable him to co-operate whole-heartedly with the new High Commissioner to be appointed by the League'. The new High Commissioner, Professor Karl Burckhardt of the University of Zürich, a Swiss National and *persona grata* in National-Socialist eyes, assumed his duties in Danzig on March 1, 1937. Meanwhile the process of *Gleichschaltung* was vigorously pushed forward, and, in May 1937, the Nazis attained a two-thirds majority in the *Volksstag*, thus securing the legal power to amend the Constitution. On October 21, 1937, the Centre (Catholic) Party, the last independent political party, was dissolved.

(i) *Extracts from the Report of the High Commissioner for Danzig for 1935, January 8, 1936.*¹

I have the honour to enclose herewith my annual report on affairs relating to the Free City of Danzig for the year 1935.

I shall be glad if you will be good enough to circulate it for the information of the Council, and at the same time I draw your attention to the fact that the document is associated with my letter of December 30, forwarding the report of the Senate of the Free City to the Council concerning the carrying out of the latter's recommendations.

(Signed) SEAN LESTER.

Annual Report of the High Commissioner for the Year 1935.

The year 1935 was one of considerable difficulty and anxiety in connexion with the affairs of the Free City of Danzig. On the one hand, the relations between Danzig and Poland have, on the whole, been satisfactory, but, for a period between June and August, the relationship became strained as a consequence of the decisions taken in connexion with the devaluation of the Danzig currency. This matter will be dealt with later. I am happy to note, however, that a spirit of compromise eventually prevailed and the dispute, which at one time was very critical, was settled without being referred to the representative of the League of Nations. Although I have not been called upon to take any official action, I have continued throughout the year, in whatever way was open to me, to encourage the maintenance of good Polish-Danzig relations.

Other aspects of the public affairs of Danzig have been, however, much less satisfactory. The year has seen an intense development of the policy to create a National-Socialist community *de facto*. The exhortations of the Council at each of its three sessions and my unintermittent efforts have not prevented the application of an anti-constitutional policy in a steadily increasing degree, which has now

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1936, p. 202.

culminated in the Senate's report as to the execution of formal recommendations made by the Council of the League.

Elections.

Inspired to some extent by certain external events, and by the results of partial local elections, the leaders of the National-Socialist Party decided last February that the time had come for a new *Volkstag* election. This Party had been in power for nearly two years with a small but absolute majority and, the *Volkstag* having passed a Full Powers Law (June 24, 1933), the Senate had been governing by the issue of decree-laws, without any embarrassment from the rare meetings of the *Volkstag*. It was apparently felt, however, that the time had come when it would be possible to secure a two-thirds majority in order, *inter alia*, to be able to propose amendments to the Constitution, and to demonstrate to the League of Nations that the great majority of the people were not in favour of petitions being brought to the League of Nations by citizens in connexion with the Constitution. The events of this election and its results were substantially dealt with in my special report presented to the May session.

Following a very active campaign, and with the participation of some of the principal Cabinet Ministers and other leaders of the German Reich, the National-Socialist Party polled nearly 59 per cent. of the votes. On November 14, the High Court of Danzig, in a joint appeal by all the Opposition parties, who sought to have the elections annulled, decided that, because of unconstitutional measures adopted to aid the National-Socialist Party, the votes given to this Party should be reduced by 10 per cent. in the rural districts and 3 per cent. in the municipal areas. In the final results, therefore, the National-Socialist Party gained an increase in their representation of one seat with about 57.3 per cent. of the votes polled (128,619 out of 224,442 votes).

It should be further noted that this election was held under conditions affected by laws subsequently established by the Council to be unconstitutional. The validity of these laws was actually pending before the Council when elections were decided upon.

The manifestation of the existence in Danzig of a very large minority opposed to the National-Socialist Party's policy did not check the efforts to apply to a still greater extent the principles of National-Socialism.

Incidentally, a petition that the elections should be declared invalid has been presented by the minority.

Liberty of the Press.

The Council has since January 1934 clearly shown that the freedom of the press was regarded as one of the most important and essential principles of the Constitution, and, during 1935, the number of seizures and suppressions, sometimes for long periods, appeared to me to a very grave extent to infringe the principle of the free expression of opinion. I can well appreciate that a government might be justified in punitive measures against certain forms of press agitation, but, in many of these cases, the Senate's idea of what constituted reasonable criticism in the press seems to have been based upon National-Socialist principles rather than upon those laid down in the Constitution. My representations to the Government on this subject have, I regret to say, ceased to be effective. . . .

Without taking the position that all these suppressions were equally unjustified, the situation of the public press in Danzig in relation to its reasonable constitutional rights can only be described as entirely unsatisfactory. The authorities would appear to have been guided more by what is legally possible in a National-Socialist State than by what is legally right in a community governed by a Constitution like that of Danzig.

The Parliament.

The *Volkstag*, or Popular Assembly, has met on seven occasions during the year. The meetings (usually lasting about an hour) did not give much evidence of a desire to use the Parliament as a means for ascertaining public opinion. The principal event at each meeting was as a rule a statement of Government policy and intentions. The time allotted to the Opposition parties, representing not very much less than half the population, would in any ordinary Parliament be regarded as pitifully inadequate. The arrangement made was invariably that the parties should have minutes allotted to them in proportion to their strength. This usually meant that, in a Parliamentary sitting, the Opposition parties' time allowance was: Social-Democrat Party, 5 minutes; Centre Party, 4 minutes; German National, Polish, and Communist groups, each 1 minute.

On April 30, the *Volkstag* adopted new rules of procedure, which included a provision that a deputy who has received no authorization to absent himself, and who does not assist at a meeting of the Assembly, or who abstains from taking part in a nominal vote, is excluded from the Assembly for a period of ten meetings. In practice, the exclusion of a deputy from Parliamentary work for ten meetings means that, as the *Volkstag* meets rarely, the deputy in question

would be unable to exercise his mandate for a period of possibly over a year.

Restrictions were also imposed upon the deputies by the application of the power given to a committee to which must be submitted Parliamentary questions prior to the sitting. At the last meeting, for example, the Opposition parties had put down twenty questions, a number of them dealing with matters of considerable public importance. The National-Socialist majority on the committee, however, decided that not one of these was permissible, on the extraordinary ground that they would disturb the even tenor of Parliamentary life!

Deputies are, under the law, immune from arrest, unless in certain special circumstances, and complaints have been made during the year that the deputies arrested from time to time have not always benefited by this provision. One deputy was arrested in December as he left my office and was taken to police head-quarters, where he was searched and subsequently released.

Workers' Organizations.

In August this year, the General Association of Workers (*Allgemeiner Arbeiterverband*), which had been suppressed in 1934 and had appealed to the local courts, obtained a verdict in its favour and was allowed for a short time to resume its activities. This trade union published a small weekly sheet called *Die Arbeit*, and on two occasions in November this newspaper was seized by the police. Unlike other cases of newspaper suppressions, it was possible in this case to appeal to the courts, which found that the Government's action had been illegal. On December 7, however, the Police President announced that the entire organization would be immediately abolished, because of the articles which had appeared in *Die Arbeit* and which represented an agitation by the trade union (1) against the sending of unemployed workers to Germany, and (2) demanding new elections to works' committees (*Vertrauensräte*). This decision to abolish the only non-National-Socialist trade union is, of course, a very grave step. . . .

Herr Albert Forster.

The situation in Danzig cannot be fully understood without considering the position of Herr Albert Forster, the District Leader for Danzig of the National-Socialist Party. Herr Forster is not a Danzig citizen, he is a German national. Furthermore, he is a Deputy of the German Reichstag and holds high official positions (e.g. Prussian Counsellor of State) in the German Government service. He appears

to have established himself here about five years ago. I cannot say if the Danzig Party had any share in his selection or whether he was nominated from outside. It is to be noted that there is a very close relationship between the National-Socialist Party in Germany and that in Danzig, the latter being regarded, apparently, as a branch of the former. (I do not discuss Herr Forster's position as it may be affected by the relations between the National-Socialist Party in Germany and the German State.)

The National-Socialist Party is organized on the principles of leadership and obedience and discipline, and from Herr Forster's own declarations it seems that he gives obedience to his superior chiefs and demands equal obedience from all members of his Party in Danzig. The importance of this principle as applied in connexion with Danzig affairs will be appreciated. Furthermore, an oath is taken by members of the National-Socialist Party of loyalty and obedience to the head of the movement in Germany.

Herr Forster is a young man and an extremely enthusiastic, not to say fanatical, National-Socialist, who believes that all people of German race or culture must also be National-Socialists and, whatever the circumstances, should give unquestioned obedience to the Leader of his Party in Germany.

In October 1934, in view of rumours as to a conflict between Herr Forster and the then President of the Senate, Dr. Rauschnig, I addressed a letter to the Senate asking if it were true that Herr Forster had presented a series of demands to the head of the Government, which were as follows:

- (1) Calling for the suppression for a long period of the Opposition newspapers in Danzig, the organs of the Social-Democrat Party, of the Centre Party, and of the Jewish population;
- (2) That the Opposition parties and their organizations should be dissolved;
- (3) That the *Allgemeiner Arbeiterverband*, recently declared a legal organ by the High Court of Danzig, should be suppressed;
- (4) The imprisonment of Catholic priests against whom the National-Socialist Party had evidence.

I took the same occasion to inquire if the Government's relations with Herr Forster had in any way changed from a declaration made to the High Commissioner in June 1933, which was to the effect that Herr Forster exercised no influence whatever upon the conduct of the Government. Herr Greiser, who was then Acting President, replied that the governing principle of the Government's declaration in 1933 remained unchanged.

I am afraid, however, that the situation is not normal. It must be borne in mind that each member of the Government is a member of the Party and that the President of the Senate himself holds a position in the Party (Substitute District Leader) subordinate to that of Herr Forster. Furthermore, it would appear from Herr Forster's own declarations that it is not his conception of his position, and the President of the Senate in his public speech on November 27, in explaining the position of members of the Government, said: 'We National-Socialists go when we are told and stay when we are told. . . . We obey only our leaders.' (President Greiser was here apparently referring to rumours of his intended resignation.)

Herr Forster and State Officials.

Even in his public speeches Herr Forster has not refrained from giving evidence that he can and does interfere in the State administration in matters supposed to be exclusively the concern of the Government. To take an example: on March 11, 1935, Herr Forster addressed a meeting of State officials in a Government building. He there declared that any State official who did not vote for the National-Socialist Party would be dismissed from his post. Members of the Government were present on the occasion and no objection was made then or at any time subsequently. It is interesting to note that the High Court, in considering the election appeal, recently found that this speech was an unconstitutional attempt to influence voting. The Court declared: 'It can make no difference if the unconstitutional influence is exercised by a superior officer or by a personality who, like the *Gauleiter*, has influence over the superior officers.' Herr Forster has frequently addressed gatherings of State officials in State buildings.

Herr Forster, in his public speeches, claims to be working for the policy of Herr Adolf Hitler, Leader of the National-Socialist Party, President and Chancellor of the German Reich. His influence in Danzig is based on that assertion.

One of his most recent declarations is a New Year's message (December 31, 1935) as follows:

'I wish all Danzigers in the New Year good courage and a firm belief in Adolf Hitler. So will we successfully overcome all the difficulties that 1936 may bring.'

I find it extremely difficult to believe, however, that the impression given of representing Herr Hitler is well founded. For example, Herr Forster is reported in his own newspaper (*Vorposten*, November 16, 1935), in a public speech on November 16, to have made the

following declarations in the presence of President Greiser and other Senators:

"Our adversaries, on the other hand, have no uniform political aim. They are only united in their campaign against us. They are only united in weakening Germany and hindering the *Führer's* work.

"We National-Socialists represent a movement which, from its very foundation, has taken the fight for Germany on to its own shoulders. No institution in the world can hinder us in our struggle. When cowards and pacifists run to the judge and try to bring us down, when they fight against their own German brothers, I can only say that I wish these party representatives would come and see me face to face; we should then learn if the truth is on their side.

"People make a great mistake if they think we would ever crawl before any institution in the world. During our period of struggle we displayed no fear, and no chicanery will disturb our confidence. The more our opponents attempt to put spokes in our wheels, the more determined and extreme we shall become. Those who think we are getting weary make a big mistake!

"Our purpose remains unchanged: to work for a great and powerful Germany. A day will come, my friends—we shall take good care of that—when all these fellows who dare to oppose us will be flung into a concentration camp, which is where they belong.

"... Our task is to pay Adolf Hitler the debt of gratitude which we owe him with our efforts and our lives. Sternly and fanatically, as in our early days of struggle, must we combat all those whose activities are aimed in the last resort at ruining Germany. Soon men from the Reich will come to help us and tell us of the *Führer's* work, in order to give us here outside the frontiers new strength and new confidence in our struggle.

"... We are firmly resolved not to give in; on the contrary, we shall continue to attack, in order to show the *Führer* our gratitude for his work and for the splendid ideal he has set before us. We must always remember that the *Führer* gave us back Germany! ..."

After the loud applause aroused by the *Gauleiter's* concluding words had died down, *Kreisleiter* Boeck (a member of the Government) thanked the *Gauleiter*, who was well acquainted with the *Führer's* thoughts and plans and knew the path which we had to follow. Here in the Kreis of Danzig City, where the Reds have been in power in many parts of the town and in the suburbs, the campaign against un-German elements is particularly severe, but we shall press forward unshaken to victory!"

A year ago, I referred to the resignation of President Rauschning and confined my remarks strictly to the official version of this incident. President Rauschning has since retired from public life, except for an intervention during the closing days of the election campaign. On this occasion, feeling himself insulted by remarks made against him by a speaker from the German Reich and by Herr Forster at an election meeting, Dr. Rauschning issued an 'open letter' addressed to Herr Forster. This document is circulated as an annex to document C.19.1936.VII (petition relating to the elections), and another annex to the same document is a copy of a letter from Dr. Rauschning to the President of the *Volkstag* on the occasion of his resignation.

From these two documents, it will be seen that the ex-President of the Senate declares he was compelled by Herr Forster to resign his position as head of the Government, ostensibly on the alleged grounds of ill-health, but in fact because of a conflict of policy between him and Herr Forster. . . .

The position of this German personality in Danzig has been mentioned in a report by my predecessor and in my last annual report was also referred to *en passant*. I have on this occasion dealt with him in some additional detail, in view of the position created by the public speech of President Greiser and in view of Herr Forster's own activities during the year. It seemed to me that the time has come when the Council should be more fully informed.

Police and Political Partisanship.

Party feeling in Danzig has been regrettably bitter during the year, and the leader of one party has several times been publicly assaulted in the streets. On the last occasion, this followed immediately on a public announcement that the Police President had withdrawn his permit to carry a weapon, and the attack took place outside the door of police head-quarters. There was some recrudescence towards the end of the year of the attacks on citizens who failed to salute the National-Socialist flag, and violence which occurred during the elections was considered by the High Court to be one of the factors leading to their decisions.

In my last annual report, I drew attention to the growing lack of confidence in the non-National-Socialist section of the population as to the equal treatment of all citizens by the police. It would seem that this lack of confidence, which has, if anything, increased, is to a great extent due to a conviction that in many cases the police are not encouraged to take action equally against members of all political parties who offend the law. Whatever the justification, it is deplorable

that such a feeling as this should be so widespread. Equal treatment in accordance with the law is one of the foundations of every State and, although allowances must be made for party feeling as one of the causes of this lack of confidence in the police, one cannot leave out of consideration the effects of the National-Socialist political philosophy as preached to officials of the State (including the police) by political leaders.

The Opposition parties' complaints, however, against intimidation and alleged violation of their constitutional rights appear to outnumber those relating to actual violence. As already pointed out, the last election figures show the National-Socialist Party to have had an actual majority over all other parties, but the Opposition was able in the circumstances to obtain 43 per cent. of the votes. The division is not a racial one and most of the Opposition voters resent a suggestion that they are not loyal to German culture. The strife might thus be described as fratricidal and to be based upon opposing political philosophies. It is to be noted that, during the past six months, complaints to the High Commissioner have been made jointly by the Social-Democratic, the German National, and the Centre (Catholic) Parties, which in normal political life are inspired by widely different ideals, but seem to feel it necessary to sink their differences in seeking protection from the guarantors of their rights.

Collaboration between High Commissioner and Senate.

In my annual report for 1934, I was able to state that a number of questions regarding the Constitution had been settled locally, the policy of the Senate at that time making it possible even to have some published laws modified in response to my representations. The members of the Council have more than once impressed upon the President of the Senate the desirability of settling most of these questions in Danzig in agreement with the views of the High Commissioner. This is not possible without the collaboration of the Senate. I myself pointed out at the September meeting that the questions which had been decided by the legal Committee and the Council could have been solved in Danzig on terms not less favourable to the Senate.

The attitude of the Senate with regard to constitutional questions has led to increasing difficulties, and for the causes and motives of this policy I cannot do better than refer the Council to the public speech of President Greiser on November 27, which is circulated as an annex to the Senate's report to the Council on the carrying-out of the latter's recommendations (document C.18.1936.VII).

In the earlier part of the year, the President of the Senate, in a public speech, referred to the role of the High Commissioner in Danzig, expressing views as to the competence of the High Commissioner in constitutional questions. This attitude being maintained by the Senate subsequently in a memorandum, the Council was required to define once again the competence of the High Commissioner. The Council's decision did not, however, remove the resentment that the guarantee of the League of Nations should make it necessary for the High Commissioner and the Council to take cognizance of the more serious complaints of citizens that their constitutional rights were being infringed. In the popular elections the Government failed to obtain the necessary mandate to propose changes in the Constitution, but efforts to maintain fundamental principles are regarded by the Government as unnecessary interference in the internal affairs of the Free City. The decisions of the Council do not seem to have changed this impression.

I have referred above to a speech made before the Popular Assembly by the President of the Senate, Herr Greiser. The text of this speech is illuminating. Again and again in this declaration, President Greiser shows that he is inspired and guided in regard to internal questions by the ideas and policy applicable in the German Reich. He speaks of the hostility of the Opposition having as its sole aim to 'recreate' in Danzig the political divisions of the German people which had been ended by the greatness of National-Socialism. Again, he refers to the National-Socialist Movement as an incarnation of the idea of the great Germany.

Further on, he speaks of complaints having been made that the National-Socialist flag or a bust of Hitler are used to decorate public buildings of the Free City. The Opposition, he states, have the effrontery to maintain that the exhibition of party emblems on public buildings is incompatible with the Constitution, and he replies by declaring that the so-called 'party emblem' is to-day the flag of Germany!

'... The symbol of our National-Socialism is to-day the banner of the German national defence force; our leader is to-day the Leader of the German People, and no National-Socialist Government will ever oppose the outward display of the symbol of New Germany on specially solemn occasions, the purpose of which is to place our German nationality in the foreground. Danzig is a German State, recognized as such by the League of Nations itself; and this it is which gives the Danzig Government the right to make an end once and for all of such press utterances and incendiary

articles insulting the flag of the German Reich and disturbing the very friendly relations between us and the German Reich.'

Further on, the President of the Senate declared that all the present sufferings of the Danzig population have their real origin in the separation of Danzig from the mother country—a separation which had been desired by the League of Nations. The President exposes once more the basis of the Senate's policy. Referring to the Senate's decision to disregard some of the Council's recommendations, he says 'a sad chapter in the internal policy of the Free City is thus closed'. He is absolutely persuaded that the life of a people, and especially of a part of a people, could not be for ever restricted by 'articles' and 'clauses' made in the time when the political and moral distress of the German people was at its height. During the greatest part of the period which had passed since the proclamation of the Free City, the fate of the Free City had been decided by the will of the League of Nations.

'... We nevertheless hope that, in Geneva, where political realities are taken so fully into account, the fact that the distribution of political power in Europe has been considerably changed will not be ignored. Particularly is this true in comparison with the time when, as the result of the Marxist revolt, Germany lay prone and powerless, and when, through this same betrayal, the Free City of Danzig was set up. Articles and paragraphs have no meaning unless there are men of flesh and blood at hand who are determined to respect them as a rule of life which has been committed to writing. To-day, the cause of Danzig's severance from the motherland, which was to provide the newly-created Republic of Poland with a free outlet to the sea, is spontaneously admitted by the German people and by the Free City of Danzig as a political law. Discussion regarding the integrity and development of this severed territory is therefore no longer the exclusive privilege of the Geneva organs, and, indeed, were such the case, the principle of the self-determination of peoples would be devoid of meaning. In sober recognition of the realities of the distribution of political forces in Europe, the Free City of Danzig will, in the future as in the past, pursue its policy of direct negotiation and agreement with Poland. To the satisfaction of the Senate, the friendly relations of the two States, which were disturbed for a short period last summer, have again been restored. Relations are good and friendly, and there is every prospect of further progress in the same direction.'

It may perhaps be the economic difficulties of the Free City to which President Greiser refers in saying:

'The economic and national development of our motherland not only fills us with inward satisfaction, but gives us also that moral support which is necessary if we are to triumph over our future difficulties.'

I have made some detailed references to this, the most recent declaration of Government policy, the full text of which is available to the Council, and nothing I could myself say can, I think, better present to the Council the policy and motives of the Government.

The speech will also be found to contain an expression of hope for friendly collaboration with the League of Nations, but its general content will perhaps make it easier to understand why the efforts of the Council, my own representations to the Senate, and the consideration and comprehension I have endeavoured to exercise, have not enabled me to report on a happier situation in the Free City.

In view of the subsequent decisions of the Senate in relation to the Council's recommendations, it may be of interest to recall that, in addressing a meeting of the Popular Assembly six months ago (on June 12, 1935), a few weeks after the Council meeting, President Greiser declared that he was glad to note that the League of Nations exhibited a keen interest in Danzig political life and that it realized its duties both as regards the guaranteeing of the Constitution and in the matter of relations between Poland and Danzig. As regards the petitions submitted to the Council, the way in which the League of Nations had dealt with those questions proved that when studying them it had envisaged them from a lofty standpoint and that it had no intention of intervening in local conflicts. The Danzig Government submitting willingly to the opinion and the judgment of that international forum, he was all the more satisfied at the way in which those questions had been dealt with, since his conscience was perfectly clear. The President pointed out, further, that the position of the High Commissioner had been considered at the session of the Council in May. This had arisen out of an electoral speech which he, Herr Greiser, had delivered, not in his capacity as Head of the Government but simply as the mouthpiece of the Danzig population. The Danzig Government would never allow the powers of the High Commissioner, which were clearly established by the treaties and by the Council's decisions, to be impaired. The Danzig Government and its President had never been at fault as regards the fundamental powers of the High Commissioner. On the other hand, a large part of the population which was not conversant with the whole of the treaties and agreements governing the situation at Danzig was of a different opinion in the matter, as a result of its ignorance.

The League's Guarantee.

I have pointed out in my report that the various recommendations of the Council, urging the Senate to keep its policy within the spirit and text of the Constitution, have not led to any great improvement. My impression has been, indeed, that each meeting of the Council during the past year was followed by an intensification of the policy which had been deplored by the Council. Except for a few warning remarks of a general character in my last annual report, expressing some of the anxiety I felt in consequence of recent tendencies in the Government's policy, and a restrained statement in September made only after the Council had reached its decisions on legal questions, I have confined my efforts to personal persuasion and disinterested counsel offered privately to the Government. The results of this policy have shown a sharp decline during the past year. In September, I felt it necessary to declare to the Council that:

'The position in Danzig had been such that, while there had been, as was known to the Council, declarations of official loyalty to the Constitution, there had also been from members of the Senate and the Party supporting them many declarations showing unfriendliness to constitutional principles. An effort was made to distinguish between the letter of the Constitution and its underlying principles, and it had not been thought wrong, in many cases, both in legislation and in administration, to endeavour to circumvent the intentions of the Constitution in favour of a particular Party.'

The machinery through which the guarantee of the Constitution is effected is necessarily slow and, if there is not the will on the part of the Government to apply the principles and spirit of the Constitution, the guarantee may in many ways be rendered ineffective. When the arrangements were originally made, it was of course not contemplated that a situation would arise in which a Danzig Government, inspired by political ideas which are antagonistic to the ideas of the Constitution, would feel itself justified in continuously disregarding the representations of the High Commissioner and failing to fulfil specific recommendations from the Council of the League of Nations. It was, of course, provided that changes in the Constitution should be proposed by a vote of two-thirds of the *Volkstag*, but the present Government has endeavoured and as yet failed to secure such a majority. The election figures show that nearly half the voters (43 per cent.) are still opposed to the National-Socialist Party's policy. It is this large section of the people who seek protection from the League of Nations. . . .

The methods open to the High Commissioner are not at present working satisfactorily. It seems to me that, if the Council at each session is not to be increasingly employed in dealing with Danzig constitutional questions—a situation which cannot be contemplated with satisfaction and which is, in addition, a very slow process—there must be a complete change in the attitude of the local Government or a change in the machinery through which the League's guarantee is made effective. It would seem to be required as a preliminary in either case that the present situation in Danzig should be restored to one more in keeping with the principles of the Constitution. . . .

(Signed) SEAN LESTER.

(ii) *Resolution adopted by the League Council, January 24, 1936.*¹

The Council,

Calls upon the Senate of the Free City to take, in general, all measures which are required in order to govern in conformity with the spirit of the Constitution ;

Notes with satisfaction that the Senate is now taking the necessary measures to revoke the Decree of October 10, 1933, regarding the maintenance of the good name of national associations, and, by means of *ex gratia* payments, to make good the prejudice which the Council considers has been caused to the petitioners Herr Luck and Herr Schmode, and to the other complainants who are in a similar situation ;

Adopts the opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, dated December 4, 1935, to the effect that the two Decrees of August 29, 1935, amending the Penal Code and the Code of Penal Procedure of Danzig, are not consistent with the Constitution of the Free City ;

Notes with satisfaction that the Senate is taking measures to conform to the said opinion by making the necessary amendments in the two decree-laws in question.

(iii) *Extracts from Statements made at the Ninety-second Session of the League Council, July 4, 1936.*²

(a) *Herr Greiser.*

. . . For the second time in a single year, the Danzig Government had been sent for to Geneva to give a public explanation, and Herr

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1936, p. 124.

² Minutes of the Fifth Meeting (Public), *League of Nations Official Journal*, July 1936, pp. 763-4.

Greiser therefore thought it his duty to go thoroughly, once for all, into all the questions affecting Danzig.

As a matter of conscience, he was obliged to speak, not as the defender of theoretical documents and paragraphs which were a dead letter, but as the governor of 400,000 Germans, who did not wish their destinies to be eternally linked with the League of Nations; who, in the last resort, did not understand the ideals of that institution; and whose hearts, united to the German people by ties of blood and racial affinity, spoke a different language from that which it was sought to impose upon them by a Constitution that remained alien to them.

The Danzig population shared Herr Greiser's view that the city of Danzig had not been severed from the mother country for the reasons that had always been publicly stated. Why had that separation taken place? The Republic of Poland had to have free access to the sea, and that was provided through the port of Danzig. The new Poland had obtained that free access to the sea, and Herr Greiser wished to say, emphatically and clearly, that, in his view, the Polish people were perfectly entitled to demand it. At the same time, if that had been the object in view, it was not necessary to separate Danzig from Germany. Since, notwithstanding those reasons, Danzig had been made into a so-called free State, it might almost be supposed that the object of the separation had been merely to create in Eastern Europe a permanent focus of trouble and friction between Germany and Poland. Not only was Danzig deprived of numerous sovereign rights belonging to an autonomous State, but the League had so far neglected to offer the Free City any practical help whatever. Neither politically nor economically had the people of Danzig obtained any advantage from the League. On the contrary, they had to pay several million Danzig gulden every year on account of financial transactions between the League and the Free City. Moreover, Danzig public opinion found it intolerable that the salary of the League's High Commissioner, which he drew in gold and foreign currencies, should be in such flagrant contrast with the poverty of the mass of the population; and the fact that half of it was paid by the Polish Republic did not make the position any easier.

The Danzig Government had not yet noticed any action by the League to abolish unemployment. He himself, much as he regretted it, had not observed that the League had done anything to combat the economic depression and poverty, or to give Danzig any advice with a view to bringing about an economic recovery.

All those anxieties fell exclusively upon the shoulders of the Danzig Government, and it was to that Government alone that the popula-

tion appealed for work and bread. During the last three years, the National-Socialist Government had done everything in its power to overcome those difficulties, and had succeeded as far as was possible. It could probably have done much more for the population as a whole had it not been constantly diverted from that important duty by Mr. Lester's activities.

At home, the Free City, which was the smallest State in Europe, had been threatened with economic collapse during the years of depression; abroad, disputes with Poland had been constantly on the agenda of the sessions of the League Council until the present Government had come into power. The Free City had been looked upon as a ferment of discord, and had been described in League circles as the powder-magazine of Eastern Europe. A tiny spark would have been enough, not merely to blow up that magazine, but to cause conflagrations serious enough to shake Europe once again to its foundations.

For years past the League of Nations had been endeavouring—unfortunately, in vain—to find some means of avoiding the explosion of the Danzig powder-magazine. It had needed the appearance of two men, who, through their personality, their authority, and above all the greatness of their loyal determination, had quickly succeeded in eliminating all the elements of conflict, restoring order and peace, and ensuring future security. Those men were Adolf Hitler, the acknowledged leader of the German people, and Marshal Pilsudski, the great and venerable marshal of Poland—both soldiers, and both men of absolute impartiality and rectitude. Indeed, those two men occupied so high a place among the great men of the world that it was easy to understand how other peoples might envy those two countries their leaders.

It was hardly surprising that the Germans of Danzig, who, far from disputing the greatness of Poland, proclaimed it, should have found the best means of eliminating all those difficulties and lightening that atmosphere of gloom. Herr Greiser was proud to remind the Council and the world at large that it was the National-Socialists of Danzig who, at the wish of their leader, Adolf Hitler, without the intervention of any High Commissioner or any international authority, had, by open and direct negotiation with Poland, restored a peaceful atmosphere and quickly and definitely eliminated that ferment of discord, that powder-magazine in Eastern Europe.

Thanks to the activity of the National-Socialist Government, agitation had given place to peace, and that was an example of what could be achieved when international understanding was genuinely

desired. The Council should be grateful to the Danzig Government for having for ever extinguished a focus of discord which might have caused the League serious trouble:

All the High Commissioners who had served in Danzig before the present representative of the League would certainly acknowledge that the relations between the Free City and Poland had very often caused them grave anxiety. To spare the League and the High Commissioner that anxiety was the first duty of the Danzig Government, which, as every one was aware, had loyally undertaken to respect all treaties. With the best will in the world, however, the people of Danzig could not understand how any one could fail to honour so lofty an obligation.

Herr Greiser regretted to have to point out that, during the past two years, instead of the Danzig Government being supported in its efforts to maintain and enhance international understanding, there had been a constant and careful search for any grains of explosive matter that could be exposed to the heat of public opinion and made to flare up before the Council of the League. It would surely have been better to throw a little water on that explosive matter and render it harmless.

Considering recent events, it was not surprising that the Government of the Free City should have found itself obliged to defer to the imperative wish of the population, who, in view of the persistence of such methods, had demanded a re-examination of the relations between the Free City and the High Commissioner.

A National-Socialist majority had been in power in Danzig for over three years, and the public confidence in it had twice been asserted by a constitutional and secret vote. The members of the Council recognized the laws of democracy, and Herr Greiser also appealed to democracy in the true sense of the word. The meaning of democracy was that the will of the majority should be carried out, within the limits of morality and the laws in force. The will of the majority had twice been clearly and unequivocally expressed in favour of the German National-Socialist Party. Yet the High Commissioner's attitude tended to ignore those democratic principles, and to allow a minority—a divided and torn minority—to terrorize the constitutionally established majority. The Government of the Free City was entitled to say that it had always deferred to the Council's wishes and decisions, even when they ran counter to its convictions and shocked the common sense of the people of Danzig. It could not be shown that on any occasion Herr Greiser had disregarded the Council's decisions or even its recommendations.

The smallest State in Europe, which Herr Greiser represented, and which was exposed to the harsh glare of the searchlights of public opinion, had done what it could, and even more than it was obliged to do. It had always hastened to prove its desire to maintain good relations with the League. In support of that statement, Herr Greiser could appeal to the testimony of numerous witnesses from all over the world, but he would only mention two by whom he set particular store—the Government of the German Reich, which had officially authorized him to quote its opinion, and the Polish Government.

None the less, when the National-Socialist majority, which supported the Danzig Government, saw that, with the conscious or unconscious help of the High Commissioner, a minority was arrogating to itself the right to terrorize a constitutional majority, it was not surprising if even the simplest mind became convinced that, on that point, the fundamental law of democracy had been violated. It was perfectly natural that the National-Socialist majority should defend itself against the terrorism of the minority, and that attitude would be understood by all who knew and loved the people of Danzig. As head of the Government, Herr Greiser could not, after all, be expected to put down a movement that supported him, or to allow the partisans of that movement to be punished when they were acting in self-defence. Such things did not happen anywhere. Self-defence was every man's right, and therefore it was the right of the National-Socialists. The minority, however, always rushed to the High Commissioner to complain. The High Commissioner sent to Geneva reports which were not shown to the Danzig Government, but which were drafted under directions from the Opposition and were published in the Opposition press. It was the Danzig National-Socialist movement that was accused, but it was a remarkable thing that it was precisely among the adherents of that movement that deaths and serious injuries occurred.

From the newspapers it appeared that there were disturbances in many States, and Herr Greiser honestly admitted that he had the greatest respect for all statesmen, whatever their political opinions, who found suitable means of putting down the disturbances occurring in their countries. The Danzig Government had confined itself to nipping in the bud the beginnings of disturbances provoked by the Opposition in Danzig, and it had employed for this purpose methods of which the High Commissioner had approved. As thanks for this, Herr Greiser was dragged away from his peaceful work and summoned once more to Geneva. The Danzig population could not understand such methods on the part of a High Commissioner, and

had reacted against this high-handed procedure. The Council should see the innocent victims of the terrorism of this Opposition minority, supported, consciously or unconsciously, by the High Commissioner. Having fought in the Great War as well as in favour of the National-Socialist ideal, Herr Greiser had seen many dead and wounded, but he would never have thought possible the mutilations of all kinds suffered by the victims of a criminal minority. If those victims came before the Council table, the Council would realize the methods of fighting tolerated by the High Commissioner, and which were no contribution to appeasement. On the contrary, the tactics followed by the High Commissioner had aroused against him opposition for which the Danzig Government was not responsible, but for which Mr. Lester was himself to blame, for he did not understand the mentality of the German population and did not even speak its language.

If the Council did not believe what he had just said in all frankness and sincerity as a Danzig citizen, he was ready to provide conclusive proof by organizing very quickly, in the Free City of Danzig, a plebiscite in which the population, by an absolutely free and secret vote, would show whether it approved or not the activities of the representative of the League of Nations at Danzig.

Herr Greiser did not wish, however, to confine himself to describing to the Council the desires and anxieties of the Danzig Government and of the population of the Free City without being able to propose a way out of the situation. Solutions might be sought in different directions. The Council might, for example, send a new High Commissioner to Danzig, instructing him, like all the former High Commissioners, to refrain from any interference in internal politics and to devote himself entirely to his province of foreign policy. Herr Greiser was authorized to state officially, on behalf of the Danzig Government, that, in the event of such a reorganization, all the rights enjoyed by the Polish minority in the territory of the Free City of Danzig in virtue of treaties and agreements, and all the rights of the Polish State, would be respected.

Another solution which might be considered would be that the Council, in view of the imminent reorganization and reform of the League of Nations, should decide no longer to send a High Commissioner to Danzig. The League of Nations could continue to implement its guarantee through the President of the Senate and Head of the Government, who would be responsible to the League of Nations. In this way, order and peace would be assured for ever in Danzig both in home and foreign affairs.

Herr Greiser recalled that his intervention was not based on legal considerations or considerations of international law, but that he spoke as the representative of 400,000 living Germans. To-day it was not paragraphs but living men who had spoken. At Danzig, the observance of the letter of the texts had already done sufficient harm and had suffered sufficient set-backs, and, if the opinion was expressed in some quarters that the League of Nations had lost some of its prestige, Herr Greiser had shown a way of greatly contributing to the restoration of that prestige in the world.

Such a resolution would constitute an historic fact of the greatest importance, and, if the Council made that gesture, not only the population of Danzig but the whole world would be grateful to it.

(b) *The President of the Council (Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden).*

The President said it was now his duty, as President, to make certain observations. All his colleagues would regret, as he did, the tone of the speech made by the President of the Danzig Senate, more particularly in view of the circumstances in which the Council had been convened. It would not be right to say that the President of the Senate of the Free City had been summoned to attend the Council. The Council was dealing, as had been explained by the High Commissioner and others, with a matter which concerned the external relations of the Free City. Poland was entrusted with the care of the external relations of the Free City; and, as the Council was aware, the Polish representative had undertaken to discuss the matter through the diplomatic channel, in the normal way, with the German Government. That was the issue before the Council, and that was the issue which was dealt with in the resolution which, as *rapporteur*, it had been the President's duty to submit to the Council.

It was clearly, he thought, the opinion of his colleagues that, whatever the merits of the case put forward by the President of the Senate, the Council could not allow a personal reflection to be made on its representative in the Free City. He considered that the correct reply to the remarks which the President of the Senate had seen fit to make in regard to Mr. Lester's personality would be an expression of the Council's confidence in him and its entire satisfaction with the way in which he was carrying out his arduous duties.

The President was sure, after hearing his colleagues' remarks, more particularly those of the representative of Poland and of the representatives of France and of Spain, that he was voicing the unanimous

feeling of the Council in asking Mr. Lester to accept this assurance of its confidence and of its thanks for his untiring efforts.

Mr. Eden did not propose, any more than did Mr. Lester himself, to deal with matters which had been raised before the Council but which did not concern the resolution he was asking the Council to adopt. There was one charge, however, which had been brought against the High Commissioner that he could not pass over in silence. That charge was that Mr. Lester had asked for the inclusion of this item in the Council's agenda. That was not so. As the members of the Council were aware, it was only as a result of a unanimous decision of the Council, taken on the previous Thursday evening after the consideration of Mr. Lester's report, that the question was included in the agenda of the Council. Mr. Lester would have been perfectly within his rights in asking the Council to consider the matter; but the fact was that he had not done so. The Council had taken a free and unanimous decision on the merits of the case.

As *rapporteur* on the Danzig question, the President wished to add one word in respect of the Council's position in relation to Danzig. He had already explained that it was not the League of Nations which had created the Free City. It was certainly not the High Commissioner—nor was it the Council's *rapporteur*! In view of the arduous character of the duty which had been imposed upon the Council—not at its own initiative—it was, he thought, entitled to ask, if it were to continue with the performance of that duty, for courteous treatment from all concerned.

As regards the proposals put forward by the President of the Senate respecting the régime of the Free City, it was obvious that the Council could not take those proposals into consideration at the moment. They raised wide issues which none of the members of the Council would wish to discuss without deep reflection. The representative of Poland had said that he reserved the right to return to those proposals at an opportune moment. The Council would, Mr. Eden thought, be content to leave the matter there for the present; but, in view of the importance of the present discussion, he felt entitled to ask his colleagues to be good enough to signify whether they agreed with the course he had proposed, with the resolution he had put forward and with the words which, as their President, he had thought it his duty to use.

The President added that notification of the present meeting had, of course, been conveyed, as he had already explained, to the representative of the Senate of the Free City, in order that he could attend if he so wished.

(c) *Herr Greiser.*

Herr Greiser said that he had not expected the Council to express any other opinion; nor, in view of the slowness of the League's methods, had he expected a resolution to be taken immediately on the proposals he had submitted. Nevertheless, he regarded the observations he had made at the present meeting as a first offensive in favour of a revision of the relations between the League of Nations and Danzig.

Herr Greiser expressed his thanks to the *rapporteur*, Mr. Eden. The latter had said that he proposed to keep to the points actually on the agenda, but that, if circumstances appeared opportune, he would revert to Herr Greiser's statement later. Herr Greiser therefore understood that Mr. Eden was considering the possibility of studying the Danzig Government's proposals subsequently, and he wished to thank him most particularly for that.

If to-day Herr Greiser had opened a first offensive in favour of a revision of the relations between the League of Nations and the Free City of Danzig, if he had done so in public and before world opinion, he wished it to be understood that he had done so, not only on behalf of the Danzig population, but on behalf of the whole German people. In the coming months the German people expected of the League of Nations resolutions which would make it possible for the President of the Senate of the Free City of Danzig not to have to appear again before the League of Nations.

(iv) *Resolution adopted by the League Council, July 4, 1936.*¹

The Council,

Having taken into consideration the report furnished to it by the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, dated June 30, 1936, on the subject of an incident which occurred in connexion with the recent visit to that port of the German cruiser *Leipzig*,

Has reached the conclusion that the incident in question is of an international character.

Having regard to the fact that, in accordance with the Statute of the Free City, Poland has undertaken the conduct of the foreign relations of Danzig,

The Council decides to request the Polish Government to deal with the matter on its behalf through the diplomatic channel, and to furnish the Council at its next ordinary session with a report on the results of the action which it may have been found possible to take.

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, July 1936, p. 762.

(v) *Extracts from the Report of the High Commissioner for Danzig,
September 12, 1936*¹

. . . No trouble followed the League's guarantee until about three years ago, when my predecessor, shortly after the present Government took office in 1933, felt called upon to bring certain cases affecting the Constitution to the notice of the Council. The result was that, in January 1934, the Council, in fulfilment of its duties, requested the local Government to respect the provisions of the Constitution to which they owed allegiance. It was not until towards the end of the same year (1934) that difficulties again began to accumulate, and the following year (1935) was one of very considerable anxiety in view of the attitude of the Government and the policy of those who controlled the Government. In spite of various warnings and recommendations from the Council, the Government's policy ended in an open refusal to carry out some of the specific decisions made by the Council. This was announced in a public speech by the present head of the Government, Herr Greiser, on November 27 last, and, as my efforts to find some amelioration locally failed, I was compelled at last to report to the Council that the situation had become serious. This is to be found in my annual report for 1935, which was considered by the Council at its session in January of this year. I had to report that neither the exhortations of the Council nor my own efforts had prevented the application of an anti-constitutional policy in a steadily increasing degree. . . .

The Council will recall that, following a discussion, the Senate eventually agreed to carry out the recommendations of the Council and left to the High Commissioner 'the task of advising and aiding the Danzig Government' in the execution of the measures referred to. For some months, it looked as though the hope of a new policy being initiated by the Government might be realized.

I dealt briefly with this aspect of the matter in my report to the Council at its special meeting at the end of June (document C.281. 1936. VII). The situation as presented in the latter document was not unfavourable to the Senate, the President of which had seemed to me to be making a genuine effort, in spite of some considerable difficulties, to prevent a recurrence of the Geneva discussions. Then came a sudden change, as was shown by the declarations made by President Greiser when he came to the table of the Council to discuss the incident of the German cruiser *Leipzig's* visit to Danzig.² These

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, November 1936, pp. 1360-2.

² See above, p. 433.

declarations will be fresh in the minds of the members of the Council. They included a demand, 'not only on behalf of the Danzig population, but also on behalf of the whole German people', for a revision of the relations between the League of Nations and the Free City. The President of the Senate described his declarations as 'a first step' and 'a first offensive in favour of revision of the relations between the League and Danzig'. He was obliged to speak, 'not as the defender of theoretical documents and paragraphs which were a dead letter, but as the governor of 400,000 Germans, who did not wish their destinies to be eternally linked with the League of Nations'. At the same time, he referred to Poland's free access to the sea and said that in his view the Polish people had been perfectly entitled to demand it. He also declared again that the Danzig Government 'had loyally undertaken to respect all treaties'.

The President of the Senate then suggested two solutions: (1) that the Council should send to Danzig a new High Commissioner and eliminate, at the same time, its present instructions regarding the Constitution, and confine the High Commissioner's duties to external affairs. In this event, all the rights enjoyed by the Polish minority in virtue of treaties and all the rights of the Polish State would be respected; or (2) that the Council should decide no longer to send a High Commissioner to Danzig, the President of the Senate to be responsible directly to the Council for the maintenance of the Constitution. . . .

The position of the President of the Senate has been one of considerable difficulty, which has always been appreciated by me. He is subordinate in his party to Herr Forster, and places very highly his loyalty and obedience to his party. Herr Forster's policy with regard to the Constitution had fairly full play during 1935, but was held in check for some months following the January Council meeting. The situation during this interim period seemed to give President Greiser an opportunity to harmonize in some degree his other loyalties with his duties under the Constitution.

(That the problem relating to Herr Forster's position is not new will be seen by reference to a Note sent by my predecessor on June 26, 1933, to the Secretary-General, document C.408.1933.I, as well as each of my annual reports for 1934 and 1935.)¹

The documents already sent through the Council's Committee show that the head of the local Government followed up his Geneva declarations by statements to the public press in which he said he would, in future, completely ignore any request by the High

¹ See above, p. 420.

Commissioner in connexion with the Constitution. Within a fortnight, decrees had been issued, some of which seemed to me to be of a character to which immediate attention must be drawn. One of these decrees of July 16 related to the transmission to 'political offices' of information of a kind which was considered to be 'against the interests of the State'. This, together with police activities at the door of my office, would presumably exclude responsible citizens from the possibility of exercising the right to present petitions. There have, in consequence, been no direct contacts with my office since the Council's last meeting.

At the time of the last meeting of the Council, there were published in Danzig four or five newspapers representing the Catholic Centre Party, the Social-Democratic Party, the German Nationalist Party and others. All of these newspapers have since been suppressed for long periods ranging from five months to a year, and, during the past weeks, the only newspapers published have been two daily papers supporting the Government's policy.

The situation at the time of writing in Danzig is therefore that the President of the Senate has followed up his statements at the last Council meeting by other declarations and actions which may affect the Constitution and the League guarantee of the Constitution. Every vestige of the Opposition press has been abolished. A series of laws has been issued and, as some of these at any rate seemed to come within the sphere of my instructions, I have forwarded them to the Council. Frequent attacks upon the High Commissioner, in relation to his duties in connexion with the Constitution, continue to be made. The Senate, apparently in pursuance of their declared policy, have so far refused to take note of letters asking them for their observations with regard to the constitutionality of various Government actions. Under a Council decision of May 22, 1931, the Senate is obliged to supply information at the request of the High Commissioner with regard to 'all the public affairs of the Free City'. This is no longer being done.

As other means of information with regard to the affairs of the Free City have become restricted, I enclose a few quotations from the Government Party press, as well as a Note prepared a short time ago with regard to police control at the door of my office, and a list of newspapers suppressed.

I shall be glad if you will be good enough to submit this report to the special Committee appointed by the Council to follow affairs in Danzig.

(Signed) SEAN LESTER.

(vi) *Report of the Committee of Three presented to the League Council by Lord Cranborne, October 5, 1936.*¹

The Committee of Three was appointed by the Council on July 4, 1936, for the purpose of following the situation at Danzig.

Several reports from the League High Commissioner on this subject have been communicated to the Committee. These documents are annexed to the present report. The Committee draws the attention of the Council to Mr. Lester's general report, dated September 12, 1936,² which gives a summary of the present situation.

It is clear from these reports that the Council and the High Commissioner are at the present time meeting with systematic obstruction from the Senate in carrying out the functions accepted by the Council of guaranteeing the Constitution of the Free City. The Senate, in particular, has failed to furnish the information which it is bound to supply under the provisions of Article 42 of the Constitution and in accordance with the Council decision of May 22, 1931. Furthermore, the Senate has issued several decrees whose compatibility with the terms of the Constitution is open at least to grave doubt.

It would have been possible for the Committee to suggest that the Council should take legal advice in regard to this matter. If the Committee has not done so, it is because it is of the opinion that the situation requires to be considered as a whole and therefore calls for a fuller and more general examination, and that it is only in the light of that examination that the Council will be able to decide on the course which should be followed.

The Council will certainly have been struck by the vexatious measures taken in regard to the High Commissioner's residence. The gravity of the question with which the Council has to deal may be judged from the fact that such treatment should be meted out to a representative of the League whose actions have been strictly limited to the carrying-out of instructions given to him by the Council with the full agreement of the Danzig Government.

The Committee is convinced that the Council can count upon the full assistance of the Polish Government in dealing with the situation. It is of opinion that the Government is particularly well placed to undertake the examination which the Committee considers should now be initiated with a view to enabling the Council to determine its future course with a full knowledge of the situation.

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, November 1936, p. 1190.

² See preceding document.

Accordingly, the Committee submits to the Council the following resolution. . . .¹

(vii) *Resolution adopted by the League Council, October 5, 1936.*²

The Council,

Having taken note of the report submitted to it by the Committee of Three;

Considering that it is necessary to seek a means of putting an end to the obstruction offered by the Danzig Government to the High Commissioner in the exercise of his functions and to render fully effective the guarantee of the League of Nations;

Considering, on the other hand, that the Statute of the Free City was conceived in order to ensure in the best conditions possible the well-being of Danzig and the maintenance of the rights accorded to Poland by the international instruments in force:

Invites the Polish Government to seek, on behalf of the Council, the means of putting an end to the situation described in the general report of the High Commissioner and thus of rendering fully effective the guarantee of the League of Nations, and to make a report on this subject at its next session;

Requests the Committee of Three to continue to follow the question;

Declares its readiness, in view of the importance of the question, to hold a special session, in case of need to deal with it.

(viii) *Report by Col. Beck on behalf of the Polish Government, presented to the League Council, January 26, 1937.*³

In its resolution of October 5, 1936, the Council of the League of Nations 'invited the Polish Government to seek, on behalf of the Council, the means of putting an end to the situation described in the general report of the High Commissioner and thus of rendering fully effective the guarantee of the League of Nations, and to make a report on this subject at its next session'.

The Council was led to take this decision on account of the difficulties which had arisen at Danzig in the relations between the Senate of the Free City and the High Commissioner, and which were likely to impair the efficacy of the League's guarantee. The Polish Government was therefore called upon to seek appropriate means of putting an end to this abnormal situation, with a view to relieving the tension at Danzig.

¹ For text see following document.

² *League of Nations Official Journal*, November 1936, p. 1191.

³ *Ibid.*, February 1937, p. 241.

In accepting this task, the Polish Government, which was fully conscious of its rights and duties, and also of its responsibilities as the member of the Council most directly concerned in questions affecting the Free City of Danzig, carried out the Council's instructions in a wholly impartial manner, taking into account all the political circumstances.

In the course of its negotiations with the Danzig Senate, the Polish Government emphasized the necessity for respecting the Statute of the Free City and the competence of the High Commissioner. It noted, in this connexion, that the Senate was resolved to carry out the Statute and the resultant obligations.

In particular, the Polish Government is in a position to lay before the Council the declaration made to it by the Senate of the Free City regarding the Senate's attitude towards the High Commissioner as the representative of the League of Nations, which is the guarantor of the Statute of Danzig.

The declaration reads as follows:

'After the conversations which it has had with the Polish Government concerning the mandate entrusted to the latter by the League Council on October 5, 1936, the Senate of the Free City of Danzig declares that the Free City bases its relations with the High Commissioner on the legal Statute in force.'

This declaration by the Danzig Senate and the assurances given to the Polish negotiators by the Danzig representatives in the course of the negotiations lead the Polish Government to hope that the difficulties experienced by the High Commissioner in the exercise of his functions will not arise in future.

If, as we are entitled to believe, the Senate in future affords the High Commissioner and the Council all the assistance required to enable the League to carry out its task, it seems to me that, from a practical standpoint, the High Commissioner, in the performance of his duties laid down in the Statute, should take care to see that the internal administration of the Free City of Danzig is not hampered. This should be the less difficult for him if it is borne in mind that a differentiation between the sources of information on which the High Commissioner bases his action is not only possible but even desirable. In this connexion, the information furnished by the Senate should be given the place corresponding to the latter's authority as the Government of the Free City of Danzig.

The Polish Government considers that it has carried out its difficult mission in submitting a solution which seems to it, in present circumstances, to be reasonable, and which, in its opinion, will prove

effective, provided the Senate acts in accordance with its own declaration mentioned above. It is obvious that the responsibility of the Council, as guarantor of the Statute of the Free City, imposes upon it the duty of following the development of the situation. This will enable the Council to see whether the proposed solution has put an end to the difficulties that have arisen in the relations between the League of Nations and the Senate.

(ix) *Report of the Committee of Three presented to the League Council by the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden (rapporteur), January 27, 1937.*¹

‘My colleagues will remember that, at the last meeting at which it discussed the situation in the Free City of Danzig, on October 5 of last year, the Council had before it a general report from its High Commissioner which gave a summary of the situation, as well as other documents communicated by him. Amongst the latter were several decrees whose compatibility with the terms of the Constitution were at least open to grave doubt.

‘The Committee of Three appointed by the Council on July 4, 1936, for the purpose of following the situation at Danzig, on consideration of the situation, did not think a detailed study of the decrees immediately necessary. In its opinion, the situation required rather to be considered as a whole, and therefore called for a fuller and more general examination. It was only in the light of that examination, the Committee thought, that the Council would be able to decide on the course which should be followed.

‘The Council endorsed its Committee’s view, and, on the latter’s recommendation, asked the Polish Government to undertake such an examination with a view to enabling the Council to determine its future course with a full knowledge of the situation.

‘Accordingly, the Council adopted, at its meeting on October 5, 1936, a resolution whereby it “invites the Polish Government to seek, on behalf of the Council, the means of putting an end to the situation described in the general report of the High Commissioner and thus of rendering fully effective the guarantee of the League of Nations and to make a report on this subject at its next session”.

‘At the same time, the Council resolution requested the Committee of Three to follow the question.

‘In execution of the Council’s request, the Polish representative has presented the report which has been circulated to the Committee as document C.89.1937.VII.

‘The Committee desires, in the first place, to express its gratitude

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1937, p. 112.

to the Polish Government for the action it has taken. It highly appreciates the zeal which the eminent representative of that Government has shown and the help which he has unstintingly given both in the course of the negotiations which led to the drawing-up of his report and during the Committee's own deliberations. The Committee asks the Council to take note of the Polish representative's report.

'The Statute of the Free City consists of three elements: the maintenance of the international position of the Free City; provision for the adjustment of difficulties between Danzig and Poland; and the guarantee of the Constitution. As was made clear in the report presented to the Council on November 17, 1920, the Constitution was intended to provide the essential guarantees for a stable and peaceful political situation and to ensure that the Government would function in conformity with the principles according to which the Free City was created and with the obligations arising out of the Treaty of Versailles.

'On the basis of this Statute, the relations between the League of Nations and Danzig have passed through two phases. Until a few years ago, the Council, acting in discharge of the principal duty laid upon it by the Treaty of Versailles, was frequently concerned with differences between Poland and Danzig, but happily the two parties have been able to adjust their differences, and the Council has not recently been called upon to deal with matters affecting Polish-Danzig relations.

'Since then, a new political situation has arisen and the constitutional liberties have on several occasions been appealed to in circumstances which, at the time when the Statute was drafted, might have been regarded as very unlikely to occur.

'The guarantee thus given has no essential connexion with the normal functions of the League; but having given it, the League is bound to do its best to fulfil it.

'It is in these circumstances that the Council is called upon to consider the report which is now before it.

'I will take first the question of the relations of the Senate with the High Commissioner. The Committee considers that the principles laid down in the report from our Polish colleague are to be understood in the sense that the High Commissioner's right to ask for information from the Senate, and the Senate's duty to furnish the information asked for, remain unquestioned. It is for the High Commissioner to decide on the basis of whatsoever information may be available to him, as to the questions, if any, in regard to which he will ask for explanations from the Senate, and thereafter to decide

himself whether or not it is advisable for him to make a report to the Council. Moreover, the High Commissioner will not fail to take account of the terms of the Polish representative's report and of the present report.

'Under the present procedure, it is left to the High Commissioner, when he thinks such action necessary, to ask the Council to place on its agenda questions relating to the constitutional life of the Free City, in regard to which he has made reports to the Council. This responsibility has made his task more difficult and Mr. Lester has suggested—and the Committee recommends that his suggestion be accepted—that, if the Council agrees, it should fall in the future on the Committee of Three and not on the High Commissioner.

'In any case, it is clear that the discharge of the League's function in regard to the Constitution depends, in a very large measure, on the manner in which the Senate of the Free City co-operates with the representative of the League, and, in this connexion, I wish to draw the particular attention of the Council to the concluding paragraph of M. Beck's report.

'Before leaving this question of the relations of the Senate with the High Commissioner, I feel sure the Council will desire to express once more its approval of the conduct of the High Commissioner, Mr. Lester, who has, throughout his tenure of the office, carried out his functions in a manner deserving the highest praise.

'The Committee considers that the information which it has received from the Polish representative, and the assurances which have been given to him on behalf of the Senate, offer sufficient grounds for expecting that the political tension in the Free City will now be lessened and that conditions will be established in which a High Commissioner will be better able to discharge his functions.

'It is not without grave preoccupation that the Committee recommends to the Council the adoption of the present report and the appointment of a new High Commissioner. But, in submitting its recommendation, the Committee has been influenced by the consideration mentioned above and by the fact that the guarantee by the League of the Constitution of the Free City is part of a complex political structure, to the disturbance of which the Council will certainly wish to avoid contributing so long as possible.

'In any case, the new High Commissioner will see on the spot what the situation is, and, as soon as he has been able to form a definite opinion, he will certainly wish to let the Council know under what practical conditions he thinks he can carry out his functions, taking the present report into account.'

Mr. Eden recalled that, at its last session, the Council had confided a very difficult mission to M. Beck, who had applied all his ability and energy in its discharge. The Council would wish to thank him for what he had done and for the assistance he had given to the Committee of Three.

As regarded the substance of M. Beck's report, it was clear that much depended on the spirit in which it was put into effect. The Council could only judge finally of the efficacy of the agreement when the first reports of the new High Commissioner were received. As M. Beck had observed, the co-operation of the Danzig Senate was essential for the proper discharge of the High Commissioner's functions in their entirety. Meanwhile, the Council could note with pleasure the co-operation between Poland and the Free City which had enabled M. Beck to discharge his task.

(x) *Resolution adopted by the League Council, January 27, 1937.*¹

The Council,

Having taken note of the report submitted to it by the representative of Poland:

Adopts the report of the Committee of Three;

And requests the Committee of Three to continue to follow the situation in Danzig.

IX. U.S.S.R.

Seven years elapsed between the conclusion of the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International on September 1, 1928,² and the opening of the Seventh World Congress on July 25, 1935. The latter was notable for the resolutions adopted on reports of MM. Dimitrov and Ercoli. The first of these dealt with 'The offensive of Fascism and the tasks of the Communist International in the fight for the unity of the working class against Fascism'. It laid down as 'the main and immediate task of the international Labour movement to establish the united fighting front of the working class'. With this in view, instructions, from which extracts follow,³ were given to apply united front tactics 'in a new manner', and to steer towards the organization of a mass political strike by striving 'to secure joint action with the Social-Democratic Parties, reformist trade unions, and other organizations of the toilers against the class enemies of the proletariat, on the basis of short- or long-term agreements. . . '.

'In face of Fascist danger, Communists may, while reserving for themselves freedom of political agitation and criticism, participate in election campaigns on a common platform and with a common ticket

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1937, p. 114.

² See *Documents* for 1928, p. 37.

³ Text in *The Communist International*, vol. xii, Nos. 17-18, pp. 949-57.

of the anti-Fascist front, depending on the growth and success of the united front movement, also depending upon the electoral system in operation. . . . Communists must enter all Fascist mass organizations which have a monopoly of legal existence in a given country, and must make use of even the smallest legal or semi-legal opportunity of working in them, in order to counterpose the interests of the masses in these organizations to the policy of Fascism, and undermine the mass basis of the latter. . . . Considering that unity of action is an urgent necessity and the surest way to bring about the political unity of the proletariat, the Seventh Congress of the Communist International declares that . . . they are ready to begin immediate negotiations with the corresponding parties of the Second International for the establishment of unity of action of the working class against the offensive of capital, against Fascism and the threat of imperialist war. . . . The establishment of the united front of the working class is the decisive link in the preparation of the toilers for the forthcoming great battles of the second round of proletarian revolution.¹

The second resolution, based upon the report of M. Ercoli, dealt with 'The tasks of the Communist International in connexion with the preparations of the Imperialists for a new world war'.²

Both these resolutions were adopted by the Congress at its final session on August 20, 1935.

Against these resolutions the American Ambassador, Mr. William Bullitt, lodged an official protest on August 25,³ recalling the pledge of non-interference given by M. Litvinov to President Roosevelt in the exchange of Notes which took place on November 16, 1933, and in which the conditions of the recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States were set out.⁴ To this protest M. Krestinski, Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, replied on August 27, maintaining that the Soviet Union 'cannot take upon itself and has not taken upon itself obligations of any kind with regard to the Communist International'.⁵ On August 31 Mr. Cordell Hull issued a statement expressing his dissatisfaction with this reply.⁶

On March 4, 1936, M. Stalin gave Mr. Roy Howard, head of Scripps-Howard newspapers and owner and editor-in-chief of the *World Telegram* of New York, a long interview,⁷ which was significant not only for its contents but also by virtue of the fact that it was the first comprehensive interview of this kind granted by the Secretary-General of the Communist Party. In it he declared that if the Mongolian People's Republic were the victim of aggression by Japan, the Soviet Union would come to its assistance. This warning received official confirmation when, a month later, the text of the Mutual Assistance Pact between the two countries, signed on March 12, 1936, was published.⁸

The text of the Protocol was communicated by M. Litvinov on April 2 to the Chinese Government, which protested against its signature in a Note dated April 7, 1936,⁹ on the ground that Outer Mongolia was an

¹ See below, p. 453.

³ See *Documents* for 1933, pp. 459-72.

⁵ See below, p. 463.

⁷ See below, p. 472.

² See below, p. 461.

⁴ See below, p. 462.

⁶ See below, p. 461.

⁸ See below, p. 473.

integral part of Chinese territory and had been so recognized in the Sino-Soviet Treaty signed in Peking on May 31, 1924. A foreign State had, therefore, no right to conclude a treaty with Outer Mongolia and such action amounted to a violation of Chinese sovereignty.

To this protest M. Litvinov replied on the following day.¹ He maintained that the signature of the Pact in no way violated Chinese sovereignty or prejudiced Chinese interests, and recalled the fact that the signature in Mukden of the Treaty between the Soviet Union and the three Eastern Provinces of China on September 20, 1924, had called forth no protest from the Chinese Government of the day.

Declarations of policy by M. Litvinov in regard to the German violation of the Rhineland Zone, and his comments and those of M. Lubchenko on the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Agreement, made at the Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets, are printed in the relevant sections above.² A significant warning by M. Zdanov to the Baltic States is also printed above.³

1. RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL, AUGUST 20, 1935⁴

I. THE PREPARATION OF WAR FOR A NEW REPARTITION OF THE WORLD

The world economic crisis and the shattering of capitalist stabilization have given rise to the extreme instability of all international relations. The intensified struggle on the world market, which has shrunk extremely as a result of the economic crisis, has passed into fierce economic war. A new repartition of the world has actually already begun.

Japanese imperialism, waging war in the Far East, has already made a start towards a new repartition of the world. The military occupation of Manchuria and North China signifies the virtual annulment of the Washington Treaties, which regulated the division of the spheres of influence among the imperialist Powers in China and their mutual relations in the Pacific. Japan's predatory expedition is already leading to the weakening of the influence of British and American imperialism in China, is menacing the position of Great Britain and the U.S.A. in the Pacific, and is a preparation for a counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union.

All that is left of the Versailles Treaty is State frontiers and the distribution of mandates for colonies. The liquidation of the Versailles Treaty took place as a result of the stoppage of reparation payments, the re-establishment of universal conscription by the Hitler

¹ See below, p. 474.

² See above, p. 91 and pp. 301-2.

³ See above, p. 408 (footnote).

⁴ *The Communist International*, vol. xii, Nos. 17-18, pp. 958-62.

Government, and also the conclusion of a naval agreement between Britain and Germany.

Being the chief instigators of war, the German Fascists, who strive for the hegemony of German imperialism in Europe, raise the question of changing the boundaries of Europe at the expense of their neighbours by means of war. The adventurist plans of the German Fascists are very far-reaching and count on a war of revenge against France, dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, annexation of Austria, destruction of the independence of the Baltic States, which they are striving to convert into a base for attack on the Soviet Union, and the wresting of the Soviet Ukraine from the U.S.S.R. They are demanding colonies and are endeavouring to arouse moods in favour of a world war for a new repartition of the world. All these intrigues of the reckless inciters of war help to intensify the contradictions between the capitalist States and create disturbances throughout Europe.

German imperialism has found an ally in Europe—Fascist Poland, which is also striving to extend its territory at the expense of Czechoslovakia, the Baltic countries, and the Soviet Union.

The dominant circles of the British bourgeoisie support the German armaments in order to weaken the hegemony of France on the European continent, to turn the spear-head of German armaments from the west to the east and to direct Germany's aggressiveness against the Soviet Union. By this policy Great Britain is striving to set up a counterbalance to the United States on a world-wide scale and, simultaneously, to strengthen the anti-Soviet tendencies not only of Germany but also of Japan and Poland. This policy of British imperialism is one of the factors accelerating the outbreak of a world imperialist war.

Italian imperialism is directly proceeding to seizure of Abyssinia, thus creating new tension in the relations between the great imperialist Powers.

The main contradiction in the camp of the imperialists is the Anglo-American antagonism which exerts its influence on all the contradictions in world politics. In South America, where the hostile interests of Great Britain and the United States clash most sharply, this antagonism led to wars between the respective South American vassals of these Powers (between Bolivia and Paraguay, Colombia and Peru), and threatens further armed conflicts in South and Central America (Colombia and Venezuela).

At a time when particularly the Fascist States—Germany, Poland, Hungary, Italy—are openly striving for a new repartition of the

world and a change in the frontiers of Europe, there is a tendency among a number of other countries to maintain the *status quo*. At the present time this tendency is represented on a world scale by the United States; in Europe, primarily by France; the efforts of these two leading imperialist Powers to maintain the *status quo* are supported by several smaller countries (the Little and Balkan Ententes, some of the Baltic States), whose independence is threatened by a new imperialist war.

The victory of German National-Socialism, the most reactionary, the most aggressive form of Fascism, and its war provocations, have spurred on the war-parties, which represent the most reactionary and chauvinist elements of the bourgeoisie, in all countries to fight more vigorously for power and to intensify the Fascization of the state apparatus.

The frantic arming of Fascist Germany, especially the restoration of military conscription and the enormous increase of the navy and air-fleet in Germany, have given rise to a new, intensified race for armaments throughout the capitalist world. Despite the world economic crisis, the war-industry flourishes more than ever before. The countries which have gone farthest in preparing for war (Germany, Japan, Italy, Poland) have already placed their national economy on a war footing. Alongside the regular armies, special Fascist detachments are trained to safeguard the rear and to do gendarme service at the front. Pre-conscription training is widespread in all capitalist countries, and even includes juveniles. Education and propaganda in the spirit of chauvinism and racial demagoguery are encouraged in every way, their cost being defrayed by the Government.

Although the acuteness of the imperialist contradictions renders the formation of an anti-Soviet *bloc* difficult at the present moment, the Fascist Governments and war-parties in the capitalist countries endeavour to solve these contradictions at the expense of the fatherland of all the toilers, at the expense of the Soviet Union. The danger of the outbreak of a new imperialist war daily threatens humanity.

II. THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

On the basis of the rapid rise of Socialist industry and agriculture, on the basis of the liquidation of the last capitalist class—the kulaks, on the basis of the final victory of Socialism over capitalism and the strengthening of the defensive power of the country resulting therefrom, the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries have entered a new phase.

The basic contradiction, that between the Socialist and the capitalist world, has become still more acute. But due to its growing might, the Soviet Union has been able to avert the attack that was already prepared by the imperialist Powers and their vassals, and to unfold its consistent policy of peace directed against all instigators of war. This has made the Soviet Union the centre of attraction not only for class-conscious workers, but for all the toiling people in the capitalist and colonial countries who strive for peace. Moreover, the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. has not only upset the plans of the imperialists to isolate the Soviet Union, but has laid the basis for its co-operation in the cause of the preservation of peace with the small States for whom war, by placing their independence in jeopardy, represents a special danger, as well as with those governments which at the present moment are interested in the preservation of peace.

The peace policy of the U.S.S.R., putting forward proletarian internationalism as against national and racial dissension, is not only directed towards defence of the Soviet country, towards ensuring the safety of Socialist construction; it also protects the lives of the workers of all countries, the lives of all the oppressed and exploited; it means the defence of the national independence of small nations; it serves the vital interests of humanity, it defends culture from the barbarities of war.

At a time when a new war between the imperialist States is approaching ever more closely, the might of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of the U.S.S.R. is constantly gaining in importance in the struggle for peace. Under the circumstances of a frantic increase in armaments by the imperialist countries, especially on the part of Germany, Japan, and Poland, all those who are striving to preserve peace are vitally interested in strengthening and actively supporting the Red Army.

III. THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE AND AGAINST IMPERIALIST WAR

On the basis of the teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin on war, the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International concretely formulated the tasks of the Communist Parties and the revolutionary proletariat in the struggle against imperialist war. Guided by these principles, the Communist Parties of Japan and China, both directly affected by war, have waged and are waging a Bolshevik struggle against imperialist war and for defence of the Chinese people. The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, confirming the decisions of the Sixth Congress on the struggle against imperialist

war, sets the following main tasks before the Communist Parties, revolutionary workers, toilers, peasants, and oppressed peoples of the whole world:

1. *The struggle for peace and for the defence of the U.S.S.R.* In face of the war provocations of the German Fascists and Japanese militarists, and the speeding up of armaments by the war-parties in the capitalist countries, in face of the immediate danger of a counter-revolutionary war breaking out against the Soviet Union, the central slogan of the Communist Parties must be: struggle for peace.

2. *The united people's front in the struggle for peace and against the instigators of war.* The struggle for peace opens up before the Communist Parties the greatest opportunities for creating the broadest united front. All those interested in the preservation of peace should be drawn into this united front. The concentration of forces against the chief instigators of war at any given moment (at the present time—against Fascist Germany, and against Poland and Japan which are in league with it) constitutes a most important tactical task of the Communist Parties. It is of especially great importance for the Communist Party of Germany to expose the national demagoguery of Hitler Fascism, which screens itself behind phrases about the unification of the German people but in fact leads to the isolation of the German people and to a new war catastrophe. The indispensable condition and prerequisite for the unification of the German people lies in the overthrow of Hitler Fascism. The establishment of a united front with Social-Democratic and reformist organizations (party, trade union, co-operative, sport, and cultural and educational organizations) and with the bulk of their members, as well as with mass national-liberation, religious-democratic, and pacifist organizations and their adherents, is of decisive importance for the struggle against war and its Fascist instigators in all countries.

The formation of a united front with Social-Democratic and reformist organizations for the struggle for peace necessitates a determined ideological struggle against reactionary elements within the Social-Democratic Parties which, in face of the immediate danger of war, proceed to collaborate even more closely with the bourgeoisie for the defence of the bourgeois fatherland, and by their campaigns of slander against the Soviet Union directly aid the preparations for an anti-Soviet war. It necessitates close collaboration with those forces in the Social-Democratic Parties, reformist trade unions, and other mass labour organizations whose position is approaching ever closer to that of revolutionary struggle against imperialist war.

The drawing of pacifist organizations and their adherents into the

united front of struggle for peace acquires great importance in mobilizing the petty bourgeois masses, progressive intellectuals, women, and youth against war. While constantly subjecting the erroneous views of sincere pacifists to constructive criticism, and vigorously combating those pacifists who by their policy screen the preparations of the German Fascists for imperialist war (the leadership of the Labour Party in Great Britain, &c.), the Communists must invite the collaboration of all pacifist organizations that are prepared to go with them even if only part of the way towards a genuine struggle against imperialist wars.

The Communists must support the Amsterdam-Pleyel anti-war and anti-Fascist movement by active collaboration with it and help to extend it.

3. *The combination of the struggle against imperialist war with the struggle against Fascism.* The anti-war struggle of the masses striving to preserve peace must be very closely combined with the struggle against Fascism and the Fascist movement. It is necessary to conduct not only general propaganda for peace, but primarily propaganda directed against the chief instigators of war, against the Fascist and other imperialist war-parties, and against concrete measures of preparation for imperialist war.

4. *The struggle against militarism and armaments.* The Communist Parties of all capitalist countries must fight: against military expenditures (war budgets), for the recall of military forces from the colonies and mandated territories, against militarization measures taken by capitalist governments, especially the militarization of the youth, women, and the unemployed, against emergency decrees restricting bourgeois-democratic liberties with the aim of preparing for war; against restricting the rights of workers employed in war-industry plants; against subsidizing the war industry and against trading in or transporting arms. The struggle against war preparation measures can be conducted only in closest connexion with the defence of the economic interest and political rights of the workers, office employees, toiling peasants, and urban petty bourgeoisie.

5. *The struggle against chauvinism.* In the struggle against chauvinism the task of the Communists consists in educating the workers and the whole of the toiling population in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which can be accomplished only in the struggle against the exploiters and oppressors, for the vital class interests of the proletariat, as well as in the struggle against the bestial chauvinism of the National-Socialist Parties and all other Fascist parties. At the same time the Communists must show that the working-class

carries on a consistent struggle in defence of the national freedom and independence of all the people against any oppression or exploitation, because only the Communist policy defends to the very end the national freedom and independence of the people of its country.

6. *The national liberation struggle and the support of wars of national liberation.* If any weak State is attacked by one or more big imperialist Powers which want to destroy its national independence and national unity or to dismember it, as in the historic instance of the partition of Poland, a war conducted by the national bourgeoisie of such a country to repel this attack may assume the character of a war of liberation, in which the working class and the Communists of that country cannot abstain from intervening. It is the task of the Communists of such a country, while carrying on an irreconcilable struggle to safeguard the economic and political positions of the workers, toiling peasants, and national minorities, to be, at the same time, in the front ranks of the fighters for national independence and to wage the war of liberation to a finish, without allowing 'their' bourgeoisie to strike a bargain with the attacking powers at the expense of the interests of their country.

It is the duty of the Communists actively to support the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, especially the Red Army of the Chinese Soviets in their struggle against the Japanese and other imperialists and the Kuomintang. The Communist Party of China must exert every effort to extend the front of the struggle for national liberation and to draw into it all the national forces that are ready to repulse the robber campaign of the Japanese and other imperialists.

IV. FROM THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE TO THE STRUGGLE FOR REVOLUTION

The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International most determinedly repudiates the slanderous contention that Communists desire war, expecting it to bring revolution. The leading role of the Communist Parties of all countries in the struggle for the preservation of peace, for the triumph of the peace policy of the Soviet Union, proves that the Communists are striving with all their might to obstruct the preparations for and the unleashing of a new war.

The Communists, while fighting also against the illusion that war can be eliminated while the capitalist system still exists, exert and will exert every effort to prevent war. Should a new imperialist world

war break out, despite all efforts of the working-class to prevent it, the Communists will strive to lead the opponents of war, organized in the struggle for peace, to the struggle for the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war against the Fascist instigators of war, against the bourgeoisie, for the overthrow of capitalism.

The Congress at the same time warns Communists and revolutionary workers against anarcho-syndicalist methods of struggle against war, which take the form of refusing to appear for military service, the form of a so-called boycott of mobilization, of committing sabotage in war plants, &c. The Congress considers that such methods of struggle only do harm to the proletariat. The Russian Bolsheviks who, during the World War, fought energetically against war and were for the defeat of the Russian Government, rejected, however, such methods; these methods merely make it easier for the bourgeoisie to take repressive measures against Communists and revolutionary workers, and prevent the latter from winning over the toiling masses, especially the soldier masses, to the side of the mass struggle against imperialist war and for its transformation into civil war against the bourgeoisie.

The Seventh Congress of the Communist International, in outlining the tasks of the Communist Parties and of the entire working-class in the event of war, bases itself upon the thesis advanced by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg and adopted by the Stuttgart Congress of the pre-war Second International:

‘If nevertheless war breaks out, it is their duty to work for its speedy termination and to strive with all their might to utilize the economic and political crisis produced by the war to rouse the political consciousness of the masses of the people and thereby hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule.’

At the present historical juncture, when on one-sixth part of the globe the Soviet Union defends Socialism and peace for all humanity, the most vital interests of the workers and toilers of all countries demand that in pursuing the policy of the working-class, in waging the struggle for peace, the struggle against imperialist war before and after the outbreak of hostilities, the defence of the Soviet Union must be considered paramount.

If the commencement of a counter-revolutionary war forces the Soviet Union to set the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army in motion for the defence of Socialism, the Communists will call upon all toilers to work, with all means at their disposal and at any price, for the victory of the Red Army over the armies of the imperialists.

2. EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
AT MOSCOW AND THE ACTING PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

(i) *Note of protest from the American Ambassador, August 25, 1935.*¹

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to call attention to the activities, involving interference in the internal affairs of the United States, which have taken place on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connexion with the Seventh All-World Congress of the Communist International,² and, on behalf of the Government of the United States, to lodge a most emphatic protest against this flagrant violation of the pledge given by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on November 16, 1933, with respect to non-interference in the internal affairs of the United States.

That pledge, which was given by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a result of the discussions which took place prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reads in full as follows:

[Here follows text of Note from M. Litvinov to President Roosevelt, dated November 16, 1933.]³

My Government invites particular attention to the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contained in the paragraph numbered 4.⁴

In view of the fact that the aim and activity of an organization, such as the Congress of the Communist International, functioning on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, cannot be unknown to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it does not seem necessary to present material to show the aim of the Congress of the Communist International with respect to the political or social order of the United States or to quote from the published proceedings of the Congress to show its activity relative to the internal affairs of the United States, as evidenced in the discussion

¹ U.S. State Department, Press Releases, No. 309, August 31, 1935.

² See above, p. 453.

³ See *Documents* for 1933, p. 462.

⁴ This read as follows: '4. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group—and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group—which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.'

at the Congress of the policies and activities of the Communist organization in the United States and the determination and formulation by the Congress of policies to be carried out in the United States by the Communist organization in the United States. Nor does it appear necessary to list the names of representatives or officials of the Communist organization in the United States who were active at the above-mentioned Congress and whose admission into the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was, of course, known to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

As I have pointed out to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs when discussing earlier violations of the undertaking of November 16, 1933, the American people resent most strongly interference by foreign countries in their internal affairs, regardless of the nature or probable result of such interference, and the Government of the United States considers the strict fulfilment of the pledge of non-interference an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of normal and friendly relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The Government of the United States would be lacking in candour if it failed to state frankly that it anticipates the most serious consequences if the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is unwilling, or unable, to take appropriate measures to prevent further acts in disregard of the solemn pledge given by it to the Government of the United States.

I may add that it is a source of regret that in the present international situation the development of friendly relations between the Russian and American peoples will inevitably be precluded by the continuance on territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in violation of the promise of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of activities involving interference in the internal affairs of the American people.

(ii) *Reply of M. Krestinski, Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, August 27, 1935.*¹

By Note of August 25 of this year you invited my attention to the activity of the Congress of the Communist International which took place at Moscow and, referring to the Note of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov to the President of the United States of America, Mr. Roosevelt, under date of November 16, 1933, protested against this activity, considered by your Government as a violation of the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist

¹ U.S. State Department, Press Releases, No. 309, August 31, 1935.

Republics concerning non-interference in the internal affairs of the United States provided for in the note of November 16, 1933.

In connexion therewith I consider it necessary to emphasize with all firmness that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has always regarded and still regards with the greatest respect all obligations which it has taken upon itself, including naturally the mutual obligation concerning non-interference in internal affairs provided for in the exchange of Notes of November 16, 1933, and discussed in detail in the conversations between the President of the United States of America, Mr. Roosevelt, and the People's Commissar Litvinov. There are contained no facts of any kind in your Note of August 25 which could be considered as a violation on the part of the Soviet Government of its obligations.

On the other hand, it is certainly not new to the Government of the United States that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cannot take upon itself and has not taken upon itself obligations of any kind with regard to the Communist International.

Hence the assertion concerning the violation by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the obligations contained in the Note of November 16, 1933, does not emanate from obligations accepted by both sides, in consequence of which I cannot accept your protest and am obliged to decline it.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, sincerely sharing the opinion of the Government of the United States of America that strict mutual non-interference in internal affairs is an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of friendly relations between our countries, and steadfastly carrying out this policy in practice, declares that it has as its aim the further development of friendly collaboration between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America responding to the interests of the people of the Soviet Union and the United States of America and possessing such great importance for the cause of universal peace.

(iii) *Extract from Statement by Mr. Cordell Hull, U.S. Secretary of State, August 31, 1935.*¹

. . . The American Government, having previously made oral complaints of failure by the Soviet Government to carry out its pledge, and being deeply concerned over the growing instability of international relations and the dangerous consequences thereof to peace and economic recovery, sought most earnestly in its Note of August 25

¹ U.S. State Department, Press Releases, No. 309, August 31, 1935.

to impress upon the Soviet Government the sanctity of its pledge to the end that there might be between the two nations continued development of friendly and official relations and valuable collaboration in many beneficial ways. When in its reply the Soviet Government indicated an intention entirely to disregard its promise 'to prevent' such activities as those complained of, it struck a severe blow at the fabric of friendly relations between the two countries.

To summarize, in view of the plain language of the pledge, it is not possible for the Soviet Government to disclaim its obligation to prevent activities on its territory directed towards overthrowing the political or social order in the United States. And that Government does not and cannot disclaim responsibility on the ground of inability to carry out the pledge, for its authority within its territorial limits is supreme and its power to control the acts and utterances of organizations and individuals within those limits is absolute.

It remains to be seen to what extent the intention indicated by the Soviet Government's reply, which is directly contrary to 'the fixed policy' declared in its pledge, will be carried into effect. If the Soviet Government pursues a policy of permitting activities on its territory involving interference in the internal affairs of the United States, instead of 'preventing' such activities, as its written pledge provides, the friendly and official relations between the two countries cannot but be seriously impaired. Whether such relations between these two great countries are thus unfortunately to be impaired and co-operative opportunities for vast good to be destroyed, will depend upon the attitude and action of the Soviet Government.

3. INTERVIEW GRANTED BY M. STALIN, MARCH 4, 1936.¹

HOWARD: What will, in your opinion, be the consequences of recent events in Japan in regard to the situation in the Far East?

STALIN: So far it is difficult to say. Too little material exists. The picture is insufficiently clear.

HOWARD: What would be the attitude of the Soviet Union if Japan should embark upon a serious military drive against the Mongolian People's Republic?

STALIN: If Japan ventures to attack the Mongolian People's Republic, seeking to destroy its independence, we will have to assist the Mongolian People's Republic. Litvinov's assistant, Stomonyakov, has already informed the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow of the fact, after pointing out the invariably friendly relations which the

¹ To Mr. Roy Howard, of Scripps-Howard newspapers. *Monthly Review of the U.S.S.R. Trade Delegation in Great Britain*, vol. ix, No. 3, March 1936.

U.S.S.R. has entertained with the Mongolian People's Republic since 1921.

We will assist the Mongolian People's Republic in the same way as we helped in 1921.

HOWARD: Would a Japanese attempt to seize Ulan Bator necessitate positive action by the U.S.S.R.?

STALIN: Yes, it would.

HOWARD: Have there recently been any new Japanese activities in this region which are construed by the Soviet Government as of an aggressive nature?

STALIN: The Japanese seem to be continuing to concentrate troops near the frontier of the Mongolian People's Republic, but so far no new attempts at frontier clashes have been observed.

HOWARD: The Soviet Union appears to believe that Germany and Poland have aggressive designs against the Soviet Union and are planning military co-operation in the realization of these designs.

Poland has, however, protested its unwillingness to permit any foreign troops to use its territory as a base of operations against a third nation. How does the Soviet Union envisage such an aggression by Germany? From what position, and in what direction, would the German forces operate?

STALIN: History shows that when some State is intent on making war against another State, even though it be not adjacent, it begins to seek frontiers across which it could reach the frontiers of the State it desires to attack.

Usually the aggressive State finds such frontiers. It finds them either with the aid of force, as in 1914, when Germany invaded Belgium in order to deal a blow at France, or it 'borrows' such a frontier as Germany did in Latvia, for instance, in 1918, when the Germans attempted to break through to Leningrad across Latvia.

I do not know what specific frontiers Germany could use for her purposes, but I think that those willing to 'lend' her a frontier can be found.

HOWARD: Seemingly the entire world is to-day predicting another great war. If it proves inevitable, when do you think it will come?

STALIN: This is impossible to predict. War may break out unexpectedly. Nowadays wars are not declared. They simply start. But on the other hand I believe that the position of the friends of peace is growing stronger.

The friends of peace are able to work in the open, basing themselves upon the force of public opinion. They have at their disposal such instruments as, for instance, the League of Nations.

This is an advantage for the friends of peace. Their strength lies in the fact that their activities against war are based on the wide masses of the people. There is no people in the whole world desiring war.

As regards the enemies of peace, they are forced to work secretly. This is a disadvantage to the enemies of peace. However, there remains the possibility that on account of this very fact they may venture upon a military adventure as an act of desperation.

HOWARD: May there not be an element of danger in the genuine fear, existing in what you term the capitalist countries, of an intention on the part of the Soviet Union to force its political theories on other nations?

STALIN: There is no justification for such fears. If you think that the people of the Soviet Union have any desire themselves and by force to alter the face of the surrounding States, then you are badly mistaken.

The people of the Soviet Union naturally desire that the face of the surrounding States should change, but this is the business of the surrounding States themselves.

I fail to see what dangers the surrounding States can see in the ideas of the Soviet people, if these States are really firmly seated in their saddles.

HOWARD: Does this statement of yours mean that the Soviet Union has to any degree abandoned its plans and intentions to bring about a world revolution?

STALIN: We never had any such plans or intentions.

HOWARD: You appreciate, no doubt, Mr. Stalin, that much of the world has for long entertained a different impression.

STALIN: This is the product of misunderstanding.

HOWARD: A tragic misunderstanding.

STALIN: No, comic. Or perhaps tragi-comic. You see, we Marxists believe that revolution will occur in other countries as well. But it will come at a time when it is considered possible or necessary by the revolutionaries in those countries.

Export of revolution is nonsense. Each country, if it so desires, will make its own revolution, and if no such desire exists, no revolution will occur.

For instance, our country wanted to effect a revolution and did effect it, and now we are building a new classless society. But to assert that we desire to bring about revolution in other countries by interfering with their way of life is to speak of something that does not exist, and which we have never preached.

HOWARD: At the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., President Roosevelt and Litvinov exchanged identical Notes concerning the question of propaganda.

Paragraph four of Litvinov's letter to President Roosevelt said that the Soviet Government undertakes 'not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group, and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organizations or groups or of representatives or officials of any organization or group, which has as its aim the overthrow or preparation for the overthrow, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States territories or possessions'.

Why, Mr. Stalin, did Mr. Litvinov sign this letter if compliance with the terms of paragraph four is incompatible with the interests of the Soviet Union or beyond its control?

STALIN: Execution of the obligations of the paragraph you quote is within our control. We have been carrying out and will continue to carry out these obligations.

According to our constitution, political *émigrés* have the right to reside on our territory. We accord them the right of asylum in the same way as the United States accords the right of asylum to political *émigrés*.

It is perfectly obvious that when Litvinov signed this letter he assumed that the obligations contained in it are of a reciprocal character.

Do you, Mr. Howard, regard it as conflicting with the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement if there are Russian White Guard *émigrés* in United States territory conducting propaganda against the Soviets and in favour of capitalism, and they are receiving material assistance from American citizens, and sometimes they represent terrorist groups?

Obviously these *émigrés* enjoy the right of asylum which exists in the United States, too. So far as we are concerned we would never tolerate a single terrorist in our territory, regardless of the question of whom he contemplates as the victim of his criminal attack.

Apparently the right of asylum receives a broader interpretation in the United States than in our country.

We, we do not complain.

Perhaps you would object that we sympathize with those political *émigrés* who arrive upon our soil. But are there no Americans sympathizing with White Guard *émigrés* who conduct propaganda in favour of capitalism against the Soviets? Then what is the point at issue?

The point is not to assist these persons, not to finance their activities. The point is that officials of both countries should not interfere with the internal affairs of the other country.

Our officials are honestly carrying out this obligation.

If any one of them be guilty of not doing so, let us be informed.

If things should go too far, and the deportation of all White Guard *émigrés* from the United States should be demanded, this would be an attack upon the right of asylum existing in the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Here we must recognize certain reasonable limits for claims and counterclaims.

Litvinov signed his letter to President Roosevelt not in a private capacity but as the representative of our State, just as President Roosevelt did. Their agreement represents an agreement between two States. In signing this agreement, both Litvinov and President Roosevelt, as representatives of two States, had in mind the activities of the agents of their States who should not and will not interfere with each other's internal affairs.

The right of asylum existing in both countries could not be affected by this agreement.

HOWARD: Did not Browder and Darcy, American Communists, appearing before the Seventh Congress of the Communist International in Moscow, last summer, appeal for the overthrow by force of the American Government?

STALIN: I admit I do not recall the speeches of Comrades Browder and Darcy. I do not even recall what they spoke about.

It is possible they said something of this nature.

But it was not the Soviet people who created the American Communist Party. It was created by Americans. It exists in the United States legally, it nominates its candidates at elections, including the presidential elections.

Comrades Browder and Darcy may have made one speech in Moscow, yet at home in the United States they made similar and doubtless even more determined speeches hundreds of times. American Communists have the opportunity freely to preach their ideas.

It would be absolutely wrong to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the activities of American Communists.

HOWARD: But in this instance is it not a fact that their activities took place on Soviet soil, contrary to the terms of paragraph four of the agreement between Roosevelt and Litvinov?

STALIN: In what do the activities of the Communist Party consist? How do they manifest themselves? These activities usually consist

in the organization of the working masses, in organizing meetings, demonstrations, strikes, &c. It is perfectly clear that American Communists cannot perform all this on Soviet territory. The American workers are not in the U.S.S.R.

HOWARD: I take it that the gist of your thought is that an interpretation can be made which will safeguard and continue good relations between our countries?

STALIN: Yes, absolutely.

HOWARD: Admittedly Communism has not been achieved in Russia. State Socialism has been built.

Have not Fascism in Italy and National-Socialism in Germany claimed they have attained similar results? Have not both been achieved at the price of privation, and the sacrifice of liberty for the good of the State?

STALIN: 'State Socialism' is not precise. Under this term many understand a state of society in which a certain part of the wealth, sometimes quite a considerable part, passes into State ownership or under its control, while in the great majority of cases the ownership of plants, factories, and land remains in private hands.

Many understand 'State Socialism' in this way.

Sometimes a system is concealed behind this term, under which a capitalist State, in the interests of the preparation or the conduct of war, takes upon itself the maintenance of a certain number of private enterprises.

The society which we have built can in no sense be termed 'State Socialism'. Our Soviet society is Socialist because private ownership of factories, plants, land, banks, means of transportation, has been abolished in our country and replaced by public ownership.

The social organization which we have created can be termed Soviet: the Socialist organization is not yet quite completed, but it is the root of the Socialist organization of society.

The foundation of this society is public ownership, State ownership, namely ownership by the entire people, as well as co-operative-collective farm property.

Neither Italian Fascism nor German National 'socialism' have anything in common with such a society; primarily because private ownership of factories, plants, land, banks, and means of transportation remained untouched there, and therefore capitalism in Germany and Italy remains in full force.

Yes, you are right, we have not yet built a Communist society.

It is not so easy to build such a society.

The difference between Communist and Socialist society is probably

known to you. In Socialist society a certain inequality in regard to property still exists. But in Socialist society there is already no unemployment, no exploitation, no oppression of nationalities. In Socialist society every one is obliged to work, even though he is remunerated for his labour, not yet according to his requirements, but according to the quantity and quality of labour expended.

Therefore, wages still exist, and unequal, differentiated wages at that.

Only when we succeed in creating an order of society under which people receive from society for their labour not according to the quantity and quality of their labour, but according to their requirements, will it be possible to say that we have built up a Communist society.

You say that in order to build our Socialist society we sacrificed personal liberty and suffered privations. In your question appears the notion that Socialist society negates personal liberty. This is incorrect. Of course, in order to build something new, one has to economize and accumulate means, and temporarily limit one's requirements, and borrow from others.

If you want to build a new house, you save money and temporarily limit your requirements, otherwise you will not build your house.

This is all the more true when the building of a whole human society is concerned.

It was necessary temporarily to limit certain requirements, to accumulate the necessary means, to strain our forces.

We acted precisely in this way, and built a Socialist society. But we built this society not for curbing personal liberty, but in order that the human personality might feel really free.

We built it for the sake of real personal liberty, liberty without inverted commas.

It is difficult for me to imagine what 'personal liberty' can be had by an unemployed man who goes hungry and cannot find a means of using his labour. Real liberty exists only where exploitation has been annihilated, where no oppression of some peoples by others exists, where there is no unemployment, no poverty, where a person does not tremble because to-morrow he may lose his job, his home, his food.

Only in such a society is a real, non-illusory liberty, in the personal and in every other sense, a possibility.

HOWARD: Do you view as compatible the coincidental development of American democracy and the Soviet system?

STALIN: American democracy and the Soviet system can exist simultaneously, and compete peacefully. But one cannot develop

into the other. The Soviet system will not evolve into American democracy or vice versa.

HOWARD: A new Constitution is being elaborated in the U.S.S.R., providing for a new system of elections. To what extent can this new system alter the situation of the U.S.S.R., since, as before, only one party will come forward at the elections?

STALIN: We shall probably adopt our new Constitution at the end of this year. The commission for elaborating the Constitution is functioning and will soon finish its work. As has already been announced, the elections under the new Constitution will be universal, equal, direct, and secret.

You are misled by the fact that only one party will come forward at these elections. You do not see how there can be an election struggle under these conditions.

But obviously election lists will be put out not only by the Communist Party, but by all kinds of public non-party organizations.

And we have hundreds such.

We have no parties standing in opposition to one another, just as we have not got a class of capitalists and a class of workers exploited by capitalists opposing each other.

Our society consists exclusively of free working people of cities and villages—workers, peasants, and intelligentsia.

Where several classes do not exist there cannot be several parties, since party is part of class.

Under National 'socialism' there is also only one party.

But nothing will come out of this Fascist one-party system.

The position is that in Germany capitalism remains, classes and the class struggle remain, and it will, despite everything, break into the open—and this means, too, the struggle of parties representing opposing classes—just as it broke out, let us say, in Spain. In Italy, too, one party, namely the Fascist Party, exists. But for the same reasons it will fare no better there either.

Why will our elections be universal? Because all citizens, with the exception of those deprived by the courts of the right to vote, will have the right to vote and the right to be elected.

Why will our elections be equal?

Because neither the still existing differences with regard to property, nor differences of race or nationality will give any privileges or cause any disadvantages.

Women will enjoy the right to elect and be elected equally with men. Our elections will be really equal.

Why will they be secret?

Because we want to give the Soviet people absolute liberty to vote for those they want to elect, to elect those they trust to ensure their interests.

Why direct ? Because direct election on the spot for all representative bodies, right up to the supreme representative bodies, are a better guarantee of the interests of the working population of our boundless country.

You think there will be no election struggle. But there will be. And I foresee a very animated election struggle.

There are quite a number of organizations in our country which function poorly. Sometimes it happens that this or that local Government body does not know how to satisfy one or another of the many-sided and ever-increasing demands of the working population of town and countryside.

Have you, or have you not built a good school ?

Have you improved living conditions ?

Are you not a bureaucrat ?

Have you helped to make our labour more effective, our life more cultured ?

Such will be the criteria with which millions of voters will approach the candidates, casting aside those who are unfit, striking them off the lists, advancing better ones, nominating them for election.

4. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE MONGOLIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC, MARCH 12, 1936.¹

(i) *Text of Pact.*

The Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic, taking into consideration the inalterable friendship that has existed between their countries since the liberation of the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic, thanks to the support of the Red Army, in 1921, from the White Guard detachments and the military forces with which the latter were connected and which penetrated into Soviet territory, and desirous of maintaining the peace of the Far East and further strengthening the existing friendly relations between their countries, have decided to formulate as the present protocol the gentlemen's agreement existing between them since November 1934.

This foresees mutual assistance in all possible ways for the cause of averting and preventing military attacks and to help and maintain

¹ *New York Times*, April 8, 1936.

each other in case of an attack by a third country. For these purposes, the protocol has been signed as follows:

Article 1

In case of menace of an attack on the territory of the Mongolian or Soviet Socialist Republics by a third country, the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic must immediately confer regarding the situation and adopt all measures that may be necessary for the protection and safety of their territories.

Article 2

The Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic are obliged, in case of a military attack against either party, to help one another with all means, including military assistance.

Article 3

The Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic are in full understanding that troops of either country that shall be sent into the territory of the other, in accordance with the mutual agreement and in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol, will immediately be withdrawn from that territory as soon as the period of necessity is over, as occurred in 1925, when Soviet troops retired from the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic.

Article 4

The present protocol is to be made in two copies, in the Russian and Mongolian languages. The two texts are equally valid. The protocol enters into force from the moment of signature and will be valid for ten years thereafter.

Signed at Ulan Bator, March 12, 1936.

(ii) *Protest by the Chinese Government, April 7, 1936.*¹

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Le 2 courant, j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir de Votre Excellence la copie d'un document intitulé: Protocole entre les Gouvernements de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes et de la Mongolie Extérieure.

On sait que dans l'article 5 de l'accord sur les principes généraux adoptés pour la solution des questions entre la Chine et l'Union Soviétique et signé le 31 mai 1924, il est dit que 'le gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes reconnaît la Mongolie Extérieure comme partie intégrante de la République chinoise et

¹ *La Documentation Internationale*, May-June 1936.

respecte la souveraineté de la Chine sur elle'. La Mongolie Extérieure étant partie intégrante de la République chinoise, aucun État étranger ne peut conclure avec elle de traité ou d'accords de quelque nature que ce soit. L'acte du gouvernement de l'Union Soviétique, qui a signé le protocole susmentionné avec la Mongolie Extérieure en violation de ses engagements à l'égard du gouvernement chinois, constitue sans contredit une violation de la souveraineté de la Chine et des stipulations de l'accord soviéto-chinois de 1924.

C'est pourquoi je crois de mon devoir de présenter à Votre Excellence une protestation vigoureuse et de constater que la signature du protocole susmentionné avec la Mongolie Extérieure par le gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes est illégale et que le gouvernement chinois ne peut, en aucun cas, reconnaître un tel protocole et ne s'estime lié par lui dans quelque mesure que ce soit.

Je prie Votre Excellence de transmettre ce qui précède au gouvernement de Votre Excellence et de donner une réponse satisfaisante.

Agréé . . . etc. . . .

TCHAN-TZUN.

Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Chine.

(iii) *Reply of the Soviet Government, April 8, 1936.*¹

Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires,

Le 7 courant vous m'avez remis d'ordre de votre gouvernement une copie de la note qui a été remise le même jour à D. Bogomolov, ambassadeur de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes en Chine.

Cette note est basée sur l'affirmation que la signature, le 12 mars dernier, d'un protocole entre les gouvernements de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes et de la République Populaire de Mongolie était une prétendue violation de la souveraineté de la Chine et contredisait l'accord soviéto-chinois du 31 mai 1924, en conséquence de quoi le gouvernement de Nankin estime nécessaire de présenter une protestation.

En réponse à la note susmentionnée, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer ce qui suit :

Le gouvernement soviétique ne peut admettre l'interprétation du protocole soviéto-mongol formulé dans cette note et ne peut par conséquent estimer bien fondée la protestation présentée par le gouvernement chinois. Ni le fait de la signature du protocole, ni ses différents articles ne violent dans la plus petite mesure la souveraineté de la Chine, et ne renferment aucune espèce de revendication territoriale de la part de l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes

¹ *La Documentation Internationale*, May-June 1936.

à l'égard de la Chine ou de la République Populaire de Mongolie. La signature du protocole n'apporte aucun changement aux rapports tant de forme que de fait qui existaient jusqu'ici entre l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes et la Chine et entre l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes et la République Populaire de Mongolie.

L'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes, en signant le protocole d'assistance mutuelle, se basait sur la considération que l'accord soviéto-chinois conclu à Pékin en 1924 n'a subi aucun dommage et conserve toute sa vigueur. Le gouvernement soviétique confirme derechef par la présente que cet accord, en ce qui concerne l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes, garde sa force pour l'avenir également.

Quant à la question du droit formel de conclure des ententes avec les parties autonomes de la République chinoise, il suffit de rappeler la signature de l'accord du 20 septembre 1924 à Moukden entre le gouvernement soviétique et le gouvernement des Trois Provinces de l'Est, lequel acte n'a soulevé aucune protestation de la part du gouvernement de la République chinoise. Ce qui plus est, celui-ci a même reconnu l'accord de Moukden ci-dessus indiqué comme ayant toute sa force à l'égal de l'entente de Pékin.

En outre, il faut noter que l'accord soviéto-mongol n'est pas dirigé contre les intérêts d'États tiers, car il entre en vigueur dans le seul cas où l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques Socialistes ou la République Populaire de Mongolie seraient victimes d'une agression et se verraient forcées de défendre leurs propres territoires.

Se basant sur ce qui précède, le gouvernement soviétique croit devoir repousser la protestation du gouvernement chinois comme non-fondée et exprime en même temps sa profonde assurance que le gouvernement de la République chinoise arrivera à la conviction que le protocole soviéto-mongol ne contredit pas l'accord de Pékin et répond aux intérêts des peuples tant mongol que chinois.

Agréé . . . etc. . . .

M. LITVINOV.

Commissaire du Peuple aux Affaires Étrangères.

B. EGYPT¹

The failure in 1930 of the negotiations for a treaty which had been proceeding since 1927, first between Sir Austen Chamberlain and Sarwat Pasha in 1927-8, and then between Mr. Arthur Henderson and Mahmud Pasha and Nahas Pasha in 1929 and 1930,² appeared to be final. There the matter rested until the autumn of 1935, when the situation resulting from the Italo-Abyssinian dispute focused attention upon Anglo-Egyptian relations in regard to a possible emergency. On September 8 Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd, said 'we shall not take part in a coming war unless we can do so on the basis of co-operation between equals'. Conversations proceeded regarding co-operation and defence.

On December 9 a United Front of all the parties in opposition to Nessim Pasha's Government was formed, and on December 12 the leaders of this group presented to the British High Commissioner a Note requesting the opening of negotiations for an Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance. The British Government's reply was delivered on January 20, 1936. This expressed willingness to enter into negotiations at once, but suggested that in the light of past experience it would be 'desirable to begin with the categories which had given most difficulty in 1930', i.e. military questions and the Sudan—two points which had not been mentioned in the United Front's note.

On January 30 a neutral Cabinet of experienced politicians was formed by Ali Pasha Maher.

On February 13 Notes were exchanged between the High Commissioner and the Egyptian Government regarding an alleged threat made by the High Commissioner when communicating the British reply of January 20. If the negotiations were to fail, he had said, the British Government would feel obliged to review their position in Egypt and define their relations anew. The Egyptian Note asked for an assurance in this regard, stating that the negotiations could be carried out only with complete freedom. The British reply stated that while the Government 'must reserve liberty of action for an unknown future, they do not feel that if, notwithstanding goodwill on both sides, there should be a failure to reach agreement, this need necessarily affect the good relations of the two countries which it is their hope not merely to maintain but to strengthen'.

Preliminary negotiations opened in Cairo on March 2. The British Delegation was led by Sir Miles Lampson (the High Commissioner), assisted by naval, military, air, and legal experts of high rank. The Egyptian delegation consisted of representatives of all parties—seven members of the Wafd, led by Nahas Pasha, six non-Wafdists, including three ex-Prime Ministers—Sidky Pasha, Mahmud Pasha and Jehia Pasha (leaders of the Shaab, Liberal Constitution, and Ittihad Parties) and Shamsi Pasha (leader of the dissident Wafdists), Hilmy Issa Pasha, and Hafez Afifi Pasha (former Minister in London).

The negotiations proceeded in private throughout the summer. The

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part V (i).

² See *Documents* for 1928, pp. 245-52, and *Documents* for 1930, pp. 207-19.

military clauses were initialed on July 24, the Sudan clauses on August 1; the remaining provisions, including the question of the Capitulations, were quickly disposed of—the full draft being initialed on August 12, the formal signature of the Treaty taking place on August 26 at the Foreign Office in London, to which the Egyptian delegation had been invited as the guests of the British Government.

The Treaty¹ as finally signed was similar in its main provisions to the draft of 1930. The principle of the permanence of the Alliance was, however, established in Article 16. Articles 1–10 of the new Treaty, though numbered differently and with a few additions, were almost identical with Articles in the 1930 draft. The additional words or sentences are printed in italics in the text reproduced below.

The Sudan problem, which had been the principal stumbling-block in all previous negotiations, was settled in Article 11, and it was noteworthy that the Egyptian Government accepted the principle that the primary aim of the Administration must be the welfare of the Sudanese. The British Government agreed to the return of Egyptian troops to the Sudan (as before the murder of the Sirdar in 1924) and to Egyptian immigration, to be 'unrestricted except for reasons of public order and health'. The question of the Capitulations was dealt with in Article 13 and an International Conference subsequently met in April and May, 1937 at Montreux, where on May 12 a convention was signed for the abolition of the Capitulations after a transitional period of twelve years. With the settlement of this question the last obstacle to the entry of Egypt into the League of Nations as a Sovereign State was removed and on May 26, 1937, with the customary ceremonial, Egypt was formally admitted at an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly.

The military provisions of the Treaty were contained in Articles 7 and 8 and relevant Annexes. The military occupation of Egypt was to be terminated in accordance with Article 1, but the actual removal of the British forces from Cairo and Alexandria was not to take place until adequate accommodation for them had been provided in the Canal Zone, and until also the roads and railways specified in Article 8 had been completed. The elaborate system of communications for which provision was made was designed to ensure a high degree of mobility for a modern mechanized army.

The restrictions on the size of the Egyptian Army were removed, and it was agreed that the British land forces should be limited to 10,000, while the Air Force should be allowed a total of 400 pilots, exclusive of technical, administrative, and civilian personnel. The restrictions were not to apply to the Sudan or in the event of war, threat of war, or apprehended international emergency.

Other points to be noted were that the Egyptian Army was to avail itself of the services of a British Military Mission and to employ armament and equipment not differing in type from those of the British forces; that, after the expiration of 20 years after ratification of the Treaty, the question as to whether the Egyptian Army was in a position 'to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal' would be reviewed; and that the Canal Zone included both sides of the Canal, i.e.

¹ See below, p. 478.

that British forces would control the Sinai Desert and thus be in close contact with British troops in Palestine. Exchanges of Notes dealt with the question of the precedence of the British Ambassador, European police officials, Egyptian and British Advisers, and the British Military Mission.¹ An Agreed Minute recorded certain points of interpretation.²

The Treaty was ratified by the Egyptian Government on November 18 and by the United Kingdom on November 24. Ratifications were exchanged at Cairo on December 22, 1936.

1. TREATY OF ALLIANCE BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY, IN RESPECT OF
THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF EGYPT,
AUGUST 26, 1936.³

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the King of Egypt;

Being anxious to consolidate the friendship and the relations of good understanding between them and to co-operate in the execution of their international obligations in preserving the peace of the world;

And considering that these objects will best be achieved by the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance, which in their common interest will provide for effective co-operation in preserving peace and ensuring the defence of their respective territories, and shall govern their mutual relations in the future;

Have agreed to conclude a treaty for this purpose, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

[Names follow]

Who, having communicated their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article 1

The military occupation of Egypt by the forces of His Majesty the King and Emperor is terminated.

Article 2

His Majesty the King and Emperor will henceforth be represented at the Court of His Majesty the King of Egypt and His Majesty the King of Egypt will be represented at the Court of St. James's by Ambassadors duly accredited.

Article 3

Egypt intends to apply for membership to the League of Nations. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, recognizing Egypt

¹ See below, p. 492.

² See below, p. 489.

³ British Blue Book, Cmd. 5360. Additions or changes, as compared with the 1930 Draft Treaty, are printed in italics.

as a sovereign independent State, *will support any request for admission which the Egyptian Government may present in the conditions prescribed by Article 1 of the Covenant.*

Article 4

An alliance is established between the High Contracting Parties with a view to consolidating their friendship, their cordial understanding, and their good relations.

Article 5

Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to adopt in relation to foreign countries an attitude which is inconsistent with the alliance, nor to conclude political treaties inconsistent with the provisions of the present treaty.

Article 6

Should any dispute with a third State produce a situation which involves a risk of a rupture with that State, the High Contracting Parties will consult each other with a view to the settlement of the said dispute by peaceful means, in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of any other international obligations which may be applicable to the case.

Article 7

Should, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 6 above, either of the High Contracting Parties become engaged in war, the other High Contracting Party will, subject always to the provisions of Article 10 below, immediately come to his aid in the capacity of an ally.

The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event of war, imminent menace of war, *or apprehended international emergency* will consist in furnishing to His Majesty the King and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the Egyptian system of administration and legislation, all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes, and means of communication. It will accordingly be for the Egyptian Government to take all the administrative and legislative measures, *including the establishment of martial law and an effective censorship*, necessary to render these facilities and assistance effective.

Article 8

In view of the fact that the Suez Canal, whilst being an integral part of Egypt, is a universal means of communication, as also an

essential means of communication, between the different parts of the British Empire, His Majesty the King of Egypt, until such time as the High Contracting Parties agree that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal, authorizes His Majesty the King and Emperor to station forces *in Egyptian territory* in the vicinity of the Canal, in the zone specified in the Annex to this Article, with a view to ensuring in co-operation with the Egyptian forces the defence of the Canal. The detailed arrangements for the carrying into effect of this Article are contained in the Annex hereto. The presence of these forces shall not constitute in any manner an occupation and will in no way prejudice the sovereign rights of Egypt.

It is understood that at the end of the period of twenty years specified in Article 16 the question whether the presence of British forces is no longer necessary owing to the fact that the Egyptian Army is in a position to ensure by its own resources the liberty and entire security of navigation of the Canal may, if the High Contracting Parties do not agree thereon, be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations *for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of signature of the present treaty or to such other person or body of persons for decision in accordance with such other procedure as the High Contracting Parties may agree.*

Annex to Article 8.

1. Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 7, the numbers of the forces of His Majesty the King and Emperor to be maintained in the vicinity of the Canal shall not exceed, of the land forces, 10,000, and of the air forces, 400 pilots, together with the necessary ancillary personnel for administrative and technical duties. These numbers do not include civilian personnel, e.g., clerks, artisans, and labourers.

2. The British forces to be maintained in the vicinity of the Canal will be distributed (a) as regards the land forces, in Moascar and the Geneifa area on the south-west side of the Great Bitter Lake, and (b) as regards the air forces, within 5 miles of the Port Said-Suez railway from Kantara in the north, to the junction of the railway Suez-Cairo and Suez-Ismailia in the south, together with an extension along the Ismailia-Cairo railway to include the Royal Air Force Station at Abu Sueir and its satellite landing grounds; together with areas suitable for air firing and bombing ranges, which may have to be placed east of the Canal.

3. In the localities specified above there shall be provided for the British land and air forces of the numbers specified in paragraph 1 above, including 4,000 civilian personnel (but less 2,000 of the land forces, 700 of the air forces and 450 civilian personnel for whom accommodation already exists), the necessary lands and durable barrack and technical accommodation, including an emergency water supply. The lands, accommodation, and water supply shall be suitable according to modern standards. In addition,

amenities such as are reasonable, having regard to the character of these localities, will be provided by the planting of trees and the provision of gardens, playing-fields, &c., for the troops, and a site for the erection of a convalescent camp on the Mediterranean coast.

4. The Egyptian Government will make available the lands and construct the accommodation, water supplies, amenities, and convalescent camp, referred to in the preceding paragraph as being necessary over and above the accommodation already existing in these localities, at its own expense, but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will contribute (1) the actual sum spent by the Egyptian Government before 1914 on the construction of new barracks as alternative accommodation to the Kasr-el-Nil Barracks in Cairo, and (2) the cost of one-fourth of the barrack and technical accommodation for the land forces. The first of these sums shall be paid at the time specified in paragraph 8 below for the withdrawal of the British forces from Cairo, and the second at the time for the withdrawal of the British forces from Alexandria under paragraph 18 below. The Egyptian Government may charge a fair rental for the residential accommodation provided for the civilian personnel. The amount of the rent will be agreed between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government.

5. The two Governments will each appoint, immediately the present treaty comes into force, two or more persons who shall together form a committee to whom all questions relating to the execution of these works from the time of their commencement to the time of their completion shall be entrusted. Proposals for, or outlines of, plans and specifications put forward by the representatives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be accepted, provided they are reasonable and do not fall outside the scope of the obligations of the Egyptian Government under paragraph 4. The plans and specifications of each of the works to be undertaken by the Egyptian Government shall be approved by the representatives of both Governments on this committee before the work is begun. Any member of this committee, as well as the Commanders of the British forces or their representatives, shall have the right to examine the works at all stages of their construction, and the United Kingdom members of the committee may make suggestions as regards the manner in which the work is carried out. The United Kingdom members shall also have the right to make at any time, while the work is in progress, proposals for modifications or alterations in the plans and specifications. Effect shall be given to suggestions and proposals by the United Kingdom members, subject to the condition that they are reasonable and do not fall outside the scope of the obligations of the Egyptian Government under paragraph 4. In the case of machinery and other stores, where standardization of type is important, it is agreed that stores of the standard type in general use by the British forces will be obtained and installed. It is, of course, understood that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom may, when the barracks and accommodation are being used by the British forces, make at their own expense improvements or alterations thereto and construct new buildings in the areas specified in paragraph 2 above.

6. In pursuance of their programme for the development of road and railway communications in Egypt, and in order to bring the means of

communications in Egypt up to modern strategic requirements, the Egyptian Government will construct and maintain the following roads, bridges, and railways:—

(A) *Roads.*

- (i) Ismailia–Alexandria, via Tel-el-Kebir, Zagazig, Zifta, Tanta, Kafr-el-Zayat, Damanhour.
- (ii) Ismailia–Cairo, via Tel-el-Kebir and thence continuing along the Sweet Water Canal to Heliopolis.
- (iii) Port Said–Ismailia–Suez.
- (iv) A link between the south end of the Great Bitter Lake and the Cairo–Suez road about 15 miles west of Suez.

In order to bring them up to the general standard of good-class roads for general traffic, these roads will be 20 feet wide, have bye-passes round villages, &c., and be made of such material as to be permanently utilizable for military purposes, and will be constructed in the above order of importance. They will comply with the technical specifications set out below which are the ordinary specifications for a good-class road for general traffic.

Bridges and roads shall be capable of carrying a double line of continuous columns of either heavy four-wheeled mechanical transport, six-wheeled mechanical transport, or medium tanks. With regard to four-wheeled vehicles, the distance between the front axle of one vehicle and the rear axle of the vehicle next ahead shall be calculated at 20 feet, the load on each rear axle to be 14 tons, on each front axle to be 6 tons, and the distance between axles 18 feet. With regard to six-wheeled vehicles, the distance between the front axle of one vehicle and the rear axle of that next ahead shall be calculated to be 20 feet, between rear axle and middle axle to be 4 feet, and between middle axle and front axle 13 feet; the load on each rear and middle axle to be 8·1 tons and on each front axle to be 4 tons. Tanks shall be calculated for as weighing 19·25 tons, to be 25 feet over-all in length, and to have a distance of 3 feet between the front of one tank and the rear of the next ahead; the load of 19·25 tons to be carried by tracks which have a bearing of 13 feet upon the road or bridge.

(B) *Railways.*

(i)¹ Railway facilities in the Canal Zone will be increased and improved to meet the needs of the increased garrison in the zone and to provide facilities for rapid entrainment of personnel, guns, vehicles, and stores according to the requirements of a modern army. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are hereby authorized to make at their own expense such subsequent additions and modifications to these railway facilities as the future requirements of the British forces may demand. Where such additions or modifications affect railway lines used for general traffic, the permission of the Egyptian Government must be obtained.

(ii) The line between Zagazig and Tanta will be doubled.

(iii) The Alexandria–Mersa Matruh line will be improved and made permanent.

¹ See Note No. 1 on p. 494.

7. In addition to the roads specified in paragraph 6 (A) above, and for the same purposes, the Egyptian Government will construct and maintain the following roads:—

- (i) Cairo south along the Nile to Kena and Kus;
- (ii) Kus to Kosseir;
- (iii) Kena to Hurghada.

These roads and the bridges thereon will be constructed to satisfy the same standards as those specified in paragraph 6 above.

It may not be possible for the construction of the roads referred to in this paragraph to be undertaken at the same time as the roads referred to in paragraph 6, but they will be constructed as soon as possible.

8. When, to the satisfaction of both the High Contracting Parties, the accommodation referred to in paragraph 4 is ready (accommodation for the forces retained temporarily at Alexandria in accordance with paragraph 18 below not being included) and the works referred to in paragraph 6 above (other than the railways referred to in (ii) and (iii) of part (B) of that paragraph) have been completed, then the British forces in parts of Egypt other than the areas in the Canal Zone specified in paragraph 2 above and except for those maintained temporarily at Alexandria, will withdraw, and the lands, barracks, aircraft landing grounds, seaplane anchorages, and accommodation occupied by them will be vacated and, save in so far as they may belong to private persons, be handed over to the Egyptian Government.

9. Any difference of opinion between the two Governments relating to the execution of paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 above will be submitted to the decision of an Arbitral Board, composed of three members, the two Governments nominating each a member and the third being nominated by the two Governments in common agreement. The decision of the Board shall be final.

10. In order to ensure the proper training of British troops, it is agreed that the area defined below will be available for the training of British forces: (a) and (b) at all times of the year, and (c) during February and March for annual manœuvres:—

- (a) West of the Canal: From Kantara in the north to the Suez-Cairo railway (inclusive) in the south and as far as longitude 31 degrees 30 minutes east, exclusive of all cultivation;
- (b) East of the Canal as required;
- (c) A continuation of (a) as far south as latitude 29 degrees 52 minutes north, thence south-east to the junction of latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes north and longitude 31 degrees 44 minutes east and from that point eastwards along latitude 29 degrees 30 minutes north.

The areas of the localities referred to above are included in the map (scale 1: 500,000) which is annexed to the present Treaty.¹

11. Unless the two Governments agree to the contrary, the Egyptian Government will prohibit the passage of aircraft over the territories situated on either side of the Suez Canal and within 20 kilometres of it, except for the purpose of passage from east to west or *vice versa* by means

¹ A map to illustrate the Treaty is annexed to the Blue Book [Cmd. 5360].

of a corridor 10 kilometres wide at Kantara. This prohibition will not, however, apply to the forces of the High Contracting Parties or to genuinely Egyptian air organizations or to air organizations genuinely belonging to any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations operating under the authority of the Egyptian Government.

12. The Egyptian Government will provide when necessary reasonable means of communication and access to and from the localities where the British forces are situated and will also accord facilities at Port Said and Suez for the landing and storage of material and supplies for the British forces, including the maintenance of a small detachment of the British forces in these ports to handle and guard this material and these supplies in transit.

13. In view of the fact that the speed and range of modern aircraft necessitate the use of wide areas for the efficient training of air forces, the Egyptian Government will accord permission to the British air forces to fly wherever they consider it necessary for the purpose of training. Reciprocal treatment will be accorded to Egyptian air forces in British territories.

14. In view of the fact that the safety of flying is dependent upon provision of a large number of places where aircraft can alight, the Egyptian Government will secure the maintenance and constant availability of adequate landing grounds and seaplane anchorages in Egyptian territory and waters. The Egyptian Government will accede to any request from the British air forces for such additional landing grounds and seaplane anchorages as experience may show to be necessary to make the number adequate for allied requirements.

15. The Egyptian Government will accord permission for the British air forces to use the said landing grounds and seaplane anchorages, and in the case of certain of them to send stocks of fuel and stores thereto, to be kept in sheds to be erected thereon for this purpose, and in case of urgency to undertake such work as may be necessary for the safety of aircraft.

16. The Egyptian Government will give all necessary facilities for the passage of the personnel of the British forces, aircraft, and stores to and from the said landing grounds and seaplane anchorages. Similar facilities will be afforded to the personnel, aircraft, and stores of the Egyptian forces at the air bases of the British forces.

17. The British military authorities shall be at liberty to request permission from the Egyptian Government to send parties of officers in civilian clothes to the Western Desert to study the ground and draw up tactical schemes. This permission shall not be unreasonably withheld.

18. His Majesty the King of Egypt authorizes His Majesty the King and Emperor to maintain units of his forces at or near Alexandria for a period not exceeding eight years from the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, this being the approximate period considered necessary by the two High Contracting Parties—

(a) For the final completion of the barrack accommodation in the Canal zone;

(b)¹ For the improvement of the roads—

(i) Cairo-Suez;

(ii) Cairo-Alexandria via Giza and the desert;

¹ See Note No. 2 on p. 496.

(iii) Alexandria–Mersa Matruh ;

so as to bring them up to the standard specified in part (A) of paragraph 6 ;

(c) The improvement of the railway facilities between Ismailia and Alexandria, and Alexandria and Mersa Matruh referred to in (ii) and (iii) of part (B) of paragraph 6.

The Egyptian Government will complete the work specified in (a), (b), and (c) above before the expiry of the period of eight years aforesaid. The roads and railway facilities mentioned above will, of course, be maintained by the Egyptian Government.

19. The British forces in or near Cairo shall, until the time for withdrawal under paragraph 8 above, and the British forces in or near Alexandria until the expiry of the time specified in paragraph 18 above, continue to enjoy the same facilities as at present.

Article 9

The immunities and privileges in jurisdictional and fiscal matters to be enjoyed by the forces of His Majesty the King and Emperor who are in Egypt in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty will be determined in a separate convention¹ to be concluded between the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

Article 10

Nothing in the present treaty is intended to or shall in any way prejudice the rights and obligations which devolve, or may devolve, upon either of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations or the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris on August 27, 1928.²

Article 11

1. *While reserving liberty to conclude new conventions in future, modifying the agreements of January 19 and July 10, 1899, the High Contracting Parties agree that the administration of the Sudan shall continue to be that resulting from the said agreements. The Governor-General shall continue to exercise on the joint behalf of the High Contracting Parties the powers conferred upon him by the said agreements.*

The High Contracting Parties agree that the primary aim of their administration in the Sudan must be the welfare of the Sudanese.

Nothing in this article prejudices the question of sovereignty over the Sudan.

2.³ *Appointments and promotions of officials in the Sudan will in*

¹ For Convention, see p. 497.

² British White Paper (Cmd. 3410).

³ See Note No. 3 on p. 496.

consequence remain vested in the Governor-General, who, in making new appointments to posts for which qualified Sudanese are not available, will select suitable candidates of British and Egyptian nationality.

3. In addition to Sudanese troops, both British and Egyptian troops shall be placed at the disposal of the Governor-General for the defence of the Sudan.

4. Egyptian immigration into the Sudan shall be unrestricted except for reasons of public order and health.

5. There shall be no discrimination in the Sudan between British subjects and Egyptian nationals in matters of commerce, immigration, or the possession of property.

6. The High Contracting Parties are agreed on the provisions set out in the Annex to this Article as regards the method by which international conventions are to be made applicable to the Sudan.

Annex to Article 11.

1. Unless and until the High Contracting Parties agree to the contrary in application of paragraph 1 of this Article, the general principle for the future shall be that international conventions shall only become applicable to the Sudan by the joint action of the Governments of the United Kingdom and of Egypt, and that such joint action shall similarly also be required if it is desired to terminate the participation of the Sudan in an international convention which already applies to this territory.

2. Conventions to which it will be desired that the Sudan should be a party will generally be conventions of a technical or humanitarian character. Such conventions almost invariably contain a provision for subsequent accession, and in such cases this method of making the convention applicable to the Sudan will be adopted. Accession will be effected by a joint instrument, signed on behalf of Egypt and the United Kingdom respectively by two persons duly authorized for the purpose. The method of depositing the instruments of accession will be the subject of agreement in each case between the two Governments. In the event of its being desired to apply to the Sudan a convention which does not contain an accession clause, the method by which this should be effected will be the subject of consultation and agreement between the two Governments.

3. If the Sudan is already a party to a convention, and it is desired to terminate the participation of the Sudan therein, the necessary notice of termination will be given jointly by the United Kingdom and by Egypt.

4. It is understood that the participation of the Sudan in a convention, and the termination of such participation, can only be effected by joint action specifically taken in respect of the Sudan, and does not follow merely from the fact that the United Kingdom and Egypt are both parties to a convention or have both denounced a convention.

5. At international conferences where such conventions are negotiated, the Egyptian and the United Kingdom delegates would naturally keep in touch with a view to any action which they may agree to be desirable in the interests of the Sudan.

Article 12

His Majesty the King and Emperor recognizes that the responsibility for the lives and property of foreigners in Egypt devolves exclusively upon the Egyptian Government, who will ensure the fulfilment of their obligations in this respect.

Article 13

His Majesty the King and Emperor recognizes that the capitulatory régime now existing in Egypt is no longer in accordance with the spirit of the times and with the present state of Egypt.

His Majesty the King of Egypt desires the abolition of this régime without delay.

Both High Contracting Parties are agreed upon the arrangements with regard to this matter as set forth in the Annex to this Article.

Annex to Article 13.

1. It is the object of the arrangements set out in this Annex:—

- (i) To bring about speedily the abolition of the Capitulations in Egypt with the disappearance of the existing restrictions on Egyptian sovereignty in the matter of the application of Egyptian legislation (including financial legislation) to foreigners as its necessary consequence;
- (ii) To institute a transitional régime for a reasonable and not unduly prolonged period to be fixed, during which the Mixed Tribunals will remain and will, in addition to their present judicial jurisdiction, exercise the jurisdiction at present vested in the Consular Courts.

At the end of this transitional period the Egyptian Government will be free to dispense with the Mixed Tribunals.

2. As a first step, the Egyptian Government will approach the Capitulatory Powers as soon as possible with a view to (a) the removal of all restrictions on the application of Egyptian legislation to foreigners, and (b) the institution of a transitional régime for the Mixed Tribunals as provided in paragraph 1 (ii) above.

3. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, as the Government of a Capitulatory Power and as an ally of Egypt, are in no way opposed to the arrangements referred to in the preceding paragraph and will collaborate actively with the Egyptian Government in giving effect to them by using all their influence with the Powers exercising capitulatory rights in Egypt.

4. It is understood that in the event of its being found impossible to bring into effect the arrangements referred to in paragraph 2, the Egyptian Government retains its full rights unimpaired with regard to the capitulatory régime, including the Mixed Tribunals.

5. It is understood that paragraph 2 (a) involves not merely that the assent of the Capitulatory Powers will be no longer necessary for the application of any Egyptian legislation to their nationals, but also that the present legislative functions of the Mixed Tribunals as regards the

application of Egyptian legislation to foreigners will terminate. It would follow from this that the Mixed Tribunals in their judicial capacity would no longer have to pronounce upon the validity of the application to foreigners of an Egyptian law or decree which has been applied to foreigners by the Egyptian Parliament or Government, as the case may be.

6. His Majesty the King of Egypt hereby declares that no Egyptian legislation made applicable to foreigners will be inconsistent with the principles generally adopted in modern legislation or, with particular relation to legislation of a fiscal nature, discriminate against foreigners, including foreign corporate bodies.

7. In view of the fact that it is the practice in most countries to apply to foreigners the law of their nationality in matters of 'statut personnel', consideration will be given to the desirability of excepting from the transfer of jurisdiction, at any rate in the first place, matters relating to 'statut personnel' affecting nationals of those Capitulatory Powers who wish that their Consular authorities should continue to exercise such jurisdiction.

8. The transitional régime for the Mixed Tribunals and the transfer to them of the jurisdiction at present exercised by the Consular Courts (which régime and transfer will, of course, be subject to the provisions of the special convention referred to in Article 9) will necessitate the revision of existing laws relating to the organization and jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals, including the preparation and promulgation of a new Code of Criminal Procedure. It is understood that this revision will include amongst other matters:—

- (i) The definition of the word 'foreigner' for the purpose of the future jurisdiction of the Mixed Tribunals;
- (ii) The increase of the personnel of the Mixed Tribunals and the Mixed Parquet, which will be necessitated by the proposed extension of their jurisdiction;
- (iii) The procedure in the case of pardons or remissions of sentences imposed on foreigners and also in connexion with the execution of capital sentences passed on foreigners.

Article 14

The present treaty abrogates any existing agreements or other instruments whose continued existence is inconsistent with its provisions. Should either High Contracting Party so request, a list of the agreements and instruments thus abrogated shall be drawn up in agreement between them within six months of the coming into force of the present treaty.

Article 15

The High Contracting Parties agree that any difference on the subject of the application or interpretation of the provisions of the present treaty which they are unable to settle by direct negotiation shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Article 16

At any time after the expiration of a period of twenty years from the coming into force of the Treaty, the High Contracting Parties will, at the request of either of them, enter into negotiations with a view to such revision of its terms by agreement between them as may be appropriate in the circumstances as they then exist. In the case of the High Contracting Parties being unable to agree *upon the terms of the revised treaty*, the difference will be submitted to the *Council of the League of Nations for decision in accordance with the provisions of the Covenant in force at the time of signature of the present treaty, or to such other person or body of persons for decision in accordance with such procedure as the High Contracting Parties may agree. It is agreed that any revision of this treaty will provide for the continuation of the Alliance between the High Contracting Parties in accordance with the principles contained in Articles 4, 5, 6, and 7.* Nevertheless, with the consent of both High Contracting Parties, negotiations may be entered into at any time after the expiration of a period of ten years after the coming into force of the treaty, with a view to such revision as aforesaid.

Article 17

The present treaty is subject to ratification. Ratifications shall be exchanged in Cairo as soon as possible. The Treaty shall come into force on the date of the exchange of ratifications, and shall thereupon be registered with the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

In witness whereof the above-named plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London in duplicate this 26th day of August, 1936.

(L.S.) ANTHONY EDEN.
 (L.S.) J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.
 (L.S.) JOHN SIMON.
 (L.S.) HALIFAX.
 (L.S.) MILES W. LAMPSON.
 (L.S.) MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS.
 (L.S.) AHMAD MAHER.
 (L.S.) M. MAHMOUD.
 (L.S.) I. SEDKI.
 (L.S.) A. YEHA.

(L.S.) WACYF BOUTROS GHALI.
 (L.S.) O. MOHARRAM.
 (L.S.) MAKRAM EBEID.
 (L.S.) MAHMOUD FAHMY EL-
 NOKRACHY.
 (L.S.) A. HANDY SEIF EL NASR.
 (L.S.) ALY EL CHAMSI.
 (L.S.) M. H. ISSA.
 (L.S.) HAFEZ AFIFI.

2. AGREED MINUTE

The United Kingdom and Egyptian Delegations desire at the moment of signature to record in a minute certain points of inter-

pretation of the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance upon which they are agreed.

These points are as follows:—

(i) It is of course understood that the facilities provided for in Article 7 to be furnished to His Majesty the King and Emperor include the sending of British forces or reinforcements in the eventualities specified in that Article.

(ii) With reference to Article 7, it is understood that as a result of the provisions of Article 6, there will have been mutual consultation between the two Governments in the case of a risk of a rupture. In the case of an apprehended international emergency, the same principle of mutual consultation applies.

(iii) The 'means of communication' referred to in the second sentence of Article 7 include telecommunications (cables, telegraphs, telephones, and wireless).

(iv) Amongst the military, administrative, and legislative measures referred to in the third sentence of Article 7 are included measures under which the Egyptian Government, in the exercise of their powers as regards radio-electric communications, will take into account the requirements of the W/T stations of the British forces in Egypt, and will continue to co-operate with the British authorities to prevent any mutual interference between British and Egyptian W/T stations, and measures providing for the effective control of all means of communications referred to in that Article.

(v) The words 'Geneifa area' in paragraph 2 (a) of the Annex to Article 8 mean: along the shore of the Great Bitter Lake from a point 3 kilometres north of Geneifa Station to a point 3 kilometres south-east of Fayid Station to a depth of 3 kilometres from the shore of the lake.

(vi) With reference to paragraph 2 (b) of the Annex to Article 8, it is understood that the exact sites in the area therein referred to where the air forces will be located will be defined as soon as possible.

The Royal Air Force Depot at present situated at Aboukir will also be transferred to this area not later than the date of the withdrawal of the British forces from Cairo under paragraph 8.

(vii) With reference to paragraph 3 of the Annex to Article 8, it is understood (a) that British barrack accommodation includes married quarters for officers and for a proportion of the other ranks, (b) that though the site of the convalescent camp cannot be definitely fixed at the moment, El Arish might possibly prove suitable, and (c) that the Egyptian Government, in pursuance of the policy which it has already taken in hand for the benefit of the inhabitants of those areas,

will take all reasonable sanitary measures for the combating of malaria in the areas adjacent to those where the British forces are situated.

(viii) With reference to paragraph 6 of the Annex to Article 8, it is understood that, with regard to road No. (iii), the Egyptian Government will, unless they are able to make arrangements with the Suez Canal Company for the use of this road by the British and Egyptian forces and for the improvement of those sections which are not already up to this standard so as to satisfy the conditions laid down in paragraph 6, construct an entirely new road connecting these places.

(ix) With reference to paragraph 12 of the Annex to Article 8, it is understood that the number of the detachment referred to shall be limited to the minimum strictly necessary to handle and guard this material.

(x) With reference to paragraph 13 of the Annex to Article 8, it is understood that flying will take place for training purposes mostly over desert areas, and that populated areas will only be flown over where necessity so demands.

(xi) With reference to paragraph 2 of the Egyptian Note relating to military matters, it is of course understood that the cost of the Military Mission will be defrayed by the Egyptian Government, and that the words 'proper training' in this paragraph include training in British military colleges and academies.

(xii) Paragraph 2 of the Egyptian Note relating to military matters only applies to persons who are already at the time members of the Egyptian armed forces.

(xiii) The word 'equipment' in paragraph 3 of the Egyptian Note relating to military matters, means all such stores as it is desirable for forces acting together to have as a common pattern. It does not include articles of clothing or articles of local production.

(xiv) With reference to paragraph 1 of Article 11, it is agreed that the Governor-General shall furnish to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Egyptian Government an annual report on the administration of the Sudan. Sudan legislation will be notified directly to the President of the Egyptian Council of Ministers.

(xv) With reference to paragraph 2 of Article 11, it is understood that, while the appointment of Egyptian nationals to official posts in the Sudan must necessarily be governed by the number of suitable vacancies, the time of their occurrence, and the qualifications of the candidates forthcoming, the provisions of this paragraph will take effect forthwith on the coming into force of the Treaty. The promotion and advancement of members of the Sudan Service shall be

irrespective of nationality up to any rank by selection in accordance with individual merits.

It is also understood that these provisions will not prevent the Governor-General occasionally appointing to special posts persons of another nationality when no qualified British subjects, Egyptian nationals, or Sudanese are available.

(xvi) With reference to paragraph 3 of Article 11, it is understood that, as the Egyptian Government are willing to send troops to the Sudan, the Governor-General will give immediate consideration to the question of the number of Egyptian troops required for service in the Sudan, the precise places where they will be stationed, and the accommodation necessary for them, and that the Egyptian Government will send forthwith, on the coming into force of the Treaty, an Egyptian military officer of high rank whom the Governor-General can consult with regard to these matters.

(xvii) With reference to Article 11, as it has been arranged between the Egyptian Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom that the question of the indebtedness of the Sudan to Egypt and other financial questions affecting the Sudan shall be discussed between the Egyptian Ministry of Finance and the Treasury of the United Kingdom, and as such discussions have already commenced, it has been considered unnecessary to insert in the Treaty any provision in regard to this question.

(xviii) With regard to paragraph 6 of the Annex to Article 13, it is understood that questions relating to this declaration are not subjects for the appreciation of any Courts in Egypt.

Signed in duplicate at London this 26th day of August, 1936.

ANTHONY EDEN,

*His Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs.*

MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS,

*President of the Egyptian Council of
Ministers.*

3. NOTES EXCHANGED IN LONDON, AUGUST 26, 1936

No. 1

Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha to Mr. Eden

London, August 26, 1936.

Sir,

With reference to Article 2 of the treaty signed this day, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, as His Majesty the King

of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, will be the first foreign sovereign to be represented in Egypt by an Ambassador, British Ambassadors will be considered senior to the other diplomatic representatives accredited to the Court of His Majesty the King of Egypt.

The provisions of this Note are subject to revision at the time and in the conditions provided for in Article 16 of the treaty.

I avail, &c.

MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS,

President of the Council of Ministers.

No. 2

Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha to Mr. Eden

London, August 26, 1936.

Sir,

With reference to Article 12 of the treaty signed this day, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Egyptian Government intend to abolish forthwith the European Bureau of the Public Security Department, but will retain, for five years from the coming into force of the treaty, a certain European element in their city police. The said police will remain for the same period under the command of British officers.

With a view to facilitating the gradual substitution of Egyptian officials for the said European element and thereby securing the harmonious working of the police organization, the Egyptian Government propose to dispense annually with the services of one-fifth of the number of European police officials.

The Egyptian Government, in view of the treaty of friendship and alliance signed to-day, will, when engaging the services of foreign experts, generally prefer British subjects possessing the necessary qualifications.

I avail, &c.

MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS,

President of the Council of Ministers.

No. 3

Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha to Mr. Eden

London, August 26, 1936.

Sir,

I wish to place on record certain further understandings in regard to military matters which have been reached between us in connexion with the Treaty of Alliance signed this day.

(1) British personnel shall be withdrawn from the Egyptian Army and the functions of the Inspector-General and his staff shall terminate.

(2) The Egyptian Government, desiring to perfect the training of the Egyptian Army including the Air Force, and intending, in the interests of the alliance which has been established, that such foreign instructors as they may deem necessary shall be chosen from amongst British subjects only, will avail themselves of the advice of a British Military Mission for such time as they may deem necessary for the purposes aforesaid. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will furnish the Military Mission which the Egyptian Government desire, and will also undertake to receive and provide proper training in the United Kingdom for any personnel of the Egyptian forces which the Egyptian Government may desire to send for the purpose of being trained. In the circumstances created by this treaty the Egyptian Government will naturally not desire to send any personnel of their armed forces to undergo a course in any training establishment or unit abroad elsewhere than in the United Kingdom, provided that this shall not prevent it from sending to any other country such personnel as cannot be received in training establishments and units in the United Kingdom.

(3) In the interests of the Alliance, and in view of the possible necessity of co-operative action between the British and Egyptian forces, the armament and equipment, land and air, of the Egyptian forces shall not differ in type from those of the British forces. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom undertake to use their good offices to facilitate the supply of such armament and equipment from the United Kingdom, at prices similar to those which would be paid by His Majesty's Government, whenever the Egyptian Government so desire.

I avail, &c.

MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS,

President of the Council of Ministers.

4. NOTES EXCHANGED IN EGYPT.—AUGUST 12, 1936

No. 1

Sir Miles Lampson to Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha

The Residency, Ramleh,

August 12, 1936.

Sir,

With reference to paragraph 6 (B) (i) of the Annex to Article H (9),¹ your Excellency asked me on behalf of the Egyptian Delegation to

¹ Article 8 in the Treaty as signed.

communicate information as regards the work which would be required to be done under this paragraph. I have the honour to enclose a statement which gives these details so far as they can be stated at the present moment. This statement is, however, only approximate and further details might have to be added to it.

I avail, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 1

Approximate Railway Requirements in Canal Zone

Moascar.

The existing siding with troop entrainment platform and one siding with end loading ramp, each to hold '60' unit trains, with facilities to enable a train to be despatched every three hours, will be maintained.

Geneifa Area.

(a) *Entrainment Station.*—Two sidings with loop entrainment platforms and two sidings with end loading ramps, each to hold '60' unit trains.

(b) Depot Area, facilities as given below together with the necessary shunting loops, &c.

Supply Depot: One spur with two loading sidings (each 20 units).

Petrol Depot: One loading siding (10 units).

M.T. Vehicle Reception Depot: One end loading siding (30 Flats).

Ordnance Depot: One spur with one loading and one end loading siding (each 20 units).

Camp Equipment Depot: One loading siding (40 units).

Ammunition Depot: One spur with two loading sidings (each 20 units).

Hospital Area: One siding and one off-loading platform for one Hospital train.

R.E. Stores Depot: One loading siding (20 units).

N.A.A.F.I. Depot: One loading siding (10 units).

(c) Marshalling and Locomotive Yards to enable one personnel train, or one M.T. train, being despatched every three hours throughout the twenty-four.

(d) Wharves and other unloading facilities as required.

NOTE.—All loading sidings to have platforms corresponding with the length of the train.

EGYPT

No. 2

Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha to Sir Miles Lampson

Antoniades Palace, Alexandria,
August 12, 1936.

Sir,

With reference to paragraph 18 (b) of the draft Annex to Article H (9)¹ initialed July 24 last, I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the work which is at present being done on the roads Cairo-Alexandria, via Giza and the desert, and Cairo-Suez will be pushed forward and will be completed by the end of 1936.

I avail, &c.

MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS,

President of the Council of Ministers.

No. 3

Sir Miles Lampson to Moustapha El-Nahas Pacha

The Residency, Ramleh,
August 12, 1936.

Sir,

In the course of discussions on questions of detail, arising out of paragraph 2 of Article K,² the suggestion for the secondment of an Egyptian economic expert for service at Khartum, and the Governor-General's wish to appoint an Egyptian officer to his personal staff as military secretary, were noted and considered acceptable in principle. It was also considered desirable and acceptable that the Inspector-General of the Egyptian Irrigation Service in the Sudan should be invited to attend the Governor-General's Council when matters relating to his departmental interests were before the Council.

I avail, &c.

MILES W. LAMPSON,
High Commissioner.

5. ORAL DECLARATION

*Minute of a Meeting held at the Antoniades Palace, Alexandria, on
August 10, 1936*

At a meeting at the Antoniades Palace on the morning of August 10, at which the provisions of the draft treaty relating to the Capitulations and other non-military clauses were under discussion, the following oral declaration was made:—

His Excellency Nahas Pasha, on behalf of the Egyptian

¹ Article 8 in the Treaty as signed (see p. 484).

² Article 11 in the Treaty as signed (see p. 485).

Delegation, stated that the absence in the treaty documents of any mention of the Judicial and Financial Advisers meant that the Egyptian Government were free from any restriction of an international character with regard to the retention or non-retention of these officials.

His Excellency the High Commissioner expressed his agreement with the declaration of Nahas Pasha.

6. CONVENTION BETWEEN HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILEGES TO BE ENJOYED BY THE BRITISH FORCES IN EGYPT, AUGUST 26, 1936.

The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government desiring, in accordance with Article 9 of the Treaty of Alliance signed this day, to settle the position as regards jurisdictional and fiscal matters of the forces in Egypt of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India (hereinafter referred to as His Majesty), have agreed as follows:—

1. In this Convention the expression 'British forces' includes—

(a) every person subject to the Naval Discipline Act, the Army Act, and the Air Force Act of the United Kingdom (or the corresponding Acts of other parts of His Majesty's Dominions) who is stationed with, or attached to, the forces of His Majesty, who are present in Egypt in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance;

(b) every civilian official of British nationality accompanying or serving with the said forces in Egypt or the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes, who is either granted relative status as an officer, or holds a pass designating his status, issued by the Appropriate British Authority as hereinafter defined, and who is paid from the funds of any part of the Dominions of His Majesty, or the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes;

(c) wives, and children under 21 years of age, of the persons mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof.

2.—(a) The expression 'Appropriate British Authority' means—

(i) in the case of members of His Majesty's Naval Forces, the Senior Naval Officer for the time being within the territorial waters of Egypt; or in cases where the matter is not within his cognizance, the Commander-in-Chief or other officer for the time being commanding the Mediterranean Station;

(ii) in the case of members of His Majesty's Land Forces, the General or other officer for the time being commanding the British troops in Egypt;

(iii) in the case of members of His Majesty's Air Forces, the Air or other officer for the time being commanding the Royal Air Force in Egypt;

(b) any authority given to, or any act or thing to be done by, to, or for, any Appropriate British Authority may be exercised by, or done by, to, or for, any other person for the time being authorized in that behalf according to the custom of the particular service of His Majesty concerned.

3.—(a) The expression 'British camps' means—the areas or places which, by virtue of Article 8 of the Treaty and the Annex thereto, have been allocated to the forces of His Majesty and such other areas as may be so allocated by agreement of both Governments either in addition to or in substitution for the aforesaid areas, and including the temporary camps and bivouacs in the training and manœuvre areas authorized by the Treaty when being used as such;

(b) the expression 'service aircraft' means any aircraft of His Majesty's forces.

4. No member of the British forces shall be subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the Courts of Egypt, nor to the civil jurisdiction of those Courts in any matter arising out of his official duties. If any civil proceeding is instituted against a member of the British forces before any Egyptian Court, notification of the proceedings shall be given to His Majesty's Ambassador, and no further steps shall be taken until twenty-one days have elapsed from the date of notification. This period shall be extended if His Majesty's Ambassador states that it has not been possible to conclude the necessary investigations in the above time. A statement to the Court by His Majesty's Ambassador that the proceedings arise out of official duties will be considered as conclusive evidence of that fact.

5. Without prejudice to the fact that British camps are Egyptian territory, the said camps shall be inviolable and shall be subject to the exclusive control and authority of the Appropriate British Authorities.

6. In pursuance of the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance, the Egyptian Government hereby consents to the enjoyment by the British forces of—

(a) freedom of movement between British camps, and to or from the ordinary points of access to Egyptian territory by water, land, or air; there would of course be consultation with the Egyptian

Authorities as regards movements of large bodies of men, stores, or vehicles on railways and roads used for general traffic ;

(b) unrestricted communication by radio or other telegraphy, telephony, or any other means howsoever ; and the necessary facilities for maintaining such communications whether inside or outside of British camps, including the laying of cables and land lines ; it is understood that the telegraph and telephone cables and lines herein referred to will be situated in the areas where the British forces are stationed, and that any connexion with the Egyptian system of telegraphs and telephones will be subject to arrangement with the Egyptian Authorities ;

(c) the right within British camps to generate light and power for use in British camps, and to transmit and distribute such light and power between the place of generation and any other British camp by means of cables, pipes, or in any other way whatsoever ;

(d) transmission, subject to the payment of the usual charges, of telegrams and messages over the Egyptian State Telegraphs and Telephones, in clear, in code, or in cypher ;

(e) use of the Egyptian State Railways upon the terms and subject to the conditions now in force ;

(f) the supply, maintenance, and use of telephones as required, as part of and connected with the Egyptian State Telephones service and system, at the rates and upon the conditions now in force ;

(g) entry into and departure from Egypt of members of His Majesty's forces at all times without let or hindrance, subject only to the production of a certificate showing membership of the British forces in cases when such members do not arrive or leave by a British man-of-war, troop-ship, freight-ship, or service aircraft, service transport, or as a formed body under command of an Officer, Warrant Officer, Non-Commissioned Officer, or Petty Officer ;

(h) the use of roads, bridges, canals, streams, lakes, water-ways, and other bodies of water without the payment of dues, tolls, or charges either by way of registration or otherwise for vehicles or water-borne craft used on His Majesty's Service ;

(i) port facilities free of payment for His Majesty's men-of-war, troop-ships, freight-ships, and service aircraft of an amphibian or seaplane character ;

(j) the same immunity regarding the official correspondence of the British forces and their couriers as is enjoyed in international law by the Diplomatic representatives of foreign States.

7.—(a) Members of the British forces who are owners of real property shall pay the same taxes, registration, and transfer fees in

respect of such property and its produce as civilians of British nationality;

(b) members of the British forces shall pay in respect of any privately owned radio receiving or transmitting apparatus the tax or licence fee for the time being in force and applicable to such apparatus;

(c) members of the British forces shall pay the fee for the time being in force for the registration of a private water-borne craft and (subject to the provisions of Article 6 (*h*) hereof) also all dues, charges, and tolls leviable in consequence of the user of such craft;

(d) members of the British forces shall pay the tax or registration fee for the time being in force for a private motor vehicle used on any public road maintained by the Egyptian Government or for any privately owned aircraft;

(e) the Agreement between the Egyptian Government and the British Military Authorities dealing with imports and exports by the British Naval, Military, and Air Force Authorities as well as with imports by individual members of His Majesty's forces and by the Navy, Army, and Air Force Institutes, dated July 14, 1921, as amended up to the date hereof, shall remain in full force and effect; provided, however, that, in the event of a change in the tariff, either party to the said Agreement shall have a right to demand a revision of the *ad valorem* rates which have been accepted by mutual consent as equivalent to the actual duties and dues chargeable under the tariff now in force. The principle of an *ad valorem* equivalent shall be maintained.

Save as above provided, British camps, the British forces, and the members thereof shall be immune from all taxation, other than municipal rates for services enjoyed, and from all registration fees or charges unless there has been an agreement between the two Governments to the contrary.

8. The Egyptian Government freely offers every assistance to British aircraft in distress, and will accord full facilities to His Majesty's personnel and stores to proceed to and from the salvage of any aircraft in distress that may have made a forced landing in Egyptian territory.

9. The Appropriate British Authority will surrender, on receipt of an application signed by the appropriate official of the Egyptian Ministry of Justice, persons not being members of His Majesty's forces and who are within any British camp, and

(a) against whom a warrant of arrest has been issued in respect of any offence triable by a court in Egypt; or

(b) against whom an order of imprisonment has been made by any court in Egypt; or

(c) against whom an order has been issued by an appropriate Egyptian military authority for desertion or absence without leave from the Egyptian Army; and

(d) who are not immediately ejected therefrom as would ordinarily be done in the case of such persons who take refuge therein from the police.

Every application for the surrender of an offender under these provisions shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the warrant of arrest or order of imprisonment as the case may be, and by such information as is available as to the identity and whereabouts of the person whose surrender is desired.

10. The Egyptian Government will ensure:—

(a) the searching for, apprehending, and handing over of any members of the British forces who are claimed as deserters or absentees without leave, upon request made in writing by the Appropriate British Authority;

(b) the prosecution of persons accused of acts in relation to the British forces which, if committed in relation to the Egyptian forces, would have rendered them liable to prosecution.

11.—(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (a) of the preceding Article, members of the British forces shall be liable to arrest by the Egyptian Authorities only in such circumstances as would justify the arrest of civilians of British nationality. Should any member of the British forces be arrested the following procedure will be adopted:

(a) notification of the arrest giving the name and other particulars of the person arrested together with information as to the nature of the offences for which the said person was arrested, will be sent forthwith to the Appropriate British Authority;

(b) a similar notification will also immediately be sent to the office of the nearest British Consular Officer;

(c) the alleged offender will be handed over on demand to the Appropriate British Authority;

(d) full particulars of the charges against the alleged offender together with the names, addresses, and statements of the relevant witnesses will be delivered or sent by registered post to the Appropriate British Authority within 48 hours of the arrest;

(2) when it is alleged that a member of the British forces has committed an offence for which he has not been arrested, particulars of such alleged offence together with the *procès-verbal* will be sent with all convenient speed to the Appropriate British Authority.

12. The British forces will send an armed escort into any part of Egypt for the purpose of taking over and escorting to a British camp,

any member of the British forces arrested under the provisions of Articles 10 and 11 hereof.

13.—(a) The Egyptian Government undertakes at the request of the Appropriate British Authority to take all reasonable steps to secure the attendance of persons amenable to its jurisdiction as witnesses before His Majesty's military tribunals in Egypt (courts-martial, courts of inquiry, committees of adjustment, and boards of officers or other service tribunals) convened and assembled by the Appropriate British Authority;

(b) the Government of the United Kingdom undertakes to take all reasonable steps to secure the attendance of any member of the British forces as a witness at any proceedings before the Egyptian Courts, including the Mixed Courts, courts-martial, disciplinary tribunals, or courts of enquiry, upon application being made to the Appropriate British Authority signed by the appropriate official of the Ministry of Justice or the President of the Tribunal concerned.

14. The Egyptian Government and the Government of the United Kingdom agree that it is desirable that any person, ordered to attend a British military tribunal under Article 13 (a) above and who is accused of any of the following offences, should be amenable to prosecution before the appropriate Egyptian Court, that is to say who:—

- (i) being duly summoned makes default in attending; or
- (ii) refuses to take oath or make a solemn declaration legally required to be taken or made; or
- (iii) refuses to produce any document in his power or control legally required to be produced by him; or
- (iv) refuses when a witness to answer any question to which the tribunal may legally require an answer; or
- (v) is guilty of contempt of the tribunal by using insulting or threatening language or by causing interruption or disturbance in the proceedings of such tribunal; or
- (vi) when examined on oath or solemn declaration before the tribunal wilfully gives false evidence.

Similarly it is desirable that a person ordered to attend an Egyptian tribunal under Article 13 (b) above who commits any of the offences specified above, shall be amenable to prosecution before the appropriate British military tribunal.

The exact manner and the extent, however, to which effect can be given to the two preceding paragraphs of this article depends upon the laws of the United Kingdom and of Egypt respectively, and the two Governments agree that there shall be further discussion at a later date in regard to this matter.

15. Each Government shall pay to the other on demand all reasonable expenses incurred in execution of the provisions of Articles 8, 9, 10 (a), 13 (a), and 13 (b) hereof.

16. The privileges and immunities provided for in the present Convention only apply to persons stationed with or attached to those forces of His Majesty who are present in Egypt in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Alliance and as further defined in Article 1 above.

As regards military and air force personnel, the limitations as to numbers provided for in the said Treaty (without prejudice to the provisions of Article 7 thereof) apply.

In witness whereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries being duly authorized to this effect by their respective Governments have signed the present agreement and affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London in duplicate this 26th day of August, 1936.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

(L.S.) ANTHONY EDEN.

For the Egyptian Government:

(L.S.) MOUSTAPHA EL-NAHAS.

C. AMERICA

I. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

An important section of President Roosevelt's annual Message to Congress on January 3, 1936, dealt with foreign affairs and contrasted the 'good neighbour' policy of the United States with the signs of 'growing ill-will, of marked trends towards aggression, of increasing armaments, of shortened tempers' which were increasingly obvious in other parts of the world. In face of this situation, the United States and the rest of the Americas could, he declared,

'play but one role: through a well-ordered neutrality, to do naught to encourage the contest; through adequate defence, to save ourselves from embroilment and attack; and through example and all legitimate encouragement and assistance, to persuade other nations to return to the ways of peace and goodwill.'¹

On February 29, 1936, the expiring Neutrality Legislation of August 31, 1935, was amended and extended by a Joint Resolution of Congress.² Further amendments came into force and the legislation was extended for a further period on May 1, 1937.

On August 14, 1936, the President delivered an important address at Chautauqua, New York, on the foreign relations of the United States and war,³ in which he reiterated in impressive terms the 'good neighbour' policy. A month later before the Good Neighbour League in New York, the Secretary of State, Mr. Cordell Hull, dealt with the foreign and trade relations of the United States.⁴ An event during the year to which both the President and Mr. Cordell Hull referred was the signature on March 2, 1936, of a treaty between the United States and Panama replacing the Hay-Varilla treaty of 1903, and safeguarding the rights of the former in the protection and operation of the Panama Canal. Though approved by Panama, the Treaty had in the autumn of 1937 not yet been ratified by the United States. Its text must be left, therefore, for inclusion in a subsequent volume.

On December 1, 1936, the Inter-American Peace Conference, called together on the initiative of President Roosevelt, opened in Buenos Aires and was attended both by the President and the Secretary of State, who made important speeches.⁵

1. SPEECH BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, AUGUST 14, 1936⁶

... A few days ago I was asked what the subject of this talk would be; and I replied that for two good reasons I wanted to discuss the

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 219.

² See *Documents* for 1935, vol. ii, p. 289.

³ See below, this page.

⁴ See below, p. 510

⁵ See below, pp. 563, 568, 594.

⁶ At Chautauqua, N.Y. U.S. State Department, Press Releases No. 360, August 22, 1936.

subject of peace: First, because it is eminently appropriate in Chautauqua and, secondly, because in the hurly-burly of domestic politics it is important that our people should not overlook problems and issues which, though they lie beyond our borders, may, and probably will, have a vital influence on the United States of the future.

Many who have visited me in Washington in the past few months may have been surprised when I have told them that personally, and because of my own daily contacts with all manner of difficult situations, I am more concerned and less cheerful about international world conditions than about our immediate domestic prospects.

I say this to you not as a confirmed pessimist but as one who still hopes that envy, hatred, and malice among nations have reached their peak and will be succeeded by a new tide of peace and goodwill—I say this as one who has participated in many of the decisions of peace and war before, during, and after the World War; one who has travelled much and one who has spent a goodly portion of every twenty-four hours in the study of foreign relations.

Long before I returned to Washington as President of the United States, I had made up my mind that, pending what might be called a more opportune moment on other continents, the United States could best serve the cause of a peaceful humanity by setting an example. That was why on March 4, 1933, I made the following declaration:

‘In the field of world policy I would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbour—the neighbour who resolutely respects himself and because he does so, respects the rights of others—the neighbour who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbours.’

This declaration represents my purpose: but it represents more than a purpose, for it stands for a practice. To a measurable degree it has succeeded; the whole world now knows that the United States cherishes no predatory ambitions. We are strong: but less powerful nations know that they need not fear our strength. We seek no conquest: we stand for peace.

In the whole of the western hemisphere our good neighbour policy has produced results that are especially heartening.

The noblest monument to peace and to neighbourly economic and social friendship in all the world is not a monument in bronze or stone, but the boundary which unites the United States and Canada—3,000 miles of friendship with no barbed wire, no gun or soldier, and no passport on the whole frontier.

Mutual trust made that frontier—to extend the same sort of mutual trust throughout the Americas was our aim.

The American Republics to the south of us have been ready always to co-operate with the United States on a basis of equality and mutual respect, but before we inaugurated the good neighbour policy there was among them resentment and fear, because certain Administrations in Washington had slighted their national pride and their sovereign rights.

In pursuance of the good neighbour policy, and because in my younger days I had learnt many lessons in the hard school of experience, I stated that the United States was opposed definitely to armed intervention.

We have negotiated a Pan-American Convention embodying the principle of non-intervention. We have abandoned the Platt Amendment which gave us the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cuba.¹ We have withdrawn American marines from Haiti. We have signed a new Treaty which places our relations with Panama on a mutually satisfactory basis.² We have undertaken a series of trade agreements with other American countries to our mutual commercial profit. At the request of two neighbouring Republics, I hope to give assistance in the final settlement of the last serious boundary dispute between any of the American nations.

Throughout the Americas the spirit of the good neighbour is a practical and living fact. The twenty-one American Republics are not only living together in friendship and in peace; they are united in the determination so to remain.

To give substance to this determination a conference will meet on December 1, 1936, at the Capitol of our great southern neighbour, Argentina, and it is, I know, the hope of all Chiefs of State of the Americas that this will result in measures which will banish wars for ever from this vast portion of the earth.³

Peace, like charity, begins at home; that is why we have begun at home. But peace in the western world is not all that we seek.

It is our hope that knowledge of the practical application of the good neighbour policy in this hemisphere will be borne home to our neighbours across the seas.

For ourselves we are on good terms with them—terms in most cases of straightforward friendship, of peaceful understanding.

But, of necessity, we are deeply concerned about tendencies of recent years among many of the nations of other continents. It is a

¹ See *Documents* for 1934, p. 443.

² In October 1937 this treaty had not yet been ratified by the United States.

³ See below, p. 544.

bitter experience to us when the spirit of agreements to which we are a party is not lived up to. It is an even more bitter experience for the whole company of nations to witness not only the spirit but the letter of international agreements violated with impunity and without regard to the simple principles of honour. Permanent friendships between nations as between men can be sustained only by scrupulous respect for the pledged word.

In spite of all this we have sought steadfastly to assist international movements to prevent war. We co-operated to the bitter end—and it was a bitter end—in the work of the General Disarmament Conference. When it failed we sought a separate treaty to deal with the manufacture of arms and the international traffic in arms. That proposal also came to nothing. We participated—again to the bitter end—in a Conference to continue naval limitation, and when it became evident that no general treaty could be signed because of the objections of other nations, we concluded with Great Britain and France a conditional Treaty of qualitative limitation which, much to my regret, already shows signs of ineffectiveness.¹

We shun political commitments which might entangle us in foreign wars; we avoid connexion with the political activities of the League of Nations; but I am glad to say that we have co-operated wholeheartedly in the social and humanitarian work at Geneva. Thus we are a part of the world effort to control traffic in narcotics, to improve international health, to help child welfare, to eliminate double taxation, and to better working conditions and labouring hours throughout the world.

We are not isolationists except in so far as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war. Yet we must remember that so long as war exists on earth there will be some danger that even the nation which most ardently desires peace may be drawn into war.

I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded. I have seen men coughing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed. I have seen two hundred limping, exhausted men come out of [the] line—the survivors of a regiment of one thousand that went forward forty-eight hours before. I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war.

I have passed unnumbered hours, I shall pass unnumbered hours thinking and planning how war may be kept from this nation.

I wish I could keep war from all nations; but that is beyond my power. I can at least make certain that no act of the United States

¹ See below, p. 598.

helps to produce or to promote war. I can at least make clear that the conscience of America revolts against war and that any nation which provokes war forfeits the sympathy of the people of the United States.

Many causes produce war. There are ancient hatreds, turbulent frontiers, the legacy of 'old, forgotten, far-off things, and battles long ago'. There are new-born fanaticisms, convictions on the part of certain peoples that they have become the unique depositories of ultimate truth and right.

A dark old world was devastated by wars between conflicting religions. A dark modern world faces wars between conflicting economic and political fanaticisms in which are intertwined race hatreds. To bring it home, it is as if, within the territorial limits of the United States, forty-eight nations with forty-eight forms of government, forty-eight customs barriers, forty-eight languages, and forty-eight eternal and different verities, were spending their time and their substance in a frenzy of effort to make themselves strong enough to conquer their neighbours or strong enough to defend themselves against their neighbours.

In one field, that of economic barriers, the American policy may be, I hope, of some assistance in discouraging the economic source of war and, therefore, a contribution towards the peace of the world. The trade agreements which we are making are not only finding outlets for the products of American fields and American factories but are also pointing the way to the elimination of embargoes, quotas, and other devices which place such pressure on nations not possessing great natural resources that to them the price of peace seems less terrible than the price of war.

We do not maintain that a more liberal international trade will stop war, but we fear that without a more liberal international trade war is a natural sequence.

The Congress of the United States has given me certain authority to provide safeguards of American neutrality in case of war.¹

The President of the United States, who, under our Constitution, is vested with primary authority to conduct our international relations, thus has been given new weapons with which to maintain our neutrality.

Nevertheless—and I speak from a long experience—the effective maintenance of American neutrality depends to-day, as in the past, on the wisdom and determination of whoever at the moment occupy the offices of President and Secretary of State.

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. ii, pp. 263–95.

It is clear that our present policy and the measures passed by the Congress would, in the event of a war on some other continent, reduce war profits which would otherwise accrue to American citizens. Industrial and agricultural production for a war market may give immense fortunes to a few men; for the nation as a whole it produces disaster. It was the prospect of war profits that made our farmers in the west plough up prairie land that should never have been ploughed, but should have been left for grazing cattle. To-day we are reaping the harvest of those war profits in the dust storms which have devastated those war-ploughed areas.

It was the prospect of war profits that caused the extension of monopoly and unjustified expansion of industry, and a price level so high that the normal relationship between debtor and creditor was destroyed.

Nevertheless, if war should break out again in another continent, let us not blink the fact that we would find in this country thousands of Americans who, seeking immediate riches—fools' gold—would attempt to break down or evade our neutrality.

They would tell you—and, unfortunately, their views would get wide publicity—that, if they could produce and ship this and that and the other article to belligerent nations, the unemployed of America would all find work. They would tell you that if they could extend credit to warring nations, that credit would be used in the United States to build homes and factories and pay our debts. They would tell you that America once more would capture the trade of the world.

It would be hard to resist that clamour; it would be hard for many Americans, I fear, to look beyond—to realize the inevitable penalties, the inevitable day of reckoning that comes from a false prosperity. To resist the clamour of that greed, if war should come, would require the unswerving support of all Americans who love peace.

If we face the choice of profits or peace, the nation will answer—must answer—'we choose peace'. It is the duty of all of us to encourage such a body of public opinion in this country that the answer will be clear and for all practical purposes unanimous.

With that wise and experienced man who is our Secretary of State, whose statesmanship has met with such wide approval, I have thought and worked long and hard on the problem of keeping the United States at peace. But all the wisdom of America is not to be found in the White House or in the Department of State; we need the meditation, the prayer, and the positive support of the people of America who go along with us in seeking peace.

No matter how well we are supported by neutrality legislation, we

must remember that no laws can be provided to cover every contingency, for it is impossible to imagine how every future event may shape itself. In spite of every possible forethought, international relations involve of necessity a vast uncharted area. In that area safe sailing will depend on the knowledge and the experience and the wisdom of those who direct our foreign policy. Peace will depend on their day-to-day decisions.

At this late date, with the wisdom which is so easy after the event and so difficult before the event, we find it possible to trace the tragic series of small decisions which led Europe into the Great War in 1914 and eventually engulfed us and many other nations.

We can keep out of war if those who watch and decide have a sufficiently detailed understanding of international affairs to make certain that the small decisions of each day do not lead toward war and if, at the same time, they possess the courage to say 'no' to those who selfishly or unwisely would let us go to war.

Of all the nations of the world to-day we are in many ways most singularly blessed. Our closest neighbours are good neighbours. If there are remoter nations that wish us not good but ill, they know that we are strong; they know that we can and will defend ourselves and defend our neighbourhood.

We seek to dominate no other nation. We ask no territorial expansion. We oppose imperialism. We desire reduction in world armaments.

We believe in democracy; we believe in freedom; we believe in peace. We offer to every nation of the world the handclasp of the good neighbour. Let those who wish our friendship look us in the eye and take our hand.

2. SPEECH BY MR. CORDELL HULL, SECRETARY OF STATE, SEPTEMBER 15, 1936¹

Our foreign relations are largely shaped by the physical geography of our country, the characteristics of our people, and our historical experience. Those who are in charge of the conduct of foreign policy must suit their actions to these underlying facts with due regard to the shifting circumstances of the times. This is particularly true in a democracy, where even in the short run the policies of the government must rest upon the support of the people.

We inhabit a large country which provides the basis for satisfactory and improving conditions of life. We do not seek or threaten

¹ Before the Good Neighbour League in New York. *International Conciliation*, No. 323, October 1936.

the territory or possessions of others. Great oceans lie between us and the powers of Asia and Europe. Though these are now crossed much more quickly and easily than they used to be, they still enable us to feel somewhat protected against physical impacts from abroad.

We are a numerous, strong, and active people. We have lived and developed in deep traditions of tolerance, of neighbourly friendliness, personal freedom, and of self-government. We have had long training in the settlement of differences of opinion and interest among ourselves by discussion and compromise. The winds of doctrine that are blowing so violently in many other lands are moderated here in our democratic atmosphere and tradition.

Our contribution must be in the spirit of our own situation and conceptions. It lies in the willingness to be friends but not allies. We wish extensive and mutually beneficial trade relations. We have the impulse to multiply our personal contacts as shown by the constant American travel abroad. We would share and exchange the gifts which art, the stage, the classroom, and the scientists' and thinkers' study contribute to heighten life and understanding; we have led the world in promoting this sort of interchange among students, teachers, and artists. Our wish that natural human contacts be deeply and fully realized is shown by the great number of international conferences in which we participate, both private and inter-governmental. In such ways we would have our relations grow.

In deciding upon the character of our political relations with the outside world we naturally take into account the conditions prevailing there. These, to-day, are not tranquil or secure; but on the contrary in many countries are excited and haunted by mutual dread. In less than twenty years events have occurred that have taken away from international agreements their force and reliability as a basis of relations between nations. There appears to have been a great failure of the spirit and out of this has come a many-sided combat of national ambitions, dogmas, and fears.

In many lands the whole national energy has been organized to support absolute aims, far-reaching in character but vaguely defined. These flare like a distant fire in the hills and no one can be sure as to what they mean. There is an increasing acceptance of the idea that the end justifies all means. Under these conditions the individual who questions either means or end is frightened or crushed. For he encounters two controlling rules, compulsory subordination to autocratic will, and the ruthless pressure of might. The result is dread and growing confusion.

Behind this lies the knowledge that laboratories and shops are

producing instruments which can blow away human beings as though they were mites in a thunderstorm ; and these instruments have been placed in the hands of an increasing number of young men whom their leaders dedicate to the horrors of war. When Foreign Offices engage in discussion with each other to-day, they have an inescapable vision of men living in concrete chambers below the earth and concrete and steel forts and tanks upon the earth, and operating destructive machines above the earth. They have strained and striven in many negotiations since the war to dispel that vision, but it appears to grow clearer and clearer.

The world waits. You may be sure that in most human hearts there is the steady murmur of prayer that life need not be yielded up in battle and that there may be peace, at least in our time.

It is in these circumstances we must shape our foreign relations. It is also these circumstances that present to us the problem of seeking to achieve a change in the dominant trend that is so full of menace.

I find, as I review the line of foreign policy we have followed, that we come close to Thomas Jefferson's expression—'peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none'. It is dangerous to take liberties with the great words of a great man, but I would add—settlement of disputes by peaceful means, renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy.

I think that the term 'good neighbour' is an apt description of that policy. We have tried to give full meaning to that term. The good neighbour in any community minds his own essential business and does not wilfully disturb the business of others. He mends his fences but does not put up spite fences. He firmly expects that others will not seek to disturb his affairs or dictate to him.

He is tolerant, but his toleration does not include those who would introduce discord from elsewhere. He observes his agreements to the utmost of his ability ; he adjusts by friendly methods any troubles that arise ; he mingles freely in the give and take of life and concerns himself with the community welfare.

All of this is in contrast with the hermit who isolates himself, who ignores the community, and in his resistance to change, decays in a mean and bitter isolation. But the role of the good neighbour is a positive and active one which calls upon the energies, the friendliness, and the self-restraint of man or nation.

In affairs between nations the neighbourliness obviously is less direct than between individuals in the local community. Its expression takes the form of just and fair dealings, without encroachment upon the rights of others, or oppression of the weak or envy of the

more fortunate. It contemplates liberal economic relations on the basis of mutual benefit, observance of law and respect for agreements, and reliance upon peaceful processes when controversies arise.

In the everyday work of the Department of State dealing with critical issues, we have resolutely pursued this course.

We have tried to bring together American opinion and opinion in other countries in a common determination against the use of force for the settlement of disputes or for other national purposes. In that connexion we have sought to maintain the vitality of the international agreement to renounce war which was signed by virtually all countries of the world when Mr. Kellogg was Secretary of State. But strong nations have chosen to proceed in disregard of that agreement, and this basis for international trust has thus been greatly impaired. We have tried to soften quarrels between other countries when they have arisen.

At times there has been criticism because we would not depart from our traditional policy and join with other governments in collective arrangements carrying the obligation of employing force, if necessary, in case disputes between other countries brought them into war. That responsibility, carrying direct participation in the political relations of the whole of the world outside, we cannot accept, eager as we are to support means for the prevention of war. For current experience indicates how uncertain is the possibility that we, by our action, could vitally influence the policies or activities of other countries from which war might come. It is for the statesmen to continue their effort to effect security by new agreements which will prove more durable than those that have been broken. This Government would welcome that achievement. It would be like full light overcoming dense darkness. It is difficult to see how responsible governments can refrain from pushing compromise to its utmost limits to accomplish that result.

Of late we have increased our defence forces substantially. This has appeared essential in the face of the universal increase of armaments elsewhere and the disturbed conditions to which I have alluded. We would not serve the cause of peace by living in the world to-day without adequate powers of self-defence. We must be sure that in our desire for peace we will not appear to any other country weak and unable to resist the imposition of force or to protect our just rights. At the same time I would make clear with the utmost emphasis that we stand ready to participate in all attempts to limit armaments by mutual accord and await the day when this may be realized.

I need say little of our relations with our great neighbour Canada. The American people and the Canadian people have lived in unbroken friendship. A new index of that friendship is the Trade Agreement signed last year. I have had to reckon with a number of attacks on this or that schedule of the Agreement. In virtually every instance I have found, and I do not wish to be partisan in this remark, that the criticism represents misjudgment or distortion of the facts. I have watched the malicious attempts of some to juggle a few minor figures in the trade returns in such a way as to prejudice the minds of particular groups against an Agreement which was the first step taken within the last century to enable the American and Canadian peoples to obtain greater mutual benefit from their work and trade.

We have confirmed our good neighbour policy by our actions in dealing with the American Republics to the south of us. This Administration has made it clear that it would not intervene in any of those Republics. It has endorsed this principle by signing at the Montevideo Conference the Inter-American Convention on the rights and duties of States;¹ it has abrogated the Platt Amendment contained in our treaty with Cuba;² it has withdrawn the American occupying forces from Haiti; it has negotiated new treaties with Panama, which, while fully safeguarding our rights to protect and operate the Canal, eliminate the rights we previously possessed to interfere in that Republic.

In all this we have shown that we have no wish to dictate to other countries, that we recognize equality of nations and that we believe in the possibility of full co-operation between nations. Later this year there will be held in Argentina a Conference between the American Republics, which has been warmly welcomed, and there is general confidence that further ways can be found to assure the maintenance of peace on this continent.³

Certainly the economic troubles that have pressed so hard on the world during these last few years are one of the main causes of the disturbance of spirit and upset of relations that have taken place. This Government has taken the lead in trying to bring about changes in the international trade situation which would improve conditions everywhere.

The needs of our own domestic situation have coincided completely with this undertaking. By 1933 a serious emergency had arisen in our trade relationships with other countries. We had repeatedly

¹ See *Documents* for 1933, p. 482.

² See *Documents* for 1934, p. 443.

³ See below, p. 544.

increased the barriers to the entry of foreign products into this country, and the sale of American goods abroad was being subjected to increasingly drastic retaliation and restriction on the part of other governments. In addition, we had most substantial investments in foreign countries which our previous policy had thrown into great jeopardy. Many branches of American agriculture and industry required a revival of our trade with other countries if they were to escape continued depression, idleness of resources, and unemployment. The other countries had no smaller need.

Under the authority conferred by the Trade Agreements Act of 1934, we have entered into numerous commercial agreements whereby most carefully selected and limited reductions have been made in our own tariffs. In return, we have secured reductions of the barriers imposed against American goods by other countries and assurance of various kinds against the operation of the trade control systems that have come into existence elsewhere. The vast decline in our foreign trade has ceased. A substantial and steady increase is being recorded. During 1935 our sales abroad exceeded those of 1932, the lowest year, by \$671,000,000. The trade records of 1936 to date indicate that this figure will be surpassed. This has been an extremely wholesome factor in the improvement in our own conditions and in building up the world's purchasing power. Our imports of foreign goods have similarly increased, reflecting chiefly the enlarged American demand for raw materials, arising from the improvement of productive activity in the United States and our increased purchasing power.

In the negotiation of these agreements the principle of equality has been maintained in the belief that trade conducted on this basis brings the greatest economic benefit, has the greatest possibilities of expansion, and involves the least conflict. We are vigorously striving to secure similar equality of treatment on the part of other countries with which we have negotiated. In connexion with this programme, we have refused to be drawn into a system of bilateral balancing between pairs of countries, because this system is comparatively sterile and requires direct Government management of international trade, which soon extends to management of domestic production. At the same time we have been alert to the problem of protecting our trade interests against the incidental disadvantages that we might suffer from the practice of such a system by other countries.

The trade policy this country is pursuing fits well into our domestic economic situation and policies. I am willing to leave this judgment to the arbitration of facts. Certainly by now it should be clear, even to those engaged in industries that have been the most direct

beneficiaries of excessive tariffs, that this alone will not bring them prosperity. It should also be apparent that they can thrive only when other branches of production thrive, including those that habitually dispose of a large part of their products in foreign markets.

The rebuilding of international trade offers a splendid opportunity for governments to improve the conditions of their people and to assure them the necessary means of acquiring the essentials of well-being and the raw materials for production. If this result can be achieved, one of the fertile causes of dissension and possible war would be weakened or removed. The plans and hopes of millions of individuals now appear to have no place except in military formation. An improvement of economic conditions would guarantee another place. Advancement in this direction need not await a solution of all political difficulties. Terms have been found by which advance can be made even in the face of the monetary uncertainty which still exists. A great opportunity awaits great leadership.

In trade interchange baleful elements enter particularly the trade in arms, ammunition, and implements of war. This trade is at present mainly incidental to the preparation for war. However, in some times and circumstances, it may itself be an element in stimulating or provoking war. Therefore, we have established a system requiring full disclosure regarding American trade in this field by placing those engaged in it under a licence plan. Whether and to what extent it may be wise to regulate or restrict such trade between ourselves and other nations, for reasons other than the protection of military secrets, is a matter on which we are constantly weighing our current experience. Our existing legal authority is limited. But, as in the present Spanish situation, we assert our influence to the utmost to prevent arms shipped from this country from thwarting national or international efforts to maintain peace or end conflict. But action of that character cannot best be governed by inflexible rule, for, to a large extent, it must be determined in the light of the facts and circumstances of each situation. This much is certain—we are always ready to discourage to the utmost the traffic in arms when required in the interest of peace.

Up to this point I have dealt with the principles of our policies and relationships with other countries when peace prevails. Lately, after a lapse of almost twenty years, we have been called upon to consider with great seriousness the question of what these relationships should be if war were unhappily to occur again among the other great countries of the world. We must squarely face the fact that to stay clear of a widespread major war will require great vigilance, poise, and

careful judgment in dealing with such interferences with our peaceful rights and activities as may take place.

Legislation recently passed provides some of the main essentials in a wise anticipatory policy. I have in mind the resolutions of Congress of 1935 and 1936 which, in addition to providing for the licensing of all imports and exports of arms, ammunition, and implements of war, prohibit their shipment to belligerent nations.¹ Those same resolutions prohibit the flotation of loans and the establishment of credits in our market by belligerent countries and otherwise strengthen our existing neutrality laws. On some of these matters the Congress by law has modified policies formerly pursued by this Government in times of war abroad. There are other vital aspects of this problem which will continue to receive the careful attention and study of the Department of State.

The problems arising during a period of neutrality are so great that they constantly renew in one the determination to spare no reasonable effort to play a full part in the encouragement of the maintenance of peace. We have sought to demonstrate that we are interested in peace everywhere. Surely this endeavour must continue to command our full abilities if war elsewhere can create such difficulties for us, if it can change for the worse the world in which we must live, if it can threaten the civilization with which all of us are concerned.

I cannot believe that the world has completely changed in mentality and desire since those great decades when the principles of liberty and democracy were extending their reign. I believe that this was a natural evolution of our civilization. I do not believe that with the great and growing facilities for education and for personal development people will permanently abandon their individual liberties and political rights. In my judgment it is not a basic defect of democratic institutions that has led to their decline in so many places, but rather the onset of weariness, fear, and indifference, which can and must be dispelled. These are the heritage of the last war. They must not be permitted to bring on another.

Let me return to a remark that I made in the beginning—that the direction of our foreign policy must be acceptable to the people. Our task is to formulate out of the wishes and wisdom of a popular democracy a sound foreign policy which will ensure peace and favour progress and prosperity. We must be on guard against the hasty, excited impulse, the quick upsurge of passing emotion.

Satisfactory foreign policy must be able to count upon the qualities of patience, of sympathetic understanding, of steady poise, and of

¹ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. ii, pp. 263-95.

assured inner strength among the people. In the past crises of our history Americans have shown that they possess these qualities in full measure. I do not doubt that they are still present as a firm support. Against the walls of our democratic methods and institutions storms from elsewhere beat violently. Let us avoid flabbiness of spirit, weakness of body, grave dissent within our own numbers, and we shall have nothing to fear from these storms. We must keep before us the knowledge that our democracy was builded on the solid qualities of hardihood, individual self-reliance, full willingness to put general welfare above personal interest in any great matter of national interest, forbearance in every direction, and abiding patriotism. They alone can furnish the necessary assurance that our foreign policy and our foreign relations will continue to bring peace with the whole world and will not fail in that leadership appropriate to a country as great as ours.

II. SOUTH AMERICA

THE (CHACO) DISPUTE BETWEEN BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY¹

The Chaco question first came before the Council of the League of Nations in December 1928. The frontier between Bolivia and Paraguay had never been fixed since they became independent States at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The first of the serious incidents occurred in February 1927, followed by others in December 1928. In July 1932 a Bolivian detachment occupied a fort held by a Paraguayan garrison which was driven out. Paraguay broke off negotiations, denouncing the 'aggressive designs of Bolivia', and took military measures. Finally, in May 1933 Paraguay declared herself in a state of war with Bolivia.

The main historical and other facts of the dispute, together with the efforts at conciliation and the action taken by the League Council and the Assembly from December 1928 to November 1934, are set out below in the report drawn up by the Committee of the Assembly in accordance with Article 15, paragraph 4 of the League Covenant, and adopted on November 24, 1934.²

This also contained the Assembly's recommendations for the settlement of the dispute, dealt with the question of the Arms Embargo applied in 1934 and the constitution of an Advisory Committee to follow the situation. The fundamental difficulties of the problem were summed up as follows:

'Each of the Parties considers that in this conflict it has defended, first in diplomatic negotiations and conferences, then by force of arms, undoubted rights against alleged rights claimed by the other Party. They each proclaim severally that there is no *res nullius* in South America, and that they are consequently occupying and defending their

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part VI (ii).

See below, p. 519.

own territory, into which the adverse Party has made illegal incursions and then committed definite acts of aggression which have degenerated into open acts of hostility.⁷

On March 11, 1935, the representatives of Argentina and Chile on the Advisory Committee suggested that an approach should be made to Bolivia and Paraguay by their neighbours, acting in a mediatory capacity, and on May 11 such a group was constituted in Buenos Aires consisting of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and the United States. The Bolivian and Paraguayan Foreign Ministers accepted their invitation to come to Buenos Aires to open direct negotiations with the assistance of the mediators. These negotiations resulted on June 12, 1935, in the signature of a Protocol¹ putting an end to the state of war between the two countries and entrusting to the President of the Argentine Republic the task of convening a Peace Conference. The Protocol was based on the recommendations contained in the League Assembly's Report of November, 1934, with certain important modifications intended as concessions to Paraguay. The Protocol was ratified by Paraguay on June 20 and by Bolivia on June 21 when it became effective.

The Peace Conference opened on July 1 in Buenos Aires and, the Neutral Military Commission having fixed without difficulty a line of separation, the demobilization of the armies began on July 3. On October 25 the Conference was able to declare that the required measures of security had all been put into effect and that, in consequence, the state of war between Paraguay and Bolivia had come to an end.² On January 21, 1936, a Protocol was signed containing provisions for the repatriation of prisoners.

Meanwhile, the Peace Conference had met with serious difficulties in discussing the question of territorial ownership. The two delegations became more and more intransigent and no progress was made.

On January 24 and May 17, 1936, Paraguay and Bolivia experienced revolutions which resulted in the establishment of militaristic régimes. In spite of this an agreement for the renewal of diplomatic negotiations, which was not, however, followed by action, was solemnly announced on August 25.

In the autumn of 1936 relations became strained once more, armies were increased and incidents began to occur again. On January 9, 1937, however, an agreement was signed for the continuance of neutral supervision of the line between the two armies and the maintenance of the military *status quo*. The fundamental problem remained unsettled as in 1927.

1. REPORT AS PROVIDED FOR UNDER ARTICLE 15, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE COVENANT, DRAWN UP BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE LEAGUE ASSEMBLY, AND ADOPTED BY THE ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 24, 1934³

The Assembly, having regard to the failure of the efforts which, under Article 15, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, it was its duty to make in order to bring about the settlement of the dispute submitted to it under paragraph 9 of the same Article, adopts the following

¹ See below, p. 538.

² See below, p. 542.

³ *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement, No. 132, pp. 43-51.

report in accordance with paragraph 4 of that Article so as to make known the facts of the dispute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.

PART I. FACTS OF THE DISPUTE

In view of the copious material that has been received and published by the League of Nations since the Chaco question first came before the Council in December 1928, and having regard in particular to the most recent documents, notably the report of the Commission despatched to the scene of hostilities by the Council, the observations of the Parties on that report and the statement of their cases which they laid before the Assembly after the Bolivian Government had invoked Article 15 of the Covenant, the Assembly may confine itself to a brief summary of the facts of the dispute.

The summary, which is of an historical character, is merely a statement of facts which can neither exhaust the subject nor rule out any other documentary evidence or precedents relating to the rights of the Parties.

1. Bolivia and Paraguay have never fixed the frontier between them since they became independent States at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

2. Between the centres of population subject to the Spanish Crown in the Andine regions of Upper Peru and those in the basin of the River Plate, especially along the River Paraguay, there was in the colonial period an area largely unexplored, which, apart from a few settlements—frequently temporary—continued to be inhabited by Indian tribes, many of them unsubjugated, even after the emancipation of the Spanish colonies.

3. In the nineteenth and especially in the twentieth century, the unexplored areas west of the River Paraguay shrank considerably owing to the Paraguayan occupation, which spread westwards and northwards, and to the Bolivian occupation, which spread eastwards and southwards towards the River Paraguay.

4. Bolivia, relying upon the principle of the *uti possidetis juris* of 1810 and appealing to her status as successor to the Royal Audiencia of Charcas, declares that she has a right to the territory of the Chaco.

5. Paraguay argues from her status as successor to the old colonial province of Paraguay, and considers that the Chaco belongs to her on the basis of the *uti possidetis*, both *de jure* and *de facto*.

6. By the frontier treaty concluded between the Argentine Republic and Paraguay in 1876, the territory lying between the main arm of the River Pilcomayo and Bahía Negra was regarded as being

divided into two parts ; the first lying between Bahía Negra and the River Verde and the second between the River Verde and the main arm of the River Pilcomayo. The Argentine Government finally renounced all claim to or right over the first part. The question of ownership of or right to the second part was submitted to the definite decision of an arbitration. In 1878 the President of the United States of America, as the arbitrator chosen by the two Contracting Parties, awarded the territory in question to Paraguay.

7. Bolivia maintains that there was *res inter alios acta* and that both Parties reserved the rights which she might claim.

8. In 1879 Bolivia and Paraguay signed a frontier treaty. This treaty was approved by the National Convention of Bolivia in 1881 with a reservation providing that negotiations should take place for the acquisition by Bolivia of one or more ports on the eastern bank of the River Pilcomayo to the south of the marshes ; it was only in 1886, after the Paraguayan Government had declared that it had lapsed, that it was ratified without reservation by the Bolivian Congress.

9. A second frontier treaty was signed in 1887. In 1888 Paraguay militarily occupied Bahía Negra (Puerto Pacheco). The treaty was not ratified by Bolivia until after the expiry of the specified period and Paraguay did not ratify it at all.

10. The third frontier treaty, which was signed in 1894, was ratified neither by Bolivia nor by Paraguay.

11. On January 12, 1907, an agreement was signed by Bolivia and Paraguay which contained provisions both for a new compromise solution of the frontier question and for a settlement of the question of the *status quo* of the possessions of the two countries in the Chaco.

The compromise solution consisted in the submission to the President of the Argentine Republic, for arbitration, of the 'zone between parallel 20° 30' and the line claimed on the north by Paraguay ; within the territory between Greenwich meridians 61° 30' and 62°'. This limited arbitration settlement was to be signed subsequently by plenipotentiaries.

Pending the execution of the agreement, the two Parties 'undertook to refrain from making any change and from pushing forward existing possessions', as at the moment of signature. The *status quo* was to be loyally observed subject to the guarantee of the Argentine Government.

12. The regulations for arbitration on a limited scale, as provided in the Protocol of 1907, remained without result. In 1913 a Protocol was signed under which the Parties undertook to negotiate a definitive boundary treaty within two years. Provision was made for a direct settlement taking into account the commercial interests of the

two countries as a first alternative. If the Parties were unable to agree on such a settlement, they were to submit the frontier problem to legal arbitration.

Pending the achievement of a direct agreement or alternatively an arbitral decision, the *status quo*, for which the Agreement of January 12, 1907, provided, was to remain in force, the two Parties stating that there was no change in their respective positions as at that date.

As the provisions of the 1913 Agreement involved modifications in the Agreement of January 12, 1907, the Contracting Parties agreed to declare the latter null and void.

13. The time-limit of two years provided by the 1913 Protocol for the negotiation of a frontier treaty proved to be too short. In 1915, the 1913 Protocol was extended to 1916. The time-limit for the conclusion of the negotiations was subsequently extended on three further occasions, in 1916, 1917, and 1918.

14. Lastly, there was no provision either for a direct agreement or for arbitration in the event of direct agreement proving impossible: but the obligation with regard to the *status quo* remained in force, and this obligation not only failed to provide a *modus vivendi* which would bring appeasement, but also proved to be a source of new controversy and mutual recriminations.

15. So far as Paraguay was concerned, the lines of the *status quo* settlement remained those which limited the zone to be submitted to arbitration under the 1907 Agreement; and there was consequently a '*status quo* zone', particularly to the west, between meridians 61° 30' and 62°, into which the forces of the two countries were not entitled to penetrate. But Bolivia successively advanced her posts to within the region of meridian 60°, thus penetrating (according to the contention of Paraguay) 'into a territory indisputably subject to Paraguayan jurisdiction, in violation of the territorial sovereignty of Paraguay'.

16. For Bolivia, 'the *status quo* line of the 1907 Protocol was not to be confused with the lines of the arbitration zone indicated in the same Agreement, which was declared null and void in 1913', and Paraguay, 'by constructing railways, granting numerous concessions, and establishing military posts', had not respected the *status quo*.

17. The first of the serious incidents caused by the advance of the military positions into the heart of the Chaco took place in February-March 1927 (capture of a Paraguayan patrol at the Bolivian fort of Sorpresa; death of the officer commanding the patrol).

18. At the Conference between Bolivia and Paraguay at Buenos Aires in the period September 1927-July 1928 no agreement was

reached either on the question of the *status quo* or on that of the fundamental settlement.

19. In December 1928 further incidents of a very serious character occurred between the Bolivian and the Paraguayan forces, and these for the first time drew the attention of the Council of the League to the Chaco problem. The latter immediately endeavoured to secure the cessation of hostilities and an agreement upon a procedure for the pacific settlement of the incidents.

20. In compliance with the suggestions of the Council, Bolivia accepted (as Paraguay had also done) the good offices of the American International Conference of Conciliation and Arbitration which was at the moment meeting in Washington. The Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation appointed by that Conference succeeded, in September 1929, in settling by conciliation the incidents of the previous year. In accordance with the Commission's resolution, the state of things which existed prior to December 5, 1928, was re-established through the restoration of the buildings of Fort Vanguardia by Paraguay and the abandonment of Fort Boquerón by Bolivian troops, no Paraguayan authorities being present. The two Governments did not accept the draft convention of arbitration which the neutral members of the Commission proposed to them for the settlement of the substance of the question.

21. In November 1931 negotiations for the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression, proposed by Bolivia, opened at Washington, with the good offices of the five American countries represented on the Commission of Inquiry and Conciliation of 1929.

22. The negotiations were slow and difficult, and on July 6, 1932, the Paraguayan Government, which on March 15 had denounced to the neutrals 'the aggressive designs of Bolivia', recalled her delegates from the Washington Conferences. The reason given for this withdrawal was the occupation of the Carlos Antonio Lopez Fort by a Bolivian detachment which had driven out the small Paraguayan garrison. This occupation, carried out on June 15, had been verified on the 29th by a Paraguayan patrol which had made contact with the Bolivian detachment.

23. To a request of the neutrals asking Paraguay to send back her delegates to the Conferences and to give full information concerning these incidents, with a view to their settlement, the Paraguayan Government replied that it maintained the withdrawal of its delegation, being unwilling to deal with the Bolivian Government so long as the latter had not given a satisfactory explanation of the incident and made proper reparation for the damage caused.

24. Paraguay did not return to the Washington Conferences and did not accept an investigation by the neutrals into the incidents until after having retaken the Carlos Antonio Lopez Fort on July 15; but it was then Bolivia's turn to protest against 'the attack on a big scale' carried out against her troops on July 15, and to refuse 'investigations which did not settle the question of substance'. Bolivia declared herself tired 'of being eternally on her guard in the Chaco in order to stay the Paraguayan advance. That is why she has resisted with all her force, being resolved to settle, even by arms, a dispute in which she is defending a territory that she considers to be hers historically. She is entitled to the bank of the Río Paraguay'. (Bolivian Government's telegram to the neutrals of August 1, 1932.)

25. Pleading the right to take reprisals after the Paraguayan military operation of July 15, the Bolivians had a few days later taken three Paraguayan forts: Corrales, Toledo, and Boquerón. Despite the efforts made in America and by the Council of the League of Nations, the prospects of peace became more and more remote.

26. Each of the Parties considers that in this conflict it has defended, first in diplomatic negotiations and conferences, then by force of arms, undoubted rights against alleged rights claimed by the other Party. They each proclaim severally that there is no *res nullius* in South America, and that they are consequently occupying and defending their own territory, into which the adverse Party has made illegal incursions and then committed definite acts of aggression which have degenerated into open acts of hostility. Paraguay, in May 1933, declared herself in a state of war with Bolivia.

27. Bolivia then appealed to the Council, being of opinion that her adversary was placing herself outside the terms of the Covenant and was liable to the sanctions provided for in Article 16. The Council, which was dealing with the question on the basis of Article 11, that Article having been invoked in March 1933 by the members of its Committee of Three, felt that in this conflict, since hostilities had already broken out and had been continuing for several months, during which the two Parties had taken part in various efforts to restore peace, its first duty was to secure the cessation of hostilities and the settlement of the dispute.

PART II. THE EFFORTS AT CONCILIATION AND THE ACTION OF THE COUNCIL

After having given an account of the circumstances of the dispute the Assembly considers it desirable to relate briefly the various

attempts at conciliation that have been made in America and the measures taken by the Council.

1. As noted above, the Committee of Neutrals at Washington lent its good offices to the Parties at the time of the first incidents in June 1932.

That Committee endeavoured immediately to bring about a cessation of hostilities and a settlement of the incidents. After having made various suggestions which were not accepted, it decided, in December 1932, to propose to the two Parties a general arrangement for the final settlement of the Chaco question.

2. The efforts of the Committee of Neutrals were supported by the Council of the League of Nations, which, in view of the fact that the Neutrals were then engaged in mediation, was anxious to avoid creating a double jurisdiction which might render their task still more difficult. The Committee of Neutrals also received the support of the other American nations, which, on August 3, 1932, subscribed to a joint declaration, the last paragraph of which provided that they 'will not recognize any territorial arrangement of this controversy which has not been obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of territorial acquisitions which may be obtained through occupation or conquest by force of arms'. Paraguay immediately accepted the principles expressed in that declaration. Bolivia accepted subsequently.

3. Paraguay having protested against the proposal for a settlement made by the Council of Neutrals in December 1932, and having withdrawn her delegation from Washington, a fresh effort was made in America by the States neighbours of the two Parties on the basis of the Agreement signed at Mendoza on February 2, 1933, by the Foreign Ministers of the Argentine and Chile.

4. The Council, which until then had confined its role to the general mission provided for in Article 4, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, had the question referred to it on March 6, 1933, in virtue of Article 11, by the three members of its Committee instructed to follow specially the development of the dispute.

5. Pending the result of the attempt at settlement made by the neighbouring States, the members of the Council concerted together with a view to a possible prohibition of the supply of arms and war material to Bolivia and Paraguay, in accordance with the suggestion made by the United Kingdom and French Governments.

6. When the attempts of the neighbouring States came to an end, the Council, which, in a spirit of international conciliation, had respected and given its support to the steps undertaken in America,

their object being in conformity with that of the Covenant, considered that it ought to take up the question, the League of Nations being the only institution juridically bound to watch over the maintenance of peace and good understanding among its Members.

The Committee of Three submitted to the Council its report of May 20, 1933, concluding with a recommendation that a Commission should be sent to the spot, whose task would be :

- (1) To negotiate, if desirable, any arrangement calculated to promote the execution of the obligation to cease hostilities ;
- (2) To prepare, in consultation with the two Governments concerned, an agreement for arbitration.
- (3) The Commission would be at the Council's disposal and would keep it informed of the course of its activities. It would, at the Council's request, proceed to make an inquiry into all the circumstances of the dispute, including the part which the two Parties had taken therein, and would report to the Council to enable the latter to fulfil the duties imposed upon it by the Covenant of the League of Nations.

7. The representative of Paraguay immediately accepted the report of May 20. The representative of Bolivia having reserved his Government's decision for the time being, the Committee of Three transmitted to both parties, in June 1933, a proposal with a view to the application of the suggestions contained in the said report. That proposal was not accepted.

8. By its report of July 3, 1933, adopted with the concurrence of the Parties, the Council decided that the Commission which it had constituted should leave as soon as possible for South America. Its departure was deferred at the request of the two Parties, who asked that the mandate entrusted to the Commission should be conferred on the neighbouring States.

9. This fresh attempt at conciliation on the part of the neighbouring States having come to an end, the Commission left for America. It proceeded to Asunción, visited the eastern part of the Chaco, and then went on to La Paz. Having been informed of the views of the two Parties, it considered, at the beginning of December 1933, a formula for the final cessation of hostilities and a settlement of the dispute.

10. The Pan-American Conference, which was then in session at Montevideo, endeavoured for its part to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Voicing the unanimous sentiment of the countries represented at the Conference, the President of the Republic of Uruguay

took active steps to induce both Parties to suspend hostilities ; and on December 18 Paraguay proposed an armistice, to begin on the following day and to last eleven days, and the negotiation of conditions of security and peace in a capital of the River Plate, under the auspices of the League of Nations Commission.

11. Bolivia having accepted this proposal, the League Commission summoned the two parties to Montevideo, where the Pan-American Conference decided to give the Commission its full support.

12. Notwithstanding the Commission's efforts, the armistice, which Paraguay would agree to extend only until January 5, ended without the negotiations having proved successful.

13. In its report of January 20, 1934, the Council invited the Commission to resume in conjunction with the Parties the study of all the aspects of the problem and of the practical possibilities of settlement. The draft treaty of peace, which the Commission finally proposed to the two Governments in February 1934, was not accepted.

14. The Commission returned to Geneva to draw up its report to the Council. This report was transmitted to the Council on May 11, 1934, and constitutes a fund of information which will be of great assistance to the Assembly in formulating its opinion.

15. At the session of the Council which opened on May 14, 1934, the United Kingdom representative recalled that, as early as November 1932, the Committee of the Council had been much exercised by the question of the supply of arms and war material to the two Parties, and that in February 1933 the United Kingdom Government, acting in agreement with the French Government, had proposed that such supplies should be prohibited. The Council requested its Committee of Three immediately to resume its examination of the question and to proceed to the indispensable consultations to permit of measures being taken, if necessary, at the next extraordinary session of the Council, which was to meet on May 30.

16. As a result of the consultations thus set on foot, a large number of Governments, both Members of the League and non-Members, took steps to prevent the supplying of arms and war material to the two Parties. On several occasions Bolivia claimed that these measures of prohibition affected her more severely than the other Party.

17. On May 31, 1934, the Bolivian Government requested the Council to apply the procedure provided for under Article 15 of the Covenant. Subsequently, within the period of fourteen days provided for in paragraph 9 of the same Article, the Bolivian Government entered a request that the dispute be referred to the Assembly.

18. In July 1934, continuing the indefatigable efforts which were

being made in America with a view to the restoration of peace, the Governments of the Argentine, the United States of America, and Brazil consulted the two Parties on a new peace formula which had been prepared by the Argentine Foreign Office. When the Assembly met in September, the only one of the three mediating Governments which was a Member of the League considered it its duty to report that this attempt had not succeeded. The Bolivian delegation subsequently confirmed this statement and communicated certain documents regarding the mediation of the three Governments.

19. Immediately after the Bolivian Government had appealed under Article 15 of the Covenant, the Paraguayan Government expressed certain doubts as to the possibility of applying that Article in its entirety in the existing circumstances. The question was examined by the Legal Committee of the Assembly (First Committee), which came to the unanimous conclusion that Article 15 was applicable.

20. On September 27, 1934, the Assembly, noting that the dispute had been properly referred to it under Article 15 of the Covenant, set up a Committee for the twofold purpose of attempting to bring about a settlement by means of conciliation, and if these efforts proved unavailing, of framing the draft report provided for under Article 15, paragraph 4.

PART III. ATTEMPTS AT CONCILIATION BY THE COMMITTEE OF THE ASSEMBLY

1. In order to endeavour to bring about a settlement by conciliation, the Committee of the Assembly set up a Sub-Committee to be presided over by its own Chairman (the delegate of Czechoslovakia) and consisting of those of its members representing American nations.

2. On September 29 this Sub-Committee requested the two Parties to accredit to it delegates possessing full powers to negotiate. The Bolivian Government accredited a plenipotentiary. The Paraguayan Government on October 7 stated that it was prepared to accredit a plenipotentiary with the object of negotiating for the immediate cessation of hostilities and a régime of security for the maintenance of peace. It stated further, on October 11, that it felt justified in hoping that the first measure for the solution of its differences with Bolivia should consist in the cessation of hostilities on bases accepted jointly and the adoption of adequate measures of security.

3. The Sub-Committee when replying stated that it had from the outset given evidence of its earnest desire to assist the two countries to put an end to the bloodshed as soon as possible, and that it was

accordingly quite prepared to seek in the first place, in consultation with the two Parties, to bring about the cessation of hostilities on bases jointly agreed upon and the adoption of adequate measures of security.

4. After an exchange of telegrams, the Paraguayan Government, on October 16, reiterated its decision to accredit a plenipotentiary provided that the Sub-Committee agreed that the negotiations regarding the cessation of hostilities and those for the settlement of the dispute were absolutely distinct.

5. In reply, the Sub-Committee pointed out that it had decided to examine in the first place the question of the cessation of hostilities and guarantees of security, but that, being an organ of conciliation, it was not entitled to limit its own terms of reference by deciding in advance that it would exclude the examination of any particular proposal for settlement.

6. On November 2, when notifying the appointment of M. Caballero de Bedoya as delegate to the Assembly, the Paraguayan Government announced that this delegate would also place himself at the disposal of the Conciliation Sub-Committee for the purpose of examining the bases of an agreement to put an end to the struggle, and such measures of security as would ensure the effective application of that agreement.

7. The representatives of both Parties were heard by a delegation of the Conciliation Sub-Committee under the chairmanship of the representative of Mexico. Subsequently, telegrams were exchanged between that delegation, which was endeavouring to find common ground for an agreement for the cessation of hostilities, and the two Governments concerned.

8. During the stage of conciliation, Paraguay repeats that, for the moment, she desires to consider solely the final cessation of hostilities and guarantees of security. Bolivia, on the other hand, reiterates that she is still prepared to accept a form of conciliation which, while settling the dispute, will also put an end to hostilities.

Such are the two cases, the conflict between which is responsible for the failure, up to the present, of the efforts made on the basis of conciliation.

PART IV. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ASSEMBLY

Section I

1. Before formulating its recommendations in virtue of Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, the Assembly desires to emphasize the

fact that the circumstances in which it now finds itself are entirely different from those attendant upon the efforts of the American States which offered the Parties their good offices; of the Council, which sought conciliation on the basis of Article 11; of the Chaco Commission, which was essentially a conciliation commission, and, in the last place, of the Sub-Committee of the Assembly, which was set up to explore the possibilities of a settlement on the basis of Article 15, paragraph 3.

All attempts at conciliation having failed, the Assembly is bound to make known the recommendations it deems just and proper in regard to the case.

2. The dispute which has arisen between the two countries is the consequence of the fact that their common frontier has never been fixed by any final treaty and that hostilities were brought about by the inevitable impact of the two movements of occupation of which the Chaco has been the scene: that of Paraguay to the north and west and that of Bolivia to the south and east.

3. For several months, hostilities continued without either of the Parties appealing to the League of Nations either under Article 11 or under Article 15. The Assembly is therefore bound to record that neither of the Parties has fulfilled its undertakings under Article 12 of the Covenant.

4. As soon as it was informed of the situation, the Council had nevertheless reminded both Parties of their obligations under the Covenant; in September 1932 especially, it requested them to put an end to all military operations and preparations.

5. During the first phase of the conflict, however, the Council, in its desire to facilitate the work of the Washington Committee of Neutrals, to which it offered its co-operation, confined itself to the general functions provided for by Article 4, paragraph 4, of the Covenant and did not claim, under other Articles, to exercise its authority over the Parties based on their own undertakings.

6. Not until March 1933 was the conflict placed upon the Council's agenda in application of Article 11, and even then, at the request, not of the Parties, but of the three members of the Council who had been especially entrusted with the task of following the developments of the situation.

7. It was not until May 31, 1934—that is to say, almost two years after the outbreak of hostilities—that a request in virtue of Article 15 was addressed to the Council by the representative of Bolivia and that request was subsequently transformed into a request to the Assembly within the specified time limit.

8. It is clear from the facts set out above that the Assembly is called upon to make its recommendations in special circumstances, which, however, as was unanimously recognized by its First Committee, do not preclude the application of Article 15 of the Covenant. The First Committee laid it down that 'to exclude the application of Article 15 in its entirety in a case where war existed would be to admit that the Covenant entitled the States in conflict to withdraw from their obligations under it'.

9. The Assembly is, however, bound to draw particular attention to the present state of breach of the Covenant mentioned in paragraph 3 above. It might simply note this situation and draw its conclusions. Like the Council at an earlier stage in the dispute, the Assembly considers, however, that, in the existing circumstances, its duty is first and foremost to seek some means of effectively assisting two Members of the League of Nations to devise the bases of a lasting peace.

The Assembly hopes that, actuated by the same spirit, the Parties will accept its recommendations.

10. The Assembly therefore makes the recommendations set forth below, the acceptance of which would put an end to the state of breach of the Covenant.

Section II

11. The provisions of the present section constitute the recommendations made by the Assembly within the meaning of Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant.

They are an indivisible whole; each of the Parties is called upon to accept them, in the terms in which they are formulated in French, as soon as possible, and with one reservation only—namely, that they are also accepted by the other Party.

Cessation of Hostilities and Measures of Security

12. A Neutral Supervisory Commission shall be set up. The Argentine, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay shall each appoint one member of the Commission. The United States of America and the United States of Brazil shall also be invited to appoint one member each.

The Commission shall determine what measures shall be taken to ensure and maintain the final cessation of hostilities in accordance with the following rules:

(i) Cessation of Hostilities.

The two Governments shall order their troops to cease all hostilities within a period of six days from the date on which the Secretary-

General of the League of Nations shall notify them that the recommendations of the Assembly have been accepted by both Parties.

(ii) *Security.*

(a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, the two armies facing one another in the field shall break contact, and within ten days they shall withdraw their forces, organizing merely police detachments, if necessary, in the security zone so created. If necessary, the width of the security zone shall be fixed by the Supervisory Commission in each particular case.

(b) Within a zone of 150 kilometres from the positions occupied on the day of the cessation of hostilities, each of the two armies shall abstain from establishing any works, whether of an offensive or of a defensive character. The troops occupying this zone must be satisfied with the equipment completed previous to the day of cessation of hostilities.

(c) The Commission shall have power:

- (i) To supervise and facilitate the execution of the two preceding paragraphs;
- (ii) To notify, if occasion arises, to the two armies within less than twelve hours any violation of the security zone provided for at letter (a) above.

The Neutral Supervisory Commission shall be authorized to provide itself with such means for the performance of its duties (forces and means of communication) as may be necessary.

(d) The two Parties shall proceed to the progressive demobilization and proportionate reduction of their armies, the final figures being fixed as provided in paragraph 15 below.

(iii) *Maintenance of the Cessation of Hostilities.*

The Neutral Supervisory Commission shall settle all the details relating to the application of the measures prescribed above in such a way as to maintain strict observance of the cessation of hostilities.

The Commission shall assemble at Buenos Aires and shall itself decide where its headquarters shall be. It shall determine its own methods of work and make its own rules of procedure. Its decisions shall be taken by a majority vote of the members present; should the votes be equally divided, the Chairman shall have a casting vote. The chair shall be taken by all the members in rotation.

As soon as the Commission has been formally constituted it shall without delay make the necessary arrangements to carry out its duties on the spot.

The creation of the security zone contemplated by the above provisions, which is a measure of a purely military character, is not, in the intention of the Assembly, to prejudge in any way the settlement of the territorial or frontier questions involved in the present dispute.

Peace Negotiations

13. Negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of peace shall be opened at a conference sitting in Buenos Aires within a period not exceeding one month from the date of the cessation of hostilities provided for in paragraph 12 above.

The President of the Argentine Republic shall be requested to fix the date of the conference and to invite to take part therein, in addition to Bolivia and Paraguay, the adjacent States, the States represented on the Washington Committee of Neutrals, Ecuador, and Venezuela. The deliberations of the conference shall embrace the three following categories of questions:

- (a) Final delimitation of the frontier between the two countries;
- (b) Security clauses;
- (c) Economic clauses.

14. By accepting the present recommendations, the Parties agree that if, on the expiry of a period of two months from the opening of the conference, the frontier shall not have been fixed by negotiations, or if no arbitration agreement shall have been concluded, the Permanent Court of International Justice shall be called upon to give judgment in accordance with the provisions hereinafter set out. Such acceptance shall be deemed to constitute a special agreement within the meaning of Article 40 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the Secretary-General shall forward the present report to the Court on behalf of the Parties.

The Court shall examine all the circumstances of the case and shall apply the rules of law enumerated in Article 38 of its Statute, due regard being had to:

- (a) The accession of the Parties to the Declaration of the American nations, dated August 3, 1932;
- (b) The adherence of the Parties to the principle of the *uti possidetis* of 1810, which was accepted by both Parties at the Buenos Aires Conferences of 1928.

The jurisdiction vested in the Court shall be as follows:

Whereas there exists between Bolivia and Paraguay a territorial or frontier dispute and whereas what one Party considers to be exercise of its territorial sovereignty is considered by the other Party to

be usurpation upon its rights and an illegal occupation, to examine the titles and arguments presented on either side, and, as the result of such examination, to give judgment and declare whether there are districts and, if so, what districts, which one or other of the Parties should evacuate and hand over to the other Party as falling under the latter's sovereignty, the two Parties undertaking in advance to accept and execute the judgment of the Court.

15. If, within a period of two months from the fixing of the frontier, whether by negotiation or by arbitral or judicial decision, no agreement shall have been reached as regards the security clauses (completion of demobilization, limitation of effectives and armaments, pact of non-aggression, &c.) to be substituted for those laid down above in connexion with the cessation of hostilities, the questions in dispute shall be submitted, for an opinion, to the Supervisory Commission provided for in paragraph 12 above. Failing agreement between the Parties within a period of one month from the date on which they shall have been notified of the opinion of the Supervisory Commission, the questions still in dispute shall be settled by arbitration. Should no arbitration agreement have been concluded between the Parties within an additional period of one month, the arbitrators who, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, shall be three in number, shall be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the arbitral tribunal shall give a decision upon the contentions of the Parties.

16. If, within a period of six months from the date of the fixing of the frontier, no agreement shall have been reached as regards the economic clauses (transit, commercial and navigation arrangements, &c.), the questions in dispute shall be submitted, for an opinion, to a committee of experts appointed by the Council of the League of Nations after consultation with the Chairman of the Economic Committee and the Chairman of the Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit of the League of Nations. Failing agreement between the two Parties within a period of two months from the date on which the opinion of the committee of experts shall have been notified to them, the questions still in dispute shall be settled by arbitration. Should no arbitration agreement have been concluded between the Parties within an additional period of one month, the arbitrators who, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, shall be three in number, shall be appointed by the President of the Permanent Court of International Justice and the arbitral tribunal shall give a decision upon the contentions of the Parties.

17. The periods allowed by paragraphs 13, 14, 15, and 16 above

shall not be capable of being extended except by agreement between the Parties.

18. The provisions of Article 13 of the Covenant shall apply to the arbitral or judicial decisions provided for in the foregoing recommendations.

19. Immediately on receipt of the acceptance of the Parties as provided for in paragraph 11 above, the Secretary-General shall notify both Parties and the President of the Argentine Republic of the date on which, as the result of such acceptance, the recommendations have come into force.

The Secretary-General shall take the necessary measures for setting up the Supervisory Commission provided for in paragraph 12 and shall notify to the Commission the entry into force of the recommendations.

PART V. PROHIBITION OF THE SUPPLY OF ARMS AND WAR MATERIAL INTENDED FOR BOLIVIA OR PARAGUAY

The Sixth Committee of the Assembly consulted the First Committee on this subject.

On September 23, 1934, the First Committee gave its opinion as follows:

‘The Council, by its resolution of May 19, 1934, recalling the action begun last year with a view to prohibiting the export or transit of arms and war material intended for Bolivia or Paraguay, requested the Committee of Three at once to resume examination of this question and to proceed to the consultations that were indispensable in order that measures might be taken, if need be, during its next extraordinary session.

‘As the result of the steps taken by the Committee of Three, a number of Members of the League of Nations prohibited the supply of arms and war material to Bolivia and Paraguay.

‘No further decision has been taken by the Council.

‘It follows that the Members of the League of Nations which have imposed the prohibition could take this measure in the particular case without any application of an article of the Covenant. They were acting lawfully in the exercise of their sovereignty and without infringing any provision of the Covenant. They were actuated by anxiety to contribute in the general interests towards putting an end to a war, an object which it is eminently proper for the Members of the League to promote.

‘It rests with the Assembly to appreciate whether, in the

recommendation which it may be led to adopt under the provisions of Article 15, it would be desirable to insert provisions dealing with the matter.'

In its resolution adopted on September 27, 1934, the Assembly directed the Committee set up by it to present to it a draft of the report provided for by Article 15, paragraph 4, of the Covenant, which should contain, in addition to recommendations for settlement of the dispute:

'... any consequences arising out of those recommendations in regard to the application of the prohibition to supply arms and war material to which numerous governments have subscribed, in some cases "subject to any further recommendation by the Council or the Assembly".'

In view of the above, the Assembly, having regard to the exceptional circumstances of the present case, and without in any way creating a precedent, approves, as one of the measures to obtain and maintain a cessation of hostilities, the prohibition of supply of arms or war material to Bolivia and Paraguay, and it recommends the Members of the League of Nations in the subsequent decisions which they may have to take as regards the maintenance, possible modification, or withdrawal of such prohibition, to have regard to the action taken by each of the Parties upon the Assembly's recommendations and, before taking any steps, to place themselves in communication with the Committee provided for in Part VI, so as to take this Committee's opinion into consideration.

PART VI. CONSTITUTION OF AN ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Whereas, in virtue of Article 3, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, the Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter affecting the peace of the world and therefore cannot withhold its attention from developments in the dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay;

Whereas the Members of the League of Nations are required to refrain from any act that might prejudice the execution or delay the application of the recommendations of the present report;

Whereas, by the Declaration signed at Washington on August 3, 1932, by nineteen American States, to which Bolivia and Paraguay have given their adhesion, the said States declared that the American nations are opposed to force and renounce it both for the solution of their controversies and as an instrument of national policy in their reciprocal relations;

And whereas the American nations declared in the same document

that they would not recognize any territorial arrangement of this controversy which has not been obtained by peaceful means, nor the validity of territorial acquisitions which may be obtained through occupation or conquest by force of arms:

The Assembly

Decides to appoint an Advisory Committee to follow the situation, more especially as regards the execution of the Assembly's recommendations for the settlement of the dispute, and to assist the Members of the League to concert their action and their attitude among themselves and with non-member States, more particularly as regards the most effective application, modification or withdrawal, of the prohibition of the supply of arms referred to in Part V, and to make any proposals it may think desirable in this connexion.

The Committee shall consist of representatives of the following States:

| | | |
|----------------|------------------|---------------------------|
| Argentine | Denmark | Portugal |
| Australia | Ecuador | Union of Soviet Socialist |
| United Kingdom | France | Republics |
| Chile | Irish Free State | Spain |
| China | Italy | Sweden |
| Colombia | Mexico | Turkey |
| Cuba | Peru | Uruguay |
| Czechoslovakia | Poland | Venezuela |

The Committee shall invite the Governments of the United States of America and Brazil to collaborate in its work in the manner which they shall consider most appropriate. The Committee shall have power to make any communication, recommendation, or proposal which it considers desirable to the Members of the League, the Assembly, or the Council. It shall communicate its reports to the Governments of the States non-Members of the League which are co-operating in its work as well as to the Members of the League.

The Committee shall more particularly bear in mind the Assembly's desire that the state of breach of obligations to settle disputes by peaceful means shall promptly be brought to an end.

The Secretary-General shall submit to the Permanent Court of International Justice, on behalf of the Assembly, a request for an opinion under Article 14 of the Covenant, should the Advisory Committee of the Assembly consider such a consultation to be justifiable and opportune with a view to facilitating the performance of the task entrusted to it. The terms of the question and the date of the request shall be determined by the Committee.

The Bolivian Government having stated that it could make known its final decision on the recommendations (Part IV, Section II, of the present Report) within twenty days, and the Paraguayan Government having similarly expressed its confidence that it would be able to make known its decision shortly after the final text of the said recommendations had been communicated to it, the Advisory Committee shall meet not later than December 20, 1934.

2. PROTOCOLS SIGNED AT BUENOS AIRES BY THE MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF BOLIVIA AND PARAGUAY TOGETHER WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MEDIATING COUNTRIES, JUNE 12, 1935¹

PROTOCOL

At Buenos Aires on the twelfth day of June of the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty-five, there being assembled in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Argentine Republic Their Excellencies Doctor Luis A. Riart, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Paraguay, and Doctor Tomás Manuel Elío, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Bolivia, together with the members of the Commission of Mediation established to promote the settlement of the existing conflict between the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of Bolivia; that is to say: His Excellency Doctor Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Ecclesiastical Affairs of the Argentine Republic; His Excellency Doctor José Carlos de Macedo Soares, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the United States of Brazil, and His Excellency Doctor José Bonifacio de Andrada e Silva, Ambassador of the United States of Brazil; His Excellency Doctor Luis Alberto Cariola, Ambassador of the Republic of Chile, and His Excellency Doctor Félix Nieto del Río, Special Plenipotentiary Delegate of the Republic of Chile; His Excellency Mr. Alexander Wilbourne Weddell, Ambassador of the United States of America, and His Excellency Mr. Hugh Gibson, Special Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the United States of America; His Excellency Doctor Felipe Barrera Laos, Ambassador of the Republic of Peru; and His Excellency Doctor Eugenio Martínez Thedy, Ambassador of the Republic of Uruguay;

Their Excellencies the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of Bolivia, having shown their full powers, found in good and due form, have resolved, under the auspices of the aforesaid Commission of Mediation, to agree, subject to ratification by their respective Governments, upon the following bases:

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, July 1935, p. 901.

I

The mediating group to be asked to request His Excellency the President of the Argentine Republic to convene the Peace Conference forthwith for the following purposes:

1. The solemn ratification of the present Agreement.
2. The settlement of such practical questions as may arise in carrying out the measures of security adopted for the purpose of bringing about the cessation of hostilities.
3. The promotion of the settlement of the disputes between Paraguay and Bolivia by direct agreement between the Parties, on the understanding that, in the event of the failure of direct negotiations, Paraguay and Bolivia assume by this Agreement the obligation to settle the Chaco disputes by legal arbitration, hereby designating the Permanent Court of International Justice at the Hague as arbitrator.

The Peace Conference will put an end to direct negotiations whenever, in its opinion, the time has come to declare that no final settlement can be reached by that means; in that event, the Parties shall proceed to negotiate an arbitration agreement, and the Peace Conference shall not close its proceedings until such arbitration agreement has been definitely reached.

4. The promotion, at such time as may be thought expedient, of an agreement between the Parties in regard to the exchange and repatriation of prisoners in accordance with the usages and principles of international law.

5. The establishment of a régime of transit, trade, and navigation, which shall take into account the geographical positions of the Parties.

6. The promotion of facilities and agreements of various kinds for the purpose of encouraging the development of the two belligerent countries.

7. The constitution by the Peace Conference of an International Commission to determine the responsibilities of every sort or kind arising out of the war; if the findings of that Commission are not accepted by one or other of the Parties, the final decision shall rest with the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. The Governments of the Republic of Paraguay and the Republic of Bolivia pledge themselves to obtain legislative sanction of this Convention within ten days of the signature thereof.

II

Hostilities to be brought finally to a close on the basis of the positions now occupied by the belligerent armies.

The positions of the belligerent armies to be determined as follows:

(a) A twelve days' truce to be granted in order that a Neutral Military Commission, consisting of representatives of the mediating nations, may fix intermediate lines between the positions of the belligerent armies.

The truce to begin at midnight (meridian of Córdoba) at the close of the day on which the Neutral Military Commission, having already proceeded to the theatre of operations, finds itself ready to begin its proceedings.

The Neutral Military Commission to consult the belligerent commands in order to determine the line of separation between the armies, and to decide any points on which the said commands may not agree. The Peace Conference to be notified when this has been done.

(b) On the expiry of the term of the truce provided for in paragraph (a), that term to be prolonged by the Peace Conference until such time as the measures of security contemplated in Article III shall have been carried out in full.

(c) The Neutral Military Commission to make such changes as experience may suggest in the line of separation between the armies, after consulting the belligerent commands.

(d) During the truce and the period of its extension, the lines of separation between the armies to be maintained under guarantees from the Peace Conference, for which purpose they shall be watched and supervised by the Neutral Military Commission.

III

The following measures of security to be taken:

1. The belligerent armies to be demobilized within ninety days of the date of the fixing of the line of separation between the armies, referred to in Article II, in such form as may be decided by the Neutral Military Commission after consulting the belligerent commands, and up to the limit laid down in the following paragraph.

2. The military effectives to be reduced to a maximum of 5,000 men.

3. No new acquisitions of warlike material to be made, apart from necessary replacements, until the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace.

4. The Parties, when signing this Convention in the presence of the mediators, to give an undertaking of non-aggression. The Neutral Military Commission to be responsible for superintending the execution of the measures of security until they shall have been carried out in full. The Peace Conference thereupon to declare the war at an end.

When the execution of the foregoing military assurances and safeguards, which must be executed in full within an unbroken period not to exceed ninety days, is initiated on the field of operations, an inquiry into the disputes to be initiated at the same time, and the Peace Conference to act as specified in Article 1.

IV

The belligerents recognized the declaration of August 3, 1932, concerning territorial acquisitions.

V

In deference to the humane sentiments of the belligerents and mediators, fire to cease at midday (meridian of Córdoba) on June 14.

In virtue whereof they hereby subscribe by common agreement, together with the representatives of the mediating States, to two copies of the present Protocol, which they seal and sign on the day and in the place aforesaid.

(Signed) LUIS A. RIART.
TOMÁS M. ELÍO.
CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS.
JOSÉ CARLOS DE MACEDO SOARES.
JOSÉ BONIFACIO DE ANDRADA E SILVA.
LUIS ALBERTO CARIOLA.
F. NIETO DEL RÍO.
ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL.
HUGH GIBSON.
FELIPE BARREDA LAOS.
EUGENIO MARTÍNEZ THÉDY.

(Signed) OSCAR IBARRA GARCÍA, *Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.*

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

For the purpose of putting into effect the provisions of Article v of the Protocol signed this day, the High Contracting Parties request the Commission of Mediation to despatch the Neutral Military Commission to the battle-front forthwith. On arrival, it shall arrange for the cessation of fire as provided in the said Article v, and shall begin the work of fixing the line of separation between the armies, contemplated in Article II, paragraph (a), of the principal Protocol. If the principal Protocol is ratified by the Congresses of Bolivia and Paraguay within the period of ten days laid down for that purpose, the provisional cessation of fire referred to by the present Additional Protocol shall be automatically converted into the initial truce

contemplated as the final cessation of hostilities in Article II, paragraph (a), of the principal Protocol; in the contrary event, that is to say, if such ratification is not secured, the suspension of fire referred to in the aforesaid Article V shall *ipso facto* come to an end.

In faith whereof they hereby sign the present Additional Protocol, in two copies, at Buenos Aires, this twelfth day of June One thousand nine hundred and thirty-five.

(Signed) TOMÁS M. ELÍO.

LUIS A. RIART.

CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS.

JOSÉ CARLOS DE MACEDO SOARES.

JOSÉ BONIFACIO DE ANDRADA E SILVA.

LUIS ALBERTO CARIOLA.

F. NIETO DEL RÍO.

ALEXANDER W. WEDDELL.

HUGH GIBSON.

FELIPE BARREDA LAOS.

EUGENIO MARTÍNEZ THÉDY.

(Signed) OSCAR IBARRA GARCÍA, *Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.*

3. PROCÈS-VERBAL OF THE MEETING OF THE BUENOS AIRES CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 25, 1935¹

At Buenos Aires, this twenty-fifth day of October, nineteen hundred and thirty-five, Their Excellencies the Delegates of the following countries to the Peace Conference: for the Argentine Republic, Dr. Carlos Saavedra Lamas, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, and Dr. Luis A. Podestà Costa; for Brazil, Dr. José de Paulo Rodriguez Alves and Dr. Edmundo da Luz Pinto; for Chile, Dr. Luis Alberto Cariola and Dr. Félix Nieto del Río; for the United States of America, Mr. Hugh Gibson; for Peru, Dr. Felipe Barreda Laos and Dr. Luis Fernán Cisneros; for Uruguay, Dr. Pedro Manini Ríos, and Dr. Eugenio Martínez Thédy; being assembled at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, deliberated upon the points contained in Article III of the Protocol of June 12, and resolved, (a) to place upon record that, at the meeting held by them on October 23, the reports of the Neutral Military Commission dated October 18 were approved; (b) that, nevertheless, in connexion with those reports the question of the neutral military police was left unsettled; (c) that, at the meeting held on

¹ Communicated to the Secretary-General of the League by Dr. Saavedra Lamas, President of the Conference. League Document, C. 455. M. 237. 1935. vii.

the twenty-fourth, it was decided to publish through the Secretariat the Draft Treaty of Peace and Friendship and the Explanatory Statement attached thereto, which were handed to the representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay, at the meeting on October 15; (d) to adopt as a decision of the Conference the following declaration to which formal expression will be given at a plenary meeting to be held on Monday October 28 in the presence of the representatives of Bolivia and Paraguay:

‘In consideration of the provisions of the Protocol of Peace of the twelfth day of June one thousand nine hundred and thirty-five, which stipulates that the war be declared at an end as soon as the measures of security specified in Article III have been carried out;

‘Whereas the Neutral Military Commission responsible for superintending the execution of the said measures of security informed the Conference in its reports of October 18 of this year:

- ‘1. That the demobilization of the belligerent armies has been completed in the form decided by the said Commission, within ninety days of the date of the fixing of the line of separation between the armies;
- ‘2. That the military effectives of the armies of Bolivia and Paraguay have been reduced to less than five thousand men;
- ‘3. That the two Parties have fulfilled their obligation not to make new acquisitions of warlike material;
- ‘4. That the two Parties have carried out their undertaking of non-aggression;

‘Whereas the said undertaking of non-aggression given by the Parties precludes the renewal of hostilities;

‘And whereas, finally, the state of war has ceased to exist owing to the final cessation of hostilities and the impossibility of their resumption,

THE PEACE CONFERENCE DECIDES:

‘To declare the war between the Republics of Bolivia and Paraguay at an end.’

It was finally resolved to adopt a second declaration which will also be formally expressed in the same manner as the preceding one:

‘The Peace Conference, in declaring the war between the Republics of Bolivia and Paraguay at an end, in accordance with Article III of the Protocol of June 12, 1935;

‘Whereas, now that the military aspect of the conflict no longer exists, it is the duty of the Parties and the mediators to continue to study the questions at issue, the Conference, discharging the functions

assigned to it under Article I of the above-mentioned Protocol, and convinced that the situation is favourable for the final settlement of all differences outstanding between the two countries,

DECIDES:

‘To make a supreme appeal to the Republics of Bolivia and Paraguay to unite their efforts with those of the mediators in the lofty aim of finding as soon as possible a pacific solution for all the differences still outstanding between the two nations.’

In faith whereof the above-mentioned delegates have signed the present instrument on the date mentioned.

(Signed) CARLOS SAAVEDRA LAMAS.

(Signed) JOSÉ DE PAULO RODRIGUEZ ALVES.
EDMUNDO DA LUZ PINTO.
HUGH GIBSON.
P. MANINI RÍOS.
EUGENIO MARTÍNEZ THÉDY.
LUIS ALBERTO CARIOLA.
F. NIETO DEL RÍO.
FELIPE BARREDA LAOS.
LUIS FERNÁN CISNEROS.
I. RUIZ MORENO.
L. A. PODESTÀ COSTA.

III. PAN AMERICA

INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE¹

The Conference which assembled in Buenos Aires on December 1, 1936, and in which twenty-one American States took part, was an Inter-American Conference, and not one of the regular series of Pan-American Conferences, of which the seventh was held at Montevideo in 1933.²

The adoption by the United States of the Good Neighbour Policy in 1933, of which practical proof was given in the withdrawal of the United States marines from Nicaragua and Haiti and the abandonment of the Platt amendment in regard to Cuba,³ created a good impression in South and Central America, where there had always been a tendency to regard with suspicion any attempt by the United States to exert its influence and to protest against any form of intervention. By 1936 confidence had increased that non-interference was the settled policy of the United States, though its development continued to be watched for any deviation. But while reassured as to the intentions of their powerful northern neighbour, the majority of other American States, and Argentina, Chile, Colombia,

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part VI (i).

² See *Documents* for 1933, pp. 480-91.

³ See *Documents* for 1934, p. 443.

Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay in particular, were not prepared to reorientate their policy on a purely Pan-American rather than an international basis. They desired, in fact, to have the best of two worlds, that is to say, to combine the benefits of their political and economic connexions with Europe and the League of Nations with the advantages of their geographical situation and their associations with one another and with the United States in the Pan-American Union. An indication of this was to be found in the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War Pact of October 10, 1933,¹ which, though originally signed by all the Latin-American States, was left open to all countries and adhered to by the United States and a number of European States.

The formulation by the United States of a neutrality policy in the summer of 1935 marked the beginning of a new development which was hastened by the failure of the League policy in regard to the Italo-Abysinian War. The object of the American neutrality legislation² was to keep the United States out of war, and there were indications in statements by the President and Mr. Cordell Hull of a desire to see a similar policy adopted by other American States with a view to ensuring the maintenance of peace on the American continent by avoiding entanglement in extraneous conflicts.

Encouraged by the results of preliminary conversations, President Roosevelt, on January 30, 1936, despatched practically identical letters to the Presidents of the twenty other American States,³ proposing the summoning of a special Inter-American Conference 'to determine how the maintenance of peace may best be safeguarded', whether by ratifying or amending existing agreements for pacific settlement, or by the creation of 'new instruments of peace, additional to those already formulated', which might supplement the efforts of the League of Nations and other peace agencies in seeking to prevent war.

While President Roosevelt's suggestion was unanimously approved, the replies revealed certain differences of opinion regarding the actual measures to be taken for the revision or extension of American peace machinery. Broadly speaking, while none of the replies advocated withdrawal from the League of Nations, and most of them were couched in non-committal terms, two tendencies were evident, one, in favour of an increasing measure of regionalism, going so far in some cases as the advocacy of the establishment of an American League of Nations with its own Covenant, Permanent Council, and Court of Justice; another, in favour of overhauling existing machinery and introducing improvements to supplement the efforts of the League of Nations without setting up a new regional organization. The first group included Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala;⁴ the second Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, and Mexico.⁵ Uruguay⁶ took up a position mid-way between the two, maintaining that 'America's problems are proper to herself' and that 'individual action of America is not irreconcilable with the Geneva Covenant', and would act as a link between the League and the American States outside it

¹ See *Documents* for 1933, p. 475.

² See *Documents* for 1935, vol. ii, pp. 263-96.

³ See below, p. 548.

⁴ See below, pp. 554, 556, 557 respectively.

⁵ See below, pp. 549, 550, 556, 557 respectively.

⁶ See below, p. 558.

(U.S.A., Brazil, Paraguay, and Costa Rica).¹ A Committee of Twenty-one, consisting of the diplomatic representatives of the Latin-American States in Washington under the Chairmanship of Mr. Cordell Hull, was set up on April 8, 1936. Argentina (April 15), Chile (May 18), and Colombia (May 20) subsequently submitted the texts of draft agreements or memoranda in amplification of their replies to President Roosevelt's invitation. The final version of the Agenda was adopted on July 22, and was divided into six sections dealing respectively with the organization of peace, neutrality, the limitation of armaments, legal problems, economic problems, and intellectual co-operation. On August 5 Dr. Saavedra Lamas announced that the Conference would open in Buenos Aires on December 1.

On November 6 it was announced that President Roosevelt would himself be present at the opening of the Conference, while the United States Delegation would be led by Mr. Cordell Hull.

The President broke his southward journey at Rio de Janeiro where, on November 27, he spoke at a joint session of the Brazilian Congress and Supreme Court,² emphasizing 'the glories of interdependence' and declaring that the American States could not 'countenance aggression—from wheresoever it may come'. In declaring the Conference open, on December 1, President Justo extended a warm welcome to President Roosevelt. He also declared that a decisive step on the road towards universal peace would have been taken on the day that 'instruments of American origin are successfully co-ordinated with the League of Nations Covenant and with other treaties for the confirmation of law, justice, equity, and morality in relations between States'.³ President Roosevelt then delivered his eagerly-awaited speech.⁴ The Republics of the New World, he declared, could help the Old World to arrest the impending catastrophe by perfecting the mechanism of peace and preventing future war between themselves by striving to prevent the creation of those conditions which give rise to war, by consulting together should any State, driven by war madness or land-hunger, seek to commit acts of aggression, by maintaining and defending democracy, and by encouraging the international exchange of commodities to the welfare and prosperity of their State and civilization as a whole. The President left on his return journey on December 2 and the Conference then settled down to Committee work, electing Dr. Saavedra Lamas as its President.

On December 5 Mr. Cordell Hull, in his opening address on behalf of the American Delegation, outlined his Government's views on the problems before the Conference, enumerating eight 'vitally important principles and proposals for a comprehensive peace programme and peace structure',⁵ the application of which was not, he pointed out, limited merely to the Conference. To give effect to this programme Mr. Hull laid before the Conference, on December 7, the draft of a convention for the co-ordination and extension of existing treaties between the American States.⁶ The principal features of this Convention were the proposed establishment of a permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee and the adoption, in

¹ Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras gave notice of withdrawal in May, June, and July, 1936, respectively.

² See below, p. 558.

³ See below, p. 561.

⁴ See below, p. 563.

⁵ See below, p. 568.

⁶ See below, p. 577.

the event of an outbreak of hostilities, of measures similar to those provided for in the United States neutrality legislation, including embargoes on the export of arms and war material and on the granting of loans and credits.

The reactions to this proposal were in accordance with expectation. Brazil, the five Central American States (Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador), Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Venezuela supported the Convention. It was criticized, on the other hand, under the leadership of the Argentine representatives, supported by Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay, by those States which were opposed to the development of Pan-American regional isolationism. Between the conflicting proposals submitted by the individual Republics forming these two groups, the United States delegation acted in a mediatory capacity, and eventually when the Conference closed on December 23 eleven conventions or treaties had been drafted, carrying the approval of all the twenty-one States. These were:

1. Convention for the maintenance, preservation, and re-establishment of peace.
2. Additional protocol relative to non-intervention.
3. Treaty on the prevention of controversies.
4. Inter-American treaty on good offices and mediation.
5. Convention to co-ordinate, extend, and assure the fulfilment of the existing treaties between the American States.
6. Convention on the Pan-American Highway.
7. Convention for the promotion of Inter-American cultural relations.
8. Convention on interchange of publications.
9. Convention concerning artistic exhibitions.
10. Convention concerning peaceful orientation of public instruction.
11. Convention concerning facilities for educational and publicity films.

In addition there were adopted sixty-two acts and resolutions.

The draft of a co-ordinating convention, submitted by Mr. Cordell Hull on December 7, underwent considerable alteration, but traces of its provisions were visible in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re-establishment of Peace (the so-called collective security pact)¹ and the Convention to Co-ordinate, Extend, and Assure the fulfilment of the existing Treaties between the American States (the so-called neutrality convention).² It may be noted that while provision was contained in these two instruments for consultation, none was included for the establishment of a permanent consultative committee. In the neutrality convention individual States were left free to impose such embargoes as they desired within the framework of their existing obligations. Further, the rights and duties of American States Members of the League were safeguarded. Certain States entered reservations to their signatures of the conventions.

The Conference also adopted a Protocol³ on Non-Intervention amending the Convention on the Rights and Duties of States adopted at the Montevideo Conference in 1933.⁴ Two other important treaties are those dealing with Good Offices and Mediation⁵ and the Prevention of Controversies.⁶

Among the sixty-two Resolutions and Declarations adopted were the

¹ See below, p. 583.

² See below, p. 584.

³ See below, p. 586.

⁴ See below, p. 588.

⁵ See *Documents* for 1933, p. 482.

⁶ See below, p. 585.

Declaration dealing with the Principles of American Solidarity and Co-operation¹ and the Resolution relative to the Co-ordination of Pacific Instruments with the Covenant of the League of Nations.² Other resolutions deferred consideration of the proposal for an American League of Nations and requested the Governing Board of the Pan-American Union to study and report on the project for an Inter-American Court of International Justice. The remainder were devoted to a variety of legal, cultural, humanitarian, and economic subjects.

Mr. Cordell Hull summed up the results of the Conference in a final speech on behalf of the American Delegation on December 23.³

1. PERSONAL LETTER FROM PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT TO PRESIDENT
JUSTO OF ARGENTINA, JANUARY 30, 1936⁴

My Dear Mr. President:

The agreement by the Governments of Bolivia and Paraguay upon the peace protocols recently negotiated at Buenos Aires⁵ has afforded the Government and people of the United States the deepest gratification, since it has led them to hope that there is now every prospect of a permanent and equitable solution of this tragic controversy, which has continued for so long a period; which has caused the sacrifice of so many lives; and which has placed so crushing a burden of expenditure upon the citizens of the two belligerent nations. I know well with what intimate concern the Government and people of Argentina have followed the course of these hostilities, and their happiness at the termination of the conflict is fully shared by the Government and people of the United States.

I cherish the sincere conviction that the moment has now arrived when the American Republics, through their designated representatives seated at a common council table, should seize this altogether favourable opportunity to consider their joint responsibility and their common need of rendering less likely in the future the outbreak or the continuation of hostilities between them, and by so doing, serve in an eminently practical manner the cause of permanent peace on this Western Continent. If the tragedy of the Chaco can be considered as having served any useful end, I believe such end will lie in our joint willingness to profit from the experience learned and to exert our common endeavours in guarding against the repetition of such American disasters.

It has seemed to me that the American Governments might for these reasons view favourably the suggestion that an extraordinary

¹ See below, p. 593.

² See below, p. 594.

³ See below, p. 594.

⁴ U.S. State Department, Press Releases, No. 333, February 15, 1936. Practically identical letters were sent at the same time to the Presidents of the other American republics.

⁵ See above, p. 538.

Inter-American conference be summoned to assemble at an early date, at Buenos Aires, should the Government of the Argentine Republic so desire, or, if not, at some other capital of this Continent, to determine how the maintenance of peace among the American Republics may best be safeguarded—whether, perhaps, through the prompt ratification of all of the Inter-American peace instruments already negotiated; whether through the amendment of existing peace instruments in such manner as experience has demonstrated to be most necessary; or perhaps through the creation by common accord of new instruments of peace additional to those already formulated.

These steps, furthermore, would advance the cause of world peace, inasmuch as the agreements which might be reached would supplement and reinforce the efforts of the League of Nations and of all other existing or future peace agencies in seeking to prevent war.

With the conclusion of the Chaco War and with the re-establishment of peace throughout this Continent, there would appear to be offered an opportunity for helpful counsel among our respective Governments which may not soon again be presented. Your Excellency's devotion to the maintenance of peace between the American Republics is well known, and I would therefore deeply appreciate such views as Your Excellency may care to express to me, as I would likewise value highly Your Excellency's opinion whether such a special Inter-American conference of the American Republics would not in fact prove most beneficial.

I am addressing myself thus personally to Your Excellency, instead of through the usual diplomatic channels, because of my thought that the questions at issue are of such vital concern to the people of this Continent as to warrant a personal interchange of views between the Presidents of the American Republics.

With the expression of my warm regard, believe me, my dear Mr. President,

Faithfully yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT.

2. EXTRACTS FROM THE REPLIES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S LETTER OF JANUARY 30, 1936.¹

(i) *President Augustín P. Justo (Argentina), February 22, 1936*

... Your Excellency's 'good neighbour' policy has opened shining perspectives in the life of American relations, with vast projections which the future will be able to develop.

¹ U.S. State Department, Press Releases, No. 342, April 18, 1936.

I understand that within the universal interdependence there is no room for regional distinctions nor for the separation of continents, but that a consolidation of peace among the nations of America will always be a very valuable contribution to the same aims which are followed in the world order. Your Excellency has enunciated with lofty criterion the hope that we may strengthen them, thus defining their easy conciliation with the great international organisms of whose pacts we are signatories and the possibility of whose co-ordination in the same noble aims has been practically demonstrated in the recent conflict of the Chaco Boreal. . . .

(ii) *President Arturo Alessandri (Chile), February 21, 1936*

. . . I share fully the conviction of Your Excellency of the usefulness of proceeding to examine the joint responsibility of the American Governments in the prevention of all future hostilities between the nations of the continent, not only in the interest of our own security, but as a valuable encouragement to the work of universal conciliation being accomplished, with growing persistence and efficiency, by such entities as the League of Nations and other analogous organisms of peace.

Aware of the necessity of acting, whenever an opportunity presents itself, in favour of the ideal of peace, my Government never has spared efforts nor declined sacrifices to promote it; and therefore I am delighted to embrace now the opportunity which Your Excellency offers to collaborate with the other American Governments in the establishment of a preventive system against conflicts between the Republics of our continent.

In the desire of so contributing that the special Inter-American Conference, the convocation of which Your Excellency proposes, may satisfy the natural hopes of the people and constitute an effective step forward in the field of good international understanding, it seems to me to be indubitably necessary previously to establish, in a precise and restrictive manner, the matters to be discussed. With this objective, transcendental for the ultimate success of the initiative, I submit to Your Excellency's examination certain phases worthy of being considered in the preparation of the programme of the proposed assembly.

Your Excellency contemplates three possible paths for the Conference to take in its work for the preservation of peace. I shall make a brief analysis of each:

I. The prompt ratification of all the Inter-American peace instruments already negotiated. The Pan-American agreements to which Your Excellency alludes are the following:

- (a) Treaty of Obligatory Arbitration; Second International Conference of American States, Mexico, 1902. Signed by 9 countries, ratifications deposited by 3, and ratified by 3 others.
- (b) Treaty for the Prevention of Conflicts (Gondra Treaty); Fifth International Conference of American States, Santiago, Chile, 1923. Signed by 20 countries, adhered to by 1, ratifications deposited by 18, and ratified by 1.
- (c) General Convention for Inter-American Conciliation; Washington, 1929. Signed by 20 countries, ratifications deposited by 14, and ratified by 3.
- (d) Inter-American Arbitration Treaty; Washington, 1929. Signed by 20 countries, ratifications without reservations deposited by 6, and with reservations by 7, and ratified by 1.
- (e) Protocol of Progressive Arbitration; Washington, 1929. Signed by 20 countries, ratifications deposited by 8, and ratified by 2.

Apart from the purely Pan-American agreements cited above, there are others of a universal character which bind a number of countries of our continent:

1. Arbitration Convention, signed at The Hague in 1907. 40 countries signed and adhered to it without reservations, 8 with reservations. 27 ratified it.

2. Pact of the League of Nations, Versailles, 1920. 29 States signed and ratified it, 15 adhered to it in the two months following its entrance into effect, and 16 were later admitted. 4 countries have denounced it.

3. Treaty for Proscribing War (Kellogg-Briand), Washington, 1928. 56 countries signed and adhered to it.

4. General Act of Geneva, 1923. It is not in force for lack of a sufficient number of ratifications.

5. Anti-War Pact (Saavedra Lamas), Rio de Janeiro, 1933. 21 American and 9 European nations signed and adhered to it, 18 have ratified, and it is before the legislative assembly of 6 of the 12 American nations which have not ratified.

Besides the referred-to agreements, the American nations are bound among themselves and with the nations of other continents by bilateral conventions of investigation, conciliation, and arbitration, some of a general type known under the name of the illustrious Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. William Jennings Bryan. They are many, and their enumeration would excessively lengthen this reply.

II. Amendment of existent peace instruments. The circumstance

that some ratifying States have made reservations to various of the conventions in force, and the resistance of others to ratification, indicates the nonconformity of some of the signatories with some of the provisions embodied in them.

III. The creation, by common accord, of new instruments of peace additional to those already formulated. This possibility has been attempted on various occasions: the Anti-War Pact of 1933 represents the first step towards co-ordinating in a single instrument the principal and most generally accepted stipulations of previous agreements; a similar objective was sought in the draft of a peace code, submitted to the Seventh International Conference of American States by Mexico, the study of which is still taking place.

The preceding detailed summary, which I have believed myself justified in making, in deference to the better co-operation that this reply seeks, suggests to me the following considerations:

The number of universal and bilateral Inter-American peace pacts already in effect musters considerable importance. Their ratification represents a great effective step, since Your Excellency is not unaware how slow and accidental is, in general terms, the process to which international agreements are subject under our constitutional systems. . . .

The procedure should be as follows: all the American States which have not yet done so should agree to seek a means of ratifying the already-existing pacts, and in the Conference, the convocation of which Your Excellency suggests, to formulate the amendments which, for that purpose, they conceive essential. These amendments and the reservations formulated by other signatories in their ratifications, when examined by the Conference, then should become, together with any other stipulations whose incorporation may be considered necessary, a part of a new additional agreement, independent of preceding ones, but intended to co-ordinate their application. . . .

The foregoing observations touch upon the purely inter-American aspects of Your Excellency's initiative: but as Your Excellency indicated, *we must consider the efforts of America as complementary to and reinforcing those of the League of Nations and other organisms for the prevention of wars.* Such is, also, the concept accepted by the Pan-American Conferences in their agreements on the codification of international law: the juridical system regulating international relations can be one only for the entire universe, whatever may be the peculiar forms of procedure required by geographical or other special circumstances. This essential nexus between the constructive efforts of groups of nations and the aggregate of all the States of the world,

may be maintained and invigorated by means of the general acceptance of a practice already established in recent agreements of American origin: Convention of Private International Law, Saavedra Lamas Pact, Convention on the Nationality of Women. This practice is that of opening Inter-American agreements to the adherence or accession of non-American countries, and thus to accelerate the substantive world unification of international law.

I do not believe it possible to limit this reply to the terms only of Your Excellency's initiative. As President of the Republic of Chile, the peace policy of which dates from the dawn of independence, I must invite Your Excellency's illustrious attention towards certain vital facts which, in our judgment, are entailed in the maintenance of effective peace between nations.

It is not enough to establish a juridical system, no matter how perfect, to destroy the germs of international conflict. From the filter of the will to peace of governments and peoples escape the contagious virus of prejudices, the subtle selfishness of economic hostilities, and the interests of international armament advocates. America is free from ancestral hatreds and feels itself united in a common aspiration of liberty and democracy in order to give to man opportunities for moral and material betterment without any limitation other than his own capacity. To purify this atmosphere from the excrescences of a propaganda interested in erecting the barrier of hatred between peoples, we must do something in favour of moral disarmament, by means of a common and ample educational effort, which will mould the coming generations of our countries in an atmosphere of affection and mutual understanding. At the same time, we need to avoid the conflict of economic interests with a policy of increasing tariff exemptions on reciprocal trade. Also, we must arrest the bellicose influence of armament advocates, which not only bleeds our peoples economically, and retards their effective progress in the social-economic field and in the spiritual realm, but creates, at times, aggressive and militant attitudes, under colour of the loftiest and noblest national aims.

This last phase has for Chile and Chileans the enhanced value of a profound and unvarying conviction. The pacts of May 1902 with the Republic of Argentina, in moments of intense bellicose excitement, not only referred to arbitration the great disputed interests, but offered the example of an agreement on the limitation of armaments, complied with loyally and honourably by both countries. Years later, before movements disturbing to peace, brought on by propaganda for greater armaments in America, Chile proposed and obtained the inclusion in the programme of the Fifth International Conference

of American States of the topic of limitation of armaments. Due to circumstances foreign to our will, the Santiago Conference could not reach an agreement on so vital a matter. Now that Your Excellency, with an initiative of lofty moral distinction, suggests to the American countries an exceptional opportunity to pursue the work of peace, an essential basis of all Pan-Americanism, I, as President of Chile, invite Your Excellency to give thought to the convenience of including in the programme of the proposed Conference the study of practicable methods for the limitation of armaments. . . .

(iii) *President Alfonso López (Colombia), February 18, 1936*

. . . I share the opinion of those who believe that the moment has come for this continent to face its fundamental problems with the decision and clarity desired by our peoples, for the multiple limitations, frequently excessive, to which other countries, with very complex interests, have to submit themselves are—in our affairs—obstacles which we Americans ought to overcome resolutely if we intend to assure peace in the Americas.

Furthermore, it is common knowledge that we might evolve a joint policy for the purpose of endeavouring to cause peace to prevail in world councils and assemblies in which, much to our regret, we have been playing a role subordinated to the interests of the great European nations, who accept our adherence to anti-war law, who request our effective co-operation in imposing it and cause that co-operation to weigh in the international game, but do not consult our will when they consider it possible to do without it in reaching solutions in which an intervention such as ours is a matter of indifference or might constitute an obstacle to vast political plans. We have just seen with surprise how, when an attempt was made to apply Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, there were not lacking those who desired to convert the very body created for avoiding, restraining, and punishing the armed aggressions of one State against another into an instrument of imperialistic enterprise affecting the independence of one of the Members of the League.

There now exists, moreover, a continental atmosphere very favourable for drawing closer the relations of the other American Republics with the Republic over which Your Excellency worthily presides. . . . Within the brief period of Your Excellency's administration, there has been effected a fundamental change of direction which all the American peoples justly appreciate and which redounds to the sympathy for and the prestige of the United States from the Rio Grande to the Straits of Magellan. Now is seen much more clearly, more

easily, the co-operation—reciprocal in its benefits—of the American States on the basis of an international democracy in which each nation counts by merit of being well organized and no longer by merit of its greater or less capacity for aggression or defence.

Permit me, Excellency, to say at this point that I consider indispensable and of decisive importance for the success of these Inter-American conferences the predominance of a proper democratic idea. The inequality of our circumstances, geographically, as well as economically and politically, would not bring these Republics to sit down comfortably at a round table if they should not have the certainty, in advance, of taking part in the discussions and of carrying weight in the decisions without being subjected to any hierarchy of preference. I think that we ought to liberate the idea of Pan-Americanism, which seeks out all the affinities of the new continent for the purpose of directing them towards common objectives, from the obstacle which would be created by a tendency to form great or small hegemones presuming to exercise more rights or exert more influence than the rest of the nations frankly meeting together for the purpose of serving a cause of union and mutual agreement. But I am sure that such obstacle will not appear at the Conference which will assemble under Your Excellency's auspices, as does generally occur in the great concerts of States where the old spirit of the imperialist Powers has not been excluded; for the inspiration of Your Excellency's Administration is a democratic guaranty which is recognized and applauded by all.

Nothing would be more gratifying to me than that Your Excellency's initiative might be extended to the organization of an Inter-American mechanism of peace dowered with a virtue with which those in existence can no longer provide themselves; this is due to the fact of their not having been submitted to difficult tests without failing in them totally or partially. The league of American nations for the purpose of creating its regional law, broader than that now prevailing in the world and intended for application with all energy and without reservations or exceptions, would be a fascinating perspective of this Conference which Colombia would view with rejoicing. Columbia would not resign herself to the mere ratification of the old agreements nor to the consolidation of those now in force without making an attempt to propose canons still more efficacious for the struggle against war and for holding in check and punishing aggressors. Your Excellency may feel assured that no country would accept such a policy with more enthusiasm nor offer more sincere support to those who, like Your Excellency, advocate it. We have on our side

the double authority of a diplomatic tradition of peace which has never failed and that of having been, together with Peru, one of the two States which have carried out Geneva's recommendations of peace—at a time when we were on the brink of a conflict—and which have sought with the most interest and decision a stable agreement for the peaceful solution of all their differences. . . .

My Government not only views the projected Conference with pleasure but, as I have said, with the hope that the Conference may find it possible to extend its scope to considering the constitution of a new agency for peace which might collaborate with the League of Nations but would act with greater vigour within the terms of a regional peace pact, adapted to the circumstances of these peoples and to the manner in which they solve their international problems, without fear for permanent peace.

(iv) *President Rafael L. Trujillo (Dominican Republic), February 11, 1936*

. . . I must declare without reservation that not only do I adhere to Your Excellency's high design of sponsoring the meeting of an extraordinary Conference wherein the States of America may agree upon the adoption of measures particularly directed towards the assurance of peace among themselves, but also that, repeating an idea expressed by myself publicly in July 1935, I hasten to advance the suggestion that the agenda of the projected Conference include, as a capital point, the study of the possibility of founding a League of American Nations of a permanent character, the action of which would be more efficacious and advantageous for our countries than that of the League of Nations.

The continental organization thus created could, like the similar one at Geneva, hold periodic general assemblies, be represented permanently by a directive committee or council, and act according to the tenor of the provisions of a covenant, the primary objective of which would be to lay the foundations of Pan-American international justice. . . .

(v) *President Maximiliano H. Martínez (El Salvador), February 12, 1936*

. . . I fully agree that the end expressed should be sought by ratifying, revising, or creating the instruments you indicate, the more so since I think—like Your Excellency—that such agreements will promote world tranquillity, by supplementing the efforts of the League

of Nations and all present and future institutions dedicated to prevention of the violent solution of international differences. . . .

(vi) *President Jorge Ubico (Guatemala), February 13, 1936*

. . . I am glad to advise Your Excellency that I accept with real pleasure the suggestions which you are pleased to make to me concerning so important a matter, as under date of December 5 last I had the honour to suggest confidentially to Your Excellency's Government through my Minister for Foreign Affairs, Licenciado Klee, and His Excellency Mr. Hanna, Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States near my Government, and through the Department of State, the signing of a general treaty of solidarity and mutual co-operation among the American nations, deeming that among them there are common interests, the protection of which is vital in the life of the continent. I added that they should exert all their efforts and possibilities to exalt and safeguard the desire for peace, justice, and mutual respect which must serve as the basis of public law in America. I venture to transmit to Your Excellency a copy of the draft under reference.¹ . . .

(vii) *President L. Cárdenas (Mexico), February 19, 1936*

. . . On the initiation of this new effort, which cannot but reinforce and supplement the efforts of the League of Nations and of the other agents, present or future, which endeavour to prevent war, Mexico, conscious of her position with respect to world interests, confirms her traditional attitude in relation to instruments of peace. I, personally, consider the special Inter-American Conference which Your Excellency suggests very useful for the high aims pursued, and I desire, therefore, to offer you my most enthusiastic co-operation for the realization of your noble idea. . . .

¹ The main provisions of this were as follows:

4. They consider interventions or acts of aggression by a foreign Power against any one of them as a danger to the integrity and sovereignty of the nations of this continent; and, as a result of the solidarity hereby agreed upon, they undertake to employ all their resources in defence of the violated right.

5. The mutual co-operation hereby agreed upon constitutes in itself an association of the Republics of America with powers sufficient to protect the strict maintenance of the American rights and interests stated in the foregoing articles.

6. They shall organize and create a permanent American international court of justice with jurisdiction for settling conflicts which may arise between the signatory Republics. A supplementary convention shall embrace the development and functioning of the said court and of the association of Republics stipulated in Article V.

(viii) *President Gabriel Terra (Uruguay), February 15, 1936*

. . . America's problems are proper to herself. The expansion to which she aspires, which is also the only one she needs, is circumscribed to the boundaries of each one of her peoples; and when they do pass beyond those boundaries, it is only in the expression of a generous solidarity.

America has her customs and her mentality.

Peoples of modern formation have assimilated the virtues of European civilization, which they adapt to broad stages, where they cause it to give fruit under a democracy which includes them all, and of which the magnificent model is the great people over whose destinies Your Excellency presides at the present hour.

That similarity of situation, of aspirations, of spirit, which brings all the American peoples into fraternity, may suggest means of action of unique efficacy—as has just occurred in the case of the fortunate mediation of various countries, which were really exponents of the will of America, in the pacification, now definitive, of Bolivia and Paraguay—without prejudice to the more general Covenant of the League of Nations, to which we are affiliated, and to which we promise to continue to give our adherence.

In point of fact, that individual action of America is not irreconcilable with the Geneva Covenant and will doubtless be destined to strengthen and broaden it, not only because of the similarity of purposes but also because it would extend the procedures in favour of peace to American countries outside the League, such as the United States of America, Brazil, Paraguay, and Costa Rica.

For my part, I have no fear of inconsistent solutions, neither do I fear the dispersion of ideas and dissipation of energy produced by lack of guidance and confusion. The purpose will be the same, namely, the preservation of the supreme good, peace, and the means of action will never conflict among themselves.

Never could too many means be decided upon for the safeguarding of peace. It is necessary to form around oneself a great environment of treaties, conferences, resolutions, spiritual and moral bonds of every order. . . .

3. EXTRACT FROM SPEECH BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT,
NOVEMBER 27, 1936¹

. . . I have had the honour of greeting your great President, and this personal friendship between the Chief Executives of our two nations

¹ Delivered before the Congress and the Supreme Court of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro. U.S. Department of State, Press Releases, No. 374, November 28, 1936.

seems to me not only of practical benefit but also of profound significance. You, Gentlemen of the Congress, now afford me the courtesy of this agreeable opportunity of meeting in person the legislative branch of your Government and of exchanging thoughts directly with its members. I could not be but deeply sensible of the unique honour offered by the presence in this chamber of your Supreme Court, a tribunal whose high traditions are known throughout the juridical world. Thus, the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of the Government of Brazil have united in this demonstration of friendship towards the nation which I have the honour to represent.

Let me now return thanks for this renewed proof of that brotherhood which has ever united Brazil and the United States—a fraternity not limited to the relations between our Governments, but a fraternity which I have reason to know is made evident in every group in both countries, whenever and wherever they meet. The fine record of our relations is the best answer to those pessimists who scoff at the idea of true friendship between nations. In the present state of the world it is heartening that the two largest countries in this hemisphere have been able, by the exercise of goodwill, good temper, and good sense, to conduct the whole course of their relations without clash, or conflict, or ill feeling.

Not only that. The confidence in each other's aims and motives enables us to work together for the common good. We have a record of which we can be proud—a record of joint endeavour in the cause of peace in this New World. My country has derived strength and confidence from the far-sighted, irreproachable attitude of Brazil in its devolution, arbitration, conciliation, and other methods for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Your first concern, like ours, is peace; for we know that war destroys, not only human lives and human happiness, but destroys as well the ideals of individual liberty and of the democratic form of representative government which is the goal of all the American Republics. I think I can say that if in the generation to come we can live without war, democratic government throughout the Americas will prove its complete ability to raise the standards of life for those millions who cry for opportunity to-day. The motto of war is: 'Let the strong survive; let the weak die.' The motto of peace is: 'Let the strong help the weak to survive.'

There is room for all of us, without treading on one another's toes. There are resources of nature adequate for our present and our future. We are happily free from ancient antagonisms which have brought so much misery to other parts of the world. There are, it is true,

conflicts of interest between the American States, but they cannot be called serious or difficult of solution, when compared with the deeply-rooted hates of other continents. There is no American conflict—and I weigh my words when I say this—there is no American conflict that cannot be settled by orderly and peaceful means. And it is in our common interest imperative that they be settled always by agreement and not by bloodshed. We serve not ourselves alone. The friendly nations of the Americas can render no greater service to civilization itself than by maintaining both domestic and international peace and by freeing themselves for ever from conflict.

We are about to gather in a great American Conference, called by President Justo in furtherance of the 'good neighbour' policy in which we all share. In this Conference we have the opportunity to banish war from the New World and dedicate it to peace. It is unthinkable to me that in this time of world-wide apprehension we should fail to seize the opportunity to meet what is a heavy responsibility. This is no time to hesitate. We must be guided by a serene and generous view of our common needs. World horizons may be dark, but the time is auspicious for our task in America. The rest of the world presents a grim picture of armed camps and threats of conflict. But in our own continent armed clashes, which in recent years have divided American countries, have been happily brought to an end.

It is gratifying to be able to pay well-deserved tribute to the very outstanding part played by your able and distinguished Foreign Minister, Macedo Soares, in the mediatory efforts of the representatives of six American Republics. And the Leticia question was settled here in Rio through the patient assistance and masterly diplomacy of Dr. Afranio Mello Franco.¹ The progress we have made must not be allowed to serve as pretext for resting on our laurels; it should, on the contrary, stimulate us to new and increased effort. It is not enough that peace prevails from the Arctic to the Antarctic, from the Atlantic to the Pacific; it is essential that this condition be made permanent, that we provide effectively against the recurrence of the horrors of war and assure peace to ourselves and our posterity. All instrumentalities for the maintenance of peace must be consolidated and reinforced. We cannot countenance aggression—from wheresoever it may come.

The people of each and every one of the American Republics—and, I am confident, the people of the Dominion of Canada as well—wish to lead their own lives free from desire for conquest and free from

¹ See *Documents* for 1934, p. 116.

fear of conquest, free at the same time to expand their cultural and intellectual relationships and to take council together to encourage the peaceful progress of modern civilization. Our aims will best be served by agreements which bring peace, security, and friendship among us and all our neighbours.

Solidarity among the American States in the cause of peace constitutes no threats to other regions or races. The honourable adherence to solemn agreements among us will harm no other continent. On the contrary, the more firmly peace is established in this hemisphere, the more closely we live up to the spirit as well as the letter of our agreements, the better it will be for all the rest of the world. Let us present a record which our hemisphere may give to the world as convincing proof that peace lies always at hand when nations, serene in their sovereign security, meet their current problems with understanding good will. All of us have learned that no real, no lasting prosperity can exist where it is secured at the expense of our neighbours—that among nations, as in our domestic relations, the principle of interdependence is paramount.

No nation can live entirely to itself. Each one of us has learned the glories of independence. Let each one of us learn the glories of interdependence. Economically, we supply each other's needs; intellectually, we maintain a constant, a growing exchange of culture, of science, and of thought; spiritually, the life of each can well enrich the life of all. We are showing in international relations what we have long known in private relations—that good neighbours make a good community.

In that knowledge we meet to-day as neighbours. We can discard the dangerous language of rivalry; we can put aside the empty phrases of 'diplomatic triumphs' or 'shrewd bargains'. We can forget all thought of domination, of selfish coalitions, or of balances of power. Those false gods have no place among American neighbours. . . .

4. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY PRESIDENT JUSTO OF ARGENTINA, DECEMBER 1, 1936¹

Once more and under highly auspicious circumstances representatives of the nations of America, animated by high and noble purposes of solidarity, meet to-day in this great assembly enhanced by the presence of the illustrious statesman who sponsored it in the name of the great Republic of the North and who has just received the sanction of an historic election. It is a signal honour for the Argentine Republic

¹ On opening the Inter-American Conference. *International Conciliation*, No. 328, March 1937, p. 204.

to receive in its capital the distinguished representatives of its sister nations of the continent, animated by the same aspirations and united by similar sentiments. . . .

The American countries, whatever their territorial expanse may be, are nations with a significance of their own. They have increasing weight in the concert of nations and form centres of civilization and culture, which influence or will influence the general evolution of the world. When these young nations, rich in natural resources, offer the rest of the countries an example of lofty and dispassionate understanding of their mutual interests, this example may have the virtue of correcting many mistaken policies and soothing men's minds by guiding them along the road of reflection and prudence. For this reason the decisions which are reached at this Conference are certain to contribute towards improving the distressing conditions against which the world is struggling.

But even though that should not be the case, we should not be disheartened. We should not forget that the greatest conquests of humanity have been the results of innumerable efforts, and that just as nothing is ever lost in the material world, so these generous dreams which honour the human spirit will never be lost. Moreover, experience has shown that if yesterday's dream is to-day's reality, we may confidently expect that to-day's dream will be the beautiful reality of to-morrow.

It seems needless to stress the point that in carrying out these noble aims, there is no intention of creating antagonistic continental groups. Our sole desire is to find more perfect formulas for the pacific solution of international conflicts which may be worthy of the adherence of all other countries.

As President Roosevelt said in his invitation to this Conference, it is very necessary to consider the means of reinforcing, from the Americas, the peace-making activities of the League of Nations, of which most countries here represented are Members. On the day that the instruments of American origin are successfully co-ordinated with the League of Nations Covenant and with other treaties for the confirmation of law, justice, equity, and morality in relations between States, a decisive step will have been taken on the road towards universal peace. . . .

I am in complete agreement with the suggestion of President Roosevelt. I believe that the atmosphere has been prepared for its triumph, and therefore I am absolutely confident as to the results of this Conference. That is to say, I have faith in this 'meeting of friends'. Sacrifices are certain to be very few, because goodwill pre-

vails, but the resulting benefits will unquestionably be of great value. . . .

5. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT,
DECEMBER 1, 1936¹

. . . Members of a family need no introduction or formalities when, in pursuance of excellent custom, they meet together for their common good.

As a family we appreciate the hospitality of our host, President Justo, and the Government and people of Argentina; and all of us are happy that to our friend Dr. Saavedra Lamas has come the well-deserved award of the Nobel Prize for great service in the cause of world peace.

Three years ago the American family met in nearby Montevideo, the great capital of the Republic of Uruguay. They were dark days. A shattering depression, unparalleled in its intensity, held us together with the rest of the world in its grasp. And on our own continent a tragic war was raging between two of our sister Republics.

Yet, at that Conference there was born, not only hope for our common future, but a greater measure of mutual trust between the American democracies than had ever existed before. In this Western Hemisphere the night of fear has been dispelled. Many of the intolerable burdens of economic depression have been lightened and, due in no small part to our common efforts, every nation of this hemisphere is to-day at peace with its neighbours.

This is no conference to form alliances, to divide the spoils of war, to partition countries, to deal with human beings as though they were the pawns in a game of chance. Our purpose, under happy auspices, is to assure the continuance of the blessing of peace.

Three years ago, recognizing that a crisis was being thrust upon the New World, with splendid unanimity our twenty-one Republics set an example to the whole world by proclaiming a new spirit, a new day in the affairs of this hemisphere.

While the succeeding period has justified in full measure all that was said and done at Montevideo, it has unfortunately emphasized the seriousness of the threat to peace among other nations. Events elsewhere have served only to strengthen our horror of war and all that war means. The men, women, and children of the Americas know that warfare in this day and age means more than the mere clash of armies: they see the destruction of cities and of farms—they foresee that children and grandchildren, if they survive, will stagger

¹ At the opening session of the Inter-American Conference. *International Conciliation*, No. 328, March 1937, p. 209.

for long years not only under the burden of poverty, but also amid the threat of broken society and the destruction of constitutional government.

I am profoundly convinced that the plain people everywhere in the civilized world to-day wish to live in peace one with another. And still leaders and governments resort to war. Truly, if the genius of mankind that has invented the weapons of death cannot discover the means of preserving peace, civilization as we know it lives in an evil day.

But we cannot now, especially in view of our common purpose, accept any defeatist attitude. We have learned by hard experience that peace is not to be had for the mere asking; that peace, like other great privileges, can be obtained only by hard and painstaking effort. We are here to dedicate ourselves and our countries to that work.

You who assemble to-day carry with you in your deliberations the hopes of millions of human beings in other less fortunate lands. Beyond the ocean we see continents rent asunder by old hatreds and new fanaticism. We hear the demand that injustice and inequality be corrected by resorting to the sword and not by resorting to reason and peaceful justice. We hear the cry that new markets can be achieved only through conquest. We read that the sanctity of treaties between nations is disregarded.

We know, too, that vast armaments are rising on every side and that the work of creating them employs men and women by the million. It is natural, however, for us to conclude that such employment is false employment, that it builds no permanent structures and creates no consumers' goods for the maintenance of a lasting prosperity. We know that nations guilty of these follies inevitably face the day either when their weapons of destruction must be used against their neighbours or when an unsound economy, like a house of cards, will fall apart.

In either case, even though the Americas become involved in no war, we must suffer too. The madness of a great war in other parts of the world would affect us and threaten our good in a hundred ways. And the economic collapse of any nation or nations must of necessity harm our own prosperity.

Can we, the Republics of the New World, help the Old World to avert the catastrophe which impends? Yes, I am confident that we can.

First, it is our duty by every honourable means to prevent any future war among ourselves. This can best be done through the strengthening of the processes of constitutional democratic govern-

ment—to make these processes conform to the modern need for unity and efficiency and, at the same time, preserve the individual liberties of our citizens. By so doing, the people of our nations, unlike the people of many nations who live under other forms of government, can and will insist on their intention to live in peace. Thus will democratic government be justified throughout the world.

In the determination to live at peace among ourselves we in the Americas make it at the same time clear that we stand shoulder to shoulder in our final determination that others who, driven by war madness or land-hunger, might seek to commit acts of aggression against us, will find a hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good. I repeat what I said in speaking before the Congress and the Supreme Court of Brazil. 'Each one of us has learned the glories of independence. Let each one of us learn the glories of interdependence.'

Secondly, and in addition to the perfecting of the mechanism of peace, we can strive even more strongly than in the past to prevent the creation of those conditions which give rise to war. Lack of social or political justice within the borders of any nation is always cause for concern. Through democratic processes we can strive to achieve for the Americas the highest possible standard of living conditions for all our people. Men and women blessed with political freedom, willing to work and able to find work, rich enough to maintain their families and to educate their children, contented with their lot in life and on terms of friendship with their neighbours, will defend themselves to the utmost but will never consent to take up arms for a war of conquest.

Interwoven with these problems is the further self-evident fact that the welfare and prosperity of each of our nations depends in large part on the benefits derived from commerce among themselves and with other nations, for our present civilization rests on the basis of an international exchange of commodities. Every nation of the world has felt the evil effects of recent efforts to erect trade barriers of every known kind. Every individual citizen has suffered from them. It is no accident that the nations which have carried this process furthest are those which proclaim most loudly that they require war as an instrument of their policy. It is no accident that attempts to be self-sufficient have led to falling standards for their people and to ever-increasing loss of the democratic ideals in a mad race to pile armament on armament. It is no accident that because of these suicidal policies and the suffering attending them, many of their people have come to believe with despair that the price of war seems less than the price of peace.

This state of affairs we must refuse to accept with every instinct of defence, with every exhortation of enthusiastic hope, with every use of mind and skill.

I cannot refrain here from reiterating my gratification that in this, as in so many other achievements, the American Republics have given a salutary example to the world. The resolution adopted at the Inter-American Conference at Montevideo endorsing the principles of liberal trade policies has shone forth like a beacon in the storm of economic madness which has been sweeping over the entire world during these later years. Truly, if the principles there embodied find still wider applications in your deliberations, it would be a notable contribution to the cause of peace. For my own part I have done all in my power to sustain the consistent efforts of my Secretary of State in negotiating agreements for reciprocal trade, and even though the individual results may seem small, the total of them is significant. These policies in recent weeks have received the approval of the people of the United States, and they have, I am sure, the sympathy of the other nations here assembled.

There are many other causes for war—among them, long festering feuds, unsettled frontiers, territorial rivalries. But these sources of danger which still exist in the Americas, I am thankful to say, are not only few in number, but already on the way to peaceful adjudication. While the settlement of such controversies may necessarily involve adjustments at home or in our relations with our neighbours which may appear to involve material sacrifice, let no man or woman forget that there is no profit in war. Sacrifices in the cause of peace are infinitely small compared with the holocaust of war.

Peace comes from the spirit, and must be grounded in faith. In seeking peace, perhaps we can best begin by proudly affirming the faith of the Americas; the faith in freedom and its fulfilment which has proved a mighty fortress beyond reach of successful attack in half the world.

That faith arises from a common hope and a common design given us by our fathers in differing form, but with a single aim—freedom and security of the individual, which has become the foundation of our peace.

If, then, by making war in our midst impossible, and if within ourselves and among ourselves we can give greater freedom and fulfilment to the individual lives of our citizens, the democratic form of representative government will have justified the high hopes of the liberating fathers. Democracy is still the hope of the world. If we in our generation can continue its successful applications in the Ameri-

cas, it will spread and supersede other methods by which men are governed and which seem to most of us to run counter to our ideals of human liberty and human progress.

Three centuries of history sowed the seeds which grew into our nations; the fourth century saw those nations become equal and free and brought us to a common system of constitutional government; the fifth century is giving to us a common meeting ground of mutual help and understanding. Our hemisphere has at last come of age. We are here assembled to show it united to the world. We took from our ancestors a great dream. We here offer it back as a great unified reality.

Finally, in expressing our faith of the Western World, let us affirm:

That we maintain and defend the democratic form of constitutional representative government.

That through such government we can more greatly provide a wider distribution of culture, of education, of thought, and of free expression.

That through it we can obtain a greater security of life for our citizens and a more equal opportunity for them to prosper.

That through it we can best foster commerce and the exchange of art and science between nations; that through it we can avoid the rivalry of armament, avert hatred, and encourage good will and true justice.

That through it we offer hope for peace and a more abundant life to the peoples of the whole world.

But this faith of the Western World will not be complete if we fail to affirm our faith in God. In the whole history of mankind, far back into the dim past before man knew how to record thoughts or events, the human race has been distinguished from other forms of life by the existence—the fact—of religion. Periodic attempts to deny God have always come and will always come to naught.

In the constitutions and in the practice of our nations is the right of freedom of religion. But this ideal, these words presuppose a belief and a trust in God.

The faith of the Americas, therefore, lies in the spirit. The system, the sisterhood of the Americas is impregnable so long as her nations maintain that spirit.

In that faith and spirit we will have peace over the Western World. In that faith and spirit we will all watch and guard our hemisphere. In that faith and spirit may we also, with God's help, offer hope to our brethren overseas.

6. SPEECH BY MR. CORDELL HULL, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE,
DECEMBER 5, 1936¹

The primary purpose of this Conference is to banish war from the Western Hemisphere. In its earnest pursuit of this great undertaking, it is necessary at the outset to visualize numerous dangerous conditions and practices in general international affairs to the extent that they bear upon and affect the work of this Conference. It is manifest that every country to-day is faced with a supreme alternative. Each must play its part in determining whether the world will slip backward towards war and savagery, or whether it can maintain and will advance the level of civilization and peace. None can escape its responsibility.

The twenty-one American Republics cannot remain unconcerned by the grave and threatening conditions in many parts of the world. Our convocation here in Buenos Aires utters this hemisphere's common voice of its interest, nay, its intense concern, over the determination of this momentous question. The repercussions of wars and preparations for wars have been so universally disastrous that it is now as plain as mathematical truth that each nation in any part of the world is concerned in peace in every part of the world. The nations of all the Americas, through their chosen delegates, have assembled to make careful survey and analysis of all aspects of their responsibilities; to take account of their common duties; and to plan accordingly for the safety and welfare of their peoples.

The Western Hemisphere must now face squarely certain hard realities. For the purpose of our undertaking, we must frankly recognize that for some time the forces of militarism have been in the ascendant in a large part of the world; those of peace have been correspondingly on the decline. We should be lacking in common sense if we ignored the plain fact that the effects of these forces will unavoidably have direct impact upon all of us. We should be lacking in ordinary caution if we fail to counsel together for our common safety and welfare.

It is bad enough when many statesmen and peoples close their minds and memories to the awful lesson taught by the millions of soldiers sacrificed in the World War; the shattered cities, the desolated fields, and all the other material, moral, and spiritual ravages of that conflict. Still worse, that war has brought in its train wounds to man's heart and spirit, national hatreds and fears, the dislocation or destruction of indispensable political and governmental structures,

¹ As Chairman of the U.S. Delegation. U.S. State Department, Press Releases, No. 375, December 5, 1936.

and the collapse or cool abandonment of former high standards of national conduct. The supreme tragedy is completed by the breakdown of the commerce of mind and culture, the attempt to isolate the nations of the earth into sealed compartments, all of which have made war a burden not to be endured by mankind.

The delegates of the American nations, meeting here in the face of these grave and threatening world conditions, must realize that mere words will not suffice. From every wise and practical viewpoint, concrete peace planning, peace views, and peace objectives are imperative. We must quicken our words and our hopes into a specific, embracing programme to maintain peace. Such a programme, adequately implemented, should constitute an armoury of peace. It should comprise a structure affording all practical means for safeguarding peace. At a time when many other governments or peoples fail or fear to proclaim and embrace a broad or definite peace plan or movement, while their statesmen are shouting threats of war, it is all the more necessary that we of the Americas must cry out for peace, keep alive the spirit of peace, live by the rules of peace, and forthwith perfect the machinery for its maintenance. Should we fail to make this outstanding contribution, it would be a practical desertion of the cause of peace and a tragic blow to the hopes of humanity.

In meeting this problem, the American Republics are in a peculiarly advantageous situation. There are among us no radical differences, no profound mistrusts or deep hatreds. On the contrary, we are inspired by the impulse to be constant friends and the determination to be peaceful neighbours.

We recognize the right of all nations to handle their affairs in any way they choose, and this quite irrespective of the fact that their way may be different from our way or even repugnant to our ideas. But we cannot fail to take cognizance of the international aspect of their policies when and to the extent that they may react upon us. I, myself, am unalterably of the view that a policy leading to war may react upon us. In the face of any situation directly leading to war, can we therefore be other than apprehensive?

In sustaining the firm determination that peace must be maintained and that any country whose policies make war likely is threatening injury to all, I believe that the nations of this hemisphere would find themselves in accord with governments elsewhere. I strongly entertain the hope that a united group of American nations may take common action at this Conference further to assure peace among themselves and define their attitude towards war; and that this action may not only demonstrate the happy position of the New

World, but, though designed primarily for our own benefit, embody policies of world application and correspond to the views and interests of nations outside this hemisphere.

There is no need for war. There is a practical alternative policy at hand, complete and adequate. It is no exclusive policy aimed at the safety or supremacy of a few, leaving others to struggle with distressful situations. It demands no sacrifices comparable to the advantages which will result to each nation and to each individual.

In these circumstances the representatives of the twenty-one American Republics should frankly call the attention of the people of this hemisphere to the possibilities of danger to their future peace and progress and at the same time set forth the numerous steps that can well be undertaken as the most effective means of improving and safeguarding the conditions of permanent peace.

While carefully avoiding any political entanglements, my Government strives at all times to co-operate with other nations to every practical extent in support of peace objectives, including reduction or limitation of armaments, the control of traffic in arms, taking the profits out of war, and the restoration of fair and friendly economic relationships. We reject war as a method of settling international disputes and favour such methods as conference, conciliation, and arbitration.

Peace can be partially safeguarded through international agreements. Such agreements, however, must reflect the utmost good faith; this alone can be the guarantee of their significance and usefulness. Contemporary events clearly show that, where mutual trust, good will, and sincerity of purpose are lacking, pacts or agreements fail; and the world is seized by fear and left to the mercy of the wreckers.

The Conference has the duty of considering all peace proposals of merit. Let me enumerate and briefly discuss eight separate and vitally important principles and proposals for a comprehensive peace programme and peace structure. They are not designed to be all-inclusive. In considering them, we should be guided by the knowledge that other forces and agencies of peace exist besides those made and to be made on our continents; what we do contemplates no conflict with sincere efforts the world over.

First. I would emphasize the local and unilateral responsibility of each nation carefully to educate and organize its people in opposition to war and its underlying causes. Support must be given to peace, to the most effective policies for its preservation; and, finally, each nation must maintain conditions within its own borders which will

permit it to adopt national policies that can be peacefully pursued. More than any other factor, a thoroughly informed and alert public opinion in each country as to the suitable and desirable relationships with other nations, and the principles underlying them, enables a government in time of crisis to act promptly and effectively for peace.

The forces of peace everywhere are entitled to function both through governments and through public opinion. The peoples of the world would be far wiser if they expended more of their hard-earned money in organizing the forces of peace and fewer of the present five billion dollars in educating and training their military forces.

Since the time when Thomas Jefferson insisted upon a 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind', public opinion has controlled foreign policy in all democracies. It is, therefore, all-important that every platform, every pulpit, and every forum should become constant and active agencies in the great work of education and organization. The limited extent of such highly organized and intelligent public opinion in support of peace is by far the largest drawback to any plan to prevent war. Truly, the first step is that each nation must thus make itself safe for peace. This, too, develops a common will for freedom, the soil from which peace springs.

People everywhere should be made to know of the peace mechanisms. Even more, there should be brought home to them the knowledge that trade, commerce, finance, debts, communications, have a bearing on peace. The workman at his bench, the farmer on his land, the shopkeeper by his shelves, the clerk at his books, the labourer in factory, plantation, mine, or construction camp, must realize that his work is the work of peace; that to interrupt it for ends of national or personal rapacity is to drive him towards quick death by bayonets, or to slower, but not less grievous suffering, through economic distress.

In all our countries we have scholars who can demonstrate these facts; let them not be silent. Our churches have direct contact with all groups; may they remember that the peacemakers are the children of God. We have artists and poets who can distill their needed knowledge into trenchant phrase and line; they have work to do. Our great journals on both continents cover the world. Our women are awake; our youth sentient; our clubs and organizations make opinion everywhere. There is a strength here available greater than that of armies. We have but to ask its aid; it will be swift to answer, not only here, but in continents beyond the seas.

Second. Indispensable in their influence for peace and well-being are frequent conferences between representatives of the nations and

intercourse between their peoples. Collaboration and the exchange of views, ideas, and information are the most effective means of establishing understanding, friendship, and trust. I would again emphasize that any written pacts or agreements not based upon such relationships as these too often exist on paper only. Development of the atmosphere of peace, understanding, and good will during our sessions here will alone constitute a vast accomplishment.

Third. Any complete programme would include safeguarding the nations of this hemisphere from using force, one against the other, through the consummation of all of the five well-known peace agreements, produced in chief part by previous conferences, as well as through the Draft Convention Co-ordinating the Existing Treaties between the American States and Extending Them in Certain Respects, which the Delegation of the United States is presenting for the consideration of this Conference.

In these, virtually all of the essentials of adequate machinery are present. If their operation is somewhat implemented by provisions in the draft proposal I have just mentioned to be considered by this Conference, such machinery would be complete.

The first of these is the Treaty to Avoid and Prevent Conflicts between the American States, which was signed in Santiago in 1923.

The second is the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the Pact of Paris, signed at Paris in 1928.

The third is the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, signed at Washington in 1929.

The fourth is the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, signed at Washington in 1929.

The fifth is the Anti-War Treaty of Non-aggression and Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1933.

While the Montevideo Conference in 1933 went on record in favour of the valid execution of these five agreements by each of the twenty-one Governments represented, several have not yet completed this ratification. These agreements provide a many-sided and flexible functioning machinery for the adjustment of difficulties that may arise in this hemisphere. A government could not give more tangible proof of its readiness to translate into practicable form its desire to promote and to maintain peace. Swift action by all of us to ratify these agreements should be the natural assertion of our intentions.

Fourth. If war should occur, any peace programme must provide for the problem then presented. For the belligerent, there is the ruin and suffering of war. For the neutrals, there is the task of remaining neutral, of not being too disturbed in their own affairs, of not having

their own peace imperilled, of working in common to restrict the war and bring it to an end. Can we in this Conference work out for ourselves a common line of policy that might be pursued during a period of neutrality? Some first broad approaches towards that end are, I think, possible. If these are to be sound they must be inspired by the determination to stay at peace. When interests are challenged, when minds are stirred, when entry into war in some particular juncture may appear to offer to some country the chance of national advantage, then determination is needed to retain neutrality. The maintenance of neutrality is an achievement to be attained more readily if undertaken jointly. Such agreement would be a tremendous safeguard for each of us. It might be a powerful means of ending war.

When we have done all that seems to be possible in extending and perfecting an integrated and permanent mechanism for preserving peaceful relations among ourselves, and when we have placed in operation these various instruments, the twenty-one Republics of this hemisphere will have given overt expression to the most determined will for peace to be found in the world to-day. In the face of a weakening elsewhere in the world of reliance on and observance of international agreements, we shall have proclaimed our firm intention that these peaceful instruments shall be the foundation of relations between nations throughout this whole region.

If we can endow peace with certainty, if we can make it glow in our part of the world, then we may indulge the hope that our example will not be in vain.

Fifth. The peoples of this region have a further opportunity. They must make headway with a liberal policy of commerce, which would lower excessive barriers to trade and lessen injurious discriminations as between the trade of different countries. This means the substitution of a policy of economic benefit, good will, and fair dealing for one stimulated by greedy and short-sighted calculations of momentary advantage in an impractical isolation. It would have most beneficial effects, both direct and indirect, upon political difficulties and antagonisms.

A thriving international commerce, well adjusted to the resources and talents of each country, brings benefit to all. It keeps men employed, active, and usefully supplying the wants of others. It leads each country to look upon others as helpful counterparts to itself rather than as antagonists. It opens up to each country, to the extent mutually profitable and desirable, the resources and the organized productive power of other countries; by its benefits small nations with limited territory or resources can have a varied, secure, and

prosperous life ; it can bring improvement to those who feel their toil too hard and their reward too meagre.

Prosperity and peace are not separate entities. To promote one is to promote the other. The economic well-being of peoples is the greatest single protection against civil strife, large armaments, war. Economic isolation and military force go hand in hand ; when nations cannot get what they need by the normal processes of trade, they will continue to resort to the use of force. A people employed and in a state of reasonable comfort is not a people among whom class struggles, militarism, and war can thrive. But a people driven to desperation by want and misery is at all times a threat to peace, their conditions an invitation to disorder and chaos, both internal and external.

The intervening years have given added significance to the economic programme adopted at the Conference at Montevideo three years ago. That programme is to-day the greatest potential force both for peace and prosperity. Our present Conference should reaffirm and secure action upon this programme of economic intelligence.

One feature of the resolutions adopted at Montevideo was the support for the principle of equality of treatment as the basis of acceptable commercial policy. This rule has been followed in a number of commercial agreements that have already been concluded between American nations. Their benefits are already becoming manifest and will continue to grow. We cannot blind ourselves to the fact, however, that at the same time there has taken place even among the American nations a growth in the restrictions upon trade and an extension of discriminatory practices ; these have tended to counteract the advantages resulting from the liberalizing terms embodied in other agreements.

I would urge again the wisdom of avoiding discrimination in our commercial policy. The practice of discrimination prevents trade from following the lines which would produce the greatest economic benefits—it inevitably in the long run must provoke retaliation from those who suffer from discrimination ; makes it more difficult for countries eager to pursue a liberal trade policy to secure the fair gains from this policy, and thereby checks the lowering of restrictions. It will not serve our broad and deep aims ; on the contrary, if steadily extended it will lead us into new controversies and difficulties. The Montevideo programme offers the only alternative to the present short-sighted, war-breeding bilateral bargaining method of trade, to the exclusion of triangular and multilateral trade, which is being employed in many parts of the world with sterile results.

The ends we seek can best be achieved by the concurrent or con-

certed action of many countries. Each can exert itself steadfastly amidst the particular circumstances of its economic situation to make its contribution towards the rebuilding of trade. Each can grant new opportunities to others as it receives new opportunities for itself. All are called upon to share in the concurrent or concerted action which is required. Any country which seeks the benefits of the programme while avoiding its responsibilities will in time shut itself off from the benefits. Any country which is tempted or forced by some special calculation to depart from these lines of action, and which conveys and seeks special advantage, jeopardizes the progress, and perhaps the very existence, of the programme. Faithful dealing, without favour, between equal partners will be required to readjust trade along the lines of growth, which is our goal.

Sixth. The Conference must recognize the all-important principle of practical international co-operation to restore many indispensable relationships between nations; for international relationships, in many vital respects, are at a low ebb. The entire international order is severely dislocated. Chaotic conditions in the relations between nations have appeared. Human progress already has slowed down.

Nations in recent years have sought to live a hermit existence by isolating themselves from each other in suspicion and fear. The inevitable result is not unlike that experienced by a community where individuals undertake to live a hermit existence, with the resultant decline and decay of the spiritual, the moral, the educational, and the material benefits and blessings which spring from community organization and effort. The difference, when nations live apart, is that the entire human race in countless instances suffers irreparable injury—political, moral, material, spiritual, and social. To-day, for illustration, through lack of comprehension, understanding, and confidence, we see many nations exhausting their material substance and the vitality of their people by piling up huge armaments. We behold others, in their attempted isolation, becoming more indifferent and less considerate towards the rights, privileges, and honest opinions of others. National character and conduct are threatened with utter demoralization. At no distant time we shall see a state of moral and spiritual isolation, bringing with it the condemnation of the world, covering great parts of the earth, unless peoples halt and turn towards a sane course.

Seventh. International law has been in large measure flouted. It should be re-established, revitalized, and strengthened by general demand. International law protects the peace and security of nations and so safeguards them against maintaining great armaments and

wasting their substance in continual readiness for war. Founded upon justice and humanity, the great principles of international law are the source and fountain of the equality, the security, and the very existence of nations. Armies and navies are no permanent substitute. Abandonment of the rule of law would not only leave small or unarmed States at the mercy of the reckless and powerful but would hopelessly undermine all international order. It is inconceivable that the civilized nations would long delay a supreme effort to re-establish that rule of law.

Eighth. Observance of understandings, agreements, and treaties between nations constitutes the foundation of international order. May I say here that this is not a time for crimination or recrimination, nor is such in my mind during this discussion. There must be the fullest patience and forbearance, one country with another, as the nations endeavour to climb back to that high ground of wholesome and elevating relationship of loyalty to the given word and faithful fair dealing.

International agreements have lost their force and reliability as a basis of relations between nations. This extremely ominous and fateful development constitutes the most dangerous single phenomenon in the world of to-day; not international law merely, but that which is higher—moral law—and the whole integrity and honour of governments are in danger of being ruthlessly trampled upon. There has been a failure of the spirit. There is no task more urgent than that of remaking the basis of trusted agreement between nations. They must ardently seek the terms of new agreements and stand behind them with unfailing will. The vitality of international agreements must be restored.

If the solemn rights and obligations between nations are to be treated lightly or brushed aside, the nations of the world will head straight towards international anarchy and chaos. And soon, too, the citizen begins to lower his individual standards of personal, moral, and business conduct to those of his government. Trust in each nation's honour and faith in its given word must be restored by the concerted resolve of all governments.

It is to the interest of every one that there be an end of treaties broken by arbitrary unilateral action. Peaceful procedure, agreements between the signatories, and mutual understanding must be restored as the means of modifying or ending international agreements.

In the accomplishment of the high aims and purposes of this eight-fold programme, the people of every nation have an equal interest.

We of this hemisphere have reason to hope that these great objectives may receive the support of all peoples. If peace and progress are to be either maintained or advanced, the time is over-ripe for renewed effort on each nation's part. There can be no delay. Through past centuries, the human race fought its way up from the low level of barbarism and war to that of civilization and peace. This accomplishment has only been partial, and it may well be but temporary.

It would be a frightful commentary on the human race if, with the awful lesson of its disastrous experience, responsible and civilized governments should now fail.

The nations of this continent should omit no word or act in their attempt to meet the dangerous conditions which endanger peace. Let our actions here at Buenos Aires constitute the most potent possible appeal to peacemakers and warmakers throughout the world.

So only does civilization become real. So only can we rightly ask that universal support which entitles governments to speak for their peoples to the world, not with the voice of propaganda but with that of truth. Having affirmed our faith, we should be remiss if we were to leave anything undone which will tend to assure our peace here and make us powerful for peace elsewhere. In a very real sense, let this continent set the high example of championing the forces of peace, democracy, and civilization.

7. DRAFT OF A CONVENTION CO-ORDINATING THE EXISTING TREATIES BETWEEN THE AMERICAN STATES AND EXTENDING THEM IN CERTAIN RESPECTS, DECEMBER 7, 1936¹

Article I. Whereas, by the Treaty to Avoid and Prevent Conflicts between the American States, signed at Santiago May 3, 1923 (known as the Gondra Treaty), the High Contracting Parties agree that all controversies which it has been impossible to settle through diplomatic channels or to submit to arbitration in accordance with existing treaties shall be submitted for investigation and report to a Commission of Inquiry; and,

Whereas, by the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on August 28, 1928 (known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris), the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another; and,

Whereas, by the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation,

¹ Proposed by Mr. Cordell Hull. U.S. State Department, Press Releases, No. 376, December 12, 1936.

signed at Washington January 5, 1929, the High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the procedure of conciliation all controversies between them, which it may not have been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, and to establish a 'Commission of Conciliation' to carry out the obligations assumed in the Convention ; and,

Whereas, by the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, signed at Washington January 5, 1929, the High Contracting Parties bind themselves to submit to arbitration, subject to certain exceptions, all differences between them of an international character, which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy and which are juridical in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law, and moreover, to create a procedure of arbitration to be followed ; and,

Whereas, by the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, signed at Rio de Janeiro October 10, 1933 (known as the Saavedra Lamas Treaty), the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that they condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those with other States, and that the settlement of disputes or controversies between them shall be effected only by pacific means which have the sanction of international law, and also declare that as between them territorial questions must not be settled by violence, and that they will not recognize any territorial arrangement not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by force of arms, and, moreover, in a case of non-compliance with these obligations, the contracting States undertake to adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude and to exercise the political, juridical, or economic means authorized by international law, and to bring the influence of public opinion to bear, without, however, resorting to intervention, either diplomatic or armed, subject nevertheless to obligations that may be incumbent upon them by virtue of their collective treaties ; and, furthermore, undertake to create a procedure of conciliation ;

Now, therefore, the High Contracting Parties renew their respective pledges that international differences that may arise between them shall be settled by pacific means. Believing, however, in the value of, and in the need for, consultation and co-operation between them at all times in all matters affecting their common interests, they agree that it is desirable to create a practical means whereby an effective and continuing opportunity for such consultation and co-operation shall be made available. They agree further that the purposes of the agency through which such practical opportunity for consulta-

tion and co-operation shall be afforded, as later provided for in this Convention, shall be the following:

(1) To assist, solely through the tender of friendly good offices and of mediation, in the fulfilment by the American Republics of existing obligations of pacific settlement, and

(2) To provide a means whereby the American Republics, with full recognition of their juridical equality as sovereign and independent States and of their general right to individual liberty of action, may nevertheless, in every way consistent therewith, take counsel together whenever emergencies arise which affect their common interests.

Article II. With the object of promoting action under this Convention, it is agreed that there shall be established a Permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee, composed of representatives of the High Contracting Parties, whose duties it shall be to assist in the observance of the several agreements enumerated in Article I of the present Convention, and of the provisions of the subsequent articles of the present Convention. This Committee shall collaborate on various ways and means of preventing conflicts of any kind, of avoiding recourse to force or of terminating any conflicts that may be in progress; and its activities in this regard shall not be deemed to be in derogation of the functions of any other agency charged with the duty of promoting the pacific settlement of international disputes. It shall also have the duty of exchanging information and views looking to the correlation of legislative and administrative action taken or to be taken pursuant to the provisions of Articles VI, VII, VIII, and IX of the present Convention.

The Committee shall be composed of the Secretary of State or Minister for Foreign Relations, as the case may be, of each of the High Contracting Parties. These officials shall *ipso facto* be considered members of the Committee upon the deposit by their governments of their instruments of ratification of the present Convention. The duties of any member of the Committee may, under exceptional circumstances, be discharged by an alternate designated by the government of which such member is a national.

The first meeting of the Committee shall be held at a time and place to be agreed upon by the High Contracting Parties and shall take place within six months following the date of the coming into force of the present Convention. The initiative in bringing about the first meeting of the Committee shall be taken by the Government of Subsequent meetings shall be held at such times and places as may be agreed upon by the Committee, and may be held independently of any particular controversy before the Committee.

The Committee, during the sessions of its first meeting, shall determine all matters related to its organization and manner of functioning, taking especial heed to establish efficient methods of procedure—such as arrangements for consultation by telephone, telegraph, and mail—in order that the Committee may be able to act at any time without the need of holding sessions at which the members of the said Committee would be required to be present personally.

Each Contracting Party shall bear the expenses of its own representative at meetings of the Committee; any joint expenses shall be pro-rated equally among the Contracting Parties participating in such meetings.

Article III. The High Contracting Parties further agree that, in the event of a dispute between two or more of them, they will seek to settle it in a spirit of mutual regard for their respective rights, having recourse for this purpose to direct diplomatic negotiation or to the alternative procedures of Commissions of Inquiry, Commissions of Conciliation, Tribunals of Arbitration, and Courts of Justice, as provided in the treaties to which they may be parties; and they also agree that, should the dispute go beyond the stage of direct diplomatic negotiation, they will report this fact to the Permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee, for which provision is made by this Convention, and the particular procedure of pacific settlement, if one should be resorted to, to which they are having recourse and the progress which is being made in effecting a settlement. However, this report may be made even though the dispute is being negotiated through regular diplomatic channels, directly between the Foreign Offices, if any of the parties considers it to be desirable and opportune to do so.

Article IV. The Permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee shall, at the request of any one of its members, have the right to take consultative action on its own account to remind the parties to a controversy of their obligations under the treaties to which they are parties, and to act as mediator between them, either by assisting them in their resort to a particular procedure or by suggesting to them a special procedure which may appear to give promise of a more prompt and satisfactory settlement.

Article V. The High Contracting Parties further agree that, in order to give greater effectiveness to the functions of the Permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee in respect to assisting in the fulfilment of their mutual obligations of pacific settlement, and in order to give to the Committee the fullest opportunity of exercising its functions as mediator, in the event of a failure on the part of two or more of them to effect a settlement of a pending controversy, they

will regard whatever mediatory action the Committee may take as being in entire harmony with the existing treaties for the pacific settlement of international disputes to which they are parties; and further that, during cognizance of the dispute by the Permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee, they will not commit acts which may aggravate the controversy nor resort to hostilities nor take military action preliminary to hostilities.

Article VI. The High Contracting Parties agree that in the unfortunate event that the methods provided by the present Convention or earlier agreements concluded between them should fail to bring about a pacific settlement of differences that may arise between any two or more of them, and hostilities should break out between two or more of them, they shall be governed by the following stipulations:

A. They shall, in accordance with the terms of the Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (Saavedra Lamas Treaty), adopt in their character as neutrals 'a common and solidary attitude', and shall, acting through the Permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee, immediately take cognizance of the outbreak of hostilities in order that they may determine forthwith, either jointly or individually, whether such hostilities shall be regarded as constituting a state of war so as to call into effect the neutrality provisions of the present Convention. Should there be a declaration, by one or other of the parties, of the existence of a state of war, and notification thereof be made to the other States parties to this Convention, such notification shall automatically call into effect the neutrality provisions of the present Convention.

B. It is contemplated that, in regard to the question whether hostilities actually in progress constitute a state of war, a decision by the Permanent Inter-American Consultative Committee shall be reached promptly, but in any event should hostilities be actually in progress between two or more of the Contracting Parties, or between two or more signatory States not at the time parties to this Convention by reason of failure to ratify it, each individual Contracting Party reserves the right to take notice of the situation and to declare that, for the purpose of its municipal legislation concerning neutrality, or for the purpose of the application of the rules of neutrality generally recognized by international law, or for both purposes, a state of war exists and such action shall not be deemed an unfriendly act or afford ground for complaint on the part of any State affected thereby.

Article VII. Individual neutral Powers shall be free to impose such prohibitions or restrictions on trade and commerce between them and belligerents, within the meaning of Article VI, as they may deem

appropriate in the interest of their domestic policy or of international peace, and such prohibitions or restrictions shall not be regarded as in contravention of provisions in treaties or other agreements with respect to trade and commerce, exception being made of provisions which are intended to secure freedom of transit as distinct from those relating to direct commercial intercourse.

Measures thus taken shall apply equally to all the belligerents, except in so far as the said neutral Powers are otherwise bound by multilateral treaties or conventions to which they are parties at the time of the entering into effect of this treaty.

Article VIII. Upon the determination of the existence of a state of war between two or more American Republics, those of the High Contracting Parties remaining neutral shall not permit, during the continuance of hostilities, the exportation from their respective territories of arms, ammunition, or implements of war to any of the belligerents, or to any neutral country for transshipment to, or for the use of, any of the belligerents.

For the purposes of this Article the term 'arms, ammunition, and implements of war' shall include the articles enumerated in Annex A attached hereto which is to be regarded as an integral part of the present Convention.

Article IX. The High Contracting Parties agree to prohibit the flotation within their respective territories of any loans through the issuance of bonds, or other evidences of indebtedness, and the establishment of any credit by or on behalf of the Government of any American Republic in a state of war with another American Republic, as may be determined under the terms of this Convention.

Article X. It is agreed that the provisions of Articles VIII and IX shall not be regarded as restricting the right of a neutral Power to impose restrictions on trade and commerce between it and belligerent countries in addition to those specified in those Articles.

Article XI. Nothing contained in this Convention shall be deemed to interfere with obligations incumbent upon any of the High Contracting Parties by virtue of other multilateral treaties or conventions to which they are parties at the time of the entering into effect of this Treaty.

Article XII. The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties and the ratifications shall be deposited with the Pan-American Union, which shall communicate the respective ratifications to the other signatory governments. It shall come into effect when ratifications have been deposited by not less than of the signatory Powers.

The Convention shall remain in force indefinitely; but it may be denounced by any of the High Contracting Parties, such denunciation to be effective one year after the date of notification thereof has been given. Notice of denunciation shall be communicated to the Pan-American Union, which shall transmit copies thereof to the other Contracting Parties. Notice of denunciation shall not be regarded as valid if the Party making such denunciation should be actually in a state of war or engaged in hostilities as foreseen in Article VI.

IN FAITH WHEREOF, the Plenipotentiaries above mentioned have signed this Treaty in Portuguese, English, Spanish, and French, and have affixed thereto their respective seals.

DONE at Buenos Aires, on this day of

8. CONVENTIONS, TREATIES, AND DECLARATIONS ADOPTED BY THE
INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 1936¹

(i) *Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re-establishment
of Peace, signed December 23, 1936*

Article 1. In the event that the peace of the American Republics is menaced, and in order to co-ordinate efforts to prevent war, any of the Governments of the American Republics signatory to the Treaty of Paris of 1928 or to the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 1933, or to both, whether or not a member of other peace organizations, shall consult with the other Governments of the American Republics, which, in such event, shall consult together for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful co-operation.

Article 2. In the event of war, or a virtual state of war between American States, the Governments of the American Republics represented at this Conference shall undertake without delay the necessary mutual consultations, in order to exchange views and to seek, within the obligations resulting from the pacts above-mentioned and from the standards of international morality, a method of peaceful collaboration; and, in the event of an international war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics, such consultation shall also take place to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory States, if they so desire, may eventually co-operate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American Continent.

Article 3. It is agreed that any question regarding the interpretation of the present Convention, which it has not been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, shall be submitted to the procedure of

¹ *International Conciliation*, No. 328, March 1937, pp. 221-30, and 263-5.

conciliation provided by existing agreements, or to arbitration, or to judicial settlement.

Article 4. The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The original convention shall be deposited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic which shall communicate the ratifications to the other signatories. The Convention shall come into effect between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they have deposited their ratifications.

Article 5. The present Convention shall remain in effect indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice, after the expiration of which period the Convention shall cease in its effects as regards the Party which denounces it but shall remain in effect for the remaining signatory States. Denunciations shall be addressed to the Government of the Argentine Republic, which shall transmit them to the other contracting States.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries sign the present Convention in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French and hereunto affix their respective seals, at the City of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, on the twenty-third day of the month of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

Reservation of Paraguay: 'With the express and definite reservation in respect to its peculiar international position as regards the League of Nations.'

(ii) *Additional Protocol Relative to Non-Intervention, signed
December 23, 1936*

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties declare inadmissible the intervention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, and for whatever reason, in the internal or external affairs of any other of the Parties.

The violation of the provisions of this Article shall give rise to mutual consultation, with the object of exchanging views and seeking methods of peaceful adjustment.

Article 2. It is agreed that every question concerning the interpretation of the present Additional Protocol, which it has not been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, shall be submitted to the procedure of conciliation provided for in the agreements in force, or to arbitration, or to judicial settlement.

Article 3. The present Additional Protocol shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The original instrument and the instruments of

ratification shall be deposited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic which shall communicate the ratifications to the other signatories. The Additional Protocol shall come into effect between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they shall have deposited their ratifications.

Article 4. The present Additional Protocol shall remain in effect indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice, after the expiration of which period the Protocol shall cease in its effects as regards the Party which denounces it but shall remain in effect for the remaining signatory States. Denunciations shall be addressed to the Government of the Argentine Republic which shall notify them to the other contracting States.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries sign the present Additional Protocol in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French, and hereunto affix their respective seals, at the City of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, on the twenty-third day of the month of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

(iii) *Treaty on the Prevention of Controversies, signed
December 23, 1936*

Article 1. The High Contracting Parties bind themselves to establish permanent bilateral mixed commissions composed of representatives of the signatory Governments which shall in fact be constituted, at the request of any of them, and such Party shall give notice of such request to the other signatory Governments.

Each Government shall appoint its own representative to the said commission, the meetings of which are to be held, alternately, in the capital cities of the two Governments represented in each of them. The first meeting shall be held at the seat of the Government which convokes it.

Article 2. The duty of the afore-mentioned commissions shall be to study, with the primary object of eliminating them, as far as possible, the causes of future difficulties or controversies; and to propose additional or detailed lawful measures which it might be convenient to take in order to promote, as far as possible, the due and regular application of treaties in force between the respective Parties, and also to promote the development of increasingly good relations in all ways between the two countries dealt with in each case.

Article 3. After each meeting of any of the said preventive commissions a minute shall be drawn and signed by its members setting out the considerations and decisions thereof and such minute shall be transmitted to the Governments represented in the commissions.

Article 4. The present Treaty shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the High Contracting Parties by virtue of international agreements.

Article 5. The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The original instrument shall be deposited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic which shall transmit authentic certified copies to the Governments for the afore-mentioned purpose of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan-American Union in Washington, which shall notify the signatory Governments of said deposit. Such notification shall be considered as an exchange of ratifications.

Article 6. The present Treaty will come into effect between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they deposit their respective ratifications.

Article 7. The present Treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely but may be denounced by means of one year's notice given to the Pan-American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory Governments. After the expiration of this period the Treaty shall cease in its effects as regards the Party which denounces it but shall remain in effect for the remaining High Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries sign the present Treaty in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French, and hereunto affix their respective seals, at the City of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, on the twenty-third day of the month of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

Reservation of the Delegation of Peru: 'Peru adheres to the above proposal with a reservation to Article 1 in the sense that it understands that recourse to the bilateral mixed commission is not mandatory but optional.'

(iv) *Inter-American Treaty on Good Offices and Mediation, signed
December 23, 1936*

Article 1. When a controversy arises between them that cannot be settled by the usual diplomatic means, the High Contracting Parties may have recourse to the good offices or mediation of an eminent citizen of any of the other American countries, preferably chosen from a general list made up in accordance with the following article.

Article 2. To prepare the afore-mentioned list, each Government, as soon as the present treaty is ratified, shall name two citizens selected from among the most eminent by reason of their high character and juridical learning.

The designations shall immediately be communicated to the Pan-American Union, which shall prepare the list and shall forward copies thereof to the Contracting Parties.

Article 3. According to the hypothesis set forth in Article 1, the countries in controversy shall, by common agreement, select one of the persons named on this list, for the purposes indicated in this Treaty.

The person selected shall name the place where, under his chairmanship, one duly authorized representative of each of the Parties shall meet in order to seek a peaceful and equitable solution of the difference.

If the Parties are unable to agree concerning the selection of the person lending his good offices or mediation, each one shall choose one of those named on the list. The two citizens chosen in this way shall select, from among the names listed, a third person who shall undertake the functions referred to, endeavouring, in so far as possible, to make a choice that shall be acceptable to both Parties.

Article 4. The mediator shall determine a period of time, not to exceed six nor be less than three months for the Parties to arrive at some peaceful settlement. Should this period expire before the Parties have reached some solution, the controversy shall be submitted to the procedure of conciliation provided for in existing Inter-American agreements.

Article 5. During the procedure established in this Treaty each of the interested Parties shall provide for its own expense and shall contribute equally to common costs or honoraria.

Article 6. The present Treaty shall not affect obligations previously entered into by the High Contracting Parties by virtue of international agreements.

Article 7. The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in conformity with their respective constitutional procedures. The original instrument shall be deposited in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, which shall transmit authentic certified copies to the Governments for the afore-mentioned purpose of ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited in the archives of the Pan-American Union in Washington, which shall notify the signatory Governments of said deposit. Such notification shall be considered as an exchange of ratifications.

Article 8. The present Treaty will come into effect between the High Contracting Parties in the order in which they deposit their respective ratifications.

Article 9. The present Treaty shall remain in effect indefinitely but

may be denounced by means of one year's notice given to the Pan-American Union, which shall transmit it to the other signatory Governments. After the expiration of this period the Treaty shall cease in its effects as regards the Party which denounces it, but shall remain in effect for the remaining High Contracting Parties.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries sign the present Treaty in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French, and hereunto affix their respective seals, at the City of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, on the twenty-third day of the month of December, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

(v) *Convention to Co-ordinate, Extend, and Assure the Fulfilment of the Existing Treaties between the American States, signed December 23, 1936*

Article 1. Taking into consideration that, by the Treaty to Avoid and Prevent Conflicts between the American States, signed at Santiago May 3, 1923 (known as the Gondra Treaty), the High Contracting Parties agree that all controversies which it has been impossible to settle through diplomatic channels or to submit to arbitration in accordance with existing treaties shall be submitted for investigation and report to a Commission of Inquiry ;

That by the Treaty for the Renunciation of War, signed at Paris on August 28, 1928 (known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris), the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another ;

That by the General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation, signed at Washington, January 5, 1929, the High Contracting Parties agree to submit to the procedure of conciliation all controversies between them, which it may not have been possible to settle through diplomatic channels, and to establish a 'Commission of Conciliation' to carry out the obligations assumed in the Convention ;

That by the General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration, signed at Washington, January 5, 1929, the High Contracting Parties bind themselves to submit to arbitration, subject to certain exceptions, all differences between them of an international character, which it has not been possible to adjust by diplomacy and which are juridical in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law, and, moreover, to create a procedure of arbitration to be followed ; and

That by the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation, signed at

Rio de Janeiro, October 10, 1933 (known as the Saavedra Lamas Treaty), the High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that they condemn wars of aggression in their mutual relations or in those with other States and that the settlement of disputes or controversies between them shall be effected only by pacific means which have the sanction of international law, and also declare that as between them territorial questions must not be settled by violence, and that they will not recognize any territorial arrangement not obtained by pacific means, nor the validity of the occupation or acquisition of territories brought about by force of arms, and, moreover, in a case of non-compliance with these obligations, the contracting States undertake to adopt, in their character as neutrals, a common and solidary attitude and to exercise the political, juridical, or economic means authorized by international law, and to bring the influence of public opinion to bear, without, however, resorting to intervention, either diplomatic or armed, subject nevertheless to the attitude that may be incumbent upon them by virtue of their collective treaties; and, furthermore, undertake to create a procedure of conciliation;

The High Contracting Parties reaffirm the obligations entered into to settle, by pacific means, controversies of an international character that may arise between them.

Article 2. The High Contracting Parties, convinced of the necessity for the co-operation and consultation provided for in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re-establishment of Peace signed by them on this same day, agree that in all matters which affect peace on the continent, such consultation and co-operation shall have as their object to assist, through the tender of friendly good offices and of mediation, the fulfilment by the American Republics of existing obligations for pacific settlement, and to take counsel together, with full recognition of their juridical equality, as sovereign and independent States, and of their general right to individual liberty of action, when an emergency arises which affects their common interest in the maintenance of peace.

Article 3. In case of threat of war, the High Contracting Parties shall apply the provisions contained in Articles 1 and 2 of the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Re-establishment of Peace, above referred to, it being understood that, while such consultation is in progress and for a period of not more than six months, the Parties in dispute will not have recourse to hostilities or take any military action whatever.

Article 4. The High Contracting Parties further agree that, in the event of a dispute between two or more of them, they will seek to

settle it in a spirit of mutual regard for their respective rights, having recourse for this purpose to direct diplomatic negotiation or to the alternative procedures of mediation, commissions of inquiry, commissions of conciliation, tribunals of arbitration, and courts of justice, as provided in the treaties to which they may be parties; and they also agree that, should it be impossible to settle the dispute by diplomatic negotiation and should the States in dispute have recourse to the other procedures provided in the present Article, they will report this fact and the progress of the negotiations to the other signatory States. These provisions do not affect controversies already submitted to a diplomatic or juridical procedure by virtue of special agreements.

Article 5. The High Contracting Parties agree that, in the event that the methods provided by the present Convention or by agreements previously concluded should fail to bring about a pacific settlement of differences that may arise between any two or more of them, and hostilities should break out between two or more of them, they shall be governed by the following stipulations:

(a) They shall, in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation (Saavedra Lamas Treaty), adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude; and shall consult immediately with one another, and take cognizance of the outbreak of hostilities in order to determine, either jointly or individually, whether such hostilities shall be regarded as constituting a state of war so as to call into effect the provisions of the present Convention.

(b) It is understood that, in regard to the question whether hostilities actually in progress constitute a state of war, each of the High Contracting Parties shall reach a prompt decision. In any event, should hostilities be actually in progress between two or more of the Contracting Parties, or between two or more signatory States not at the time parties to this Convention by reason of failure to ratify it, each Contracting Party shall take notice of the situation and shall adopt such an attitude as would be consistent with other multilateral treaties to which it is a party or in accordance with its municipal legislation. Such action shall not be deemed an unfriendly act on the part of any State affected thereby.

Article 6. Without prejudice to the universal principles of neutrality provided for in the case of an international war outside of America and without affecting the duties contracted by those American States Members of the League of Nations, the High Contracting Parties reaffirm their loyalty to the principles enunciated in the five

agreements referred to in Article 1, and they agree that in the case of an outbreak of hostilities or threat of an outbreak of hostilities between two or more of them, they shall, through consultation, immediately endeavour to adopt in their character as neutrals a common and solidary attitude, in order to discourage or prevent the spread or prolongation of hostilities.

With this object, and having in mind the diversity of cases and circumstances, they may consider the imposition of prohibitions or restrictions on the sale or shipment of arms, munitions, and implements of war, loans, or other financial help to the States in conflict, in accordance with the municipal legislation of the High Contracting Parties, and without detriment to their obligations derived from other treaties to which they are or may become parties.

Article 7. Nothing contained in the present Convention shall be understood as affecting the rights and duties of the High Contracting Parties which are at the same time Members of the League of Nations.

Article 8. The present Convention shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their constitutional procedures. The original convention and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, which shall communicate the ratifications to the other signatory States. It shall come into effect when ratifications have been deposited by not less than eleven of the signatory States.

The Convention shall remain in force indefinitely; but it may be denounced by any of the High Contracting Parties, such denunciation to be effective one year after the date upon which such notification has been given. Notice of denunciation shall be communicated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic, which shall transmit copies thereof to the other signatory States. Denunciation shall not be regarded as valid if the Party making such denunciation shall be actually in a state of war, or shall be engaged in hostilities without fulfilling the provisions established by this Convention.

In witness whereof, the Plenipotentiaries above mentioned have signed this Treaty in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French, and have affixed thereto their respective seals, in the City of Buenos Aires, Capital of the Argentine Republic, this twenty-third day of December, of the year nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

RESERVATIONS

Reservation of the Argentine Delegation:

(1) In no case, under Article 6, can foodstuffs or raw materials destined for the civil populations of belligerent countries be considered

as contraband of war, nor shall there exist any duty to prohibit credits for the acquisition of said foodstuffs or raw materials which have the destination indicated.

With reference to the embargo on arms, each nation may reserve freedom of action in the face of a war of aggression.

Reservation of the Delegation of Paraguay:

(2) In no case, under Article 6, can foodstuffs or raw materials destined for the civil populations of belligerent countries be considered as contraband of war, nor shall there exist any duty to prohibit credits for the acquisition of said foodstuffs or raw materials which have the destination indicated.

With reference to the embargo on arms, each nation may reserve freedom of action in the face of a war of aggression.

Reservation of the Delegation of El Salvador:

(3) With reservation in respect of the idea of continental solidarity when confronted by foreign aggression.

Reservation of the Delegation of Colombia:

(4) In signing this Convention, the Delegation of Colombia understands that the phrase 'in their character as neutrals', which appears in Articles 5 and 6, implies a new concept of international law which allows a distinction to be drawn between the aggressor and the attacked, and to treat them differently. At the same time, the Delegation of Colombia considers it necessary, in order to assure the full and effective application of this Pact, to set down in writing the following definition of the aggressor:

That State shall be considered as an aggressor which becomes responsible for one or several of the following acts:

(a) That its armed forces, to whatever branch they may belong, illegally cross the land, sea, or air frontiers of other States. When the violation of the territory of a State has been effected by irresponsible bands organized within or outside of its territory and which have received direct or indirect help from another State, such violation shall be considered equivalent, for the purposes of the present Article, to that effected by the regular forces of the State responsible for the aggression;

(b) That it has intervened in a unilateral or illegal way in the internal or external affairs of another State;

(c) That it has refused to fulfil a legally given arbitral decision or sentence of international justice.

No consideration of any kind, whether political, military, economic, or of any other kind, may serve as an excuse or justification for the aggression here anticipated.

(vi) *Declaration of Principles of Inter-American Solidarity and Cooperation* [No. xxvii], approved December 21, 1936

The Governments of the American Republics, having considered:

That they have a common likeness in their democratic form of government, and their common ideals of peace and justice, manifested in the several treaties and conventions which they have signed for the purpose of constituting a purely American system tending towards the preservation of peace, the proscription of war, the harmonious development of their commerce and of their cultural aspirations demonstrated in all of their political, economic, social, scientific, and artistic activities;

That the existence of continental interests obliges them to maintain solidarity of principles as the basis of the life of the relations of each to every other American nation;

That Pan-Americanism, as a principle of American international law, by which is understood a moral union of all of the American Republics in defence of their common interests based upon the most perfect equality and reciprocal respect for their rights of autonomy, independence, and free development, requires the proclamation of principles of American international law; and

That it is necessary to consecrate the principle of American solidarity in all non-continental conflicts, especially since those limited to the American continent should find a peaceful solution by the means established by the treaties and conventions now in force or in the instruments hereafter to be executed,

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace

DECLARES:

1. That the American nations, true to their republican institutions, proclaim their absolute juridical liberty, their unrestricted respect for their several sovereignty, and the existence of a common democracy throughout America;

2. That every act susceptible of disturbing the peace of America affects each and every one of them, and justifies the initiation of the procedure of consultation provided for in the Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation, and Re-establishment of Peace, executed at this Conference; and

3. That the following principles are accepted by the international American community:

(a) Proscription of territorial conquest and that, in consequence, no acquisition made through violence shall be recognized;

(b) Intervention by one State in the internal or external affairs of another State is condemned ;

(c) Forcible collection of pecuniary debts is illegal ; and

(d) Any difference or dispute between the American nations, whatever its nature or origin, shall be settled by the methods of conciliation, or full arbitration, or through operation of international justice.

(vii) *Co-ordination of Pacific Instruments with the Covenant of the League of Nations* [No. xxix], approved December 21, 1936

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace

RESOLVES :

1. To recommend to the American States Members of the League of Nations and signatories to the Pact of Paris, the Saavedra Lamas Treaty, and any other similar agreements signed in the future, that they request the States which are not Members of the League and which are parties to the other treaties referred to above, that they co-operate with the League of Nations in the study of the projects for the co-ordination of those various instruments with the Covenant of the League of Nations ;

2. To recommend to the American States which are not Members of the League of Nations and are parties to the other aforementioned treaties, that they co-operate with the League of Nations in the measures which it may adopt to prevent war or to settle international conflicts by pacific means, whenever the respective legal systems of said States permit ;

3. That in due time the present resolution be brought to the attention of the special Committee now assembled in Geneva to study the co-ordination of the Covenant of the League of Nations with other peace instruments.

(The delegation of the United States of America abstains from voting on this Resolution.)

9. EXTRACTS FROM SPEECH BY MR. CORDELL HULL, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, DECEMBER 23, 1936¹

To-day this Conference for the maintenance of peace holds its last session. Before it adjourns, let me review briefly the major events and actions. One point stands out boldly. No such conference could have had any measure of real success had it not been approached in

¹ Read at the final session of the Conference by Mr. Sumner Welles, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State. *International Conciliation*, No. 328, March 1937, p. 215.

the spirit with which each of the twenty-one delegations has approached this one—a spirit of good will and common determination to consolidate the pattern of peace. . . .

The twenty-one American Republics have, by the conventions adopted at this Conference, co-ordinated and made effective the existing machinery for the maintenance of peace. Such agreements as the Kellogg-Briand Pact [Pact of Paris] have been handicapped by lack of implementation; other agreements have created the initial machinery of peace, but have failed to provide ways and means to assure its successful operation. By the agreements adopted at this Conference, we now have a method of consultation which is capable of enhancing the efficiency of the peace pacts already in existence and of assisting the parties to them in carrying out the obligations they entail. Without real identification of purpose among us all, without common understanding, and unless we—all of us—had the same goal in view, the system of consultation might be considered a poor, a sterile plan. But with a continuation of the good will which now exists and with, as I hope, an ever-increasing purpose of real co-operation, consultation lies necessarily at the basis of all agreement on this continent. Without it no plans of common action could be made effective. We pledge ourselves to consult; we also rely upon our sense of our individual national needs and the recognition of our common interest in the maintenance of peace to meet such situations as may arise.

The American Republics have not only entered into a solemn agreement to consult one another should any one of them be threatened or attacked at home and seek to give effect to a common and solidary policy of neutrality; but more than that, they have undertaken to assume a common and solidary attitude towards an attack from abroad. This they have done in a way consistent with their sovereignty and independence and their ultimate right to make decisions in accordance with their own national legislation. They meet as equals before the law. They have formally disclaimed any purpose of intervening in one another's domestic affairs. They recognize their collective concern in the safety of each and all of their number if any non-American Power should offer a threat to the peace of this continent. Thus, the national security of each individual American Republic has become the common interest of all.

The twenty-one Republics could have taken no more significant step in promoting conditions of both regional and world peace than by making their unanimous and unequivocal declaration for equality of commercial treatment and for the lowering of the barriers obstructing trade. They have emphasized their will for peace by manifesting

their intention to pursue the economic policies which alone afford the firm foundation for peace. They are persuaded that a flourishing commerce is a strong link to bind nations together ; that a freer interchange of goods and services inevitably operates to relieve economic distress, to increase employment, to improve standards of living, and to add to the material happiness of their peoples.

Furthermore, union of common purpose must include facilities for physical and intellectual exchange. This Conference has made striking advances in this field, of having facilitated the construction of a Pan-American highway, arranged for exchange of students and professors, and made plans for scientific and artistic co-operation in a degree heretofore unknown.

Such, in brief summary, are the outstanding accomplishments of this Conference. The fact stands out that a great Inter-American Conference has met, and in a spirit of mutual trust and common purpose has worked out detailed and practical measures for the preservation of peace.

We turn now to something more fundamental than the actual accomplishments of the Conference as they appear on the records of the treaties and resolutions adopted. I have in mind the spirit which animates the individual American Republics and which is the firmest guarantee of their written word. That spirit is latent in their democratic institutions which we believe to be the basis upon which the good faith of nations must ultimately rest. If, in the words of the President of my country, 'democracy is still the hope of the world', then it is for us to guard with a jealous eye our chosen form of government and to further in every possible way the education of our people in the processes of self-government. The necessity for such education cannot be over-emphasized. *Freedom is the soil from which peace springs.* From the institutions of a free people arise those conditions of stability of governments so essential for the preservation of lasting peace. Therefore we are joined in a common determination to make our countries safe for peace.

There is no need for this conception to be limited to the American nations. There is an imperative necessity for its immediate world-wide application. . . .

I keenly feel that, in our labours here, we have done more than to co-ordinate the machinery to preserve the peace of our own Republics. I cannot emphasize too strongly that we are in no sense moving towards a policy of continental isolation. We are not lured by the mirage of self-containment ; we are aware of its pitfalls. In a close-knit, interdependent world, we see the folly of seeking to build a

Chinese wall around a hemisphere. Our purpose is not to isolate this continent, but to chart our own path to peace, and thereby set a practical example to other parts of the world.

Of what could there be greater need to-day than for the example given by us here of opening the door to peace? Here by practical action we have demonstrated that there can be a common collaboration to this end. Here we have revitalized international law, and here we have renewed those finer relationships between nations upon which, in the last analysis, freedom, peace, prosperity, and civilization itself depend.

In recent years the entire international order has suffered severe dislocation; the relations between nations have become increasingly confused and chaotic, and human progress has been obstructed. These conditions require prompt attention and remedy. We must diminish the dangers attendant upon conditions of moral isolation and intensified nationalism. This we seek to do by encouraging a world-wide reaffirmation of the principle of the honourable maintenance of obligations, of full faith in the given word, and of fair dealing between equal partners. Such qualities in the conduct of nations are essential conditions for the betterment of their relations and for the consolidation of peace.

And so, in this last hour, when our co-operative efforts here for the common welfare are at a close, and when each of us is about to return to his own country, let us do so with a continued faith and hope.

We here have witnessed significant advances towards the establishment of a permanent peace for this hemisphere. Let us each go our way determined to carry forward our programme and to emblazon upon the banners of our republics the spirit in which it was conceived. Let us return to our particular problems and duties pledging that we will, individually and collectively, reject the counsels of force. Let us hold out to a darkened world the beacon of a just and permanent peace which we pledge ourselves to maintain on this American continent. May the spirit and the example which we have consecrated here be of avail throughout the world.

D. GENERAL

I. THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS¹

The origins and results of the London Naval Conference which opened on December 9, 1935, and closed with the signature of the Treaty on March 25, 1936, are described in an official British Memorandum.² The Treaty³ was signed by the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and India, the United States of America and France, Japan having withdrawn from the Conference on January 15 and Italy having regretted her inability to sign, in view of the fact that she could not agree to any limitation of her defences so long as the concentration of fleets in the Mediterranean, arising out of the conflict with Abyssinia and the sanctions policy of the League of Nations, continued.⁴

At the meeting of the First Committee of the Conference on January 15 the Japanese delegate, Admiral Nagano, restated the Japanese thesis.⁵ Lord Monsell⁶ and Mr. Norman Davis,⁷ leaders of the United Kingdom and United States' delegations, explained the British and American stand-points. In view of the failure of the Japanese delegation to secure general support for the proposal of a 'common upper limit', Admiral Nagano on the same day notified Lord Monsell, the Chairman of the Conference, of their decision to withdraw.⁸

The Rules regarding submarine warfare contained in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 had been accepted only by the United Kingdom and the British Dominions signatories of that Treaty, the United States, and Japan. France and Italy signified their willingness to accept these Rules, and a *Procès-verbal* recording their adherence was signed in London on November 6, 1936,⁹ by the representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, the Irish Free State, New Zealand, South Africa, and India, and of France, Italy, Japan, and the United States of America.

Article 4, paragraph 2, of the London Naval Treaty of 1936 laid down that the calibre of guns to be carried on capital ships should not exceed 14 in. (356 mm.), provided that in the event of the five Washington Naval Powers failing to agree to this reduction by April 1, 1937, the maximum calibre should be fixed at 16 in. (406 mm.).

While the United Kingdom and France, the United States (provided that Japan agreed) and Italy (provided all five Naval Powers agreed) were prepared to accept the reduction in gun calibre to 14 in., Japan, on March 27, 1937, notified the other Powers of her refusal to accept the proposed reduction. In view of this the United States Administration announced their intention to mount 16-in. guns on their new capital ships under construction.

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part I (ii).

² See below, p. 599.

³ See below, p. 616. South Africa and the Irish Free State decided not to become parties to the Treaty on the ground that it would be inappropriate for them to do so in view of the fact that they possessed no naval forces.

⁴ See below, p. 615.

⁵ See below, p. 606.

⁶ See below, p. 608.

⁷ See below, p. 613.

⁸ See below, p. 614.

⁹ See below, p. 632.

On July 17, 1937, difficult negotiations which had been proceeding for many months between the United Kingdom and Germany and Russia¹ resulted in the signature of bilateral agreements² between the United Kingdom and these two countries whereby they accepted, with certain changes, the definitions and limitations agreed upon in the London Naval Treaty of 1936 and its provisions for the exchange of information concerning naval construction. Ratifications were exchanged on November 4, 1937.

The London Naval Treaty was ratified by the United States on July 2, 1936, by France on June 24, 1937 and by the United Kingdom on July 29, 1937, on which day it entered into force.

1. BRITISH MEMORANDUM ON THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE
DECEMBER 9, 1935, TO MARCH 25, 1936³

Under the provisions of the London Naval Treaty, 1930,⁴ the High Contracting Powers agreed to meet in conference in 1935 to frame a new agreement to replace and carry out the purposes of the existing treaty. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom therefore initiated early in 1934 the preliminary conversations which experience has shown to be essential to the success of an international conference of this nature.⁵

2. On December 29, 1934, notice of termination of the Washington Treaty was given by Japan.⁶ As the Contracting Powers to that Treaty had agreed to meet in conference within one year of the date of such notice of termination, it was, for this reason also, necessary to summon a conference in 1935. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, feeling that as they had taken the initiative in the preparatory conversations they were perhaps under a greater obligation in the matter than other governments, accordingly issued the necessary invitations.

3. The Conference was opened on Monday, December 9, 1935, by the Prime Minister, who stated that the proposals of this country remained the same as those communicated by His Majesty's Government to the Disarmament Conference in July 1932, and that they attached the greatest importance to a continuation of limitation in both the quantitative and qualitative field. He pointed out that an international agreement on these lines would undoubtedly lead to great economy in future naval construction throughout the world.

¹ The object of these negotiations, which were supplemented by separate conversations with Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey, was to bring the war vessels of these States within the framework of the London Naval Treaty by securing their acceptance of the definitions and limitations agreed upon by its signatories.

² See below, pp. 634, 641.

³ British White Paper, Cmd. 5137.

⁴ See *Documents* for 1930, p. 22.

⁵ See *Documents* for 1934, pp. 486-503.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 501.

He also expressed the hope that, even if the abolition of submarines should prove impossible, the acceptance by France and Italy of the rules laid down in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, would be the signal for the acceptance of those rules by all the maritime Powers of the world, and that by this means unrestricted submarine warfare would in future be averted.

4. As regards quantitative limitation, His Majesty's Government were forced to the conclusion during the preliminary conversations that agreement on any system of limitation based directly on a 'ratio' or definite relationship of naval strength, such as that on which the Washington and London Naval Treaties were founded, would prove difficult of attainment. In order to preserve some measure of quantitative limitation they proposed as a 'middle way' that the quantitative side of the Treaty should consist of unilateral and voluntary declarations by each of the signatory Powers limiting its construction over a period of, say, six years.

They realized that the degree to which their proposal would effect a quantitative limitation in naval armaments would depend entirely on the spirit in which it was carried out, but they would have been fully prepared to give to such construction figures as might be agreed upon the form of a contractual obligation, if that method of limitation had been acceptable to other Powers.

Agreement on any form of quantitative limitation has, however, unfortunately not been possible.

5. At the opening of the Conference Japan tabled her proposal for a 'Common Upper Limit'. After considerable discussion this proposal remained unacceptable to all the other delegations, and to the deep regret of His Majesty's Government Japan withdrew her delegation from the Conference, leaving, however, observers to watch its progress.

6. The United Kingdom proposals mentioned above having also proved unacceptable generally, the further efforts of the Conference were directed to achieving the maximum measure possible of qualitative limitation, and to obtaining agreement on provisions for advanced notification of construction or acquisition of war vessels, and to exchange of information on their principal characteristics. The object of this latter provision is to remove one of the most fruitful sources of suspicion between Naval Powers, thus reducing the likelihood of building competition between them.

Complete agreement has been reached between the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations possessing sea-going naval forces, the United States of America, and France on these points. Although

| <i>Limitations proposed by His Majesty's Government to the Disarmament Conference, 1932, which were again put forward at the present Conference.</i> | | | <i>Limitations agreed to in The London Naval Treaty, 1936.</i> | | |
|--|--|---|---|---|---|
| | <i>Maxi- mum displace- ment. Tons.</i> | <i>Maxi- mum gun calibre.</i> | | <i>Maxi- mum displace- ment. Tons.</i> | <i>Maxi- mum gun calibre.</i> |
| Capital ships .. (assuming the retention of the 8-in. cruiser) | 25,000 | 12-in. | Capital ships .. | 35,000 | 14-in. ¹ |
| Aircraft carriers .. | 22,000 | 6.1-in. | Aircraft carriers .. | 23,000 | 6.1-in. |
| Cruisers— | | | Light surface ves- sels ² — | | |
| Category (a) .. i.e., 10,000 tons— 8-in. guns. | No further con- struction. | | Sub-category (a) .. (Corresponding to Cruiser category (a)). | No further con- struction dur- ing the period of the Treaty. | |
| Category (b) .. i.e., 10,000 tons— 6-in. guns. | 7,000 | 6.1-in. | Sub-category (b) .. (Corresponding gen- erally to Cruiser category (b)). | | |
| Destroyers— | | | For the period of the Treaty, agreement has been obtained to a 'Holiday' in the building of Light surface vessels Sub- category (b), up to the full limits that would be possible within the definition of the sub-category, i.e., 10,000 tons and 6.1-in guns and the limits allowed are .. | 8,000 | 6.1-in. |
| Leaders .. | 1,850 | 5-in. | | | |
| Destroyers .. | 1,500 | | | | |
| Submarines— | | | Submarines .. | 2,000 | 5.1-in. |
| Abolition, or, failing this .. | 250 | | | | |

¹ Provided that if any of the Washington Powers fail to accept this provision before April 1, 1937, the maximum gun calibre shall be 16-in.

² It will be observed that Cruisers, Leaders, and Destroyers are now classed together under the name of Light surface vessels. This has been done to meet the wishes of other Powers, none of whom except the U.S.A. and Japan have ever accepted a separate Leader and Destroyer category.

Italy has found herself unable for the present to associate herself with this agreement, the Italian delegation entered fully into all the discussions, was consulted on all points, and, subject to certain reservations, agreed to the wording of the various reports.

7. As regards qualitative limitation, it will be convenient to place before Parliament a comparison of the aims of His Majesty's Government with the results actually achieved by the Conference [see p. 601].

8. As regards capital ships, although agreement on reduction of the Washington tonnage has not been found possible, the reduction in calibre of gun is a satisfactory step and may lead to future agreement on reductions in tonnage, and possibly to gradual further reductions in calibre.

This reduction in gun calibre is, as before stated, subject to the provision that, if any of the Washington Powers fail to agree to it before April 1, 1937, the maximum gun calibre shall remain at 16-inch.

9. As regards aircraft carriers, the reduction to 23,000 tons from the Washington limit of 27,000 tons is considerable, and will result initially in appreciable financial saving in the building of this expensive class of warship, although against this saving must be offset the increased expense in the long run of embarking a similar number of aircraft in smaller carriers.

10. As regards light surface vessels, His Majesty's Government are very gratified that their desire permanently to reduce the size of cruisers has resulted in the adoption of a 'Holiday' in the building of all large cruisers, whether of sub-category (a) and armed with the 8-inch gun, or of sub-category (b) of a size larger than 8,000 tons, and armed with guns of a calibre not greater than 6.1-inch. In view of our commitments, both in respect of replacement of old wartime cruisers and of the essential steady increase in numbers, this will result in substantial reductions in expenditure.

11. The limitations on light surface vessels (Cruisers, Destroyers, &c.) are made effective by agreement on a 'zone of non-construction' within which no ships may be built. If this had not been done, vessels could have been built which by definition would have been capital ships, but which in reality could have been of a superior cruiser type.

The 'zone' extends from 8,000 to 17,500 tons and the necessary corollary has been a corresponding limitation on the minimum size of gun to be carried by a capital ship, which is fixed at 10 inches.

In order to prevent a vessel which would upset the intentions of the Treaty being built in the guise of an aircraft carrier, provision

has also been made to limit to ten the number of guns of above 5.25-inch calibre carried by those vessels.

12. As regards submarines, it has again not been found possible to reach agreement on the policy of abolition, and the London Naval Treaty limits for this category have been retained.

13. As regards Advance Notification of Construction or Acquisition of Warships, the provisions now made are entirely new. Under neither the Washington nor the London Naval Treaty were there any arrangements of this nature.

As regards Exchange of Information, not only is this to take place earlier in the life of each ship building or acquired than was provided for in those Treaties, but the scope of the information is considerably extended. The main provisions are that:

- (a) The High Contracting Parties will communicate to each other within the first four months of each calendar year their annual programme of construction or acquisition of the principal classes of warship, giving the calibre of the largest gun carried by each vessel.

Once these programmes are declared, no increase in the number of vessels included in the declaration is permitted for the current year, subject, of course, to the operation of the various safeguarding clauses.

No vessel of the principal classes of warship can be laid down until after the lapse of four months from the date of communication of the above programme.

- (b) Full information as to characteristics of each vessel is to be given at least four months before the ship is laid down.

Arrangements are also made to provide for exchange of information concerning necessary departures during building from the characteristics already reported, details of ships scrapped or otherwise disposed of, particulars of ships acquired, important alterations in vessels previously completed, and various other matters.

14. As regards various other classes of ships which were not sufficiently important to be included in the above procedure and which, under the London Naval Treaty, 1930, were classified as Exempt or Special vessels, arrangements have been made whereby they are now classed as 'Auxiliary Vessels' or as 'Minor War Vessels'. These vessels will not be subject to the provisions of Advance Notification of Construction or Acquisition, but lists of them will be exchanged and kept up to date annually.

15. All information exchanged will, of course, necessarily be treated

as confidential until published by the High Contracting Party supplying it.

16. As regards safeguarding clauses, careful arrangements have been made to deal with the three principal sets of circumstances in which the release of a Contracting Party from the provisions of the Treaty might be necessary, namely, should a Contracting Party become engaged in a war and consider the naval requirements of his security to be materially affected; should a Power not signatory to the Treaty acquire, or propose to acquire, vessels not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions of the Treaty; or should a High Contracting Party's national security be materially affected by any change of circumstances other than those mentioned above, or below, in respect of the 'Cruiser Holiday'. In all the above cases consultation between the High Contracting Parties is required and three months' delay is imposed before departing from the obligations of the Treaty, except in the case where one such Party becomes engaged in war, when he can suspend any or all of the obligations at once, and the other Parties can, after consultation, also forthwith suspend them.

17. A special and limited safeguard has also been provided in respect of the 'Cruiser Holiday' in the article dealing with that 'Holiday'. This safeguard provides for a High Contracting Party, should he consider his national security to be affected, an escape against the amount of construction by any Power of cruisers of sub-category (b) and against the construction by a non-Contracting Party of light surface vessels not allowed to be built under the terms of the 'Holiday'.

18. The Treaty will come into force on January 1, 1937, provided by that date it is ratified by all the signatory Powers, or, failing this, on the date by which it is ratified by these Powers. It will of course be open to accession by Japan and Italy as signatories of the Washington Treaty. Negotiations have already commenced for the conclusion of a bilateral agreement on the same lines with Germany, and it is hoped that similar negotiations for bilateral agreements with certain other Naval Powers will be undertaken shortly.

As a first step towards the acceptance of a general Treaty on the same lines by all Naval Powers, the Conference, in communicating the Treaty to the League of Nations, has suggested that the remarks of other Naval Powers should in the first instance be forwarded to His Majesty's Government.

The Treaty will remain in force until December 31, 1942.

As regards arrangements for framing a further Treaty to come into force after that date, provision is made for His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to initiate, during the last quarter of 1940, a

consultation between the Parties. Unless, as a result of consultation, it appears that it would be neither desirable nor practicable, a conference will be held in 1941. In the course of the consultation views will be exchanged to determine whether, amongst other points, it may be possible to agree upon a reduction in the calibre of gun and in the size of future capital ships.

19. The full extent of reduction and limitation aimed at by His Majesty's Government has by no means been achieved. A substantial measure of success has, however, been accomplished. Although agreement on any form of quantitative limitation has not proved possible, His Majesty's Government feel that, even if agreement to stand on the qualitative limits of the Washington and London Naval Treaties had been the only outcome of the conference, a very considerable success would have been recorded.

20. The principal capital ship fleets of the world will shortly be in process of renewal, a steady increase in cruiser strength can no longer be postponed in our own case, whilst in other classes of ships much new construction is required in place of war-time and obsolescent vessels. If no Treaty had been negotiated to replace those of Washington and London, there would have been complete freedom to build up to any size of ship desired, with the resulting increase of expenditure. Not only, however, has this been avoided, but the reductions in displacement and calibre of gun that have been agreed to, although not so drastic as His Majesty's Government had hoped, are in themselves sufficient to ensure considerable financial saving in our future naval construction programmes. Furthermore, the agreement should go far to put into effect the hopes, expressed by the Prime Minister at the opening of the Conference, that the public mind will be relieved of the threat of a general race in naval armaments. The arrangements made for advance notification and exchange of information should do much to help in achieving this object, and the avoidance of secret building, with the inevitable suspicion which results from it, should materially assist in reinforcing international good will.

21. The Rules regarding submarine warfare contained in Part IV of the London Naval Treaty, 1930, had already been accepted and become binding upon all the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States of America and Japan as a result of their ratification of the above Treaty. The Rules had not, however, become binding upon France and Italy, owing to the fact that, though the Treaty was signed in respect of these countries, they had not ratified it, and in consequence it was not possible, as had been contemplated in the Treaty, for His Majesty's Government in the United

Kingdom to communicate the Rules to countries in respect of which the Treaty had not been signed. France and Italy have now indicated their desire to confirm their acceptance of the above Rules resulting from the signature of the previous London Naval Treaty, and a separate instrument has been prepared, which it is hoped will shortly be signed, embodying the French and Italian confirmation of their previous acceptance of the Rules and authorizing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to communicate the Rules, which are a continuing obligation and not one for a short term only, to all other maritime countries, with an invitation to accede thereto and without limit of time.¹

2. STATEMENT BY ADMIRAL NAGANO, JAPANESE DELEGATE, TO THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE, JANUARY 15, 1936²

I wish to state—and this I do with all due deference to the lofty aims of the other Powers—that Japan is second to no country in her sincere and zealous desires for world peace. We have taken as our primary objective the elimination of the menace of war and the assurance of equality of security for all Powers concerned.

The disarmament question should be considered on the basis of 'one Power versus one Power' relationship. If two Powers are to conclude such an agreement on the strengths of their naval forces as will give them equal standing and guarantee their mutual security, the most rational principle to be applied is that of equality of armaments. We believe, in fact, that there is no other method which would be at once fair and just. And this is especially true as between two Powers which are separated by ocean and whose defence is wholly dependent on their navies.

It is a peculiar characteristic of naval forces that they can be moved about at will with great facility. It follows, therefore, that when discussing naval relations between two countries, it is only reasonable that at least all vessels capable of participating in naval engagements should be taken into consideration.

In order to establish as complete a state of non-aggression and non-menace as possible, we advocate the complete abolition or drastic reduction of offensive armaments. We advocate the abolition of aircraft carriers and a drastic reduction in capital ships and A-class cruisers. As regards armaments which are essentially defensive in character and purpose, we believe that each Power should be permitted to equip itself in the manner best suited to its conditions and circumstances.

¹ See below, p. 632.

² *The Times*, January 17, 1936.

I would undertake to set forth the framework of our formula:

(1) There would first of all be fixed a maximum global tonnage which none of the Powers concerned may exceed, and which must be fixed at as low a level as possible so as not to be contrary to the spirit of disarmament.

(2) There would be fixed for those categories which are generally recognized to be predominantly offensive in character—namely, capital ships, aircraft carriers (in the event of their non-abolition), and A-class cruisers—a common maximum tonnage and number of units to be allowed to each Power in respect of each of the three categories separately.

(3) As regards B-class cruisers and vessels of lesser type, which are generally recognized to be essentially defensive, it should be sufficient to fix a common maximum global tonnage for all of the said categories.

(4) Any Power which may deem it necessary to do so for reasons of its special circumstances may voluntarily reduce its tonnage in A-class cruisers, and increase its tonnage in any of the defensive categories.

(5) The Japanese plan would not necessarily preclude the adoption of such a formula, for instance, as the declaration of naval building programmes.

(6) If there should be any Power which claims the necessity of effecting modifications even beyond the adjustments contemplated in the foregoing paragraphs, such claim would be carefully examined by the Powers concerned, and if it is found to be reasonable and well-founded Japan would not refuse it recognition. But we could in no circumstances consent to an increase in the combatant strength of a navy such as would jeopardize the state of non-menace and non-aggression.

May I be permitted at this point to consider, in the light of the basic conception underlying the Japanese proposal, a few of the points raised by the other delegations in the course of their observations on our plan? We can readily understand that the possession of greater and more numerous oversea possessions and lines of communication may well justify a demand for a greater strength than other Powers in small and purely defensive types of vessels which have no combatant capacity at sea but which are suitable for coast patrol, defence of harbours, and other similar purposes. But if, for the same reason, a Power should demand superiority in naval force as a whole, the sense of security of other Powers would thereby be disturbed. In any case, I believe it is a well-known fact that the

conditions of nations whose naval forces are now on a basis of parity are not the same as regards their oversea possessions and lines of communications.

Japan is wholly dependent on the sea. She is poor in natural resources, and, with her population exceeding in density that of any other country in the world, is forced to look to countries beyond the seas for the greater part of the supplies necessary to her existence, as well as for the raw materials for her industries.

By way of conclusion, I desire to say that while Japan will never cease to hope for the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament, that is not to say that she is going to insist on obtaining the impossible. It is our conviction that through the adoption of the principles embodied in the Japanese proposal the Conference would succeed in achieving a comprehensive agreement on naval disarmament without serious difficulties.

3. STATEMENT BY VISCOUNT MONSELL, UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATE,
TO THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE, JANUARY 15,
1936¹

The United Kingdom delegation have examined with great care the proposals laid before the Committee by the Japanese delegation at its first meeting on December 10, 1935, and the subsequent explanations that have been furnished by the Japanese delegation at succeeding meetings of the First Committee. The United Kingdom delegation find themselves in complete agreement with the first part of the Japanese fundamental thesis, which asserts that:

‘To possess the measure of armaments necessary for national security is a right to which all nations are equally entitled.’

2. Throughout the numerous discussions and conversations that have been devoted to the consideration of this thesis we have been actuated solely by the desire to ascertain whether the method of limitation proposed by the Japanese delegation, that is, the establishment of a common upper limit for the naval forces of the leading naval Powers, is in fact based on the above principle, and whether it may reasonably be expected to achieve naval security for the Powers concerned.

3. The presentation of the Japanese case by their principal delegate seems to show that the following points are integral features of the Japanese proposal:

First, that equality of fleets in the area of contact is essential;

Secondly, that in asserting the strengths of these fleets, all the

¹ Read by Vice-Adm. Sir Ernle Chatfield. *The Times*, January 16, 1936.

forces of each navy that are capable of taking part in battle, irrespective of where they may be normally located, must be included in their entirety, leaving out of consideration only such small units as are intended for local patrol and defence of harbours.

Thirdly, that while it is recognized that there may be differences between countries as regards their degree of vulnerability, the primary cause of such differences is to be found in different levels of naval strengths, and that it is only after equalization of naval strengths has been postulated that the Japanese delegation are prepared to consider the remaining differences in vulnerability;

Fourthly, that the common upper limit must apply to the fleets of the U.S.A., the British Commonwealth of Nations, and Japan, and may be extended to the fleets of France and Italy should those Powers wish to participate;

Fifthly, that while the common upper limit should be fixed by the Conference, it should be set as low as possible, and preferably below the level of the existing Japanese naval forces.

4. With regard to the first point, the United Kingdom delegation believe that naval strength in the area of contact cannot be measured solely in terms of numbers of fighting ships, but that factors such as remoteness of bases and sources of supply and the vulnerability of long communications must also be taken into consideration. Modern fleets are very dependent on supplies of fuel and stores and on dock-yard facilities, and without the latter a damaged ship is likely to be a lost ship. The United Kingdom delegation maintain in fact that a fleet operating far from its own country must inevitably, even though equal in numbers, be far less effective for action than an opposing fleet operating from its home waters. As was stated by the United Kingdom delegation at the sixth meeting of the First Committee:

'It is our opinion that a country defending itself in or near its own territory has an inherent advantage over an attacking force and therefore can defend itself with a lesser force than that brought against it.'

If, therefore, the fleets in the area of contact are numerically equal, that fleet which is operating in its own home waters will, in effect, possess the advantage in spite of equality in numbers. The conclusion is strengthened by the introduction of aircraft, which add very greatly to the defensive power of a fleet in its own home waters. The position of a Power defending its territories and trade in oceans far from its home bases and factories is equally difficult and disadvantageous if attack on them by a Power with an equal total naval strength is possible. The Japanese delegation has stated to-day that it is generally

recognized that there are certain types of warship that are *offensive* and others that are purely *defensive*.

There is, as far as we are aware, no such agreement. On the contrary, although the question is one that has often been discussed, it is a recognized fact that this division of warships into two such categories is wholly impracticable, and is indeed a problem that baffles solution.

5. With regard to the second point of the Japanese exposition, the United Kingdom delegation, while fully recognizing the mobility of naval forces, cannot subscribe to a strategical theory that naval needs are purely relative, and that, in consequence, a Power with greater total naval strength can, whatever the geographical position of its home territories, whatever the dispersion of its interests, or the distribution of the countries for which it is responsible, denude these territories of their essential defences and concentrate its entire fleet in the distant waters of a hypothetical opponent. The United Kingdom delegation consider that such a theory is neither sound in reasoning nor supported by history. The events of the Russo-Japanese War, for instance, quoted by the Japanese delegate in support of his argument, seem to us to be capable of an opposite interpretation and to demonstrate conclusively the immense handicap imposed on a fleet operating at a great distance from its home bases.

6. A Power with world-wide responsibilities must, in the first place, devote naval forces to the protection of the sea communications between its various parts as well as the long line of communications of its principal naval forces. For this reason alone it is necessary for it to have forces in excess of those of a Power which is able to maintain its whole naval forces in or near its own home waters. Moreover, it must in all equity be admitted that a Power with distant possessions must be able in a time of emergency to despatch an adequate naval force for the defence of those possessions without denuding or seriously impairing its home defences. Apart from these purely strategical necessities, it is clear that political considerations will always prevent the concentration of the whole naval forces in one part of the world. It is not to be supposed that under any conditions the people of the home country would be prepared to permit the whole naval forces of their nation to be despatched to some distant part of the world, leaving them entirely exposed to the lightest attack. They must indeed always insist upon the retention of a substantial naval force in home waters.

7. With regard to the third point, the United Kingdom delegation, for the reasons just given, find themselves quite unable to agree to

the proposition that the primary cause of differences in vulnerability is inequality in naval armaments. No substantial argument has been adduced in support of this proposition. Nor do they see any prospect that even such differences in vulnerability could be rectified by the somewhat indefinite procedure suggested by the Japanese delegation.

8. With regard to the fourth and fifth points, the United Kingdom delegation do not find that the proposal to apply a common upper limit either to the British Commonwealth, U.S.A., and Japan alone, or to all the Powers here assembled, is consistent with the defence requirements of the members of the British Commonwealth. In estimating these requirements we have to take into account responsibilities in European waters, in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. These imply the necessity for a fleet of sufficient strength to be able to dispose simultaneously in more than one area forces adequate to meet all reasonable defensive needs. It has been recognized by most schools of thought that the naval requirements of a country are absolute as well as relative, and this circumstance alone introduces an element of variation in the naval needs of each Power.

9. The United Kingdom delegation understand that the Japanese delegation claim that equal security amongst the principal Naval Powers would be ensured by the retention by them of equal naval armaments. On this point we find ourselves in complete accord with the principal delegate of the United States, who gave it as his view that:

‘It is impossible to maintain that equal armaments give equal security.’

We ourselves believe that the Washington Treaty itself, with its provisions for maintaining the *status quo* as regards fortifications in those parts of the Pacific Ocean in which Japan is specially interested, offers the best guarantee for that security which is the inalienable right of all nations, and which we conceive to be in accordance with the Japanese principle of ‘non-menace’ and ‘non-aggression’.

10. The Japanese delegation have admitted that, if France and Italy desire to participate in any scheme for a common upper limit, the scope of such a scheme could not be confined to Japan, the United States, and the British Commonwealth of Nations. This being so, it is obvious that the plan would have to be universal in its operation, for by no process of reasoning could it be contended that the plan is suitable to those countries represented at this Conference but inapplicable to those not so represented.

We should therefore be faced with a strange situation in which

every country, however slender its resources and however small its responsibilities, would not only have the right to build up its naval strength to equality with its neighbours, but would actually receive an indirect encouragement to do so. For supposing that Power A finds itself prevented by treaty from increasing its existing naval strength, Power B, possessed, let us say, of few responsibilities but much ambition, would be tempted to build up to the level of Power A. In its turn, Power C, concerned at the building of Power B, feels constrained similarly to increase its naval strength to an extent which would otherwise be unnecessary.

Thus the plan for a common upper limit, if adopted, might well furnish an incentive for a general increase in building among the Powers at present possessing smaller navies. It is true that the Japanese plan seems to check such a development by means of 'adjustments' between the various Powers. But surely the word 'adjustment' is simply a longer, if pleasanter, term for the word 'ratio', which it is the purpose of the Japanese delegation to delete from our naval vocabulary. Apart from the Japanese delegation, the French and Italian delegations have demonstrated their strong objection to the reintroduction of the ratio system in any form.

11. The Government and people of this country yield nothing to Japan in their desire to see a general reduction in naval armaments. But such reduction must be achieved by a method which is fair to all and impairs the security of none. Judged by this standard they feel that the plan under discussion not only fails to provide a fair and practicable basis for a general agreement, but would create a position of special disadvantage for the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. For the country, or countries, which have the greatest needs and which therefore must maintain a navy fully built up to the common upper level would be the only country or countries debarred by the proposal from expanding their naval forces in the event of some development in the world situation making such expansion necessary for their own security. This is a situation which such a country cannot feel to be fair or calculated to produce a sense of security.

12. In expressing their sincere regret that they have been unable to find in the Japanese plan that basis for a reduction and limitation which they so sincerely desire, the United Kingdom delegation nevertheless hope that the Japanese delegation will continue to seek, in co-operation with the other delegations here represented, some alternative method for achieving the end which we all have in view.

4. EXTRACTS FROM STATEMENT BY MR. NORMAN H. DAVIS, U.S. DELEGATE, TO THE FIRST COMMITTEE OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE, JANUARY 15, 1936¹

The United States has been most desirous of reaching a new agreement for a reduction and limitation of naval armaments to supersede the existing treaties that are to expire at the end of this year. . . . We have accordingly listened with the most careful attention to all the explanations given by the Japanese delegation of their proposal for a common upper limit with a view to determining whether any new facts or considerations might be developed which would justify the United States in modifying its belief that the principles of the common upper limit would not be a practicable basis for the limitation and reduction of naval armament. While we greatly appreciate the clear exposition of the Japanese point of view presented by Admiral Nagano, the discussion has, if anything, served to strengthen our conviction that the principle of a common upper limit would not serve as a basis for negotiation and agreement. . . .

The Japanese recognize that there are differences in vulnerability, responsibility, and needs as between the Powers. They state these are of 'great consequence to every Power'. To provide for these differences they propose to make a small quantitative adjustment within the common upper limit. While Japan has objected to a continuance of the so-called ratio system, their proposal for a common upper limit is in fact not an abandonment but a continuance of the ratio system on the basis of parity without taking into account the varying needs of the countries concerned.

The principle of the common upper limit rests in fact on the assumption which it has not been possible to substantiate that equality of security—which we are all unanimously agreed must be the foundation of limitation and reduction—could be achieved by equality of naval armament. We believe it has been sufficiently shown in the course of our discussions that equality of naval armament not only is not the same as equality of security but that the two are incompatible and contradictory. Equal armaments do not ensure equal security.

Equality of security, as was recognized and established at the Washington Conference, can mean only superiority of defence in each country's own waters. This defence depends only in part on actual naval strength. Other factors of equal, if not greater, importance in determining a nation's capacity for defence are strength of land and air forces and of fortifications, distances from other Powers, length of communications, configuration of coast-lines, importance

¹ *The Times*, January 16, 1936.

and relative distance of outlying possessions, extent and complexity of responsibilities. These necessarily dictate unequal navies if equality of security is to be assured. . . .

Certain nations are so situated as to be endowed by nature with a superior power of defence. If, without regard to all the other factors I have cited, a nation so situated should possess naval armaments equal to those of Powers not so favoured, then that nation would have a very marked naval superiority far more than sufficient for its defensive needs. The sense of security which we feel was created by existing naval treaties would thereby disappear. It is possible to change some factors ; it is not possible to change geography.

The existing relative strengths have in effect provided an equilibrium of defence and an equality of security as near as is humanly possible. It would be extremely difficult, even in more normal times and under conditions of greater mutual confidence, to agree upon such a radical readjustment of these relative strengths as would be involved in acceptance of the common upper limit. In the face of the present world stability, such a readjustment, quite aside from the question of principle, is impossible. Bearing in mind the situation in the Far East, in Europe, and in Africa, the United States is unwilling to consent to any change which would lessen its relative security, particularly in the absence of greater assurance than we now have that to do so would promote peace and establish a régime of non-menace and non-aggression. . . .

With reference to the question of reducing so-called offensive naval arms which has been alluded to, I am persuaded that it is not possible to make out any case whatever as to a distinction to be drawn between offensive and defensive naval vessels. Whether any particular type of naval armament is offensive or defensive depends entirely upon the use that is made of it. . . .

For all the foregoing reasons the United States is unable to accept the principle of the 'common upper limit' as the basis for an agreement. While we would deeply regret the inability to arrive at an agreement acceptable to all the Powers here represented, our desire and purpose will be to foster the continuance of our friendly relations with all the naval Powers.

5. LETTER FROM ADMIRAL NAGANO TO VISCOUNT MONSELL, CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE, NOTIFYING JAPAN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE CONFERENCE, JANUARY 15, 1936¹

I have the honour hereby to notify your lordship that, as it has become sufficiently clear at to-day's session of the First Committee

¹ *The Times*, January 16, 1936.

that the basic principles embodied in our proposal for a comprehensive limitation and reduction of naval armaments cannot secure general support, our delegation have now come to the conclusion that we can no longer usefully continue our participation in the deliberations of the present Conference.

We remain, nevertheless, firmly convinced that our proposal is one best calculated to attain an effective disarmament, and we regret to state that we cannot subscribe, for the reasons we have repeatedly set forth, to the plans of quantitative limitation submitted by the other delegations.

I desire to assure you, on this occasion, that we most sincerely appreciate the cordial manner in which you have been good enough to conduct the Conference; at the same time, I should like to tender our deepest thanks, on behalf of our delegation, for the hearty co-operation of all the delegations to this Conference.

6. EXTRACTS FROM EXPLANATORY STATEMENT BY SIGNOR GRANDI,
ITALIAN DELEGATE, MARCH 25, 1936¹

It is with the most sincere regret that Italy finds herself prevented from being among the Powers who are to-day signing the Naval Treaty, towards the technical elaboration of which the Italian delegation have so willingly and actively co-operated. . . . You will, however, recall that at the opening meeting of the Conference I frankly stated that my Government was compelled to take carefully into account the position in which my country had been placed by the attitude of many States in regard to the Italo-Abyssinian dispute.

I may add that at that time my Government sincerely hoped that before the conclusion of the Naval Conference the abnormal situation in which Italy found herself would have been clarified, and that consequently my country would have been in a position to proceed in the work which had been undertaken with such sincere good will and with every hope of success.

Unfortunately this has not happened. Only a few weeks after the beginning of the Naval Conference Italy found herself confronted with agreements of mutual naval assistance in the Mediterranean which were openly designed to give military support to those very sanctions, the iniquity and injustice of which the Italian people so deeply resent, and which have only had a pernicious effect—that of disrupting the political solidarity between the Great Powers, of crushing the efforts at economic reconstruction, of increasing disorder and political confusion in Europe.

¹ *The Times*, March 26, 1936.

These agreements have deeply wounded the Italian people, who find themselves to-day in the unquestionable necessity of considering the problem of my country's naval security in relation to the new situation in which they have been placed. In these circumstances the Italian Government find themselves compelled to maintain unprejudiced their freedom in the field of naval construction, and to provide, in the manner which they consider more appropriate, for the safeguard of the supreme interests in the country's naval defence.

You will surely appreciate that an agreement for the limitation of armaments and, above all, the contents and the technical clauses of such an agreement, cannot be disembodied from the framework of the political relations between the States, nor can it likewise ignore the problems connected with their respective security. . . .

7. TREATY FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS,
MARCH 25, 1936¹

The President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, and His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India ;

Desiring to reduce the burdens and prevent the dangers inherent in competition in naval armament ;

Desiring, in view of the forthcoming expiration of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament signed at Washington on February 6, 1922, and of the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament signed in London on April 22, 1930 (save for Part IV thereof), to make provision for the limitation of naval armament, and for the exchange of information concerning naval construction ;

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty for these purposes and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

[Names follow]

Who, having communicated to one another their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

PART I. DEFINITIONS

Article I

For the purposes of the present Treaty, the following expressions are to be understood in the sense hereinafter defined.

A.—*Standard Displacement.*

(1) The standard displacement of a surface vessel is the displacement of the vessel, complete, fully manned, engaged, and equipped

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5561.

ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board.

(2) The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure), fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores, and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

(3) The word 'ton' except in the expression 'metric tons' denotes the ton of 2,240 lb. (1,016 kilos).

B.—*Categories.*

(1) *Capital Ships* are surface vessels of war belonging to one of the two following sub-categories:

- (a) surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, auxiliary vessels, or capital ships of sub-category (b), the standard displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.);
- (b) surface vessels of war, other than aircraft carriers, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) and which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.).

(2) *Aircraft Carriers* are surface vessels of war, whatever their displacement, designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea. The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off deck on any vessel of war, provided such vessel has not been designed or adapted primarily for the purpose of carrying and operating aircraft at sea, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be classified in the category of aircraft carriers.

The category of aircraft carriers is divided into two sub-categories as follows:

- (a) vessels fitted with a flight deck, from which aircraft can take off, or on which aircraft can land from the air;
- (b) vessels not fitted with a flight deck as described in (a) above.

(3) *Light Surface Vessels* are surface vessels of war other than aircraft carriers, minor war vessels or auxiliary vessels, the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons) and does not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons), and which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.).

The category of light surface vessels is divided into three sub-categories as follows:

- (a) vessels which carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.);
- (b) vessels which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.) and the standard displacement of which exceeds 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons);
- (c) vessels which do not carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.) and the standard displacement of which does not exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons).

(4) *Submarines* are all vessels designed to operate below the surface of the sea.

(5) *Minor War Vessels* are surface vessels of war, other than auxiliary vessels, the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons) and does not exceed 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons), provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (a) mount a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.); (b) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes; (c) are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots.

(6) *Auxiliary Vessels* are naval surface vessels the standard displacement of which exceeds 100 tons (102 metric tons), which are normally employed on fleet duties or as troop transports, or in some other way than as fighting ships, and which are not specifically built as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (a) mount a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.); (b) mount more than eight guns with a calibre exceeding 3 in. (76 mm.); (c) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes; (d) are designed for protection by armour plate; (e) are designed for a speed greater than twenty-eight knots; (f) are designed or adapted primarily for operating aircraft at sea; (g) mount more than two aircraft-launching apparatus.

(7) *Small Craft* are naval surface vessels the standard displacement of which does not exceed 100 tons (102 metric tons).

C.—Over Age.

Vessels of the following categories and sub-categories shall be deemed to be 'over-age' when the undermentioned number of years have elapsed since completion:

- (a) Capital ships 26 years.
- (b) Aircraft carriers 20 „

- (c) Light surface vessels, sub-categories (a) and (b):
 (i) if laid down before January 1, 1920 . 16 years.
 (ii) if laid down after December 31, 1919 . 20 „
 (d) Light surface vessels, sub-category (c) . 16 „
 (e) Submarines 13 „

D.—*Month.*

The word 'month' in the present Treaty with reference to a period of time denotes the month of thirty days.

PART II. LIMITATION

Article 2

After the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, no vessel exceeding the limitations as to displacement or armament prescribed by this Part of the present Treaty shall be acquired by any High Contracting Party or constructed by, for, or within the jurisdiction of any High Contracting Party.

Article 3

No vessel which at the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty carries guns with a calibre exceeding the limits prescribed by this Part of the present Treaty shall, if reconstructed or modernized, be rearmed with guns of a greater calibre than those previously carried by her.

Article 4

(1) No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement.

(2) No capital ship shall carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 14 in. (356 mm.); provided however that if any of the Parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament signed at Washington on February 6, 1922, should fail to enter into an agreement to conform to this provision prior to the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, but in any case not later than April 1, 1937, the maximum calibre of gun carried by capital ships shall be 16 in. (406 mm.).

(3) No capital ship of sub-category (a), the standard displacement of which is less than 17,500 tons (17,780 metric tons), shall be laid down or acquired prior to January 1, 1943.

(4) No capital ship, the main armament of which consists of guns of less than 10 in. (254 mm.) calibre, shall be laid down or acquired prior to January 1, 1943.

GENERAL

Article 5

(1) No aircraft carrier shall exceed 23,000 tons (23,368 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun with a calibre exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.).

(2) If the armament of any aircraft carrier includes guns exceeding 5.25 in. (134 mm.) in calibre, the total number of guns carried which exceed that calibre shall not be more than ten.

Article 6

(1) No light surface vessel of sub-category (b) exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) standard displacement, and no light surface vessel of sub-category (a) shall be laid down or acquired prior to January 1, 1943.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) above, if the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party are, in his opinion, materially affected by the actual or authorized amount of construction by any Power of light surface vessels of sub-category (b), or of light surface vessels not conforming to the restrictions of paragraph (1) above, such High Contracting Party shall, upon notifying the other High Contracting Parties of his intentions and the reasons therefor, have the right to lay down or acquire light surface vessels of sub-categories (a) and (b) of any standard displacement up to 10,000 tons (10,610 metric tons) subject to the observance of the provisions of Part III of the present Treaty. Each of the other High Contracting Parties shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the same right.

(3) It is understood that the provisions of paragraph (1) above constitute no undertaking expressed or implied to continue the restrictions therein prescribed after the year 1942.

Article 7

No submarine shall exceed 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement or carry a gun exceeding 5.1 in. (130 mm.) in calibre.

Article 8

Every vessel shall be rated at its standard displacement, as defined in Article 1A of the present Treaty.

Article 9

No preparations shall be made in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of warlike armaments for the purpose of converting such ships into vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening

of decks for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6.1 in. (155 mm.) in calibre.

Article 10

Vessels which were laid down before the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the standard displacement or armament of which exceeds the limitations or restrictions prescribed in this Part of the present Treaty for their category or sub-category, or vessels which before that date were converted to target use exclusively or retained exclusively for experimental or training purposes under the provisions of previous treaties, shall retain the category or designation which applied to them before the said date.

PART III. ADVANCE NOTIFICATION AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

Article 11

(1) Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate every year to each of the other High Contracting Parties information, as hereinafter provided, regarding his annual programme for the construction and acquisition of all vessels of the categories and sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a), whether or not the vessels concerned are constructed within his own jurisdiction, and periodical information giving details of such vessels and of any alterations to vessels of the said categories or sub-categories already completed.

(2) For the purposes of this and the succeeding Parts of the present Treaty, information shall be deemed to have reached a High Contracting Party on the date upon which such information is communicated to his Diplomatic Representatives accredited to the High Contracting Party by whom the information is given.

(3) This information shall be treated as confidential until published by the High Contracting Party supplying it.

Article 12

The information to be furnished under the preceding Article in respect of vessels constructed by or for a High Contracting Party shall be given as follows; and so as to reach all the other High Contracting Parties within the periods or at the times mentioned:

(a) Within the first four months of each calendar year, the annual programme of construction of all vessels of the following categories and sub-categories, stating the number of vessels of each category or sub-category and, for each vessel, the calibre of

the largest gun. The categories and sub-categories in question are:

| | | |
|------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Capital Ships: | Aircraft Carriers: | Light Surface Vessels: |
| sub-category (a) | sub-category (a) | sub-category (a) |
| sub-category (b) | sub-category (b) | sub-category (b) |
| | | sub-category (c) |
| Submarines. | | |

- (b) Not less than four months before the date of the laying of the keel, the following particulars in respect of each such vessel:

Name or designation;
 Category and sub-category;
 Standard displacement in tons and metric tons;
 Length at waterline at standard displacement;
 Extreme beam at or below waterline at standard displacement;
 Mean draught at standard displacement;
 Designed horse-power;
 Designed speed;
 Type of machinery;
 Type of fuel;
 Number and calibre of all guns of 3 in. (76 mm.) calibre and above;
 Approximate number of guns of less than 3 in. (76 mm.) calibre;
 Number of torpedo tubes;
 Whether designed to lay mines;
 Approximate number of aircraft for which provision is to be made.

- (c) As soon as possible after the laying-down of the keel of each such vessel, the date on which it was laid.
- (d) Within one month after the date of completion of each such vessel, the date of completion together with all the particulars specified in paragraph (b) above relating to the vessel on completion.
- (e) Annually during the month of January, in respect of vessels belonging to the categories and sub-categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above:
- (i) Information as to any important alterations which it may have proved necessary to make during the preceding year in vessels under construction, in so far as these alterations affect the particulars mentioned in paragraph (b) above.
 - (ii) Information as to any important alterations made during the preceding year in vessels previously completed, in so far as these alterations affect the particulars mentioned in paragraph (b) above.
 - (iii) Information concerning vessels which may have been scrapped or otherwise disposed of during the preceding year.

If such vessels are not scrapped, sufficient information shall be given to enable their new status and condition to be determined.

- (f) Not less than four months before undertaking such alterations as would cause a completed vessel to come within one of the categories or sub-categories mentioned in paragraph (a) above, or such alterations as would cause a vessel to change from one to another of the said categories or sub-categories: information as to her intended characteristics as specified in paragraph (b) above.

Article 13

No vessel coming within the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a) shall be laid down by any High Contracting Party until after the expiration of a period of four months both from the date on which the annual programme in which the vessel is included, and from the date on which the particulars in respect of that vessel prescribed by Article 12 (b), have reached all the other High Contracting Parties.

Article 14

If a High Contracting Party intends to acquire a completed or partially completed vessel coming within the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a), that vessel shall be declared at the same time and in the same manner as the vessels included in the annual programme prescribed in the said Article. No such vessel shall be acquired until after the expiration of a period of four months from the date on which such declaration has reached all the other High Contracting Parties. The particulars mentioned in Article 12 (b), together with the date on which the keel was laid, shall be furnished in respect of such vessel so as to reach all the other High Contracting Parties within one month after the date on which the contract for the acquisition of the vessel was signed. The particulars mentioned in Article 12 (d), (e), and (f) shall be given as therein prescribed.

Article 15

At the time of communicating the annual programme prescribed by Article 12 (a), each High Contracting Party shall inform all the other High Contracting Parties of all vessels included in his previous annual programmes and declarations that have not yet been laid down or acquired, but which it is the intention to lay down or acquire during the period covered by the first mentioned annual programme.

GENERAL

Article 16

If, before the keel of any vessel coming within the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a) is laid, any important modification is made in the particulars regarding her which have been communicated under Article 12 (b), information concerning this modification shall be given, and the laying of the keel shall be deferred until at least four months after this information has reached all the other High Contracting Parties.

Article 17

No High Contracting Party shall lay down or acquire any vessel of the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a), which has not previously been included in his annual programme of construction or declaration of acquisition for the current year or in any earlier annual programme or declaration.

Article 18

If the construction, modernization, or reconstruction of any vessel coming within the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a), which is for the order of a Power not a party to the present Treaty, is undertaken within the jurisdiction of any High Contracting Party, he shall promptly inform all the other High Contracting Parties of the date of the signing of the contract and shall also give as soon as possible in respect of the vessel all the information mentioned in Article 12 (b), (c), and (d).

Article 19

Each High Contracting Party shall give lists of all his minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels with their characteristics, as enumerated in Article 12 (b), and information as to the particular service for which they are intended, so as to reach all the other High Contracting Parties within one month after the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty ; and, so as to reach all the other High Contracting Parties within the month of January in each subsequent year, any amendments in the lists and changes in the information.

Article 20

Each of the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to each of the other High Contracting Parties, so as to reach the latter within one month after the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, particulars, as mentioned in Article 12 (b), of all vessels of the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a), which are

then under construction for him, whether or not such vessels are being constructed within his own jurisdiction, together with similar particulars relating to any such vessels then under construction within his own jurisdiction for a Power not a party to the present Treaty.

Article 21

(1) At the time of communicating his initial annual programme of construction and declaration of acquisition, each High Contracting Party shall inform each of the other High Contracting Parties of any vessels of the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a), which have been previously authorized and which it is the intention to lay down or acquire during the period covered by the said programme.

(2) Nothing in this Part of the present Treaty shall prevent any High Contracting Party from laying down or acquiring, at any time during the four months following the date of the coming into force of the Treaty, any vessel included, or to be included, in his initial annual programme of construction or declaration of acquisition, or previously authorized, provided that the information prescribed by Article 12 (b) concerning each vessel shall be communicated so as to reach all the other High Contracting Parties within one month after the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(3) If the present Treaty should not come into force before May 1, 1937, the initial annual programme of construction and declaration of acquisition, to be communicated under Articles 12 (a) and 14 shall reach all the other High Contracting Parties within one month after the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

PART IV. GENERAL AND SAFEGUARDING CLAUSES

Article 22

No High Contracting Party shall, by gift, sale or any mode of transfer, dispose of any of his surface vessels of war or submarines in such a manner that such vessel may become a surface vessel of war or a submarine in any foreign navy. This provision shall not apply to auxiliary vessels.

Article 23

(1) Nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice the right of any High Contracting Party, in the event of loss or accidental destruction of a vessel, before the vessel in question has become over-age, to replace such vessel by a vessel of the same category or sub-category as soon as the particulars of the new vessel mentioned in Article 12 (b) shall have reached all the other High Contracting Parties.

(2) The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall also govern the immediate replacement, in such circumstances, of a light surface vessel of sub-category (b) exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) standard displacement, or of a light surface vessel of sub-category (a), before the vessel in question has become over-age, by a light surface vessel of the same sub-category of any standard displacement up to 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons).

Article 24

(1) If any High Contracting Party should become engaged in war, such High Contracting Party may, if he considers the naval requirements of his defence are materially affected, suspend, in so far as he is concerned, any or all of the obligations of the present Treaty, provided that he shall promptly notify the other High Contracting Parties that the circumstances require such suspension, and shall specify the obligations it is considered necessary to suspend.

(2) The other High Contracting Parties shall in such case promptly consult together, and shall examine the situation thus presented with a view to agreeing as to the obligations of the present Treaty, if any, which each of the said High Contracting Parties may suspend. Should such consultation not produce agreement, any of the said High Contracting Parties may suspend, in so far as he is concerned, any or all of the obligations of the present Treaty, provided that he shall promptly give notice to the other High Contracting Parties of the obligations which it is considered necessary to suspend.

(3) On the cessation of hostilities, the High Contracting Parties shall consult together with a view to fixing a date upon which the obligations of the Treaty which have been suspended shall again become operative, and to agreeing upon any amendments in the present Treaty which may be considered necessary.

Article 25

(1) In the event of any vessel not in conformity with the limitations and restrictions as to standard displacement and armament prescribed by Articles 4, 5, and 7 of the present Treaty being authorized, constructed or acquired by a Power not a party to the present Treaty, each High Contracting Party reserves the right to depart if, and to the extent to which, he considers such departures necessary in order to meet the requirements of his national security;

(a) during the remaining period of the Treaty, from the limitations and restrictions of Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 (1), and 7, and

- (b) during the current year, from his annual programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition.

This right shall be exercised in accordance with the following provisions:

(2) Any High Contracting Party who considers it necessary that such right should be exercised, shall notify the other High Contracting Parties to that effect, stating precisely the nature and extent of the proposed departures and the reasons therefor.

(3) The High Contracting Parties shall thereupon consult together and endeavour to reach an agreement with a view to reducing to a minimum the extent of the departures which may be made.

(4) On the expiration of a period of three months from the date of the first of any notifications which may have been given under paragraph (2) above, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, subject to any agreement which may have been reached to the contrary, be entitled to depart during the remaining period of the present Treaty from the limitations and restrictions prescribed in Articles 3, 4, 5, 6 (1), and 7 thereof.

(5) On the expiration of the period mentioned in the preceding paragraph, any High Contracting Party shall be at liberty, subject to any agreement which may have been reached during the consultations provided for in paragraph (3) above, and on informing all the other High Contracting Parties, to depart from his annual programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition and to alter the characteristics of any vessels building or which have already appeared in his programmes or declarations.

(6) In such event, no delay in the acquisition, the laying of the keel, or the altering of any vessel shall be necessary by reason of any of the provisions of Part III of the present Treaty. The particulars mentioned in Article 12 (b) shall, however, be communicated to all the other High Contracting Parties before the keels of any vessels are laid. In the case of acquisition, information relating to the vessel shall be given under the provisions of Article 14.

Article 26

(1) If the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party should, in his opinion, be materially affected by any change of circumstances, other than those provided for in Articles 6 (2), 24, and 25 of the present Treaty, such High Contracting Party shall have the right to depart for the current year from his annual programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition. The amount of construction by any party to the Treaty, within the

limitations and restrictions thereof, shall not, however, constitute a change of circumstances for the purposes of the present Article. The above-mentioned right shall be exercised in accordance with the following provisions:

(2) Such High Contracting Party shall, if he desires to exercise the above-mentioned right, notify all the other High Contracting Parties to that effect, stating in what respects he proposes to depart from his annual programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition, giving reasons for the proposed departure.

(3) The High Contracting Parties will thereupon consult together with a view to agreement as to whether any departures are necessary in order to meet the situation.

(4) On the expiration of a period of three months from the date of the first of any notifications which may have been given under paragraph (2) above, each of the High Contracting Parties shall, subject to any agreement which may have been reached to the contrary, be entitled to depart from his annual programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition, provided notice is promptly given to the other High Contracting Parties stating precisely in what respects he proposes so to depart.

(5) In such event, no delay in the acquisition, the laying of the keel, or the altering of any vessel shall be necessary by reason of any of the provisions of Part III of the present Treaty. The particulars mentioned in Article 12 (b) shall, however, be communicated to all the other High Contracting Parties before the keels of any vessels are laid. In the case of acquisition, information relating to the vessel shall be given under the provisions of Article 14.

PART V. FINAL CLAUSES

Article 27

The present Treaty shall remain in force until December 31, 1942.

Article 28

(1) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will, during the last quarter of 1940, initiate through the diplomatic channel a consultation between the Governments of the parties to the present Treaty with a view to holding a conference in order to frame a new treaty for the reduction and limitation of naval armament. This conference shall take place in 1941 unless the preliminary consultations should have shown that the holding of such a conference at that time would not be desirable or practicable.

(2) In the course of the consultation referred to in the preceding paragraph, views shall be exchanged in order to determine whether, in the light of the circumstances then prevailing and the experience gained in the interval in the design and construction of capital ships, it may be possible to agree upon a reduction in the standard displacement or calibre of guns of capital ships to be constructed under future annual programmes and thus, if possible, to bring about a reduction in the cost of capital ships.

Article 29

None of the provisions of the present Treaty shall constitute a precedent for any future treaty.

Article 30

(1) The present Treaty shall be ratified by the Signatory Powers in accordance with their respective constitutional methods, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, which will transmit certified copies of all the *procès-verbaux* of the deposits of ratifications to the Governments of the said Powers and of any country on behalf of which accession has been made in accordance with the provisions of Article 31.

(2) The Treaty shall come into force on January 1, 1937, provided that by that date the instruments of ratification of all the said Powers shall have been deposited. If all the above-mentioned instruments of ratification have not been deposited by January 1, 1937, the Treaty shall come into force so soon thereafter as these are all received.

Article 31

(1) The present Treaty shall, at any time after this day's date, be open to accession on behalf of any country for which the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament was signed in London on April 22, 1930, but for which the present Treaty has not been signed. The instrument of accession shall be deposited with His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, which will transmit certified copies of the *procès-verbaux* of the deposit to the Governments of the Signatory Powers and of any country on behalf of which accession has been made.

(2) Accessions, if made prior to the date of the coming into force of the Treaty, shall take effect on that date. If made afterwards, they shall take effect immediately.

(3) If accession should be made after the date of the coming into force of the Treaty, the following information shall be given by the

acceding Power so as to reach all the other High Contracting Parties within one month after the date of accession :

- (a) The initial annual programme of construction and declaration of acquisition, as prescribed by Articles 12 (a) and 14, relating to vessels already authorized, but not yet laid down or acquired, belonging to the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a).
 - (b) A list of the vessels of the above-mentioned categories or sub-categories completed or acquired after the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, stating particulars of such vessels as specified in Article 12 (b), together with similar particulars relating to any such vessels which have been constructed within the jurisdiction of the acceding Power after the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, for a Power not a party thereto.
 - (c) Particulars, as specified in Article 12 (b), of all vessels of the categories or sub-categories above-mentioned which are then under construction for the acceding Power, whether or not such vessels are being constructed within his own jurisdiction, together with similar particulars relating to any such vessels then under construction within his jurisdiction for a Power not a party to the present Treaty.
 - (d) Lists of all minor war vessels and auxiliary vessels with their characteristics and information concerning them, as prescribed by Article 19.
- (4) Each of the High Contracting Parties shall reciprocally furnish to the Government of any country on behalf of which accession is made after the date of the coming into force of the present Treaty, the information specified in paragraph (3) above, so as to reach that Government within the period therein mentioned.
- (5) Nothing in Part III of the present Treaty shall prevent an acceding Power from laying down or acquiring, at any time during the four months following the date of accession, any vessel included, or to be included, in his initial annual programme of construction or declaration of acquisition, or previously authorized, provided that the information prescribed by Article 12 (b) concerning each vessel shall be communicated so as to reach all the other High Contracting Parties within one month after the date of accession.

Article 32

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts shall both be equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of His

Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which will transmit certified copies thereof to the Governments of the countries for which the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament was signed in London on April 22, 1930.

In faith whereof the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in London the 25th day of March, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

(L.S.) NORMAN H. DAVIS.

(L.S.) STANHOPE.

(L.S.) WILLIAM H. STANDLEY.

(L.S.) VINCENT MASSEY.

(L.S.) CHARLES CORBIN.

(L.S.) S. M. BRUCE.

(L.S.) ROBERT, G.

(L.S.) C. J. PARR.

(L.S.) ANTHONY EDEN.

(L.S.) R. A. BUTLER.

(L.S.) MONSELL.

8. PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE

At the moment of signing the Treaty bearing this day's date, the undersigned, duly authorized to that effect by their respective Governments, have agreed as follows:

1. If, before the coming into force of the above-mentioned Treaty, the naval construction of any Power, or any change of circumstances, should appear likely to render undesirable the coming into force of the Treaty in its present form, the Powers on behalf of which the Treaty has been signed will consult as to whether it is desirable to modify any of its terms to meet the situation thus presented.

2. In the event of the Treaty not coming into force on January 1, 1937, the above-mentioned Powers will, as a temporary measure, promptly communicate to one another, after the laying down, acquisition or completion of any vessels in the categories or sub-categories mentioned in Article 12 (a) of the Treaty, the information detailed below concerning all such vessels laid down between January 1, 1937 and the date of the coming into force of the Treaty, provided, however, *that this obligation shall not continue after July 1, 1937:*

Name or designation;

Classification of the vessel;

Standard displacement in tons and metric tons;

Principal dimensions at standard displacement, namely length at water-line and extreme beam at or below water-line;

Mean draught at standard displacement;

Calibre of the largest gun.

3. The present Protocol, of which the French and English texts

shall both be equally authentic, shall come into force on this day's date. It shall be deposited in the archives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which will transmit certified copies thereof to the Governments of the countries for which the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament was signed in London on April 22, 1930.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in London the 25th day of March, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

| | |
|-----------------------------|------------------------|
| (L.S.) NORMAN H. DAVIS. | (L.S.) STANHOPE. |
| (L.S.) WILLIAM H. STANDLEY. | (L.S.) VINCENT MASSEY. |
| (L.S.) CHARLES CORBIN. | (L.S.) S. M. BRUCE. |
| (L.S.) ROBERT, G. | (L.S.) C. J. PARR. |
| (L.S.) ANTHONY EDEN. | (L.S.) R. A. BUTLER. |
| (L.S.) MONSELL. | |

ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL

The undersigned Plenipotentiaries express the hope that the system of Advance Notification and Exchange of Information will be continued by international agreement after the expiration of the Treaty bearing this day's date, and that it may be possible in any future Treaty to achieve some further measure of reduction in naval armament.

Done in London the 25th day of March, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

| | |
|----------------------|-----------------|
| NORMAN H. DAVIS. | STANHOPE. |
| WILLIAM H. STANDLEY. | VINCENT MASSEY. |
| CHARLES CORBIN. | S. M. BRUCE. |
| ROBERT, G. | C. J. PARR. |
| ANTHONY EDEN. | R. A. BUTLER. |
| MONSELL. | |

9. PROCÈS-VERBAL RELATING TO THE RULES OF SUBMARINE WARFARE SET FORTH IN PART IV OF THE TREATY OF LONDON OF APRIL 22, 1930, NOVEMBER 6, 1936¹

Whereas the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armaments signed in London on April 22, 1930, has not been ratified by all the signatories ;

And whereas the said Treaty will cease to be in force after December 31, 1936, with the exception of Part IV thereof, which sets forth rules as to the action of submarines with regard to merchant ships as

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5302.

being established rules of international law, and remains in force without limit of time ;

And whereas the last paragraph of Article 22 in the said Part IV states that the High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to the said rules ;

And whereas the Governments of the French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy have confirmed their acceptance of the said rules resulting from the signature of the said Treaty ;

And whereas all the signatories of the said Treaty desire that as great a number of Powers as possible should accept the rules contained in the said Part IV as established rules of international law ;

The Undersigned, representatives of their respective Governments, bearing in mind the said Article 22 of the Treaty, hereby request the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland forthwith to communicate the said rules, as annexed hereto, to the Governments of all the Powers which are not signatories of the said Treaty, with an invitation to accede thereto definitely and without limit of time.¹

RULES

‘(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.

‘(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew, and ship’s papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship’s boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.’

Signed in London, the 6th day of November, nineteen hundred and thirty-six.

ROBERT WORTH BINGHAM.

S. M. BRUCE.

VINCENT MASSEY.

CHARLES CORBIN.

ANTHONY EDEN.

J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

SAMUEL HOARE.

R. A. BUTLER.

JOHN W. DULANTY.

DINO GRANDI.

SHIGERU YOSHIDA.

W. J. JORDAN.

C. T. TE WATER.

¹ See below, p. 712.

10. ANGLO-GERMAN AND ANGLO-RUSSIAN NAVAL AGREEMENTS,
JULY 17, 1937

Both Agreements follow closely the text of the London Naval Treaty with certain changes in Article 6 and Article 19 (omitting auxiliary vessels and adding a new § 2) and reservations (to Article 2 and Article 11) in the Anglo-Russian Agreement.

The Anglo-German Agreement was supplemented by a Declaration¹ clarifying certain points left over for later settlement in the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935,² and an exchange of Notes, which reveals the difficulties which held up the conclusion of the two Agreements.³

In each Agreement Article 30 provided for ratification and the exchange of ratifications in London as soon as possible, and for the entry into force of the Agreement on or after the exchange of ratifications of the London Naval Treaty of 1936, and simultaneously with the similar agreement signed between the United Kingdom and Germany/the Soviet Union.

In each case the Protocol of Signature was substantially the same as that appended to the London Naval Treaty.

(i) *Anglo-German Agreement*⁴

Note: The text of the Agreement is substantially the same as that of the London Naval Treaty with the exception of Article 6 and Article 19, which in the Agreement read as follows:

Article 6

(1) It is agreed in principle, and subject to the provisions of paragraph (2) below, that no light surface vessel of sub-category (b) exceeding 8,000 tons (8,128 metric tons) standard displacement and no light surface vessel of sub-category (a) shall be laid down or acquired prior to January 1, 1943.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) above, either Contracting Government shall, upon notifying the other Contracting Government of its intentions, have the right to lay down or acquire light surface vessels of sub-category (a); or to acquire such vessels by converting light surface vessels of sub-category (b). The other Contracting Government shall thereupon be entitled to exercise the same right. In the event of the Soviet Government making a notification as contemplated above, the Government of the United Kingdom is authorized to transmit this decision confidentially to any Power with which it is in treaty relations similar to those of the present Agreement.

(3) The provisions of Part III of the present Agreement shall be observed in respect of any vessels constructed as a result of a notification given in accordance with the provisions of the preceding para-

¹ See below, p. 637.

² See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 142.

³ See below, p. 635.

⁴ Full text and annexes in British White Paper, Cmd. 5519.

graph; except that the Government making the notification shall, during the year in which it is made, have the right to depart from its annual programmes of construction and declarations of acquisition and to alter, for the purposes of paragraph 2 above, the characteristic of any vessels building or which have already appeared in the programmes or declarations. In the event of such departure, no delay in the acquisition, the laying of the keel, or the altering of any vessel shall be necessary by reason of any of the provisions of Part III of the present Agreement. The particulars mentioned in Article 12 (b) shall, however, be communicated to the other Contracting Government before the keels of any vessels are laid. In the case of acquisition, information relating to the vessel shall be given under the provisions of Article 14.

Article 19

(1) Each Contracting Government shall give lists of all its minor war vessels with their characteristics, as enumerated in Article 12 (b), and information as to the particular service for which they are intended, so as to reach the other Contracting Government within one month after the date of the coming into force of the present Agreement; and, so as to reach the other Contracting Government within the month of January in each subsequent year, any amendments in the lists of changes in the information.

(2) In the event of negotiations for the conclusion of a general multilateral treaty similar in character to the present Agreement, or of a general arrangement providing for the exchange of information between naval Powers, the Contracting Governments will, notwithstanding that the present Agreement does not provide for the exchange of information as regards auxiliary war vessels, be prepared, in conjunction with the other Powers concerned, to consider entering into an undertaking for the exchange of information in regard to these vessels with their characteristics as enumerated in Article 12 (b) of the present Agreement.

(ii) *Exchange of Notes between the Rt. Hon. Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and Herr Joachim von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador at London, July 17, 1937*¹

(a) *Note from Mr. Eden to Herr von Ribbentrop:*

Your Excellency,—I have the honour, with reference to Article 6, paragraph 1, of the Agreement for the Limitation of Naval Armament and the Exchange of Information concerning Naval Construction

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5519.

signed this day between the Government of the United Kingdom and the German Government, to state my understanding of this matter as follows:

2. In accordance with the provisions of the Agreement regarding the Limitation of Naval Armament embodied in the Notes exchanged between the Government of the United Kingdom and the German Government of June 18, 1935, Germany was entitled in view of the existing strength of the aggregate forces of the British Commonwealth of Nations in that sub-category to construct five cruisers in sub-category (a)—i.e. cruisers with a maximum displacement of 10,000 tons and a maximum gun calibre of 8 in. In the course of the discussions which took place between the representatives of the German and United Kingdom Governments in June 1935, the German Government agreed, as their contribution to the limitation in the construction of large cruisers, to forgo their right to construct the fourth and fifth sub-category (a) cruisers, provided that no further vessels in this sub-category were laid down by any other Power. The Government of the United Kingdom having subsequently informed the German Government of the intention of the U.S.S.R. to construct seven vessels in sub-category (a) with a displacement of 8,000 tons and a gun calibre of 7.1 in., the German Government informed the Government of the United Kingdom that they could no longer maintain their intention not to construct the fourth and fifth (a) cruisers, and the Government of the United Kingdom recognized that the German Government were entitled to regard the previous Anglo-German understanding on this point as having lapsed. It was therefore recognized by both Governments that the German Government had the right to lay down these two vessels at any time, or to acquire them by converting sub-category (b) into sub-category (a) cruisers. Nevertheless, in their earnest desire to prevent the loss of the building holiday for (a) cruisers which was agreed to in the London Naval Treaty, the German Government have stated that they are prepared not to avail themselves of their freedom of action unless special circumstances arise which may compel them to do so. Should they decide to exercise their rights in this respect they would before the work of construction or conversion is commenced notify the decision to the Government of the United Kingdom who would be authorized to transmit it confidentially to the other naval Powers with whom they are in similar treaty relations.

3. I have the honour to request your Excellency to confirm the above statement as correctly representing the position concerning this matter.

(b) *Reply of Herr von Ribbentrop to Mr. Eden:*

Your Excellency,—I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's Note of this day's date in which your Excellency stated your understanding of the position regarding Article 6 (1) of the Agreement for the Limitation of Naval Armament and the Exchange of Information concerning Naval Construction signed this day between the German Government and the Government of the United Kingdom, and in which your Excellency requested confirmation of this statement.

2. In reply, I have the honour to assure your Excellency that the statement in question is in accordance with the views of the German Government and is regarded by them as correctly representing the position concerning this matter.

(iii) *Anglo-German Declaration*¹

The Undersigned, duly authorized to that effect by their respective Governments, have agreed on the following Declaration relative to certain matters arising out of the Agreement regarding the Limitation of Naval Armament (hereinafter styled the Agreement of 1935) embodied in the Notes exchanged between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the German Government on June 18, 1935.²

Article 1

In the present Declaration the following expressions have the meanings herein set out:

(i) The term 35 per cent. ratio when used with reference to the whole German fleet denotes the proportion of 35 : 100 which, under the Agreement of 1935, the total tonnage of the German fleet bears to the total tonnage of the aggregate naval forces of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The term German fleet means that part of the German naval forces to which, in the aggregate, the 35 per cent. ratio applies.

When used with reference to a category of vessels of war, the term 35 per cent. ratio denotes a proportion of 35 : 100 between the total tonnage of any category of vessels in the German fleet to which, under the Agreement of 1935, this ratio applies, and the total tonnage of the corresponding category of vessels in the aggregate naval forces of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

(ii) The expression 'maximum standard displacement permitted

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5519.

² See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 142.

by treaty' for an individual vessel of any category denotes the standard displacement of the largest vessel of that category which it is permissible to build under the Agreement signed this day for the Limitation of Naval Armament and the Exchange of Information concerning Naval Construction (hereinafter styled the Agreement signed this day), or under any subsequent instrument by which the two Governments may both be bound.

(iii) A transfer of tonnage as contemplated by paragraph 2 (*d*) of the Agreement of 1935 takes place when the tonnage of a given category of vessels is increased so as to exceed the 35 per cent. ratio for that category, and such increase is at the same time set off by a corresponding reduction below the 35 per cent. ratio of the tonnage in another category.

(iv) An adjustment of tonnage takes place when tonnage is constructed or acquired so as to cause the 35 per cent. ratio for the whole German fleet to be exceeded, in the manner contemplated by paragraph 2 (*g*) of the Agreement of 1935.

(v) The term category with reference to cruisers and destroyers denotes one category inclusive of both types of vessel. This category does not, however, include vessels of the type defined in Article 8 of the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament, signed in London on April 22, 1930,¹ which are not subject to the Agreement of 1935 or to the present Declaration.

(vi) Except as otherwise provided in the present Declaration, the terms and expressions defined in Part I of the Agreement signed this day bear the same meanings in the present Declaration.

Article 2

The present Declaration does not relate to submarines which are and remain regulated exclusively by paragraph 2 (*f*) of the Agreement of 1935. Nothing in the present Declaration shall affect the rights or obligations of either Government arising under that paragraph.

Article 3

The transfers and adjustments of tonnage which may be made in pursuance of paragraph 2 (*d*) and 2 (*g*) of the Agreement of 1935 shall be those set forth in the succeeding sub-paragraphs. In virtue of Article 2 of the present Declaration, however, these sub-paragraphs do not relate to submarines.

1. The German Government having stated in paragraph 2 (*d*) of the Agreement of 1935 that they favour the system of dividing vessels

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 3758.

of war into categories, and that they are in consequence prepared in principle, and subject to paragraph 2 (b) of the said Agreement, to apply the 35 per cent. ratio to the tonnage of each category of vessel, and to make any variation of this ratio dependent on future arrangements to this end; it is hereby agreed that the manner and extent of any transfer of tonnage shall be regulated in each case by prior agreement between the two Governments.

2. If the German Government should at any time find that the total tonnage available in a given category on the basis of the 35 per cent. ratio is not exactly divisible by the figure of the maximum standard displacement permitted by treaty for individual vessels in that category, it shall, subject to the limitations and conditions set out below, have the right to effect an adjustment of tonnage; provided (i) that the German Government shall give prior notification to the Government of the United Kingdom of its intention to exercise this right, (ii) that the extent and duration of the proposed adjustment shall form the subject of discussion between the two Governments, (iii) that in no case shall the adjustment be such as to cause the German fleet to exceed the 35 per cent. ratio by more than half the maximum standard displacement permitted by treaty for an individual capital ship, and (iv) that the maximum duration of any particular adjustment shall be not more than ten years from the date of the notification mentioned under (i) above.

Article 4

1. In view of the fact that a number of vessels in the present German fleet were constructed under the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, it is agreed that, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Agreement signed this day, vessels of the following classes shall be deemed to be over-age after the lapse of the periods of time indicated below from their completion:

| | <i>Years.</i> |
|---|---------------|
| <i>Deutschland</i> class of armoured ships | 15 |
| <i>Emden</i> , <i>Karlsruhe</i> and <i>Nürnberg</i> class of cruisers | 15 |
| <i>Wolf</i> and <i>Möwe</i> class of destroyers | 12 |

2.—(a) Although the Agreement of 1935 allows the German fleet to be constituted, on the basis of the 35 per cent. ratio, entirely out of vessels all of which shall be under-age, the German Government agree in principle that the proportion of over-age to under-age vessels in the light surface vessel category of the German fleet should be approximately the same as may at any time exist in the corresponding category of vessel in the aggregate forces of the British Commonwealth.

of Nations; subject, however, to the right to depart from this principle in special circumstances (e.g. heavier naval armament on the part of other European Powers). In this event prior notification will be given to the Government of the United Kingdom, indicating the nature and extent of the departure involved.

(b) As the German Government will not for a considerable time possess sufficient over-age tonnage to replace with ships actually over-age the necessary percentage of over-age tonnage, it is agreed that after the lapse respectively of the periods indicated below from the date of completion, the following vessels may be replaced on the over-age list by newer vessels, which shall thereupon be deemed to be over-age for the purposes of the present Declaration and the Agreement of 1935:

| | <i>Years.</i> |
|---|---------------|
| All destroyers of the <i>Wolf</i> and <i>Möwe</i> classes | 16 |
| <i>Emden</i> , <i>Karlsruhe</i> and <i>Nürnberg</i> | 20 |
| <i>Königsberg</i> and <i>Köln</i> | 21 |
| <i>Leipzig</i> | 22 |

Article 5

Notwithstanding the definition of over-age in respect of capital ships in the Agreement signed this day, it is agreed that neither of the two Governments will object if the other replaces at any age not less than twenty years any of its capital ships now building or projected, provided the Government effecting such replacement is able to show and shall represent to the other (a) that a third Power has laid down a capital ship before the date at which such vessel would normally require to be laid down if intended to replace an existing capital ship which had become over-age in accordance with the above-mentioned definition; and (b) that it is in consequence necessary for the Government making the representations to effect replacement before the over-age date for the vessel or vessels in question is reached.

Article 6

It is recognized that the definitions of vessels of war contained in Part I of the Agreement signed this day do not affect the scope of the Agreement of 1935. In consequence, the types of vessels to which the limitations of the Agreement of 1935 do not apply are those defined in Article 8 of the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament signed in London on April 22, 1930.

In faith whereof the Undersigned have signed the present Declaration and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in London, the 17th day of July 1937, in the English and German languages, both texts being equally authentic.

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

(L.S.) ANTHONY EDEN.

(L.S.) DUFF COOPER.

For the German Government:

(L.S.) JOACHIM V. RIBBENTROP.

(iv) *Anglo-Russian Agreement*¹

Note. The text of the agreement is substantially the same as that of the London Naval Treaty with the exception of the reservations appended to Articles 2 and 11 (printed below), and Articles 6 and 19, which are identical with the same Articles in the Anglo-German Agreement, which are printed on pp. 634-5 above.

Article 2

(2) It is understood, however, that the Soviet Government shall not be bound by the limitations and restrictions of this Part of the present Agreement in so far as the Soviet Far Eastern naval forces are concerned, so long as there shall not be concluded a special agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Japan on this subject. Nevertheless, the Soviet Government will not construct or acquire any vessels exceeding the said limitations and restrictions, except in the event of such construction or acquisition by Japan or any other Power in the Far East.

(3) Should the Soviet Government, as the result of such construction or acquisition by Japan or any other Power in the Far East, decide to construct or acquire vessels exceeding the said limitations or restrictions, a notification to that effect shall be made to the Government of the United Kingdom, and the vessels concerned shall not be laid down or acquired until after this notification has reached the Government of the United Kingdom. The Soviet Government shall not be obliged in this case to have any recourse to the procedure set out in Article 25 of the present Agreement.

(4) The Government of the United Kingdom will treat as confidential any information received under the preceding paragraph, subject to a right to transmit it confidentially to any Power with which that Government is in treaty relations similar to those of the present Agreement.

(5) Nothing in paragraph (2) above shall entitle the Soviet Government to construct or acquire any vessel exceeding the limitations or

¹ Full text in British White Paper, Cmd. 5518.

restrictions prescribed by this Part of the present Agreement for service, or to employ such a vessel on service, elsewhere than in the Far East, wherever the vessel may be constructed or acquired. The Soviet Government shall equally not be entitled by anything in paragraph (2) above to transfer from the Soviet Far Eastern to the Soviet Baltic or Black Sea Fleet any vessel constructed or acquired in the exercise of the right conferred by that paragraph.

[Article 6 as in German Agreement, see above p. 634.]

Article 11

(1)—(b) It is understood, however, that the Soviet Government shall not be under any obligation to furnish the Government of the United Kingdom with any information regarding any vessels coming within the said categories or sub-categories which may be constructed in the Far Eastern territories of the Soviet Union, for service in the Far East, so long as there shall not be concluded between the Soviet Government and the Japanese Government a special agreement on this subject; and this part of the present agreement shall be read subject to this understanding.

(c) Full particulars will be furnished in regard to all vessels acquired by the Soviet Government (wherever the acquisition may take place), and in regard to all vessels constructed in the European territories of the Soviet Union, whether the vessels so acquired or constructed are for service in the Far East or elsewhere.

(d) Full particulars will also be furnished in regard to any vessel constructed in the Far Eastern territories of the Soviet Union (i) for service elsewhere than in the Far East, or (ii) for service in the Far East but which it is decided prior to the date of completion to employ for service elsewhere, or (iii) which at any time after being put into commission it is decided to transfer from the Soviet Far Eastern to the Soviet Baltic or Black Sea Fleet. In cases coming under (ii) and (iii), the particulars prescribed by Article 12 (b) of the present Agreement shall be furnished as soon as possible after the decision in question has been taken, and the vessel shall not be removed from the Far East until these particulars have reached the Government of the United Kingdom. Nothing in this paragraph shall operate so as to allow the transfer of any vessel in a case in which it would be forbidden under Article 2 (5) of the present Agreement.

[Article 19 as in German Agreement, see above, p. 635.]

II. THE MONTREUX STRAITS CONVENTION, JULY 20, 1936¹

The Straits Convention of July 24, 1923, was signed on the same day as the Treaty of Lausanne, which replaced the abortive Treaty of Sèvres (1920) and settled the terms of peace between Turkey and the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, the U.S.S.R., Greece, and Rumania.² Apart from the regulations regarding transit through the Straits, the main features of the Straits Convention of 1923 were: (i) the demilitarization of the Bosphorus, all islands but one in the Sea of Marmora, and certain islands in the Ægean Sea; (ii) the establishment of a Straits Commission responsible to the League of Nations, charged with the supervision of the Convention, and (iii) an international guarantee (Article 18) by the signatories and 'in any case by France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan' of the freedom of navigation of the Straits and the security of the demilitarized zone 'by all the means the League Council may decide', in the event of either being imperilled by attack or threat of war.

The first hint that Turkey was preparing to put forward a request for the abrogation of the demilitarization clauses of the Lausanne Convention was given on May 23, 1933, by the Turkish representative in the General Commission of the Disarmament Conference. During the next two years other occasions were taken to put forward similar demands, notably on April 17, 1935, at the Extraordinary Session of the League Council,³ summoned to consider Germany's denunciation of the Armament Clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, and on September 14, 1935, during the meeting of the Sixteenth League Assembly.

The failure of the League Powers to take effective action either in the case of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute or on the occasion of the occupation of the Rhineland Zone by Germany on March 7, 1936, provided the Turkish Government with an excellent justification for claiming that the security furnished by the international guarantee contained in the Convention of 1923 was no longer sufficient protection, while the demilitarization of the Straits Zone was a positive source of danger in an international situation which had seriously deteriorated.

On April 10, 1936, therefore, the Turkish Government addressed identical Notes to the signatories of the Straits Convention, Yugoslavia, and the Secretary-General of the League of Nations, setting out the reasons for a request that negotiations should be initiated for the revision of the régime of the Straits 'under conditions of security which are indispensable for the inviolability of Turkey's territory'.⁴

The Turkish Note, with its request for revision by agreement, was favourably received, coming so soon after the shock of Germany's unilateral denunciation of the Locarno Treaties and reoccupation of the demilitarized Rhineland Zone. Italy alone of the signatories of Lausanne completely reserved her attitude and ultimately declined to attend the Conference, which opened at Montreux on June 22, 1936.

¹ See *Survey* for 1936, Part IV (i).

² The delegate of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State did not sign the Treaty; the Soviet Government later refused to ratify it.

³ See *Documents* for 1935, vol. i, p. 111.

⁴ See below, p. 645.

The work of the Conference fell into two periods: the first, from June 23-5, was devoted to the first reading of a draft convention circulated by the Turkish Government and adopted by the Conference as a basis of discussion; the second, after an adjournment for the meetings of the League Council and Assembly at Geneva, lasted from July 6-20, when the Conference worked on the basis of a new draft proposed by the British delegation. Little difficulty was found in securing unanimity for the abrogation of the demilitarization clauses of the Lausanne Convention and of the international guarantee contained in Article 18.

The main points of difference which held up agreement may be summarized briefly as follows: (1) the stipulations regarding transit through the Straits and ingress or egress into or from the Black Sea of war vessels, especially those of non-riverain States; (2) the abolition of the International Straits Commission; (3) the question of the sanitary and other dues levied on merchant ships in transit. In effect the main conflict, which arose out of the considerations of security and naval strategy involved under the first of these headings, was between the United Kingdom delegation, on the one hand, sometimes supported by the Japanese delegation, and the Soviet delegation on the other, supported by France and the States of the Balkan Entente, with Turkey generally standing somewhat aloof. It was a conflict, firstly, between the Soviet claim to special treatment in view of Russia's peculiar position in the Black Sea and the British claim that, on the principle of reciprocity, the Straits should be either equally open or equally closed to the warships of all Powers; and, secondly, between the desire of the Franco-Soviet *bloc* to fit the new Convention into their own system of regional pacts and the desire of the British delegation to exclude any provisions which might be objectionable to Powers not represented at the Conference, in particular Germany.

In the event, new limitations were imposed on the movement of warships through the Straits in peace-time in two respects. First of all, in the interests of Turkish security, strict limits were imposed on the aggregate tonnage which might be at any one time in transit through the Straits (Article 14)—with a special exception in favour of riverain Powers, who might send capital ships through the Straits provided that they passed singly. All transit of warships was to be preceded by a notification to the Turkish Government. Secondly, in the interests of Russian security, new limits were imposed both on the type of warship and on the maximum tonnage which non-riverain Powers might send into the Black Sea at any one time (with a further limit on the percentage of this maximum allowed to any one Power).

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, war vessels of belligerent States were not to pass through the Straits except in the execution of obligations under the League Covenant, or in rendering assistance to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance '*binding Turkey*' and concluded within the framework of and registered with the League of Nations. The words in italics represent the compromise evolved to settle the conflict between the British and the Franco-Soviet views on the relation between the new Convention and the Franco-Soviet system of regional pacts.

In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent or considering herself

threatened by imminent danger of war, the passage of warships was to be left to the discretion of the Turkish Government.

Except, therefore, by the express invitation of the Turkish Government in time of war, no large fleet of a non-riverain State can be introduced into the Black Sea, while Soviet warships can be sent out into the Mediterranean or transferred to the Baltic or the Pacific or *vice-versa*. In consequence, the naval security of the Soviet Union is greatly increased. At the same time Turkish friendship is likely to be an important factor in case of war or threat of war.

The Convention also contains an unusual feature in the shape of a clause providing for its revision at stated intervals. Annexes attached to the Convention deal with the taxes and charges to be levied on merchant vessels in transit,¹ reproduce the definition of war vessels contained in Part I of the London Naval Treaty of 1936,² record a concession in the case of three Japanese over-age training ships,³ and define the categories and sub-categories of vessels to be included in the calculation of the total tonnage and displacement of Black Sea States under Article 18. The latter are identical with those contained in Article 12 (a) of the London Naval Treaty of 1936.⁴

Finally, a Protocol authorized Turkey to remilitarize the Straits immediately and apply the new régime as from August 15, 1936⁵. An exchange of Notes, in which Turkey gave the United Kingdom an assurance regarding the upkeep and supervision of, and visits to, war cemeteries in the Straits Zone, was also appended.

Ratifications of the Convention were deposited in Paris by all signatories on November 9, 1936, with the exception of Japan whose ratification was deposited on April 19, 1937.

1. COMMUNICATION FROM THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT, APRIL 10, 1936⁶

In 1923, when Turkey agreed at Lausanne to sign the Straits Convention prescribing freedom of transit and demilitarization, the general situation of Europe, from the political and military point of view, presented an aspect totally different from that of to-day.

Europe was progressing towards disarmament, and the political organization of Europe was to be based solely on the unchanging principles of law embodied in international engagements. The land, naval, and air forces were much less formidable and were showing a tendency towards decrease. At that time, Turkey signed the restrictive clauses of the Straits Convention. She had the assurance given her by Article 18, which added to the guarantee afforded by Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations an undertaking that the signatories, and in any case four great Powers, conjointly undertook,

¹ See below, p. 665.

² See above, p. 616.

³ See below, p. 666.

⁴ See above, p. 621.

⁵ See below, p. 667.

⁶ League Document C. 154. M. 92. 1936. VII.

by all the means decided upon for that purpose by the Council of the League, the defence of the Straits if threatened.

Since then, the situation in the Black Sea has come to present an aspect of concord which has been reassuring in every respect. Uncertainty has gradually arisen, however, in the Mediterranean ; naval conferences have shown a tendency towards rearmament, and the naval shipyards will soon launch upon the seas vessels of a power never previously attained. In the air, the curve of increase has shown a swift upward turn, and continental and insular fortifications are constantly being multiplied.

During this complete change of conditions the only guarantee intended to guard against the total insecurity of the Straits has just disappeared in its turn, and while the Powers most closely concerned are proclaiming the existence of a threat of general conflagration, Turkey finds herself exposed at her most vulnerable point to the worst dangers without any counterpart for this disquieting insecurity. In response to the urgent demands addressed to her, Turkey accepted the demilitarization of the Straits, then wholly occupied by foreign forces, after having very fully considered, in the existing conditions, the value of the minimum guarantees granted to her in order that the demilitarization of the Straits and of the contiguous zones should not constitute an unjustifiable danger to the military security of Turkey.

To Article 18 of the Convention, which provided a guarantee of security indissolubly bound up with the body of clauses regulating the régime of the Straits, the signatories attached such importance that they solemnly affirmed that the guarantee in question formed an integral part of the clauses regarding demilitarization and freedom of transit.

This means that without an effective, practical, and efficacious assurance, Turkey's sovereignty could not have been diminished over a portion of her territory the security of which is indispensable to that of the country as a whole.

It is also evident that if this guarantee becomes inoperative or uncertain, the equilibrium of the whole Convention is overthrown, to the prejudice of Turkey and to that of European peace.

Political crises have made it clear that the present machinery for collective guarantees is too slow in coming into operation and that a delayed decision is likely in most cases to cause the advantage of international action to be lost. It was for this reason that Turkey in 1923, like many other Powers at the present time, could not be content with the collective guarantee which would be ensured to her by

the Covenant on her becoming a Member of the League of Nations; that she considered the collective guarantee of all the signatories of the Straits Convention insufficient; and that only the conjoint guarantee of the four great Powers seemed to her calculated to ensure in the conditions then existing the minimum of security indispensable for her territorial integrity.

But, if this minimum itself is weakened or rendered problematical by political and military circumstances entirely different from those which existed when the security was given, the Government of the Republic cannot, without being guilty of serious negligence, expose the whole country to an irreparable *coup de main*.

The position of the guarantors of the security of the Straits *vis-à-vis* the League of Nations, the particular circumstances which render doubtful, to say the least, the effective military collaboration of these guarantors to secure the object assigned to them—these factors have upset the general economy of the Convention of 1923.

It cannot be said to-day that the security of the Straits is still ensured by a real guarantee, and Turkey cannot be asked to remain indifferent to the possibility of a dangerous failure to act.

Besides these considerations it should be added that the Straits Convention mentions only a state of peace and a state of war, Turkey being a neutral or a belligerent in the latter case, but does not provide for the contingency of a special or general threat of war or enable Turkey in such a case to provide for her legitimate defence.

It is amply proved to-day, however, that the most delicate stage of danger from without is this very stage of a threat of war in which a state of war may arise unexpectedly and without any formality.

This omission may in itself render the guarantees contemplated ineffective, whatever their value.

From the beginning of its existence the Turkish Republic has followed a policy of peace and understanding, the carrying-out of which in every field has necessarily imposed upon her sacrifices, often heavy sacrifices.

The Turkish Government has shown, in the many circumstances which have arisen in the last decade, a spirit of conciliation, of loyalty to her engagements, and of sincere attachment to the cause of peace, which has been appreciated by all the Powers. Turkey is entitled to claim for herself the security which she has always ensured to others.

Circumstances independent of the will of the Lausanne signatories have rendered inoperative clauses which were drawn up in all good faith, and as the issue at stake is the existence of Turkey herself and the security of her whole territory, the Government of the Republic

may be led to take before the nation the responsibility incumbent upon it by adopting the measures dictated by the imperious necessity of circumstances.

In view of the above considerations, and rightly holding that the provisions of Article 18 of the Straits Convention relating to a joint guarantee of the four great Powers have become uncertain and inoperative and that they can no longer in practice shield Turkey from an external danger to her territory, the Government of the Republic has the honour to inform the Powers which took part in the negotiations for the conclusion of the Straits Convention that it is prepared to enter into negotiations with a view to arriving in the near future at the conclusion of agreements for regulation of the régime of the Straits under the conditions of security which are indispensable for the inviolability of Turkey's territory, in the most liberal spirit, for the constant development of commercial navigation between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.

TEWFIK RÜSTÜ ARAS, *Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs.*

2. THE [MONTREUX] CONVENTION REGARDING THE RÉGIME OF THE STRAITS, JULY 20, 1936¹

Together with relevant Articles of the Lausanne Convention of July 24, 1923²

PREAMBLE

[Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923.]

Article 23: The High Contracting Parties are agreed to recognize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation, by sea and by air, in time of peace as in time of war, in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, as prescribed in the separate Convention signed this day, regarding the régime of the Straits. This Convention will have the same force and effect in so far as the present High Contracting Parties are concerned as if it formed part of the present Treaty.

Preamble of Lausanne Straits Convention, July 24, 1923.

The British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania. Russia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Turkey, being desirous of ensuring in the Straits freedom of transit and navigation between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea for all nations, in accordance with the principle laid down in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed this day,

And considering that the maintenance of that freedom is necessary to the general peace and the commerce of the world,

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5249.

² British Blue Book, Cmd. 1929. These are printed in italics and precede the Articles to which they correspond in the Montreux text.

Have decided to conclude a Convention to this effect, and have appointed as their respective Plenipotentiaries:]

His Majesty the King of the Bulgarians, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of the Hellenes, His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, His Majesty the King of Rumania, the President of the Turkish Republic, the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and His Majesty the King of Yugoslavia;

Desiring to regulate transit and navigation in the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus comprised under the general term 'Straits' in such manner as to safeguard, within the framework of Turkish security and of the security, in the Black Sea, of the riparian States, the principle enshrined in Article 23 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923;

Have resolved to replace by the present Convention the Convention signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

[Names follow]

Who, after having exhibited their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following provisions:

[Article 1: The High Contracting Parties agree to recognize and declare the principle of freedom of transit and of navigation by sea and by air in the Strait of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, hereinafter comprised under the general term of the 'Straits']

Article 2: The transit and navigation of commercial vessels and aircraft, and of war vessels and aircraft in the Straits in time of peace and in time of war shall henceforth be regulated by the provisions of the attached Annex.]

Article 1

The High Contracting Parties recognize and affirm the principle of freedom of transit and navigation by sea in the Straits.

The exercise of this freedom shall henceforth be regulated by the provisions of the present Convention.

[Merchant Vessels]

[Annex to Article 2]

[Rules for the passage of commercial vessels and aircraft, and of war vessels and aircraft through the Straits.]

1. *Merchant vessels, including hospital ships, yachts and fishing vessels and non-military aircraft.*

(a) In time of peace.

Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and by night under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, or tax, or

charge whatever (subject, however, to international sanitary provisions) unless for services directly rendered, such as pilotage, light, towage or other similar charges, and without prejudice to the rights exercised in this respect by the services and undertakings now operating under concessions granted by the Turkish Government.

To facilitate the collection of these dues, merchant vessels passing the Straits will communicate to stations appointed by the Turkish Government their name, nationality, tonnage, and destination.

Pilotage remains optional.

(b) *In time of war, Turkey being neutral.*

Complete freedom of navigation and passage by day and by night under the same conditions as above. The duties and rights of Turkey as a neutral Power cannot authorize her to take any measures liable to interfere with navigation through the Straits, the waters of which, and the air above which, must remain entirely free in time of war, Turkey being neutral just as in time of peace.

Pilotage remains optional.

(c) *In time of war, Turkey being a belligerent.*

Freedom of navigation for neutral vessels and neutral non-military aircraft, if the vessel or aircraft in question does not assist the enemy, particularly by carrying contraband, troops, or enemy nationals. Turkey will have the right to visit and search such vessels and aircraft, and for this purpose aircraft are to alight on the ground or on the sea in such areas as are specified and prepared for this purpose by Turkey. The rights of Turkey to apply to enemy vessels the measures allowed by international law are not affected.

Turkey will have full power to take such measures as she may consider necessary to prevent enemy vessels from using the Straits. These measures, however, are not to be of such a nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral vessels, and Turkey agrees to provide such vessels with either the necessary instructions or pilots for the above purpose.]

SECTION I. MERCHANT VESSELS

Article 2

In time of peace, merchant vessels shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits, by day and by night, under any flag and with any kind of cargo, without any formalities, except as provided in Article 3 below. No taxes or charges other than those authorized by Annex I to the present Convention shall be levied by the Turkish authorities on these vessels when passing in transit without calling at a port in the Straits.

In order to facilitate the collection of these taxes or charges merchant vessels passing through the Straits shall communicate to the officials at the stations referred to in Article 3 their name, nationality, tonnage, destination, and last port of call (provenance).

Pilotage and towage remain optional.

Article 3

All ships entering the Straits by the Ægean Sea or by the Black Sea shall stop at a sanitary station near the entrance to the Straits for the purposes of the sanitary control prescribed by Turkish law within the framework of international sanitary regulations. This control, in the case of ships possessing a clean bill of health or presenting a declaration of health testifying that they do not fall within the scope of the provisions of the second paragraph of the present Article, shall be carried out by day and by night with all possible speed, and the vessels in question shall not be required to make any other stop during their passage through the Straits.

Vessels which have on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus, or smallpox, or which have had such cases on board during the previous seven days, and vessels which have left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours, shall stop at the sanitary stations indicated in the preceding paragraph in order to embark such sanitary guards as the Turkish authorities may direct. No tax or charge shall be levied in respect of these sanitary guards and they shall be disembarked at a sanitary station on departure from the Straits.

Article 4

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, merchant vessels, under any flag or with any kind of cargo, shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits subject to the provisions of Articles 2 and 3.

Pilotage and towage remain optional.

Article 5

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, merchant vessels not belonging to a country at war with Turkey shall enjoy freedom of transit and navigation in the Straits on condition that they do not in any way assist the enemy.

Such vessels shall enter the Straits by day and their transit shall be effected by the route which shall in each case be indicated by the Turkish authorities.

Article 6

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, the provisions of Article 2 shall nevertheless continue to be applied that vessels must enter the Straits by day and that their transit must be effected by the route which shall, in each case, be indicated by the Turkish authorities.

Pilotage may, in this case, be made obligatory, but no charge shall be levied.

Article 7

The term 'merchant vessels' applied to all vessels which are not covered by Section II of the present Convention.

[Warships, Etc. (Peace Time)]

[Annex to Article 2 (cont.)]

[2. *Warships, including fleet auxiliaries, troopships, aircraft carriers, and military aircraft.*

(a) *In time of peace:*

Complete freedom of passage by day and by night under any flag, without any formalities, or tax, or charge whatever, but subject to the following restrictions as to the total force:

The maximum force which any one Power may send through the Straits into the Black Sea is not to be greater than that of the most powerful fleet of the littoral Powers of the Black Sea existing in that sea at the time of passage; but with the proviso that the Powers reserve to themselves the right to send into the Black Sea, at all times and under all circumstances, a force of not more than three ships, of which no individual ship shall exceed 10,000 tons.

Turkey has no responsibility in regard to the number of war vessels which pass through the Straits.

In order to enable the above rule to be observed, the Straits Commission provided for in Article 10 will, on January 1 and July 1 of each year, enquire of each Black Sea littoral Power the number of each of the following classes of vessel which such Power possesses in the Black Sea: Battleships, battle-cruisers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, or other types of vessels as well as naval aircraft; distinguishing between the ships which are in active commission and the ships with reduced complements, the ships in reserve and the ships undergoing repairs or alterations.

The Straits Commission will then inform the Powers concerned that the strongest naval force in the Black Sea comprises: Battleships, battle-cruisers, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, and units of other types which may exist. The Straits Commission will also immediately inform the Powers concerned when, owing to the passage into or out of the Black Sea of any ship of the strongest Black Sea force, any alteration in that force has taken place.

The naval force that may be sent through the Straits into the Black Sea will be calculated on the number and type of the ships of war in active commission only.]

SECTION II. VESSELS OF WAR

Article 8

For the purposes of the present Convention, the definitions of vessels of war and of their specification together with those relating

to the calculation of tonnage shall be as set forth in Annex II to the present Convention.

Article 9

Naval auxiliary vessels specifically designed for the carriage of fuel, liquid or non-liquid, shall not be subject to the provisions of Article 13 regarding notification, nor shall they be counted for the purpose of calculating the tonnage which is subject to limitation under Articles 14 and 18, on condition that they shall pass through the Straits singly. They shall, however, continue to be on the same footing as vessels of war for the purpose of the remaining provisions governing transit.

The auxiliary vessels specified in the preceding paragraph shall only be entitled to benefit by the exceptional status therein contemplated if their armament does not include: for use against floating targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 105 millimetres; for use against aerial targets, more than two guns of a maximum calibre of 75 millimetres.

Article 10

In time of peace, light surface vessels, minor war vessels, and auxiliary vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, and whatever their flag, shall enjoy freedom of transit through the Straits without any taxes or charges whatever, provided that such transit is begun during daylight and subject to the conditions laid down in Article 13 and the articles following thereafter.

Vessels of war other than those which fall within the categories specified in the preceding paragraph shall only enjoy a right of transit under the special conditions provided by Articles 11 and 12.

Article 11

Black Sea Powers may send through the Straits capital ships of a tonnage greater than that laid down in the first paragraph of Article 14, on condition that these vessels pass through the Straits singly, escorted by not more than two destroyers.

Article 12

Black Sea Powers shall have the right to send through the Straits, for the purpose of rejoining their base, submarines constructed or purchased outside the Black Sea, provided that adequate notice of the laying down or purchase of such submarines shall have been given to Turkey.

Submarines belonging to the said Powers shall also be entitled to pass through the Straits to be repaired in dockyards outside the Black

Sea on condition that detailed information on the matter is given to Turkey.

In either case, the said submarines must travel by day and on the surface, and must pass through the Straits singly.

Article 13

The transit of vessels of war through the Straits shall be preceded by a notification given to the Turkish Government through the diplomatic channel. The normal period of notice shall be eight days ; but it is desirable that in the case of non-Black Sea Powers this period should be increased to fifteen days. The notification shall specify the destination, name, type, and number of the vessels, as also the date of entry for the outward passage and, if necessary, for the return journey. Any change of date shall be subject to three days' notice.

Entry into the Straits for the outward passage shall take place within a period of five days from the date given in the original notification. After the expiry of this period, a new notification shall be given under the same conditions as for the original notification.

When effecting transit, the commander of the naval force shall, without being under any obligation to stop, communicate to a signal station at the entrance to the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus the exact composition of the force under his orders.

Article 14

The maximum aggregate tonnage of all foreign naval forces which may be in course of transit through the Straits shall not exceed 15,000 tons, except in the cases provided for in Article 11 and in Annex III to the present Convention.

The forces specified in the preceding paragraph shall not, however, comprise more than nine vessels.

Vessels, whether belonging to Black Sea or non-Black Sea Powers, paying visits to a port in the Straits, in accordance with the provisions of Article 17, shall not be included in this tonnage.

Neither shall vessels of war which have suffered damage during their passage through the Straits be included in this tonnage ; such vessels, while undergoing repair, shall be subject to any special provisions relating to security laid down by Turkey.

Article 15

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall in no circumstances make use of any aircraft which they may be carrying.

[Annex to Article 2 (cont.)][4. *Limitation of time of transit for warships.*

In no event shall warships in transit through the Straits, except in the event of damage or peril of the sea, remain therein beyond the time which is necessary for them to effect their passage, including the time of anchorage during the night if necessary for safety of navigation.

5. *Stay in the ports of the Straits and of the Black Sea.*

(a) Paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this Annex apply to the passage of vessels, warships, and aircraft through and over the Straits and do not affect the right of Turkey to make such regulations as she may consider necessary regarding the number of men-of-war and military aircraft of any one Power which may visit Turkish ports or aerodromes at one time, and the duration of their stay.

(b) Littoral Powers of the Black Sea will also have a similar right as regards their ports and aerodromes.

(c) The light-vessels which the Powers at present represented on the European Commission of the Danube maintain as stationnaires at the mouths of that river as far up as Galatz will be regarded as additional to the men-of-war referred to in paragraph 2, and may be replaced in case of need.]

Article 16

Vessels of war in transit through the Straits shall not, except in the event of damage or peril of the sea, remain therein longer than is necessary for them to effect the passage.

Article 17

Nothing in the provisions of the preceding articles shall prevent a naval force of any tonnage or composition from paying a courtesy visit of limited duration to a port in the Straits, at the invitation of the Turkish Government. Any such force must leave the Straits by the same route as that by which it entered, unless it fulfils the conditions required for passage in transit through the Straits as laid down by Articles 10, 14, and 18.

Article 18

(1) The aggregate tonnage which non-Black Sea Powers may have in that sea in time of peace shall be limited as follows:

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) below, the aggregate tonnage of the said Powers shall not exceed 30,000 tons;

(b) If at any time the tonnage of the strongest fleet in the Black Sea shall exceed by at least 10,000 tons the tonnage of the strongest fleet in that sea at the date of the signature of the present Convention, the aggregate tonnage of 30,000 tons mentioned in paragraph (a) shall be increased by the same amount, up to a maximum of 45,000

tons. For this purpose, each Black Sea Power shall, in conformity with Annex IV to the present Convention, inform the Turkish Government, on January 1 and July 1 of each year, of the total tonnage of its fleet in the Black Sea; and the Turkish Government shall transmit this information to the other High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

(c) The tonnage which any one non-Black Sea Power may have in the Black Sea shall be limited to two-thirds of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above;

(d) In the event, however, of one or more non-Black Sea Powers desiring to send naval forces into the Black Sea for a humanitarian purpose, the said forces, which shall in no case exceed 8,000 tons altogether, shall be allowed to enter the Black Sea without having to give the notification provided for in Article 13 of the present Convention, provided an authorization is obtained from the Turkish Government in the following circumstances: if the figure of the aggregate tonnage specified in paragraphs (a) and (b) above has not been reached and will not be exceeded by the despatch of the forces which it is desired to send, the Turkish Government shall grant the said authorization within the shortest possible time after receiving the request which has been addressed to it; if the said figure has already been reached or if the despatch of the forces which it is desired to send will cause it to be exceeded, the Turkish Government will immediately inform the other Black Sea Powers of the request for authorization, and if the said Powers make no objection within twenty-four hours of having received this information, the Turkish Government shall, within forty-eight hours at the latest, inform the interested Powers of the reply which it has decided to make to their request.

Any further entry into the Black Sea of naval forces of non-Black Sea Powers shall only be effected within the available limits of the aggregate tonnage provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) above.

(2) Vessels of war belonging to non-Black Sea Powers shall not remain in the Black Sea more than twenty-one days, whatever be the object of their presence there.

[Warships (Wartime: Turkey-Neutral)]

[Annex to Article 2 (cont.)]

[2 (b). *[Warships] in time of war, Turkey being neutral.*

Complete freedom of passage by day and by night under any flag, without any formalities, or tax, or charge whatever, under the same limitations as in paragraph 2 (a).

However, these limitations will not be applicable to any belligerent Power to the prejudice of its belligerent rights in the Black Sea.

The rights and duties of Turkey as a neutral Power cannot authorize her to take any measures liable to interfere with navigation through the Straits, the waters of which, and the air above which, must remain entirely free in time of war, Turkey being neutral, just as in time of peace.

Warships and military aircraft of belligerents will be forbidden to make any capture, to exercise the right of visit and search, or to carry out any other hostile act in the Straits.

As regards revictualling and carrying out repairs, war vessels will be subject to the terms of the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907, dealing with maritime neutrality.]

Article 19

In time of war, Turkey not being belligerent, warships shall enjoy complete freedom of transit and navigation through the Straits under the same conditions as those laid down in Articles 10 to 18.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not, however, pass through the Straits except in cases arising out of the application of Article 25 of the present Convention, and in cases of assistance rendered to a State victim of aggression in virtue of a treaty of mutual assistance binding Turkey, concluded within the framework of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and registered and published in accordance with the provisions of Article 18 of the Covenant.

In the exceptional cases provided for in the preceding paragraph, the limitations laid down in Articles 10 to 18 of the present Convention shall not be applicable.

Notwithstanding the prohibition of passage laid down in paragraph 2 above, vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers, whether they are Black Sea Powers or not, which have become separated from their bases, may return thereto.

Vessels of war belonging to belligerent Powers shall not make any capture, exercise the right of visit and search, or carry out any hostile act in the Straits.

[*Warships (Wartime: Turkey Belligerent)*]

[*Annex to Article 2 (cont.)*]

[2. (c) [*Warships*] in time of war, Turkey being belligerent.

Complete freedom of passage for neutral warships, without any formalities, or tax, or charge whatever, but under the same limitations as in paragraph 2 (a).

The measures taken by Turkey to prevent enemy ships and aircraft from using the Straits are not to be of such a nature as to prevent the free passage of neutral ships and aircraft, and Turkey agrees to provide the said ships

and aircraft with either the necessary instructions or pilots for the above purpose.

Neutral military aircraft will make the passage of the Straits at their own risk and peril, and will submit to investigation as to their character. For this purpose aircraft are to alight on the ground or on the sea in such areas as are specified and prepared for this purpose by Turkey.

3. (a) *The passage of the Straits by submarines of Powers at peace with Turkey must be made on the surface.*

(b) *The officer in command of a foreign naval force, whether coming from the Mediterranean or the Black Sea, will communicate, without being compelled to stop, to a signal station at the entrance to the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, the number and the names of vessels under his orders which are entering the Straits.*

These signal stations shall be notified from time to time by Turkey; until such signal stations are notified, the freedom of passage for foreign war vessels in the Straits shall not thereby be prejudiced, nor shall their entry into the Straits be for this reason delayed.]

Article 20

In time of war, Turkey being belligerent, the provisions of Articles 10 to 18 shall not be applicable; the passage of warships shall be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government.

Article 21

Should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war she shall have the right to apply the provisions of Article 20 of the present Convention.

Vessels which have passed through the Straits before Turkey has made use of the powers conferred upon her by the preceding paragraph, and which thus find themselves separated from their bases, may return thereto. It is, however, understood that Turkey may deny this right to vessels of war belonging to the State whose attitude has given rise to the application of the present article.

Should the Turkish Government make use of the powers conferred by the first paragraph of the present article, a notification to that effect shall be addressed to the High Contracting Parties and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations.

If the Council of the League of Nations decide by a majority of two-thirds that the measures thus taken by Turkey are not justified, and if such should also be the opinion of the majority of the High Contracting Parties signatories to the present Convention, the Turkish Government undertakes to discontinue the measures in question as also any measures which may have been taken under Article 6 of the present Convention.

[Sanitary Protection]

[Annex to Article 2 (cont.)]

[b. *Special provisions relating to sanitary protection.*]

Warships which have on board cases of plague, cholera, or typhus, or which have had such cases on board during the last seven days, and warships which have left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours, must pass through the Straits in quarantine and apply by the means on board such prophylactic measures as are necessary to prevent any possibility of the Straits being infected.

The same rule shall apply to merchant ships having a doctor on board and passing straight through the Straits without calling at a port or breaking bulk.

Merchant ships not having a doctor on board shall be obliged to comply with the international sanitary regulations before entering the Straits, even if they are not to call at a port therein.

Warships and merchant vessels calling at one of the ports in the Straits shall be subject in that port to the international sanitary regulations applicable in the port in question.]

Article 22

Vessels of war which have on board cases of plague, cholera, yellow fever, exanthematic typhus, or smallpox, or which have had such cases on board within the last seven days, and vessels of war which have left an infected port within less than five times twenty-four hours, must pass through the Straits in quarantine and apply by the means on board such prophylactic measures as are necessary in order to prevent any possibility of the Straits being infected.

[Aircraft]

[Annex to Article 2 (cont.)]

[2. (b) *In time of war, Turkey being neutral.*]

Military aircraft will receive in the Straits similar treatment to that accorded under the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907 to warships, pending the conclusion of an international convention establishing the rules of neutrality for aircraft.

3. (c) *The right of military and non-military aircraft to fly over the Straits under the conditions laid down in the present rules, necessitates for aircraft:*

- (i) *Freedom to fly over a strip of territory of five kilometres wide on each side of the narrow parts of the Straits;*
- (ii) *Liberty, in the event of a forced landing, to alight on the coast or on the sea in the territorial waters of Turkey.]*

SECTION III. AIRCRAFT

Article 23

In order to assure the passage of civil aircraft between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the Turkish Government will indicate the

air routes available for this purpose, outside the forbidden zones which may be established in the Straits. Civil aircraft may use these routes provided that they give the Turkish Government, as regards occasional flights, a notification of three days, and as regards flights on regular services, a general notification of the dates of passage.

The Turkish Government moreover undertake, notwithstanding any remilitarization of the Straits, to furnish the necessary facilities for the safe passage of civil aircraft authorized under the air regulations in force in Turkey to fly across Turkish territory between Europe and Asia. The route which is to be followed in the Straits zone by aircraft which have obtained an authorization shall be indicated from time to time.

OTHER PROVISIONS

[*Summary of Articles 3-17*]

[(i) *Demilitarization.*]

Articles 3 to 9 and 17 of the Lausanne Straits Convention of July 24, 1923, provided for the demilitarization of the Straits zone. These stipulations may be summarized as follows:

(1) *Both shores of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus and their hinterland.*

(2) *All the islands in the Sea of Marmora, with the exception of the island of Emir Ali Adasi.*

(3) *In the Aegean Sea, the islands of Samothrace, Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, and Rabbit Islands.*

In these zones no fortification, no permanent artillery organization, no submarine engines of war other than submarine vessels, no military aerial organization and no naval base were permitted and no armed forces were to be stationed, with the exception of police and gendarmerie forces necessary for the maintenance of order. The Turkish Government, however, was to have the right to transport armed forces through these zones and their aeroplanes or war vessels were to be permitted to fly over them or to anchor in territorial waters. The maintenance of a garrison not exceeding 12,000 men, an arsenal, and a naval base were permitted at Constantinople.

'If, in case of war, Turkey, or Greece, in pursuance of their belligerent rights, should modify in any way the provisions of demilitarization prescribed above, they will be bound to re-establish as soon as peace is concluded the régime laid down in the present Convention.' (Article 9.)

There was to be no restriction on the right of Turkey to move her fleet freely in Turkish waters. (Article 17.)

[(ii) *Straits Commission.*]

Articles 10 to 16 dealt with the establishment and functions of an International Commission of the Straits. The Commission was to be composed of a representative of Turkey (President) and representatives of France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Greece, Rumania, and Russia. The salaries of the Members of the Commission and any incidental expenditure

incurred by the Commission were to be borne by the Governments represented. (Articles 12 and 13.)

The functions of the Committee were to see that 'the provisions relating to the passage of warships and military aircraft are carried out'. (Article 14.) These functions were to be carried out under the auspices of the League of Nations to which the Commission would address an annual report. (Article 15.)

The Commission was to prescribe such regulations 'as may be necessary for the accomplishment of its task'. (Article 16.)

(iii) *International Guarantee.*

Article 18 of the Lausanne Convention provided for an international guarantee in the following terms:

'The High Contracting Parties, desiring to secure that the demilitarization of the Straits and of the contiguous zones shall not constitute an unjustifiable danger to the military security of Turkey, and that no act of war should imperil the freedom of the Straits or the safety of the demilitarized zones, agree as follows:

'Should the freedom of navigation of the Straits or the security of the demilitarized zones be imperilled by a violation of the provisions relating to freedom of passage, or by a surprise attack or some act of war or threat of war, the High Contracting Parties, and in any case France, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, acting in conjunction, will meet such violation, attack, or other act of war or threat of war, by all the means that the Council of the League of Nations may decide for this purpose.

'So soon as the circumstance which may have necessitated the action provided for in the preceding paragraph shall have ended, the régime of the Straits as laid down by the terms of the present Convention shall again be strictly applied.

'The present provision, which forms an integral part of those relating to the demilitarization and to the freedom of the Straits, does not prejudice the rights and obligations of the High Contracting Parties under the Covenant of the League of Nations.']

SECTION IV. GENERAL PROVISIONS

Article 24

The functions of the International Commission set up under the Convention relating to the régime of the Straits of July 24, 1923, are hereby transferred to the Turkish Government.

The Turkish Government undertake to collect statistics and to furnish information concerning the application of Articles 11, 12, 14, and 18 of the present Convention.

They will supervise the execution of all the provisions of the present Convention relating to the passage of vessels of war through the Straits.

As soon as they have been notified of the intended passage through the Straits of a foreign naval force, the Turkish Government shall

inform the representatives at Angora of the High Contracting Parties of the composition of that force, its tonnage, the date fixed for its entry into the Straits, and, if necessary, the probable date of its return.

The Turkish Government shall address to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations and to the High Contracting Parties an annual report giving details regarding the movements of foreign vessels of war through the Straits and furnishing all information which may be of service to commerce and navigation, both by sea and by air, for which provision is made in the present Convention.

Article 25

Nothing in the present Convention shall prejudice the rights and obligations of Turkey, or of any of the other High Contracting Parties Members of the League of Nations, arising out of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

[Final Provisions]

[Article 19: The High Contracting Parties will use every possible endeavour to induce non-signatory Powers to accede to the present Convention.

This adherence will be notified through the diplomatic channel to the Government of the French Republic, and by that Government to all signatory or adhering States. The adherence will take effect as from the date of notification to the French Government.

Article 20: The present Convention shall be ratified. The ratifications shall be deposited at Paris as soon as possible.

The Convention will come into force in the same way as the Treaty of Peace signed this day. In so far as concerns those Powers who are not signatories of this Treaty and who at that date shall not yet have ratified the present Convention, this Convention will come into force as from the date on which they deposit their respective ratifications, which deposit shall be notified to the other Contracting Powers by the French Government.]

SECTION V. FINAL PROVISIONS

Article 26

The present Convention shall be ratified as soon as possible.

The ratifications shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic in Paris.

The Japanese Government shall be entitled to inform the Government of the French Republic through their diplomatic representative in Paris that the ratification has been given, and in that case they shall transmit the instrument of ratification as soon as possible.

A *procès-verbal* of the deposit of ratifications shall be drawn up as soon as six instruments of ratification, including that of Turkey, shall

have been deposited. For this purpose the notification provided for in the preceding paragraph shall be taken as the equivalent of the deposit of an instrument of ratification.

The present Convention shall come into force on the date of the said *procès-verbal*.

The French Government will transmit to all the High Contracting Parties an authentic copy of the *procès-verbal* provided for in the preceding paragraph and of the *procès-verbaux* of the deposit of any subsequent ratifications.

Article 27

The present Convention shall, as from the date of its entry into force, be open to accession by any Power signatory to the Treaty of Peace at Lausanne signed on July 24, 1923.

Each accession shall be notified, through the diplomatic channel, to the Government of the French Republic, and by the latter to all the High Contracting Parties.

Accessions shall come into force as from the date of notification to the French Government.

Article 28

The present Convention shall remain in force for twenty years from the date of its entry into force.

The principle of freedom of transit and navigation affirmed in Article 1 of the present Convention shall however continue without limit of time.

If, two years prior to the expiry of the said period of twenty years, no High Contracting Party shall have given notice of denunciation to the French Government, the present Convention shall continue in force until two years after such notice shall have been given. Any such notice shall be communicated by the French Government to the High Contracting Parties.

In the event of the present Convention being denounced in accordance with the provisions of the present Article, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference for the purpose of concluding a new Convention.

Article 29

At the expiry of each period of five years from the date of the entry into force of the present Convention each of the High Contracting

Parties shall be entitled to initiate a proposal for amending one or more of the provisions of the present Convention.

To be valid, any request for revision formulated by one of the High Contracting Parties must be supported, in the case of modifications to Articles 14 or 18, by one other High Contracting Party, and, in the case of modifications to any other Article, by two other High Contracting Parties.

Any request for revision thus supported must be notified to all the High Contracting Parties three months prior to the expiry of the current period of five years. This notification shall contain details of the proposed amendments and the reasons which have given rise to them.

Should it be found impossible to reach an agreement on these proposals through the diplomatic channel, the High Contracting Parties agree to be represented at a conference to be summoned for this purpose.

Such a conference may only take decisions by a unanimous vote, except as regards cases of revision involving Articles 14 and 18, for which a majority of three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties shall be sufficient.

The said majority shall include three-quarters of the High Contracting Parties which are Black Sea Powers, including Turkey.

In witness whereof, the above-mentioned Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Convention.

Done at Montreux July 20, 1936, in eleven copies, of which the first copy, to which the seals of the Plenipotentiaries have been affixed, will be deposited in the archives of the Government of the French Republic, and of which the remaining copies have been transmitted to the signatory Powers.

(L.S.) N. P. NICOLAEV.

(L.S.) STANLEY.

(L.S.) PIERRE NEÏCOV.

(L.S.) S. M. BRUCE.

(L.S.) J. PAUL-BONCOUR.

(L.S.) N. POLITIS.

(L.S.) H. PONSOT.

(L.S.) RAOUL BIBICA ROSETTI.

The undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of Japan, declare, in the name of their Government, that the provisions of the present Convention do not in any sense modify the position of Japan as a State not a Member of the League of Nations, whether in relation to the Covenant of the League of Nations or in regard to treaties of mutual assistance concluded within the framework of the said Covenant, and that in particular Japan reserves full liberty of interpretation as

regards the provisions of Articles 19 and 25 so far as they concern that Covenant and those treaties.

(L.S.) N. SATO.

(L.S.) MASSA-AKI HOTTA.

(L.S.) N. TITULESCO.

(L.S.) N. MENEMENCIOGLU.

(L.S.) CONS. CONTZESCO.

(L.S.) ASIM GÜNDÜZ.

(L.S.) V. V. PELLA.

(L.S.) N. SADAK.

(L.S.) DR. R. ARAS.

(L.S.) MAXIME LITVINOFF.

(L.S.) SUAD DAVAZ.

(L.S.) DR. I. V. SOUBBOTITCH.

ANNEX I¹

The taxes and charges which may be levied in accordance with Article 2 of the present Convention shall be those set forth in the following table. Any reductions in these taxes or charges which the Turkish Government may grant shall be applied without any distinction based on the flag of the vessel:

| <i>Nature of service rendered.</i> | <i>Amount of tax or charge to be levied on each ton of net register tonnage. Francs gold.²</i> |
|--|---|
| (a) Sanitary control stations | 0.075 |
| (b) Lighthouses, light and channel buoys— | |
| Up to 800 tons | 0.42 |
| Above 800 tons | 0.21 |
| (c) Life-saving services, including lifeboats, rocket stations, fog sirens, direction-finding stations, and any light buoys not comprised in (b) above, or other similar installations | 0.10 |

2. The taxes and charges set forth in the table attached to paragraph 1 of the present Annex shall apply in respect of a return voyage through the Straits (that is to say, a voyage from the Ægean Sea to the Black Sea and return back to the Ægean Sea, or else a voyage through the Straits from the Black Sea to the Ægean Sea followed by a return voyage into the Black Sea); if, however, a merchant vessel re-enters the Straits with the object of returning into the Ægean Sea or to the Black Sea, as the case may be, more than six months after the date of entry into the Straits for the outward voyage, such vessel may be called upon to pay these taxes and charges a second time, provided no distinction is made based on the flag of the vessel.

3. If, on the outward voyage, a merchant vessel declares an intention of not returning, it shall only be obliged, as regards the taxes and

¹ British White Paper, Cmd. 5249.

² 100 piastres at present equals 2.5 francs gold (approx.).

charges provided for in paragraphs (b) and (c) of the first paragraph of the present Annex, to pay half the tariff indicated.

4. The taxes and charges set forth in the table attached to the first paragraph of the present Annex, which are not to be greater than is necessary to cover the cost of maintaining the services concerned and of allowing for the creation of a reasonable reserve fund or working balance, shall not be increased or added to except in accordance with the provisions of Article 29 of the present Convention. They shall be payable in gold francs or in Turkish currency at the rate of exchange prevailing on the date of payment.

5. Merchant vessels may be required to pay taxes and charges for optional services, such as pilotage and towage, when any such service shall have been duly rendered by the Turkish authorities at the request of the agent or master of any such vessel. The Turkish Government will publish from time to time the tariff of the taxes and charges to be levied for such optional services.

6. These tariffs shall not be increased in cases in the event of the said services being made obligatory by reason of the application of Article 5.

ANNEX II

[The wording of this Annex is taken from the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936, Part I. See above, pp. 616-19.]

ANNEX III

It is agreed that, of the three over-age training ships, as indicated below, belonging to the Japanese Fleet, two units may be allowed to visit ports in the Straits at the same time.

The aggregate tonnage of these two vessels shall in this case be considered as being equivalent to 15,000 tons.

| | | <i>Date when laid down.</i> | <i>Date of entry into service.</i> | <i>Standard displace- ment (tons).</i> | <i>Armaments.</i> |
|------------------|----|---------------------------------|--|--|-----------------------------|
| <i>Asama</i> .. | .. | 20-X-1896 | 18-III-1899 | 9,240 | IV × 200 mm. XII × 150 " |
| <i>Yakumo</i> .. | .. | 1-IX-1898 | 20-VI-1900 | 9,010 | IV × 200 " XII × 150 " |
| <i>Iwate</i> .. | .. | 11-XI-1898 | 18-III-1901 | 9,180 | IV × 200 " XIV × 150 " |

ANNEX IV

The categories and sub-categories of vessels to be included in the

calculation of the total tonnage of the Black Sea Powers provided for in Article 18 of the present Convention are the following:

| | | |
|-------------------|--------------------|------------------------|
| Capital Ships: | Aircraft Carriers: | Light Surface Vessels: |
| sub-category (a). | sub-category (a). | sub-category (a). |
| sub-category (b). | sub-category (b). | sub-category (b). |
| | | sub-category (c). |

Submarines:

as defined in Annex II to the present Convention.

The displacement which is to be taken into consideration in the calculation of the total tonnage is the standard displacement as defined in Annex II. Only those vessels shall be taken into consideration which are not over-age according to the definition contained in the said Annex.

2. The notification provided for in Article 18, paragraph (b) shall also include the total tonnage of vessels belonging to the categories and sub-categories mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present Annex.

3. PROTOCOL

At the moment of signing the Convention bearing this day's date, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries declare for their respective Governments that they accept the following provisions:

(1) Turkey may immediately remilitarize the zone of the Straits as defined in the Preamble to the said Convention.

(2) As from August 15, 1936, the Turkish Government shall provisionally apply the régime specified in the said Convention.

(3) The present Protocol shall enter into force as from this day's date.

Done at Montreux, July 20, 1936.

N. P. NICOLAEV.

PIERRE NEÏCOV.

J. PAUL-BONCOUR.

H. PONSOT.

STANLEY.

S. M. BRUCE.

N. POLITIS.

RAOUL BÏBICA ROSETTI.

N. SATO (*ad referendum*).

MASSA-AKI HOTTA

(*ad referendum*).

N. TITULESCO.

CONS. CONTZESCO.

V. V. PELLA.

DR. R. ARAS.

SUAD DAVAZ.

N. MENEMENCIÖGLÜ.

ASIM GÜNDÜZ.

N. SADAK.

MAXIME LITVINOFF.

DR. I. V. SOUBBOTITCH.

III. WORLD ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

1. OFFICIAL STATEMENT ISSUED BY H.M. TREASURY ANNOUNCING THE CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AGREEMENT, SEPTEMBER 25, 1936¹

1. His Majesty's Government, after consultation with the United States Government and the French Government, join with them in affirming a common desire to foster those conditions which will safeguard peace and will best contribute to the restoration of order in international economic relations, and to pursue a policy which will tend to promote prosperity in the world and to improve the standard of living.

2. His Majesty's Government must, of course, in its policy towards international monetary relations, take into full account the requirements of internal prosperity of the countries of the Empire, as corresponding considerations will be taken into account by the Governments of France and of the United States of America. They welcome this opportunity to reaffirm their purpose to continue the policy which they have pursued in the course of recent years, one constant object of which is to maintain the greatest possible equilibrium in the system of international exchanges and to avoid to the utmost extent the creation of any disturbance of that system by British monetary action. His Majesty's Government share with the Governments of France and the United States the conviction that the continuation of this twofold policy will serve the general purpose which all governments should pursue.

3. The French Government inform his Majesty's Government that, judging that the desired stability of the principal currencies cannot be ensured on a solid basis except after the re-establishment of a lasting equilibrium between the various economic systems, they have decided with this object to propose to their Parliament the readjustment of their currency. His Majesty's Government have, as also the United States Government, welcomed this decision in the hope that it will establish more solid foundations for the stability of international economic relations. His Majesty's Government, as also the Governments of France and of the United States of America, declare their intention to continue to use the appropriate available resources so as to avoid as far as possible any disturbance of the basis of international exchanges resulting from the proposed readjustment. They

¹ *The Times*, September 26, 1936. Identical official statements (*mutatis mutandis*) were issued by the French Ministry of Finance and the Secretary of the U.S. Treasury. See *Survey for 1936*, Part II (i) (d).

will arrange for such consultation for this purpose as may prove necessary with the other two Governments and the authorized agencies.

4. His Majesty's Government are moreover convinced, as are also the Governments of France and the United States of America, that the success of the policy set forth above is linked with the development of international trade. In particular, they attach the greatest importance to action being taken without delay to relax progressively the present system of quotas and exchange controls with a view to their abolition.

5. His Majesty's Government, in common with the Governments of France and the United States of America, desire and invite the co-operation of the other nations to realize the policy laid down in the present Declaration. They trust that no country will attempt to obtain an unreasonable competitive exchange advantage and thereby hamper the effort to restore more stable economic relations which it is the aim of the three Governments to promote.

2. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE LEAGUE ASSEMBLY, OCTOBER 10, 1936¹

I

THE Assembly,

Noting with satisfaction the joint declaration issued by the Governments of France, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom on September 26, 1936, and the adhesions thereto immediately given by several States;²

Recognizing that this declaration harmonizes with the recommendations made by the Economic Committee of the League of Nations in its recent Report on the Present Phase of International Economic Relations (document C.378.M.249.1936.II.B);

Considering that a concordant policy designed to re-establish a durable equilibrium between the economies of the various countries, to lay more solid foundations for the stability of economic relations, and to promote international trade, would effectively contribute to the consolidation of peace, the restoration of international order, the growth of world prosperity, and the improvement of the standard of living of peoples:

Affirms the general desire of the States Members of the League to

¹ *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement, No. 155, p. 141.

² Belgium adhered on September 26, 1936, and Switzerland and the Netherlands on November 22, 1936.

pursue the realization of these objects and invites all States, whether Members of the League or not, to co-operate fully to that end ;

Urgently recommends all States, as an essential condition of final success, to organize without any delay determined and continuous action to ensure the application of the policy indicated above, to reduce excessive obstacles to international trade and communications, and in particular to relax and, as soon as possible, to abolish the present systems of quotas and exchange controls.

II

The Assembly,

Considering that the time has now arrived when discussion of and inquiry into the question of equal commercial access for all nations to certain raw materials might usefully be undertaken with the collaboration of the principal States, whether Members or non-Members of the League, having a special interest in the matter :

Decides to request the Council, when it thinks fit, to appoint a Committee composed, in suitable proportions, of members of the Economic and Financial Committees of the League of Nations together with other qualified persons, irrespective of nationality, to undertake the study of this question and report thereupon ;

Recognizes that the choice of the raw materials to be considered should be at the discretion of the body thus appointed ;

Believes that the participation in the work of the Committee of nationals of the non-member as well as member-States specially interested would be desirable ;

Suggests that the Council should give attention to this consideration in reaching its decision ;

And instructs the Secretary-General to communicate the present resolution to the governments of non-member States.

III

The Assembly,

Considering that efforts to reduce the obstacles to the international circulation of capital must not have the effect of increasing fiscal fraud ;

Being of opinion that double taxation is both one of the causes of fiscal fraud and at the same time a serious obstacle to the development of international economic and financial relations ;

And holding that only concerted action based on specific agreements for international co-operation can ensure the accurate assessment and equitable allocation of taxes :

Requests the Fiscal Committee to pursue vigorously its work for the avoidance of double taxation as far as possible, and also its work on the subject of international fiscal assistance, in order to promote practical arrangements calculated as far as possible to put down fiscal fraud.

IV

Whereas the development of international intercourse must necessarily be hampered unless it takes place simultaneously in every sphere—that is to say, not merely in the international trade in goods, but also in the circulation of capital and the movement of men ;

And whereas migration is at present at a standstill ;

The Assembly :

Notes with satisfaction that the Migration Commission, set up in the International Labour Organization, has been convened for November to consider certain aspects of this serious question ;

Expresses its confidence that this Commission and the International Labour Office will frame practical suggestions capable of being immediately put into effect and thus contributing to the settlement of the economic and social difficulties already mentioned ;

Requests the Council to follow the work of the said Conference and to remain in touch in this connexion with the International Labour Organization, so that the appropriate organs of the League of Nations may, should occasion arise, contribute to that work ;

And decides to place the question of emigration on the agenda of its next ordinary session.

APPENDIX

CHRONOLOGY OF TREATIES*

(i) Treaties and Agreements between two or more States.

* In order to correct or complete the *Chronology for 1935* several treaties, dates of ratification, &c., belonging to that year are included in this volume. The following abbreviations are used in the references (in brackets) to the published texts of treaties: *Cmd.* = *British Parliamentary Paper*; *E.N.* = *L'Europe Nouvelle*; *J.O.F.* = *Journal Officiel* (France); *L.N.O.J.* = *League of Nations Official Journal*; *L.N.T.S.* = *League of Nations Treaty Series*; *O.M.* = *Oriente Moderno*; *Ov.F.S.* = *Overenskomst med Fremmede Stater* (Norway); *R.* = *Reichsgesetzblatt, Teil II* (Germany); *R.d.L.F.* = *Recueil des Lois Fédérales* (Switzerland); *R.I.I.C.* = *Revue de l'Institut International du Commerce*; *S.* = *Staatsblad* (Netherlands); *S.Ö.F.M.* = *Sveriges Överenskommelser med Främmande Makter*; *T.I.* = *Treaty Information* (U.S.A.); *U.S.E.A.* = *United States Executive Agreement*; *U.S.T.S.* = *United States Treaty Series*.

AFGHANISTAN

- 1935, May 6. Agreement signed with U.S.S.R. regarding campaign against locusts. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 164).
1936, March 26. Provisional agreement signed with U.S.A. in regard to friendship and diplomatic and consular representation. Came into force same day (*U.S.E.A.* 88).
March 29. Agreement signed with U.S.S.R. prolonging neutrality and non-aggression treaty of June 24, 1931, for ten years. Ratifications exchanged Sept. 3.

ALBANIA

- 1935, Feb. 4. Ratifications exchanged with Czechoslovakia of commercial convention and protocol of April 9, 1934 (*L.N.T.S.* 158).
1936, Jan. 25. Exchange of notes with Yugoslavia regarding partial entry into force of frontier traffic protocol of May 8, 1934 (*L.N.T.S.* 159).
Jan. 28. Protocol signed with Italy additional to commercial treaty of Jan. 20, 1924 (*L.N.T.S.* 172). (May 30, exchange of notes regarding coming into force of agreement on June 25.) March 19, agreements signed at Tirana regarding: (1) import quotas; (2) second additional protocol to treaty of Jan. 20, 1924; (3) financial assistance; (4) liquidation of the loan of June 26, 1931; (5) agricultural loan; (6) tobacco monopoly loan; (7) Durazzo harbour; (8) oil concessions; (9) veterinary agreement. Ratifications exchanged May 30, entry into force (1-8), May 30; (9) June 20.

ARGENTINA

- 1935, Jan. 9. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of workmen's compensation convention of Oct. 8, 1928 (*L.N.T.S.* 158).
May 24. Agreements signed with Brazil and Uruguay regarding international bridge over River Uruguay.

ARGENTINA: *cont.*

- May 29. Commercial treaty and agreement regarding exchange of experts on the control of plant diseases signed with Brazil.
- July 2. Agreements signed with Chile regarding (1) communication of judicial acts; (2) Transandine Railway Commission; (3) frontier traffic; (4) artistic and industrial exhibitions; (5) intellectual co-operation.¹
- July 2. Agreements signed with Peru regarding (1) communication of judicial acts; (2) intellectual exchanges; (3) cinematograph films; (4) exchange of official publications; (5) civil disturbances; (6) judicial assistance in criminal matters; (7) political refugees.¹
- Dec. 31. Commercial convention signed with Finland.
- Dec. 31. Commercial convention signed with Uruguay.
- 1936, Feb. 11. Convention of July 2, 1935, with Chile regarding suppression of drug traffic came into force (*L.N.T.S.* 167).
- Feb. 13. Ratifications exchanged with Denmark of medical assistance agreement of Feb. 13, 1936 (*L.N.T.S.* 168).
- March 4. Exchange of notes with France concluding commercial agreement in force from April 4 (*J.O.F.* April 4, 1936).
- Aug. 14. Most favoured nation treaty signed with Rumania.
- Aug. 27. Commercial convention signed with Austria and came provisionally into force.
- Oct. 29/Nov. 4. Exchange of notes with Venezuela regarding diplomatic mails.
- Dec. 1. Commercial agreement signed with Great Britain replacing agreement of Sept. 26, 1933 (*Cmd.* 5324).

AUSTRALIA

- 1935, Aug. 31. Exchange of notes effecting commercial agreement with South Africa.
- 1936, May 8/20. Exchange of notes with Indo-China regarding exemption of ships' bills of health from consular visas. Came into force May 20 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).
- Aug. 3/19. Commercial treaty and protocol signed with Czechoslovakia (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
- Sept. 14. Exchange of notes with Netherlands with declaration regarding boundaries in New Guinea. Came into force same day.
- Oct. 3. Provisional commercial agreement signed with Belgium and Luxembourg (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
- Nov. 27. Notes exchanged with France regarding tariffs and quotas (*J.O.F.* Dec. 31, 1936).
- See also under CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1935, Oct. 22/30; DANZIG, June 26; DENMARK, March 30; FRANCE, 1935, Dec. 20; 'IRAQ, April 25; ITALY, Aug. 6; U.S.A., Jan. 25/Feb. 13.

AUSTRIA

- 1936, Jan. 7. Exchange of notes with Greece regarding customs procedure in the case of advertising matter.

¹ For other agreements signed with Chile and Peru on July 2 see the *Chronology for 1935*.

AUSTRIA: *cont.*

- Jan. 13. Accession of Danzig to Austro-Polish commercial treaty of Oct. 11, 1933, with effect from Nov. 7, 1935. July 29, additional agreement concluded with Poland, provisionally in force from Sept. 1.
- Feb. 7. Exchange of notes with Monaco regarding abolition of passport visas. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 167).
- Feb. 11. Exchange of notes regarding importation of dead geese from Lithuania. Came into force same day.
- Feb. 15. Exchange of notes with Hungary modifying commercial treaty of Dec. 21, 1932. Came into force provisionally same day. May 15, ratifications exchanged of additional commercial agreements of June 28, 1934, and May 15, 1935.
- March 5. Exchange of notes with Italy regarding payments agreement of Dec. 17, 1935. Sept. 25, ratifications exchanged of main agreement (*R.I.I.C.* March 1936).
- March 10. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of protocol of July 1, 1935, modifying commercial agreements of May 14, 1934, and Jan. 4, 1935 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1935). Nov. 7, further agreement concluded, in force from Dec. 15. Dec. 12, further exchange of notes.
- March 23. Three protocols signed with Hungary and Italy additional to Rome protocols of March 17, 1934 (see pp. 308-9 above).
- April 1. Exchange of notes regarding imports of steel into Italy (*R.I.I.C.* June 1936). July 11, further exchange of notes. Dec. 16, another agreement came into force.
- April 2. Agreement concluded with Czechoslovakia additional to commercial convention of May 4, 1921. July 9, further protocol concluded, both agreements being provisionally in force from Aug. 1 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- April 2. Agreement concluded with France regarding intellectual and artistic relations (*J.O.F.* Aug. 20, 1936). June 25, further agreement signed. Ratifications exchanged of both agreements July 16.
- April 8. Exchange of notes with Netherlands regarding double taxation.
- April 30. Agreement concerning payments signed with Czechoslovakia, in force from May 15.
- May 27. Agreement signed with Germany regarding movement of currency in Austrian frontier districts, provisionally in force from June 1, ratifications exchanged Nov. 17 (*R.* May 29, 1936).
- June 1. Clearing agreement signed with Turkey. Came into force same day (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- June 27. Annex signed to protocol of Dec. 30, 1933, modifying export agreement with Italy of Feb. 18, 1932.
- July 11. Reconciliation agreement signed with Germany (see pp. 320-1 above).
- July 23. Commercial exchanges agreement concluded with Turkey, with effect from July 21.
- July 28. Provisional commercial agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Brazil. Came into force Aug. 1.

AUSTRIA: *cont.*

- Aug. 22. Agreements signed with Germany regarding (1) payments and (2) tourist traffic ((1) *R.* Sept. 5, 1936). Aug. 26, agreement signed regarding passport facilities in boundary districts (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- Sept. 17. Ratifications exchanged with Hungary of exchange of notes of Nov. 25, 1935, modifying payments agreement of Dec. 28, 1932.
- Nov. 16. Exchange of notes with Germany concluding fourth additional agreement to commercial treaty of April 12, 1932. Came into force provisionally Nov. 25 (*R.* Nov. 21, 1936).
- Nov. 21. Motor traffic agreement signed with Switzerland.
- Dec. 15. Exchange of notes with Germany regarding judicial assistance treaty of June 21, 1923 (*R.* Jan. 8, 1937).
- See also under ARGENTINA, Aug. 27.

BELGIUM

- 1935, Aug. 14. Arbitration, conciliation, and judicial settlement treaty signed with Venezuela.
- Sept. 25. Ratifications exchanged with Honduras of supplementary extradition treaty of June 17, 1933. Came into force Jan. 25, 1936 (*L.N.T.S.* 167).
- Nov. 2/7. Provisional commercial agreement¹ concluded by exchange of notes with South Africa. Dec. 7/10, further exchange of notes. 1936, May 14, exchange of notes prolonging agreement till May 31, 1937.
- Dec. 23. Quota agreement¹ regarding agricultura¹ produce concluded with France, with effect from Jan. 1, 1936. Jan. 11, further exchange of notes.
- Dec. 28. Protocol signed with France additional to social insurance convention of Aug. 23, 1930. Dec. 30, ratifications exchanged of convention and protocol (*L.N.T.S.* 166).
- Jan. 1. Agreement of Dec. 30, 1935, regarding itinerant traders came into force with France (*L.N.T.S.* 166).
- Jan. 1. Double taxation convention of Feb. 20, 1933, came into force with Netherlands (*L.N.T.S.* 164). Jan. 7, ratifications exchanged of establishment and labour convention of Feb. 20, 1933, and additional protocol signed (*L.N.T.S.* 165).
- Jan. 25. Supplementary extradition agreement of Feb. 3, 1933, came into force with Costa Rica (*L.N.T.S.* 166).
- Jan. 28. Agreement regarding income tax on shipping profits concluded by exchange of notes with U.S.A. (*U.S.E.A.* 87).
- Feb. 10. Exchange of notes¹ between Belgium and Lithuania regarding customs régime on produce of Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi.
- Feb. 12. Eleventh additional agreement¹ signed to commercial agreement with Germany of April 4, 1925. Came into force provisionally March 1. Feb. 28, exchange of notes prolonging eighth additional agreement¹ (of May 23, 1935), provisionally in force from March 1.

¹ Including Luxembourg.

BELGIUM: *cont.*

- Aug. 24. further exchange of notes,¹ provisionally in force from Sept. 1 (*R. Feb.* 24 and Aug. 28, 1936).
- Feb. 22. Commercial exchanges convention¹ signed with Latvia (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- Feb. 25. Import quotas agreement¹ concluded with Denmark.
- Feb. 29. Agreement signed with Yugoslavia concerning judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters.
- March 2. Additional agreement signed to commercial treaty¹ with Poland of Dec. 30, 1922. Came into force March 22 in place of agreement of June 10, 1933 (*L.N.T.S.* 168).
- March 26. Convention¹ signed with Italy modifying and renewing commercial payments convention of Dec. 11, 1935.
- April 1. Agreement¹ signed with Bulgaria regarding commercial exchanges and payments (*L.N.T.S.* 169). Sept. 16, additional agreement signed regarding payment for cereals.
- April 4. General convention¹ concerning payments signed with Spain. Came into force April 13 (*L.N.T.S.* 168).
- April 24. With effect from July 20, 1937, Belgium denounced Art. 4 of convention of July 20, 1927, with Portugal regarding economic relations between Angola and Belgian Congo.
- May 6. Conventions signed with Netherlands regarding coal and import quotas. May 15, agreement signed regarding relief and repatriation of indigent persons (*S. No.* 990, 1936).
- May 15. Belgium denounced convention of May 25, 1874, with Luxembourg regarding small packages and 'articles de finances', together with additional declaration of May 14/18, 1880, and arrangement of April 25/26, 1881.
- June 1. Exchange of notes of May 22, 1935, regarding notification of judicial sentences and finger-print records came into force with Denmark (*L.N.T.S.* 159).
- June 19. Exchange of notes¹ with Uruguay regarding commercial exchanges and payments. Came into force July 4.
- June 24. Currency agreement signed regarding German tourists visiting Belgium and Luxembourg between July 1 and Sept. 20.
- July 9. Exchange of notes concluding provisional commercial agreement¹ with Haiti.
- July 13. Postal convention signed with Netherlands to replace convention of Aug. 4, 1932.
- July 15. Convention signed with Hungary concerning commercial exchanges and payments.
- July 16. Declaration signed with France regarding civil procedure in the relations of Belgium with the French Zone of Morocco. Came into force Aug. 30 (*L.N.T.S.* 171). July 18, exchange of notes regarding taxation of certain products imported into Belgium.
- Aug. 10/21. Exchange of notes¹ with New Zealand regarding commercial agreement of Dec. 5, 1933 (*Cmd.* 5359).

¹ Including Luxembourg.

BELGIUM: *cont.*

- Aug. 17. Agreement¹ concluded with Rumania regarding payment for Rumanian wheat (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- Aug. 21. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of convention of Dec. 2, 1935, extending extradition conventions of Jan. 15, 1875, March 10, 1879, Dec. 30, 1881, and Jan. 28, 1929, to Belgian Congo, Ruanda Urundi, and Italian possessions (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
- Aug. 21. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of provisional commercial convention¹ of Sept. 5, 1935. Came into force same day (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- Aug. 27. Exchange of notes¹ with Chile effecting provisional commercial agreement. Came into force same day, replacing agreement of Dec. 14, 1931 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- Oct. 26. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of treaty of May 2, 1934, regarding the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments. Came into force Nov. 26 (*Cmd.* 5321).
- Nov. . Siam denounced friendship and commerce treaty¹ of July 13, 1926, with effect from Nov. 5, 1937.
- Nov. 3. *Modus vivendi*¹ concluded with Italy regarding commercial exchanges and payments (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- Nov. 7. Additional agreement concluded to agreement¹ of July 27, 1935, with Germany regarding payments. Came into force Nov. 20 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936). Dec. 21, further agreement signed. Came into force same day.
- Dec. 17. Convention on the taxation of motor vehicles signed with Norway.
- Dec. 21. Exchange of notes¹ with France regarding import of rabbit skins (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
- Dec. 22. Commercial payments agreement¹ signed with Rumania (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
- Dec. 28. Commercial *modus vivendi*¹ and agreement¹ for the liquidation of arrears of debt concluded with Brazil (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
- See also under AUSTRALIA, Oct. 3; FRANCE, Sept. 25.

BOLIVIA

- 1935, July 12. Convention signed with Peru regarding fisheries in Lake Titicaca.
- Aug. 10. Agreements concluded at Quito with Colombia, Ecuador, Panamá, Peru, and Venezuela regarding (1) undesirable aliens; (2) academic degrees; (3) exchange of publications; (4) publication of documents; (5) extradition.
- 1936, Jan. 21. Agreement signed with Paraguay concerning repatriation of prisoners of war, re-establishment of diplomatic relations, and the security clauses of the protocol of June 12, 1935 (*L.N.O.J.* March 1936).
- March 13. Exchange of notes with Spain regarding the protection of intellectual property (*L.N.T.S.* 170).
- June 4. Exchange of notes with Germany regarding consular marriages.

¹ Including Luxembourg.

BOLIVIA: *cont.*

Sept. 14. Friendship and non-aggression pact and convention regarding legislation on social questions and the protection of Indians signed with Peru.

Nov. 19. Commercial agreement signed with Czechoslovakia.

BRAZIL

1935, Sept. 18. Additional protocol concluded to extradition treaty with Mexico of Dec. 28, 1933.

Oct. 29. Exchange of notes with U.S.A. of June 20 and Oct. 29 regarding military mission agreement of May 10, 1934, Nov. 9/Dec. 16/19, exchange of notes extending agreement for two years from May 10, 1936. 1936, Nov. 12, further agreement signed, came into force next day (*U.S.E.A.* 84, 85, 98).

Nov. 8. Extradition treaty concluded with Chile.

Nov. 23. Agreement concluded with Uruguay regarding fresh fruit.

Dec. 2. Agreement regarding diplomatic correspondence concluded by exchange of notes with the Vatican.

1936, Jan. 1. Commercial treaty of Feb. 2, 1935, and exchange of notes of April 17, 1935, came into force with U.S.A. (*L.N.T.S.* 166).

March 4. Exchange of notes with France concluding commercial agreement (*J.O.F.* March 15, 1936).

April 30. Brazil denounced commercial agreement of Sept. 30, 1932, with Estonia with effect from Aug. 1.

May 27. Agreement signed with U.S.A. concerning naval mission. Came into force June 25 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).

June 8. Provisional commercial agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Germany. Came into force Aug. 1, replacing agreement of Oct. 22, 1931.

July 22. Exchange of notes with Czechoslovakia concluding provisional commercial agreement replacing agreement of Nov. 27, 1931.

July 24. Exchange of notes with Ecuador concluding provisional commercial agreement.

July 24. Exchange of notes with Switzerland concluding provisional commercial agreement to replace convention of Oct. 29, 1931, with effect from Aug. 1 (*R.d.L.F.* Aug. 26, 1936).

July 27. Provisional commercial agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Norway, replacing convention of Dec. 31, 1931, with effect from Aug. 1 (*Op.F.S.* No. 1, 1937).

July 27. Provisional commercial convention concluded with Peru.

July 28. Exchange of notes with Sweden renewing commercial agreement of Oct. 16, 1931 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).

July 30. Provisional commercial agreement concluded by exchanges of notes with Hungary. Nov. 27, further agreement concluded.

July 30. Provisional commercial agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Mexico.

July 31. Commercial convention with the Netherlands of Sept. 16, 1931, denounced by Brazil with effect from Sept. 15, but afterwards prolonged.

BRAZIL: *cont.*

- Aug. 10. Exchange of notes regarding commercial relations with Great Britain, and exchange of notes with Great Britain on behalf of Newfoundland. Came into force same day (*Cmd.* 5267 and 5268).
- Aug. 14. Commercial *modus vivendi* concluded with Italy (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- Aug. 24. Provisional commercial agreement concluded with Rumania.
- Sept. 17. Exchange of notes of Jan. 31/July 30/Sept. 17 with India regarding denunciation and renewal of commercial agreement of July 21, 1932.
- See also under ARGENTINA, 1935, May 24, May 29; AUSTRIA, July 28; BELGIUM, Dec. 28.

BULGARIA

- 1935, July 26. Railway communications convention signed with Rumania.
- 1936, April 18. Commercial agreement additional to agreement of June 12, 1934, came into force with Hungary.
- April 29. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of parcel post agreement of July 10, 1935. Came into force May 29 (*L.N.T.S.* 168).
- July 6. Agreement concluded with France regarding payments. Came into force July 17 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- July 11. Convention signed with Switzerland concerning judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters (*F.F.* Aug. 26, 1936). Clearing agreement also signed which came into force July 15, replacing agreement of March 1, 1933, and which was itself replaced by an agreement of Dec. 24 (*R.d.L.F.* July 15, 1936, and Jan. 13, 1937).
- Sept. 30. Commercial exchanges and payments agreement concluded with Italy. Came into force same day (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- Oct. 27. Commercial and clearing agreements concluded with Finland. Came into force Nov. 15.
- Nov. 5. Friendship treaty concluded with Mexico.
- Dec. 7. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding certificates of origin (*S.Ö.F.M.* No. 23, 1936).
- Dec. 17. Education convention signed with France.
- See also under BELGIUM, April 1.

CANADA

- 1935, Oct. 3. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding taxation of certain gains arising out of an agency.
- 1936, Jan. 1. Arts. 1, 3, and 4 of commercial agreement with U.S.A. came into force. May 14, exchange of instruments of ratification and proclamation and coming into force of whole agreement (*U.S.E.A.* 91).
- March 20. Exchange of notes with France regarding protocol of Feb. 26, 1935, additional to establishment and navigation convention of May 12, 1933. Nov. 5, ratifications exchanged of convention, came into force Nov. 10 (*J.O.F.* March 29, Nov. 9-10, 1936).
- July 1. Exchange of notes with South Africa of Aug. 2/31, 1935, concerning commercial relations came into force.

CANADA: *cont.*

- July 31. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of commercial convention of July 3, 1935. Came into force Aug. 15 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 Oct. 22. Agreements signed with Germany regarding commercial relations and payments, provisionally in force from Nov. 15 (*R. Nov.* 14, 1936; *R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
 Dec. 30. Convention regarding taxation signed with U.S.A.
 See also under DANZIG, June 26; DENMARK, Jan. 1/7; FRANCE, 1935, Dec. 20; 'IRĀQ, April 25; ITALY, Aug. 6; NETHERLANDS, Feb. 1.

CHILE

- 1935, July 5. Conventions signed with Peru regarding rogatory commissions and the suppression of coining. Nov. 26, ratifications exchanged of commercial treaty of March 17, 1934, and protocol of Feb. 2, 1935.
 1936, Jan. 1. Provisional coming into force of exchange of notes with Germany of Sept. 25, 1935, modifying commercial treaty and commercial payments convention of Dec. 26, 1934, and prolonging them till Dec. 31, 1936. Aug. 15, further exchange of notes (*R. Jan.* 25 and Dec. 30, 1935, and Aug. 28, 1936).
 Jan. 16. Commercial agreement and protocol signed with France. June 18, July 20, and Aug. 11, further exchanges of notes (*J.O.F.* March 13 and Oct. 2, 1936).
 Feb. 18. Exchange of notes with Spain of Sept. 4, 1935/Jan. 18/Feb. 18, 1936, regarding disparaging films. Came into force Feb. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).
 April 7. Commercial agreement concluded with Ecuador.
 May 4. Exchange of notes with Netherlands regarding clearing convention of June 1, 1934.
 July 15. Ratifications exchanged with Peru of extradition treaty of Nov. 5, 1932.
 Sept. 24. Ratifications exchanged with Lithuania of friendship treaty of June 20, 1935.
 Oct. 2/21. Exchange of notes with Sweden concerning trade marks (*S.O.F.M.* No. 8, 1937).
 Nov. 27. Commercial agreement signed with Colombia (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
 Dec. 30. Exchange of notes with Netherlands concluding commercial convention to replace convention of Dec. 17, 1934. Came into force same day, including Netherlands East Indies, Surinam, and Curaçao.
 See also under ARGENTINA, 1935, July 2; 1936, Feb. 11; BELGIUM, Aug. 27; BRAZIL, 1935, Nov. 8.

CHINA

- 1936, Jan. 14. Exchange of notes bringing aviation agreement of Sept. 30, 1935, into force with France.
 Feb. 12. Parcel post agreement signed with Malaya on July 6, 1935/Feb. 12, 1936 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).
 June 25. Friendship treaty signed with Latvia. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 30.

CHINA: *cont.*

July 17. Money order agreement signed with North Borneo on June 20/July 17, with effect from July 1.

COLOMBIA

1936, Jan. 11. Money order agreement concluded with U.S.A. by exchange of notes of July 27, Aug. 15/24, Sept. 7, Nov. 26, and Dec. 7/20, 1935, and Jan. 11, 1936. Came into force Jan. 11 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).

March 14. Exchange of notes with Venezuela concluding commercial agreement. Came into force same day (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).

April 20. Ratification and approval exchanged of commercial agreement of Sept. 13, 1935, with U.S.A. Came into force May 20 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

May 24. Agreement signed with Spain regarding coffee quota to remain in force till Sept. 30.

June 8. Exchange of notes with Ecuador regarding passports.

July 20. Conventions signed with Peru regarding (1) exchange of publications; (2) intellectual co-operation; (3) civil status records; (4) census records.

Oct. 15. Ratifications exchanged with Cuba of extradition convention of July 2, 1932.

See also under BOLIVIA, 1935, Aug. 10; CHILE, Nov. 27; ECUADOR, July 6.

COSTA RICA

1936, March 5. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of consular convention of Dec. 12, 1933. Came into force same day.

Nov. 28. Reciprocal trade agreement signed with U.S.A.

See also under BELGIUM, Jan. 25.

CUBA

See under COLOMBIA, Oct. 15.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

1935, Oct. 22/30. Exchange of notes with Great Britain extending supplementary judicial assistance convention of Nov. 11, 1924, to Scotland as from Nov. 23. Afterwards extended to Southern Rhodesia, New Zealand, Newfoundland, and British colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories by exchanges of notes of Dec. 19/30, 1935, Feb. 8/18, Feb. 25/March 9, and Dec. 5/15, 1936 (*L.N.T.S.* 161 and 164). Extended to Australia as from May 7.

Dec. 14. Ratifications exchanged with Netherlands of additional commercial agreement of April 9, 1934 (*L.N.T.S.* 164).

Dec. 20. Ratifications exchanged with Rumania of frontier delimitation convention of July 15, 1930 (*L.N.T.S.* 164).

Dec. 22. Compensation convention concluded with Hungary. 1936, Jan. 1, convention came into force. May 30, additional agreement concluded.

Dec. 31. Import quotas agreement signed with Hungary. Came into force Jan. 1, 1936.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: *cont.*

- 1936, Jan. 15. Fifth additional agreement (of Dec. 30, 1935, concerning concertinas) to commercial convention of June 29, 1920, came into force provisionally with Germany. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 2, came into force Nov. 17 (*R.* Jan. 11, 1936).
- Jan. 28. Protocol signed with Finland additional to commercial convention of March 2, 1927. Came into force Feb. 16 (*L.N.T.S.* 166).
- Jan. 31. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of parcel post agreement of June 8, 1935. Came into force March 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 167).
- Feb. 26. Ratifications exchanged with Rumania of three financial agreements of Dec. 5, 1930; of protocol of Dec. 22, 1930, regarding the exchange of documents; and of conventions of Dec. 22, 1930, regarding (1) property of administrative units divided by frontier; (2) Akna-Slatina salt mines; (3) Huta state forests (with additional protocol of June 20, 1934). All these agreements came into force same day. Ratifications also exchanged of customs administration convention of Dec. 22, 1930, and of conventions of June 20, 1934, regarding fiscal co-operation and double taxation in connexion with succession duties. These agreements came into force May 26 (*L.N.T.S.* 167, 168).
- March 23. Commercial treaty signed with Uruguay.
- March 28. Commercial protocol and clearing agreement signed with Rumania.
- April 9. Agreement signed with France additional to commercial treaty of July 2, 1928.
- April 16. Ratifications exchanged with Luxembourg of extradition and legal aid treaty of Dec. 1, 1934 (*L.N.T.S.* 168).
- May 1. Additional commercial agreement with Rumania of July 4, 1935, came provisionally into force.
- May 12. Commercial agreement concluded with Turkey, with effect from June 1.
- May 23. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of consular convention of Nov. 16, 1935. Came into force June 6 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).
- May 26. Exchange of notes of June 21, 1934, regarding requisition vouchers, came into force with Rumania (*L.N.T.S.* 168).
- June 15. Agreement signed with Hungary, additional to commercial treaty of June 14, 1935, came into force provisionally June 24. Sept. 12, ratifications exchanged of 1935 treaty (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- June 18. Denunciation by Czechoslovakia of convention with Poland of Sept. 23, 1922, regarding employment of doctors and midwives took effect.
- June 25. Ratifications exchanged with Monaco of extradition and judicial assistance convention of Dec. 22, 1934 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- July 6. Announcement made concerning prolongation for three years of arbitration, conciliation, and judicial settlement treaty of Nov. 16, 1928, with Spain.
- July 14. Financial agreement signed with Rumania.
- July 16. Exchange of notes with Yugoslavia regarding additional commercial agreement of March 30, 1931. Nov. 10, exchange of

CZECHOSLOVAKIA: *cont.*

- notes concluding further agreement, provisionally in force from Dec. 1 (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
- July 23. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding unemployment insurance. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- Aug. 12. Protocol signed with Poland, additional to commercial convention of Feb. 10, 1934.
- Aug. 31. *Modus vivendi* concluded with Italy regarding commercial exchanges and payments (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
- Sept. 12. Ratifications exchanged with Hungary of agreement of June 8, 1934, regarding control of fishing in frontier waters (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
- Sept. 16/20. Commercial agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Guatemala.
- Oct. 1. Denunciation by Germany of Art. 13 (concerning nationality) of commercial treaty of June 29, 1920, took effect.
- Oct. 12. Agreement signed between administrative departments of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Turkey regarding telecommunications and postal services.
- Oct. 19. Commercial payments agreement signed with Greece, additional to agreement of July 30, 1932. Came into force same day (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
- Oct. 23. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of commercial agreement of June 26, 1935, regarding pearl buttons (*R.* June 28, 1935).
- See also under ALBANIA, 1935, Feb. 4; AUSTRALIA, Aug. 3/19; AUSTRIA, April 2, April 30; BOLIVIA, Nov. 19; BRAZIL, July 22.

DANZIG

- 1935, April 26. Exchange of notes regarding accession of Danzig to Anglo-Polish convention of Oct. 26, 1933, regarding commercial travellers (*L.N.T.S.* 158). Dec. 20/28, exchange of notes regarding accession of Danzig to Anglo-Polish commercial treaty of Feb. 27, 1935, with effect from Jan. 5, 1936.
- Dec. 31. Expiry of convention of May 29, 1929, with Poland regarding taxation of bills of exchange.
- 1936, June 9. Convention signed with Poland regarding currency restrictions. Came into force June 19.
- June 26. Exchange of notes regarding accession of Danzig, as from July 11, to convention of April 16, 1934, between Poland and Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand regarding the tonnage measurement of merchant ships (*L.N.T.S.* 163).
- July 10. Exchange of notes regarding accession of Danzig to commercial convention of Dec. 14, 1934, between Spain and Poland as from July 25.
- See also under FRANCE, May 9.

DENMARK

- 1935, Feb. 14. Exchange of notes with Latvia regarding notification of penal sentences and finger-prints. Came into force April 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 158).

DENMARK: *cont.*

- 1936, Jan. 1. Exchange of notes with Finland of Dec. 7, 1935, concerning registration of private motor-cars came into force (*L.N.T.S.* 160).
- Jan. 1. Convention on laws of inheritance of Nov. 19, 1934, came into force with Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden (*L.N.T.S.* 164).
- Jan. 1. Expiry of convention with Iceland of Sept. 30, 1924, regarding the inspection of ships (*L.N.T.S.* 164).
- Jan. 1/7. Exchange of notes with Great Britain regarding accession of Canada, as from Feb. 1, to judicial assistance convention of Nov. 29, 1932 (*L.N.T.S.* 164).
- Jan. 9. Exchange of notes with Germany regarding motor-car licences (*L.N.T.S.* 166).
- Jan. 13. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of agreement of Oct. 28, 1935, regarding suppression of liquor smuggling. Came into force Jan. 28 (*S.O.F.M.* No. 2, 1936).
- March 30. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of supplementary extradition convention of Oct. 15, 1935. Came into force June 30 (*Cmd.* 5172). Exchange of notes of Sept. 14/26 and Oct. 24 regarding accession of Australia and dependencies as from Nov. 9 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).
- May 6. Supplementary extradition treaty signed with U.S.A. regarding offences against bankruptcy laws. Ratifications exchanged Sept. 30. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
- June 17. Exchange of notes with Germany concerning legalization of signatures of documents. Came into force July 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- June 19. Agreement and protocol signed with Great Britain additional to commercial agreement of April 24, 1933 (*Cmd.* 5491).
- June 29. Parcel post agreement signed with U.S.S.R.
- July 16/23. Exchange of notes with Japan regarding judicial assistance in civil and commercial matters. Came into force July 23 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- July 22. Exchange of notes with Venezuela concluding commercial agreement.
- Oct. 26. *Modus vivendi* concluded with Italy regarding commercial exchanges and payments (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
- Nov. 5. Siam denounced friendship and commerce treaty of Sept. 1, 1925.
- Nov. 20. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding unemployment insurance. Came into force same day (*S.O.F.M.* No. 32, 1936).
- See also under ARGENTINA, Feb. 13; AUSTRIA, Jan. 13; BELGIUM, 1935, May 22; 1936, Feb. 25, June 1.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

- 1935, Oct. 6. Commercial agreement and protocol signed with Spain.
- 1936, March 9. Protocol signed with Haiti regarding delimitation of frontier. Ratifications exchanged April 14, also of boundary agreement of Feb. 27, 1935 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- Sept. 4. Commercial agreement, with protocol and *modus vivendi*, concluded with France. Came into force Sept. 30 (*J.O.F.* Sept. 30 and Nov. 23/24, 1936).

ECUADOR

- 1935, Jan. 7. Exchange of notes with Peru of Dec. 31, 1934/Jan. 7, 1935, regarding passports for business men.
- Feb. 14. Ecuador denounced agreements for the abolition of passports by exchanges of notes of Feb. 14/April 3 with France, Feb. 14/16 with Germany, and Feb. 26 with Netherlands.
- 1936, Jan. 1. Commercial exchanges agreement of Dec. 12/17, 1935, came into force with Germany.
- May 12/13. Commercial convention with France concluded by exchange of notes of July 9/12, 1935, and May 12/13, 1936. Came into force July 23 (*J.O.F.* July 23, 1936).
- May 16. Exchange of notes with Switzerland concluding commercial *modus vivendi* (*R.d.L.F.* June 17, 1936).
- June 12. Exchange of notes with U.S.A. concluding commercial agreement. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 170). July 2/4, agreement concluded providing for waiver of passport visa fees. Came into force July 15/20.
- July 6. Agreement signed with Peru concerning opening of arbitral proceedings at Washington regarding frontier dispute. July 9/10/12, exchange of notes regarding participation of Colombia in agreement.
- Dec. 28. Commercial payments agreement signed with France (*J.O.F.* Jan. 21, 1937).
- See also under BOLIVIA, 1935, Aug. 10; BRAZIL, July 24; CHILE, April 7; COLOMBIA, June 8.

EGYPT

- 1936, Jan. 16. Provisional commercial agreement was signed, and came into force with Rumania (*R.I.I.C.* June 1936).
- Feb. 1/29. Parcel post agreement signed with Malaya, with effect from Feb. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).
- May 7. Friendship treaty concluded with Sa'ūdī Arabia. Ratifications exchanged and treaty came into force May 8 (*O.M.* June 1936).
- Aug. 18. Exchange of notes with Great Britain concluding provisional commercial agreement with Palestine (*Cmd.* 5361).
- Aug. 26. Treaty of alliance signed with Great Britain, with exchange of notes and convention regarding British armed forces, completed by declaration of Aug. 10 and exchange of notes of Aug. 12. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 22. Nov. 5, financial agreement signed regarding Sudan (*Cmd.* 5360 and 5319, and see pp. 478-503 above).
- Nov. 18. Agreement signed with Sa'ūdī Arabia regarding the Mahmal, the Waqf al-Haramayn, and questions of citizenship.

ESTONIA

- 1935, June 6. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia of fiscal co-operation convention of May 28, 1936, and protocol of Feb. 17, 1934 (*L.N.T.S.* 159).
- Oct. 10. Ratifications exchanged with Sweden of aviation convention of May 20, 1935.
- Dec. 10. Protocol signed with Latvia regarding compensation for

ESTONIA: *cont.*

- alienated ground in frontier zone. Ratifications exchanged and entry into force, March 6, 1936. Oct. 6, further exchange of notes. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 168, 172).
- Dec. 10. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia and Lithuania of conventions of Nov. 14, 1935, concerning the recognition and execution of judgments and sentences in (1) criminal matters; (2) civil matters; and of Estonian-Latvian protocol of Nov. 14, 1935, interpreting (2). Entry into force (1), Dec. 10, 1935; (2, and protocol), Jan. 10, 1936 (*L.N.T.S.* 166).
- Dec. 10. Industrial property agreement signed with Lithuania. Came into force Feb. 18, 1936 (*L.N.T.S.* 168).
- 1936, Jan. 1. Commercial exchanges agreement with Germany of Nov. 29, 1935, modifying agreement of Jan. 4, 1935, came into force provisionally. Nov. 2, second additional agreement signed (*R.* Dec. 17, 1935, and Nov. 14, 1936).
- Jan. 1. Economic protocol of Dec. 7, 1935, came into force provisionally with Latvia. Ratifications exchanged Feb. 21 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).
- Jan. 1. Entry into force of agreement of Dec. 21, 1935, regarding imports of Estonian meat into Sweden.
- Jan. 21. Supplementary clearing protocol of Dec. 7, 1935, came into force with Latvia (*L.N.T.S.* 169).
- Feb. 22. Exchange of notes with France regarding tariff on French wines. Came into force April 27 (*L.N.T.S.* 168).
- March 23. Protocol signed with Poland additional to commercial treaty of Feb. 19, 1927.
- April 3. Protocol signed with Finland modifying commercial agreement of July 5, 1934. Came into force April 18. April 16, convention concluded regarding telephones, telegraphs, and submarine cables. Came into force Aug. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 168 and 171).
- June 10. Protocol signed with Latvia regarding use of roads in frontier zones. Came into force Aug. 15.
- Sept. 12. Aviation convention signed with Finland. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 7 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
- Oct. 6. Agreement concluded with Italy regarding commercial exchanges and payments. Came into force Oct. 30 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
- Dec. 15/18. Postal convention signed with Finland.
- See also under BRAZIL, April 30.

FINLAND

- 1935, Sept. 25. Conventions signed with Germany regarding (1) double taxation and (2) fiscal co-operation. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 31, conventions came into force Jan. 1, 1936 ((1) *L.N.T.S.* 172). 1936, Aug. 3/Oct. 6, additional agreement concluded.
- 1936, Jan. 1. Agreement of Dec. 3, 1935, regarding payments came into force with Rumania. June 23, additional agreement concluded, with effect from July 15 (*L.N.T.S.* 165).
- Jan. 1. Exchange of notes of Dec. 14, 1935, regarding motor-car licences came into force with Sweden (*L.N.T.S.* 160).

FINLAND: *cont.*

- Jan. 28. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of establishment treaty of May 7, 1935. Came into force same day (*R.d.L.F.* Feb. 12, 1936).
 - Feb. 1. Exchange of notes of Dec. 18, 1935, regarding communication of judicial sentences came into force with Sweden (*L.N.T.S.* 165).
 - Feb. 11. Protocol signed with U.S.S.R. modifying railway transport • convention of June 18, 1924. Ratifications exchanged April 13, protocol came into force June 12 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 - Feb. 14. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding abrogation of convention of March 28/April 9, 1889, between Norway, Sweden, and Russia regarding inheritance.
 - March 12. Exchange of notes with Great Britain interpreting liquor smuggling convention of Oct. 13, 1933 (*L.N.T.S.* 164).
 - March 28. Commercial agreement concluded with Latvia, with effect from April 15.
 - April 3. Exchange of notes with Hungary regarding abolition of passport visas with effect from May 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 - April 30. Ratifications exchanged with Norway of convention of Nov. 5, 1935, regarding control of reindeer (*L.N.T.S.* 169).
 - May 18. Commercial agreement signed with U.S.A. Came into force Nov. 2 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 - June 20. Trade and clearing agreements concluded with Turkey, with effect from July 1. Additional protocols of June 20 came into force Oct. 9 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 - July 16. Supplementary tariff protocol concluded with Poland. Came into force Aug. 20 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 - Aug. 25. Supplementary tariff protocol concluded with Netherlands. Came provisionally into force Sept. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 - Sept. 1. Agreement came into force with Sweden modifying telephone agreement of July 6/10, 1928.
 - Sept. 11. Announcement of denunciation of telephone agreement with U.S.S.R. of June 18, 1924, with effect from Sept. 30.
 - Sept. 28. Agreement concluded with Italy regarding commercial exchanges and payments. Oct. 26, further exchange of notes (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 - Oct. 2. Peace and friendship treaty signed with Mexico.
 - Oct. 8/23. Exchange of notes with Great Britain modifying protocol to commercial agreement of Sept. 29, 1933, with effect from Oct. 23.
 - Oct. 20. Commercial agreement signed with Uruguay.
 - Oct. 31. Protocol signed with Hungary additional to commercial convention of May 29, 1925. Came into force Nov. 15.
 - Nov. 16. Exchange of notes with Rumania regarding abolition of passport visas.
 - Nov. 20. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding agreement of Dec. 29, 1933, on the prevention of liquor smuggling.
- See also under ARGENTINA, 1935, Dec. 31; BULGARIA, Oct. 27; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Jan. 28; DENMARK, Jan. 1; ESTONIA, April 3, Sept. 12, Dec. 15/18.

FRANCE

- 1935, July 23. Aviation convention signed with Hungary. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 9, convention came into force Nov. 9 (*J.O.F.* Oct. 30 and Nov. 4, 1936).
- Dec. 20. War graves convention concluded with Germany and Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 167).
- Dec. 23. Exchange of notes of July 18/Dec. 23 with Luxembourg regarding importation of potatoes from frontier zone (*J.O.F.* Sept. 13, 1936).
- 1936, Jan. 1. Double taxation convention of April 27, 1932, came into force with U.S.A. (*U.S.T.S.* 885).
- Jan. 4. Convention signed with India regarding sale of opium at Chandernagore (*L.N.T.S.* 170). Dec. 18, further agreement signed.
- Jan. 4. Agreement of Dec. 30, 1935, regarding purchases of tobacco and the prevention of smuggling came into force with Spain (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
- Jan. 6. Agreement concluded with U.S.S.R. prolonging commercial agreement of Jan. 11, 1934. Jan. 21 and Dec. 17, additional agreements signed (*J.O.F.* Jan. 6/7, Jan. 23, and Dec. 31, 1936).
- Jan. 11. Exchange of notes with Luxembourg regarding importation of tan bark. Dec. 21, further exchange of notes (*J.O.F.* Jan. 7, 1937).
- Jan. 13. Exchange of notes with Netherlands regarding import quotas. April 3, Oct. 22, and Nov. 28, further exchanges of notes.
- Jan. 18. Exchange of notes with Sweden concluding commercial agreement. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 167).
- Feb. 4. Agreement concluded with U.S.S.R. regarding tax on importation and transit of Russian products (*J.O.F.* March 13, 1936).
- Feb. 7. Agreement signed with Rumania regarding oil exports. Commercial payments agreement signed with effect from June 1 (*R.I.I.C.* June 1936).
- Feb. 21. Commercial agreement signed with Norway.
- March 9. Parcel post agreement signed with U.S.S.R. Ratifications exchanged June 30. Came into force Aug. 14 (*J.O.F.* Aug. 16/17/18, 1936).
- March 16. Nicaragua denounced commercial convention of Jan. 27, 1902, with *modus vivendi* of Jan. 21, 1921, with effect from June 16.
- March 27. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of mutual assistance treaty of May 2, 1935. Came into force March 28 (*L.N.T.S.* 167).
- April 15. Convention signed with Great Britain supplementary to legal proceedings convention of Feb. 2, 1927 (*Cmd.* 5182).
- April 23. Supplementary extradition convention signed with U.S.A. regarding bankruptcy offences. Ratifications exchanged Aug. 25. Came into force Sept. 24 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
- April 25. Friendship treaty signed with Yaman.
- May 1. Convention signed with India regarding letter packets. Came into force same day.
- May 6. Exchange of notes with South Africa prolonging commercial agreement of Aug. 27, 1935 (*J.O.F.* July 5, 1936).

FRANCE: *cont.*

- May 6. Reciprocal trade agreement signed with U.S.A. Came provisionally into force June 15 (*J.O.F.* May 13, 1936).
- May 9. Poland denounced commercial treaty of Dec. 9, 1924. July 10, Danzig denounced treaty. July 18, provisional commercial agreement and agreement regarding payments signed, with effect from July 20. Dec. 14, further exchange of notes (*J.O.F.* July 19, July 23, and Dec. 31, 1936).
- May 12. Exchange of notes with Germany regarding cinematograph films (*J.O.F.* May 30, 1936).
- May 15. Ratifications exchanged with Italy of aviation convention of May 13, 1935. Convention signed regarding up-keep of frontier marks.
- May 16. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of convention of Jan. 18, 1934, regarding the execution of civil and commercial judgments. Came into force June 16 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- May 16. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia of consular convention of Jan. 20, 1930 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).
- May 20/25. Agreement concluded by exchange of notes with Netherlands abolishing consular visa on bills of health as between Indo-China and the Netherlands East Indies, with effect from Nov. 25.
- May 29. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of additional act of Oct. 4, 1935, to convention of June 15, 1869, regarding judicial competence and the execution of civil judgments (*R.d.L.F.* June 10, 1936).
- May 30. Exchange of notes with Venezuela regarding commercial relations.
- June 3. Agreement concluded with Sweden regarding intellectual co-operation and the recognition of university degrees (*S.Ö.F.M.* No. 12, 1936).
- June 19. Agreements signed with Germany regarding pensions for former Saar officials of French nationality (*R.* June 5, 1937).
- June 19. Parcel post agreement with Palestine signed on March 31/June 19. Came into force Aug. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
- June 27. Agreement signed with Hungary, additional to commercial payments agreement of July 18, 1935. Came into force July 1. Oct. 15 and Dec. 19, further agreements concluded by exchanges of notes (*J.O.F.* June 29/30, Oct. 26/27, and Dec. 24, 1936).
- Aug. 11. Compensation agreement and *modus vivendi* regarding commercial exchanges and payments concluded with Italy. Oct. 31 and Dec. 31, agreement and exchange of notes concluded regarding *modus vivendi* (*J.O.F.* Aug. 14, and Dec. 3, 1936, and Jan. 27, 1937).
- Aug. 11. Agreement signed with U.S.S.R. regarding transmission of judicial and notarial acts and execution of rogatory commissions. Ratifications exchanged Oct. 8 (*J.O.F.* Oct. 23, 1936).
- Aug. 14. Convention signed with Germany terminating agreement of April 25, 1929, regarding local frontier traffic, with effect from June 30.
- Aug. 18. Agreement signed with Latvia additional to commercial payments agreement of March 8, 1932. Came into force Aug. 28 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).

FRANCE: *cont.*

- Sept. 9. Treaty of friendship, with military convention and exchanges of notes concluded with Syria (*E.N.* Nov. 28, 1936).
- Sept. 25. Declarations issued by France, Great Britain, and U.S.A. regarding monetary policy. Sept. 26, accession of Belgium. Oct. 12, further agreement concluded. Nov. 22, accession of Netherlands and Switzerland. (See pp. 668-9 above).
- Oct. 4. Exchange of notes with Switzerland prolonging commercial convention of March 29, 1934 (*R.d.L.F.* Nov. 18, 1936).
- Oct. 15. Exchange of notes with Germany prolonging commerce and establishment agreement regarding mandated territories of July 28, 1934, except as regards Syria and Lebanon.
- Oct. 26. Agreement signed with Luxembourg regarding student workers (*J.O.F.* Nov. 28, 1936).
- Nov. 4. Ratifications exchanged with Germany of Rhine bridges agreement of Nov. 6, 1934 (*R.* Nov. 14, 1936).
- Nov. 6. Friendship treaty and pacific settlement convention with Rumania of June 10, 1926, prolonged for ten years from Nov. 8.
- Nov. 12/17. Exchange of notes with Portugal regarding commercial aviation in Africa (*J.O.F.* Dec. 5, 1936).
- Nov. 13. Friendship treaty and military convention signed with the Lebanon (*E.N.* Nov. 28, 1936).
- Dec. 3. Ratifications exchanged with Lithuania of judicial assistance treaty of May 9, 1928.
- Dec. 8. Agreements signed with Yugoslavia *re* (1) additional agreement to commercial convention of Jan. 30, 1929; (2) preferential treatment for maize; (3) wheat quota. Entry into force (2) Dec. 8, (3) Dec. 15 ((1) *J.O.F.* Jan. 1, 1937; (2, 3) Dec. 15, 1936).
- Dec. 10/12. Exchange of notes with U.S.A. concerning the suppression of customs frauds. Came into force Dec. 15 (*J.O.F.* Dec. 16, 1936).
- Dec. 21. Exchange of notes with Luxembourg regarding Art. 9 of commercial agreement of Feb. 23, 1928 (*J.O.F.* Jan. 7, 1937).
- See also under ARGENTINA, March 4; AUSTRALIA, May 8/20, Nov. 27; AUSTRIA, April 2; BELGIUM, 1935, Dec. 28; 1936, Jan. 1, July 16, Dec. 21; BRAZIL, March 4; BULGARIA, July 6, Dec. 17; CANADA, March 20; CHILE, Jan. 16; CHINA, Jan. 14; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, April 9; DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, Sept. 4; ECUADOR, 1935, Feb. 14, 1936, May 12/13, Dec. 28; ESTONIA, Feb. 22.

GERMANY

- 1935, March 22. Navigation treaty concluded with Peru.
- June 17. Passenger traffic convention and protocol regarding transfer moratorium signed with Netherlands. 1936, June 5, further agreements signed.
- July 19/Aug. 13. Agreements signed with Norway regarding motor-car licences. Came into force Aug. 15.
- 1936, Jan. 1. Exchange of notes of Nov. 10, 1935, regarding carp quota, came into force with Hungary. Ratifications exchanged Aug. 26. (*R.* Dec. 17, 1935).

GERMANY: *cont.*

- Jan. 1. Entry into force of exchange of notes with Italy of Dec. 20, 1935, amending and prolonging rayon agreements of Dec. 12, 1933, and March 29, 1934 (*R. Dec. 31, 1935*).
- Jan. 1. Commercial agreement of Dec. 4, 1935, came into force with Latvia (*L.N.T.S. 166*).
- Jan. 1. Commercial agreement of Dec. 23, 1935 came provisionally into force with Netherlands. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 16.
- Dec. 23, further agreements signed regarding clearing and commercial exchanges (*R. Dec. 23 and Dec. 29, 1936*).
- Jan. 15. Convention signed with Switzerland regarding inclusion of Jestetten enclave in German customs area. Provisionally in force from Feb. 1. Ratifications exchanged July 10 (*R.d.L.F. Feb. 12, 1936*).
- Jan. 23. Provisional entry into force with Italy of exchange of notes of Dec. 20, 1935, regarding payments agreement of Sept. 26, 1934. Ratifications exchanged Dec. 10, and agreement of 1934 extended to Italian colonies (*R. Feb. 1 and Dec. 22, 1936*).
- Jan. 31. Agreement signed with Sweden regarding transfer moratorium and Dawes, Young and Kreuger Loans, with effect from Jan. 1 (*L.N.T.S. 168*).
- Feb. 11. Eighth additional agreement concluded to commercial exchanges agreement with Switzerland of Nov. 5, 1932. Exchange of notes regarding additional agreement of Dec. 20, 1933. Both agreements came into force provisionally March 1 (*R. Feb. 24, 1936*). July 6, ninth additional agreement concluded, provisionally in force from July 20. Dec. 23, tenth additional agreement concluded (*R.d.L.F. July 22, 1936 and Jan. 6, 1937*).
- March 2. Exchange of notes with Hungary regarding tariff on embroidered dresses, &c. Came into force provisionally March 16 (*R. March 13, 1936*).
- March 9. Convention signed with Italy regarding judicial decisions in civil and commercial matters (*R. May 20, 1937*).
- March 9. Commercial exchanges agreement signed with Spain replacing agreement of Dec. 21, 1934.
- March 21. Exchange of notes with Yugoslavia concluding additional agreement to commercial treaty of May 1, 1934. April 1 and Oct. 20, further exchanges of notes. Provisional entry into force (1, 2), May 1; (3), Oct. 20 (*R. April 24 and Oct. 28, 1936*).
- March 23. Exchange of notes with Switzerland of March 6 and 23 concluding agreement regarding extradition and judicial assistance interpreting the treaty of Jan. 24, 1874 (*R.d.L.F. April 1, 1936*).
- April 18. Ratifications exchanged with Hungary of agreement of May 13, 1935, regarding marsh reeds (*R. May 17, 1935*).
- April 29. Exchange of notes with Irish Free State regarding commercial agreement of Jan. 28, 1935 (*Cmd. 4844*). Dec. 18, further exchange of notes (*Saorstát Éireann Treaty Series, No. 8, 1936*).
- April 29. Convention concluded with U.S.S.R. regarding trade and clearing during 1936. Came into force same day.
- April 30. Commercial agreement concluded with Manchukuo. Came into force June 1 (*Times, June 2, 1936*).

GERMANY: *cont.*

- May 10. Expiry of commercial agreement of Feb. 17, 1929, with Iran.
- May 19. Third additional agreement concluded with Turkey regarding commercial treaty of May 27, 1930. Provisional entry into force May 20 (*R.* June 12, 1936).
- May 26. Ratifications exchanged with 'Irāq of commercial treaty of Aug. 4, 1935 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- May 28. Intellectual co-operation agreement signed with Hungary (*R.* April 27, 1937).
- June 26. Exchange of notes with Great Britain regarding extension of Art. 7 paragraph (ii) of payments agreement of Nov. 1, 1934. Dec. 16, further exchange of notes.
- June 26. Agreement concluded with Italy regarding air services.
- June 29. Agreement signed with Portugal regarding liquidation of German property, rights and interests. Ratifications exchanged and entry into force, Dec. 18 (*R.* Jan. 8, 1937).
- July 6. Additional agreement signed to clearing agreement with Switzerland of April 17, 1935, provisionally in force as from July 1.
- Oct. 18, second agreement signed, provisionally in force from Oct. 19.
- Dec. 23, third agreement signed (*R.d.L.F.* July 22, 1936, and Jan. 6, 1937).
- July 18. Additional agreement signed to commercial treaty and commercial payments agreement with Poland of Nov. 4, 1935, provisionally in force from Sept. 10.
- Oct. 19, second additional agreement signed to commercial treaty, provisionally in force from Nov. 1.
- Nov. 19, ratifications exchanged of both treaty and agreement.
- Dec. 21, third additional agreement signed to treaty (*R.* Nov. 16, 1935, Sept. 5 and Oct. 28, 1936, and Jan. 5, 1937).
- Aug. 5. Agreements signed with Lithuania regarding (1) commercial exchanges; (2) clearing; (3) frontier traffic. Provisional entry into force (1, 2), Aug. 15; (3) Aug. 25 (*R.* Aug. 14, 1936).
- Aug. 26. Ratifications exchanged with Hungary of commercial payments agreement of Dec. 2, 1935 (*R.* Dec. 3, 1935).
- Sept. 3. Air traffic agreement concluded with Yugoslavia.
- Sept. 24. Second additional agreement signed to clearing agreement of May 24, 1935, with Rumania. Provisional entry into force Oct. 1 (*R.* Oct. 1, 1936).
- Oct. 17. Agreement signed with Poland regarding legal matters connected with revaluation (*R.* Jan. 12, 1937).
- Nov. 5. Siam denounced friendship and commerce treaty of April 7, 1928, with effect from Nov. 4, 1937.
- Nov. 9. Aviation agreement concluded with Greece.
- Nov. 12. Exchange of notes with Switzerland regarding accident insurance for railways (*R.d.L.F.* Jan. 20, 1937).
- Nov. 25. Anti-Communist agreement signed with Japan (see pp. 297-9 above).
- Nov. 30. Ratifications exchanged with Netherlands of additional commercial agreement and of commercial exchanges agreement regarding Netherlands East Indies of June 6, 1934 (*S.* No. 99, M and N, 1936).

GERMANY: *cont.*

- Dec. 2. Parcel post agreement signed with Great Britain on Oct. 6, and Dec. 2.
- Dec. 10. Agreements signed with Italy regarding payment of literary, scientific and artistic royalties, and extension of commercial treaty of Oct. 31, 1935, to Italian possessions and colonies (*R. Dec. 22, 1936*).
- Dec. 17. Parcel post agreement signed with Malaya on July 11 and Dec. 17.
- Dec. 21. Ratifications exchanged of agreement of Nov. 10, 1934, with Poland regarding the redemption of West Prussian bonds (*R. Jan. 12, 1937*).
- Dec. 21. Commercial exchanges agreement concluded with South Africa.
- See also under AUSTRIA, May 27, July 11, Aug. 22, Nov. 16. Dec. 15; BELGIUM, Feb. 12, June 24, Nov. 7; BOLIVIA, June 4; CANADA, Oct. 22; CHILE, Jan. 1; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Jan. 15, Oct. 1, Oct. 23; DENMARK, Jan. 9, June 17; ECUADOR, 1935, Feb. 14; 1936, Jan. 1; ESTONIA, Jan. 1; FINLAND, 1935, Sept. 25; FRANCE, 1935, Dec. 20; 1936, May 12, June 19, Aug. 14, Oct. 15, Nov. 4.

GREAT BRITAIN

See under ARGENTINA, Dec. 1; BELGIUM, Oct. 26; BRAZIL, Aug. 10; CANADA, 1935, Oct. 3; CHINA, Feb. 12, July 17; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1935, Oct. 22/30; DANZIG, 1935, April 26; 1936, June 26; DENMARK, Jan. 1/7, March 30, June 19; EGYPT, Feb. 1/29, Aug. 18, Aug. 26; FINLAND, March 12, Oct. 8/23; FRANCE, 1935, Dec. 20; 1936, April 15, May 16, Sept. 25; GERMANY, June 26, Dec. 2, Dec. 17; GREECE, Jan. 18/21, Feb. 27, Sept. 17; HAITI, June 6/Dec. 17; HUNGARY, Feb. 1, May 7, Sept. 18; IRAQ, March 31, April 25, Nov. 18, Dec. 14; ITALY, Aug. 6, Nov. 6; JUGOSLAVIA, Feb. 27, Nov. 27; LITHUANIA, May 7; NETHERLANDS, Feb. 1, May 22; NORWAY, Jan. 15, Nov. 18; PARAGUAY; PERU, Oct. 6; POLAND, Aug. 1/27; RUMANIA, May 2; SA'UDĪ ARABIA; SIAM, Nov. 5; SOUTH AFRICA, 1935, Aug. 30; SPAIN, Jan. 6; SWEDEN, April 30; SWITZERLAND, 1935, Dec. 21; SYRIA; TURKEY, Sept. 2; U.S.A. Jan. 25/Feb. 13, Oct. 29/Dec. 31; U.S.S.R.; URUGUAY.

GREECE

- 1935, July 20. Ratifications exchanged with Yugoslavia of air services convention of July 22, 1933 (*L.N.T.S.* 161).
- 1936, Jan. 11. Commercial exchanges agreement concluded with Sweden, with effect from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31. Dec. 31, further agreement signed (*S.Ö.F.M.* Nos. 3 and 27, 1936).
- Jan. 14. Commercial agreement signed with U.S.S.R., with effect from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31 (*R.I.I.C.* June 1936).
- Jan. 18/21. Exchange of notes with Great Britain regarding expropriation of landed properties. Came into force Jan. 21 (*Cmd.* 5260).

GREECE: *cont.*

- Jan. 24. Aviation convention signed with Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Turkey.
 - Feb. 27. Convention signed with Great Britain regarding legal proceedings in civil and commercial matters (*Cmd.* 5146).
 - March 13/28. Parcel post agreement signed with Palestine. Came into force April 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).
 - April 2. Commercial payments agreement signed with Hungary. Came into force April 10. Agreement also signed additional to commercial treaty of June 3, 1930. Provisional entry into force April 10, ratifications exchanged Sept. 16.
 - April 2. Agreement signed with Rumania regarding payments. Came into force same day.
 - April 7. Exchange of notes with Spain regarding nationality of certain families living in Greece.
 - June 30. Agreement signed regarding Italian air services across Greece.
 - Aug. 12, commercial exchanges and clearing agreement signed.
 - Nov. 7, further agreement signed, with effect from Nov. 16 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936 and March 1937).
 - Aug. 22. Trade and payments agreement signed with Yugoslavia, with effect from Sept. 1 (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).
 - Aug. 22. Trade and payments agreement concluded with Rumania.
 - Sept. 17. Agreement concluded with Great Britain regarding taxation of certain profits arising out of an agency (*Cmd.* 5318).
 - Oct. 1. Import quota agreement signed with Poland.
 - Nov. 21. Treaty of entry, establishment and residence signed with U.S.A.
- See also under AUSTRIA, Jan. 7; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Oct. 12, Oct. 19; GERMANY, Nov. 9.

GUATEMALA

- 1935, July 6. Convention signed regarding entry of Japanese commercial travellers and tourists. July 17, commercial exchanges convention signed.
 - 1936, March 27. Act signed with Honduras and Salvador regarding common boundary point.
 - April 24. Commercial agreement signed with U.S.A. Came into force June 15 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).
 - June 6. Exchange of notes with Italy regarding commercial relations.
 - June 11. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding commercial relations (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
- See also under CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Sept. 16/20.

HAITI

- 1936, June 6/Dec. 17. Parcel post agreement signed with Jamaica. Came into force Dec. 17.
 - Dec. 23. Exchange of notes with Switzerland concluding provisional commercial agreement (*R.d.L.F.* Feb. 3, 1937).
- See also under BELGIUM, July 9; DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, March 9.

HONDURAS

- 1936, March 2. Commercial treaty of Dec. 18, 1935, came into force with U.S.A. (*L.N.T.S.* 167).
 July 17. Denunciation by Honduras of commercial treaty with Nicaragua of Jan. 30, 1930 took effect.
 July 17. Denunciation by Honduras of treaty of May 5, 1905 with Spain regarding academic degrees took effect.
 See also under BELGIUM, 1935, Sept. 25; GUATEMALA, March 27.

HUNGARY

- 1935, May 29/June 28. Exchange of notes with Poland regarding certificates of origin.
 1936, Feb. 1. Compensation agreement came into force with Great Britain (*R.I.I.C.* March 1936).
 April 4. Payments agreement signed with Rumania, in force as from April 1. Sept. 3, additional agreement signed (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
 April 24. Third additional protocol signed to commercial treaty with Poland of March 26, 1925.
 May 7. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of civil and commercial procedure convention of Sept. 25, 1935. Came into force June 7. Extended to Scotland, Southern Rhodesia, New Zealand, and Newfoundland by exchanges of notes of July 1/19, Sept. 23/30, Oct. 5/15, and Nov. 17/28 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).
 May 16. Additional commercial agreement concluded with Italy. Commercial payments agreement concluded, in force from June 1 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936). July 4, agreement concluded regarding Italian purchases of wheat.
 July 23. Agreement signed with Switzerland additional to clearing agreement of March 9, 1935. Came into force Aug. 1.
 Aug. 18. Ratifications exchanged with Netherlands of aviation convention of June 8, 1935. Came into force Sept. 17 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
 Sept. 18. Supplementary extradition treaty signed with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 5311).
 Nov. 9. Ratifications exchanged with Switzerland of aviation convention of June 18, 1935. Came into force Dec. 9 (*R.d.L.F.* Dec. 23, 1936).
 Dec. 17. Agreements signed with Yugoslavia regarding trade and payments.
 See also under AUSTRIA, Feb. 15, March 23, Sept. 17; BELGIUM, July 15; BRAZIL, July 30; BULGARIA, April 18; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1935, Dec. 22; 1936, June 15, Sept. 12; FINLAND, April 3, Oct. 31; FRANCE, 1935, July 23; 1936, June 27; GERMANY, Jan. 1, March 2, April 18, May 28, Aug. 26; GREECE, April 2.

ICELAND

- See under DENMARK, Jan. 1.

INDIA

1936, Nov. 6/Dec. 23. Postal agreement signed with Nepal.

See also under BRAZIL, Sept. 17; DANZIG, June 26; FRANCE, 1935, Dec. 20; 1936, Jan. 4, May 1; 'IRĀQ, April 25; ITALY, Aug. 6.

IRAN

1935, July 27. Ratifications exchanged with Latvia of friendship treaty of Jan. 15, 1929 (*L.N.T.S.* 162).

1936, June 8. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of conventions of Aug. 27, 1935 regarding (1) commerce, establishment, and navigation; (2) locusts; (3) plant diseases and insect pests; (4) veterinary regulations.

See also under GERMANY, May 10.

'IRĀQ

1936, March 31. Agreement signed with Great Britain regarding transfer of railways. Ratifications exchanged July 9 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).

April 2. Treaty of Arab brotherhood and alliance signed with Sa'ūdī Arabia. Ratifications exchanged Nov. 12 (*Times*, April 7, 36).

April 23. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.A. of extradition treaty of June 7, 1934. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

April 25. Entry into force of war graves agreement of March 15, 1935 between 'Irāq and Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India, New Zealand, and South Africa (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

Nov. 18. Civil and commercial procedure convention of July 25, 1935 came into force with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 5369).

Dec. 14. Exchange of notes with Great Britain regarding commercial relations between Palestine and 'Irāq.

See also under GERMANY, May 26.

IRISH FREE STATE

1935, July 31. Exchange of notes with South Africa concluding commercial agreement (*Saorstát Éireann Treaty Series*, No. 7, 1935).

1936, Jan. 14. Exchange of notes with Spain of Dec. 16, 1935/Jan. 14, 1936 regarding diplomatic mails (*L.N.T.S.* 168).

July 29. Exchange of notes with Netherlands regarding commercial exchanges (*Cmd.* 5442).

Oct. 1. Exchange of notes with Turkey regarding trade and payments. Came into force Oct. 15 (*Cmd.* 5443).

See also under GERMANY, April 29.

ITALY

1935, June 7/18. Exchange of notes with Peru regarding analysis of wines. July 12, agreement concluded regarding the notification of penal sentences.

Dec. 10. Payments agreement of Dec. 3, 1935, came into force with Switzerland. 1936, April 3, additional agreement signed also with effect from Dec. 10 (*R.d.L.F.* April 12 and June 10, 1936).

1936, Jan. 1. Consular convention of July 10, 1935, came into force with Poland. Ratifications exchanged May 7.

ITALY: *cont.*

- Jan. 22. Exchange of notes with Spain regarding clearing.
 - Jan. 23. Exchange of notes with South Africa of May 21, 1935/Jan. 23, 1936 regarding commercial relations.
 - April 16. Exchange of notes with Netherlands putting aviation agreement of May 20, 1935 into force as from Jan. 6.
 - April 28. Agreement signed with Rumania concerning appointment of Professor Isopesco to professorship of Rumanian at Rome.
 - April 30. Ratifications exchanged with San Marino of monetary convention of June 15, 1935.
 - June 20. Agreements signed with Switzerland regarding commercial treaty of Jan. 27, 1923 and trade in medicinal products.
 - Aug. 6. Exchange of notes with Great Britain, Australia, Canada, India, and New Zealand regarding war graves agreement of May 11, 1922 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).
 - Aug. 11. Commercial payments agreement signed with Syria and Lebanon.
 - Aug. 25. Convention signed with Norway regarding commercial exchanges and payments (*L.N.T.S.* 171).
 - Sept. 5. *Modus vivendi* concluded with Sweden regarding commercial exchanges and payments. Dec. 1, agreements concluded regarding trade, clearing, and arrears of debts (*S.Ö.F.M.* Nos. 15 and 20-2, 1936).
 - Sept. 14. Trade and clearing agreement and financial agreement concluded with Poland.
 - Sept. 22. Trade and clearing agreement concluded with Lithuania. Came into force same day (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
 - Sept. 26. Commercial exchanges and payments agreement concluded with Yugoslavia, together with additional protocol to commercial treaty of July 14, 1924 (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).
 - Nov. 6. Commercial agreement and agreement on commercial exchanges and payments signed with Great Britain. Came into force Nov. 16 (*Cmd.* 5306 and 5307).
 - Nov. 7. Ratifications exchanged with Lithuania of consular convention and extradition and judicial assistance convention of July 13, 1935. Came into force Dec. 7.
 - Nov. 7. Provisional commercial payments convention concluded with Rumania. Came into force Nov. 12.
 - Dec. 15. Protocol signed with U.S.A. regarding denunciation of commercial treaties of Feb. 26, 1871 and Feb. 25, 1913.
 - Dec. 21. Agreements signed with Portugal regarding trade, commercial payments, and arrears of debts (*R.I.I.C.* March and June, 1937).
 - Dec. 29. Most-favoured-nation agreement and agreements regarding import quotas and clearing signed with Turkey (*R.I.I.C.* June 1937).
- See also under ALBANIA, Jan. 28; AUSTRIA, March 5, March 10, March 23, April 1, June 27; BELGIUM, March 26, Aug. 21, Nov. 3; BRAZIL, Aug. 14; BULGARIA, Sept. 30; COSTA RICA, March 5; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Aug. 31; DENMARK, Oct. 26; ESTONIA, Oct. 6; FINLAND,

ITALY: *cont.*

Sept. 28; FRANCE, May 15, Aug. 11; GERMANY, Jan. 1, Jan. 23, March 9, June 26, Dec. 10; GREECE, June 30; GUATEMALA, June 6; HUNGARY, May 16.

JAPAN

1936, June 10. Convention signed concerning the residence of Japanese subjects, taxation, &c. in Manchukuo, with supplementary agreement (*American Journal of International Law*, Oct. 1936).

July 29. Commercial agreement signed with Syria.

See also under DENMARK, July 16/23; GERMANY, Nov. 25; GUATEMALA, 1935, July 6.

JUGOSLAVIA

1935, June 7. Ratifications exchanged with Turkey of friendship, non-aggression, and pacific settlement treaty of Nov. 27, 1933, and of claims agreement of Nov. 28, 1933 (*L.N.T.S.* 161).

1936, Feb. 27. Convention signed with Great Britain regarding legal proceedings in civil and commercial matters (*Cmd.* 5161).

May 15. Commercial agreement and protocol regarding payments concluded with Spain. Came into force June 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

July 15. Tourist traffic agreement signed with Rumania (*R.I.I.C.* June 1937).

Sept. 25. Supplementary commercial agreement concluded with Netherlands, with effect from Oct. 1.

Oct. 26. Commerce and navigation convention signed with Turkey, with effect from Nov. 5. Nov. 3, commercial payments agreement signed (*R.I.I.C.* March 1937).

Nov. 21. Convention signed with Rumania regarding railway bridge over Danube.

Nov. 27. Trade and payments agreement signed with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 5323).

See also under ALBANIA, Jan. 25; ARGENTINA, 1935, Jan. 9; BELGIUM, Feb. 29; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, July 16, Oct. 12; FRANCE, Dec. 8; GERMANY, March 21, Sept. 3; GREECE, 1935, July 20; 1936, Jan. 24, Aug. 22; HUNGARY, Dec. 17; ITALY, Sept. 26.

LATVIA

1936, June 12. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding clearing agreement of March 26, 1935. Came into force June 13. Nov. 21, further exchange of notes. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 164, *S.O.F.M.* Nos. 13 and 19, 1936).

Nov. 30. Clearing agreement signed with Lithuania additional to agreement of April 10, 1935.

Dec. 15/30. Postal convention signed with Sweden.

See also under BELGIUM, Feb. 22; CHINA, June 25; ESTONIA, 1935, June 6, Dec. 10; 1936, Jan. 1, Jan. 21, June 10; FINLAND, March 28; FRANCE, May 16, Aug. 18; GERMANY, Jan. 1; IRAN, 1935, July 27.

LEBANON

See under FRANCE, Oct. 15, Nov. 13; ITALY, Aug. 11; SYRIA.

LIECHTENSTEIN

1936, May 20. Extradition treaty signed with U.S.A.

LITHUANIA

1936, May 1. Exchange of notes with Netherlands regarding quotas.

May 7. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of civil and commercial procedure convention of April 24, 1934. Came into force June 7 (*Cmd.* 5197). Extended to Scotland, Southern Rhodesia, New Zealand, and Newfoundland by exchanges of notes of Aug. 3/13, Sept. 30/Oct. 14, Oct. 7/26, and Nov. 25/27 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).

See also under AUSTRIA, Feb. 11; BELGIUM, Feb. 10; CHILE, Sept. 24; ESTONIA, 1935, Dec. 10; FRANCE, Dec. 3; GERMANY, Aug. 5; ITALY, Sept. 22, Nov. 7; LATVIA, Nov. 30.

LUXEMBOURG

1936, Feb. 3. Ratifications exchanged with Poland of extradition and judicial assistance convention of Jan. 22, 1934.

March 3. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.A. of supplementary extradition treaty of April 24, 1935. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 168).

April 15. Exchange of notes with Netherlands regarding establishment and labour convention of April 1, 1933.

June 15. Agreement regarding waiving of passport visas came into force with U.S.A.

See also under AUSTRALIA, Oct. 3; BELGIUM, 1935, Nov. 2/7, &c.; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, April 16; FRANCE, 1935, Dec. 23; 1936, Jan. 11, Oct. 26, Dec. 21.

MANCHUKUO

See under GERMANY, April 30; JAPAN, June 10.

MEXICO

1935, Sept. 2. Exchange of notes with Salvador concluding commercial agreement.

1936, Feb. 1. Entry into force of exchange of notes with Panamá of agreement of Dec. 3/6 regarding abolition of visa fees.

Feb. 7. Agreement signed with U.S.A. regarding protection of migrating birds and game animals. Feb. 10/11, further exchange of notes (*U.S.T.S.* 912). March 7, ratifications exchanged of marine salvage treaty of June 13, 1935. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 168). Oct. 6, agreement signed regarding recovery of stolen motor-cars and aeroplanes.

See also under BRAZIL, 1935, Sept. 18; 1936, July 30; BULGARIA, Nov. 5; FINLAND, Oct. 2.

MONACO

See under AUSTRIA, Feb. 7; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, June 25.

NEPAL

See under INDIA.

NETHERLANDS

1936, Jan. 15. Ratifications exchanged with Uruguay of commercial treaty of Jan. 29, 1934. Came into force Jan. 30, and April 15 as regards Netherlands colonies (*L.N.T.S.* 166).

Feb. 1. Civil and commercial procedure convention with Great Britain of May 31, 1932, extended to Canada as from Feb. 1.

Feb. 1. Entry into force of Arts. 1-16 of commercial agreement with U.S.A. (*T.I.* Dec. 1935).

March 28. Ratifications exchanged with Spain of commercial treaty of June 16, 1934 (*L.N.T.S.* 168). March 31, exchange of notes of Feb. 22/March 25/31 regarding taxation of motor vehicles.

April 9. Quota agreement signed with Poland replacing agreement of April 12, 1933, with effect from April 1. Tariff agreement signed replacing agreement of Dec. 11, 1933, with provisional effect from April 20 (*S. No.* 99 G, 1936).

May 22. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of agreement of June 6, 1935 regarding taxation of profits or gains arising through an agency. Came into force same day (*Cmd.* 5191). Aug. 27, exchange of notes regarding taxation of air transport profits. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 172).

Aug. 28. Clearing convention signed with Rumania. Came into force Sept. 1.

Sept. 26/Oct. 15. Exchange of notes with Switzerland regarding carriage by air of fire-arms and ammunition. Came into force Oct. 15.

Nov. 5. Siam denounced friendship and commerce treaty of June 8, 1925, with effect from Nov. 5, 1937.

See also under AUSTRALIA, Sept. 14; AUSTRIA, April 8; BELGIUM, Jan. 1, May 6, July 13; BRAZIL, July 31; CHILE, May 4, Dec. 30; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1935, Dec. 14; ECUADOR, 1935, Feb. 14; FINLAND, Aug. 25; FRANCE, Jan. 13, May 20/25, Sept. 25; GERMANY, 1935, June 17; 1936, Jan. 1, Nov. 30; HUNGARY, Aug. 18; IRISH FREE STATE, July 29; ITALY, April 16; JUGOSLAVIA, Sept. 25; LITHUANIA, May 1; LUXEMBOURG, April 15.

NEW ZEALAND

See under BELGIUM, Aug. 10/21; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1935, Oct. 22/30; DANZIG, June 26; FRANCE, 1935, Dec. 20; HUNGARY, May 7; IRAQ, April 25; ITALY, Aug. 6; LITHUANIA, May 7; SWITZERLAND, 1935, Dec. 21; U.S.A., Jan. 25/Feb. 13.

NEWFOUNDLAND

See under BRAZIL, Aug. 10; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1935, Oct. 22/30; HUNGARY, May 7; LITHUANIA, May 7.

NICARAGUA

1935, Nov. 6. Ratifications exchanged with Spain of intellectual property convention of Nov. 20, 1934 (*L.N.T.S.* 166). 1936, Jan. 1, entry into force of exchange of notes of Nov. 6, 1935, regarding defamatory films (*L.N.T.S.* 166).

NICARAGUA: *cont.*

March 11. Commercial agreement concluded with U.S.A. Came into force Oct. 1 (*U.S.E.A.* 95).

See also under FRANCE, March 14; HONDURAS, July 17.

NORWAY

1936, Jan. 15. Exchange of notes with Great Britain of Aug. 8, 1934/Jan. 15, 1936 extending extradition treaty of June 26, 1873 and declaration of Feb. 18, 1907 to Unfederated Malay States and Brunei as from Jan. 15 (*L.N.T.S.* 164).

March 14. Protocol signed with Poland regarding tariff on oils and fats from marine animals. Ratifications exchanged Aug. 29, entry into force Sept. 28 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).

March 23. Ratifications exchanged with Venezuela of arbitration and conciliation convention of May 13, 1935 (*L.N.T.S.* 167).

April 4. Commercial convention with protocol and exchange of notes concluded with Uruguay (*Ov.F.S.* No. 1, 1937).

June 8. Agreement regarding quotas and compensation and payments agreement concluded with Turkey. Came into force June 12 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

June 13. Trade and payments conventions concluded with Spain. Came into force June 20 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

Nov. 18. Load line certificates agreement signed with Great Britain. Came into force as from Nov. 6 (*Cmd.* 5336).

Dec. 10. Payments agreement signed with Rumania. Came into force Dec. 15 (*Ov.F.S.* No. 1, 1937).

See also under BELGIUM, Dec. 17; BRAZIL, July 24; DENMARK, Jan. 1; FINLAND, April 30; FRANCE, Feb. 21; GERMANY, 1935, July 19/Aug. 13; ITALY, Aug. 25.

NYASSALAND

1936, Aug. 21. Agreement signed with Southern Rhodesia regarding native immigration.

OUTER MONGOLIA

1936, March 12. Mutual assistance protocol signed with U.S.S.R.

PALESTINE

1935, Aug. 24/Sept. 1. Agreement signed with Transjordan modifying extradition agreement of July 16, 1934.

1936, Aug. 22. Agreement signed with Syria regarding movement of animals across frontier.

See also under EGYPT, Aug. 18; FRANCE, June 19; GREECE, March 13/28; IRÂQ, Dec. 14.

PANAMÁ

1936, March 2. Treaty and exchanges of notes concluded with U.S.A. revising convention of Nov. 18, 1903. Conventions signed regarding radio communications, naval wireless stations, and the construction of a trans-isthmian highway.

See also under BOLIVIA, 1935, Aug. 10; MEXICO, Feb. 1.

PARAGUAY

1936, March 19. Exchange of notes with Great Britain of Aug. 30, 1934/Nov. 30, 1935/March 19, 1936 extending additional extradition agreement of July 16, 1913 to Malay States and Brunei (*L.N.T.S.* 164).

See also under BOLIVIA, Jan. 21 ; Aug. 22.

PERSIA

See IRAN.

PERU

1936, March 2/5. Exchange of notes with Spain regarding disparaging films. Came into force March 5 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).

Oct. 6. Commercial convention signed with Great Britain (*Cmd.* 5288).

See also under ARGENTINA, 1935, July 2 ; BOLIVIA, 1935, July 12, Aug. 10 ; 1936, Sept. 14 ; BRAZIL, July 27 ; CHILE, 1935, July 5 ; 1936, July 15 ; COLOMBIA, July 20 ; ECUADOR, 1935, Jan. 7 ; 1936, July 6 ; GERMANY, 1935, March 22 ; ITALY, 1935, June 7/18.

POLAND

1935, June 7. Intellectual co-operation protocol signed with Sweden.

Aug. 1/27. Exchange of notes with Great Britain extending commercial treaty of Nov. 26, 1923 to Malay States, Brunei, and Sarawak. 1936, June 4/18, exchange of notes extending treaty to Kenya as from June 18 (*L.N.T.S.* 160, 172).

1936, Feb. 19. Commercial agreement concluded with Turkey.

March 3. Tariff agreement signed with U.S.S.R.

March 13. Protocol signed with Switzerland modifying supplementary commercial agreement of Feb. 3, 1934.

March 19. Clearing agreement concluded with Turkey (*R.I.I.C.* Dec. 1936).

April 8. Ratifications exchanged with Spain of commercial convention of Dec. 14, 1934. July 10, exchange of notes regarding extension to Danzig (*L.N.T.S.* 168).

May 6. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.A. of supplementary extradition treaty of Nov. 22, 1927 (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

July 3. Protocol signed with Sweden modifying commercial protocol of Oct. 21, 1933. Provisional entry into force Aug. 20 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).

Oct. 28. Exchange of notes with Switzerland regarding quotas. Nov. 19, compensation agreement signed. Provisional entry into force Nov. 30. Dec. 31, further agreement signed (*R.d.L.F.* Dec. 9, 1936 and Feb. 10, 1937).

Nov. 27. Ratifications exchanged with Rumania of frontier delimitation agreements of May 17, 1935. Intellectual co-operation convention signed.

Dec. 31. Protocol signed regarding tariff on Swiss chemical products (*R.d.L.F.* March 24, 1937).

POLAND: *cont.*

See also under AUSTRIA, Jan. 13; BELGIUM, March 2; CANADA, July 31; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, June 18, Aug. 12; DANZIG; ESTONIA, March 23; FINLAND, July 16; FRANCE, March 9; GERMANY, July 18, Oct. 17, Dec. 21; GREECE, Oct. 1; HUNGARY, 1935, May 29/June 28; 1936, April 24; ITALY, Jan. 1, Sept. 4, Sept. 14; LUXEMBOURG, Feb. 3; NETHERLANDS, April 9; NORWAY, March 14.

PORTUGAL

1936, March 11/14. Exchange of notes with South Africa modifying Lourenço Marques convention of Nov. 17, 1934.

Nov. 9. Siam denounced friendship and commerce treaty of Nov. 14, 1935, with effect from Nov. 9, 1937.

See also under BELGIUM, April 24; FRANCE, Nov. 12/17; GERMANY, June 29; ITALY, Dec. 21.

RUMANIA

1936, Feb. 15. Clearing convention concluded with U.S.S.R. Came into force March 1.

March 23. Agreement signed with Switzerland additional to clearing agreement of Sept. 4, 1935. Came into force April 1 (*R.I.I.C.* June 1936).

May 2. Clearing convention signed with Great Britain. May 28, two further agreements signed. (1, 2) came into force June 1, (3) June 10.

Dec. 5, supplementary agreement signed (*Cmd.* 5174, 5187, and 5471).

Sept. 4. Convention and exchanges of notes concluded with Turkey regarding emigration of Turkish population of Dobrudja.

Nov. 10. Supplementary extradition treaty signed with U.S.A. regarding offences against bankruptcy laws.

See also under ARGENTINA, Aug. 14; BELGIUM, Aug. 17, Dec. 22; BRAZIL, Aug. 24; BULGARIA, 1935, July 26; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1935, Dec. 20; 1936, Feb. 26, March 28, May 1, May 26, July 14, Oct. 12; EGYPT, Jan. 16; FINLAND, Jan. 1, Nov. 16; FRANCE, Feb. 7, Nov. 6; GERMANY, Sept. 24; GREECE, Jan. 24, April 2, Aug. 22; HUNGARY, April 4; ITALY, April 28, Nov. 7; JUGOSLAVIA, July 15, Nov. 21; NETHERLANDS, Aug. 28; NORWAY, Dec. 10; POLAND, Nov. 27.

SALVADOR

1936, June 23. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding commercial relations. Came into force same day (*E.N.T.S.* 171).

See also under GUATEMALA, March 27; MEXICO, 1935, Sept. 2.

SAN MARINO

See under ITALY, April 30.

SA'UDĪ ARABIA

1935, Nov. 16/17. Exchange of notes with Great Britain regarding Bahrein transit dues. 1936, Oct. 3, exchange of notes prolonging and modifying Treaty of Jidda of May 20, 1927 (*Cmd.* 5168 and 5380).

See also under EGYPT, May 7, Nov. 18; 'IRĀQ, April 2.

SIAM

1936, Nov. 5. Siam denounced commercial treaty with Great Britain of July 14, 1925, with effect from Nov. 4, 1937.

Nov. 5/7. Exchange of notes with Sweden regarding denunciation by Siam of commercial treaty of Nov. 19, 1925, with effect from Nov. 5, 1937.

Nov. 5/17. Exchange of notes with U.S.A. regarding denunciation by Siam of friendship and commerce treaty of Dec. 16, 1920, with effect from Nov. 5, 1937 (*T.I.* Nov. 1936).

See also under BELGIUM, Nov.; DENMARK, Nov. 5; GERMANY, Nov. 5; NETHERLANDS, Nov. 5; PORTUGAL, Nov. 9.

SOUTH AFRICA

1935, Aug. 30. Commercial agreement signed with Great Britain. 1936, March 10, additional agreement signed.

1936, April 20. Exchanges of notes with Southern Rhodesia of Sept. 9/16 and Oct. 8/21, 1935, and March 7/21 and April 9/20, 1936, regarding commercial agreement of Feb. 18, 1935. May 29, exchange of notes of March 7/19 and May 8/29 regarding tariff treaty of Feb. 13, 1930.

See also under AUSTRALIA, 1935, Aug. 31; BELGIUM, 1935, Nov. 2/7; CANADA, July 1; FRANCE, 1935, Dec. 20; 1936, May 6; GERMANY, Dec. 21; IRAQ, April 25; IRISH FREE STATE, 1935, July 31; ITALY, Jan. 23; PORTUGAL, March 11/14.

SOUTHERN RHODESIA

See under CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1935, Oct. 22/30; HUNGARY, May 7; LITHUANIA, May 7; NYASSALAND; SOUTH AFRICA, April 20; U.S.A., Jan. 25/Feb. 13.

SPAIN

1935, Oct. 30. Exchange of notes with Switzerland regarding recognition of the marking of watches. Came into force Nov. 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 166).

1936, Jan. 1. Commercial and clearing agreements of Dec. 31, 1935, came into force with Turkey (*L.N.T.S.* 166).

Jan. 6. Payments convention concluded with Great Britain with effect from Jan. 13. June 6, further agreement concluded. Came into force same day (*Cmd.* 5097 and 5250).

See also under BELGIUM, April 4; BOLIVIA, March 13; CHILE, Feb. 18; COLOMBIA, May 24; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, July 6; DANZIG, July 10; DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, 1935, Oct. 6; FRANCE, Jan. 4; GERMANY, March 9; GREECE, April 7; HONDURAS, July 17; IRISH FREE STATE, Jan. 14; ITALY, Jan. 22; JUGOSLAVIA, May 15; NETHERLANDS, March 28; NICARAGUA, 1935, Nov. 6; NORWAY, June 13; PERU, March 2/5; POLAND, April 8.

SWEDEN

1936, Jan. 15. Convention signed with Switzerland regarding execution of judicial and arbitral decisions. Ratifications exchanged April 30. Came into force July 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 169).

SWEDEN: *cont.*

Feb. 1. Declaration made by Sweden to Turkey regarding extradition.
Feb. 27, trade and clearing agreements concluded with Turkey with effect from March 1. Dec. 14, further clearing agreement concluded with exchange of notes regarding commercial agreement (*L.N.T.S.* 167, *S.Ö.F.M.* 5, 6, 24, and 25, 1936).

April 30. Load line certificates agreement concluded with Great Britain. Came into force same day (*L.N.T.S.* 168).

July 25. Exchange of notes with Switzerland regarding unemployment insurance (*L.N.T.S.* 171).

See also under BRAZIL, July 28; BULGARIA, Dec. 7; CHILE, Oct. 2/21; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, July 23; DENMARK, Jan. 1, Jan. 13, Nov. 20; ESTONIA, 1935, Oct. 10; 1936, Jan. 1; FINLAND, Jan. 1, Feb. 1, Feb. 14, Sept. 1, Nov. 20; FRANCE, Jan. 18, June 3; GERMANY, Jan. 31; GREECE, Jan. 11; GUATEMALA, June 11; ITALY, Sept. 5; LATVIA, June 12, Dec. 15/30; POLAND, 1935, June 7; 1936, July 3; SALVADOR; SIAM, Nov. 5/7.

SWITZERLAND

1935, Dec. 21. Exchange of notes with Great Britain of Oct. 24/30 and Dec. 18/21 regarding accession of New Zealand and Western Samoa to supplementary extradition convention of Dec. 19, 1934.

1936, Jan. 9. Commercial agreement signed with U.S.A., provisionally in force from Feb. 15. Exchange of approval and ratification, May 7. Declaration also signed regarding exportation of watches and watch movements, with effect from May 1 (*L.N.T.S.* 171).

See also under AUSTRIA, Nov. 9; BRAZIL, July 24; BULGARIA, July 11; ECUADOR, May 16; FINLAND, Jan. 20; FRANCE, May 29, Sept. 25, Oct. 4; GERMANY, Jan. 15, Feb. 11, March 23, July 6, Nov. 12; HAITI, Dec. 23; HUNGARY, July 23, Nov. 9; ITALY, 1935, Dec. 10; 1936, June 20; NETHERLANDS, Sept. 26/Oct. 15; POLAND, March 13, Oct. 28, Dec. 31; RUMANIA, March 23; SPAIN, 1935, Oct. 30; SWEDEN, Jan. 15, July 25.

SYRIA AND LEBANON

1936, May 1. Money order agreement of July 16, 1935, came into force with Great Britain (*L.N.T.S.* 168).

See also under FRANCE, Sept. 9, Oct. 15; ITALY, Aug. 11; JAPAN, July 29; PALESTINE, 1936, Aug. 22.

TRANSJORDAN

See under PALESTINE, 1935, Aug. 24/Sept. 1.

TURKEY

1936, March 16. Ratifications exchanged with U.S.S.R. of protocol of Nov. 7, 1935, prolonging friendship and neutrality treaty of Dec. 17, 1925.

Sept. 2. Trade and clearing agreement with protocol concluded with Great Britain with effect from Sept. 17 (*Cmd.* 5274).

TURKEY: *cont.*

See also under AUSTRIA, June 1, July 23; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, May 12, Oct. 12; FINLAND, June 20; GERMANY, May 19; GREECE, Jan. 24; IRISH FREE STATE, Oct. 1; ITALY, Dec. 29; JUGOSLAVIA, 1935, June 7; 1936, Oct. 26; NORWAY, June 8; POLAND, Feb. 19, March 19; RUMANIA, Sept. 4; SPAIN, Jan. 1; SWEDEN, Feb. 1.

U.S.A.

1936, Jan. 25/Feb. 13. Exchange of notes with Great Britain regarding application to Southern Rhodesia of agreement of March 28/April 5, 1935, regarding registration of aeroplanes and pilots' licences (*L.N.T.S.* 162). May 27, convention signed with Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand regarding the tenure and disposition of real and personal property (*Cmd.* 5269).

July 11. Exchanges of notes with U.S.S.R. of July 11 and July 9/13 regarding prolongation of commercial agreement of July 13, 1935 (*L.N.T.S.* 172).

Oct. 29/Dec. 21. Parcel post agreement signed with Bahamas with effect from Nov. 1.

See also under AFGHANISTAN, March 26; BELGIUM, Jan. 28; BRAZIL, Jan. 1, May 27; CANADA, Jan. 1, Dec. 30; COLOMBIA, Jan. 11, April 20; COSTA RICA, Nov. 28; DENMARK, May 6; ECUADOR, June 12; FINLAND, May 18; FRANCE, Jan. 1, April 23, May 6, Sept. 25, Dec. 10/12; GREECE, Nov. 21; GUATEMALA, April 24; HONDURAS, March 2; 'IRĀQ, April 23; ITALY, Dec. 15; LIECHTENSTEIN; LUXEMBOURG, March 3, June 15; MEXICO, Feb. 7; NETHERLANDS, Feb. 1; NICARAGUA, March 11; PANAMÁ; POLAND, May 6; RUMANIA, Nov. 10; SIAM, Nov. 5/17; SWITZERLAND, Jan. 9.

U.S.S.R.

1936, July 28. Commercial convention concluded with Great Britain, with effect from Aug. 1.

See also under AFGHANISTAN, 1935, May 6; 1936, March 29; BELGIUM, Aug. 21; BRAZIL, 1935, Oct. 29; BULGARIA, April 29; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Jan. 31, May 23; DENMARK, June 29; FINLAND, Feb. 11, Sept. 11; FRANCE, Jan. 6, Feb. 4, March 9, March 27, Aug. 11; GERMANY, April 29; GREECE, Jan. 14; IRAN, June 8; OUTER MONGOLIA; POLAND, March 3; RUMANIA, Feb. 15; TURKEY, March 16; U.S.A., July 11.

URUGUAY

1936, Feb. 3. Ratifications exchanged with Great Britain of commercial agreement and commercial exchanges agreement of June 26, 1935 (*Cmd.* 5343).

See also under ARGENTINA, 1935, May 24, Dec. 31; BELGIUM, June 19; BRAZIL, 1935, Nov. 23; CZECHOSLOVAKIA, March 23; FINLAND, Oct. 20; NETHERLANDS, Jan. 15; NORWAY, April 4.

VATICAN

See under BRAZIL, 1935, Dec. 2.

VENEZUELA

See under ARGENTINA, Oct. 29/Nov. 4; BELGIUM, 1935, Aug. 14; BOLIVIA, 1935, Aug. 10; COLOMBIA, March 14; DENMARK, July 22; FRANCE, May 30; NORWAY, March 23.

YAMAN

See under FRANCE, April 25.

(ii) General International Conventions

AERIAL NAVIGATION

(i) (1) Protocol amending Arts. 3, 5, 7, 15, 34, 37, 41, 42, and final clauses of convention of Oct. 13, 1919, and protocol of May 1, 1920 (Paris, June 15, 1929); (2) Protocol amending Arts. 34 and 40 (Paris, Dec. 11, 1929).

1936 *Coming into force of Accession*: Finland (1, 2), Feb. 28.

(ii) Convention on the unification of certain rules concerning international aerial transport (Warsaw, Oct. 12, 1929) (*Cmd.* 4284).

1936 *Accessions*: Hungary, May 29; Malay States, North Borneo, Sarawak, and Tonga, July 4.

1936 *Ratifications*: Belgium, July 13.

(iii) Sanitary convention (The Hague, April 12, 1933) (*Cmd.* 4938).

1936 *Accession*: New Guinea, Norfolk Island, and Papua, March 31.

(iv) Private air law conventions (Rome, May 29, 1933). (1) Precautionary attachment of aircraft; (2) Damage caused to third parties on the surface (*T.I.* Aug. 1933).

1936 *Ratifications*: Belgium (1, 2), Oct. 14; Italy (and dependencies) (1), Sept. 29.

AFRICA: Convention for the preservation of the flora and fauna of (London, Nov. 8, 1933) (*L.N.T.S.* 172).

1935 *Ratifications*: Belgium,¹ July 29; Sudan, Oct. 14.

AGRICULTURE: International Institute of; (1) Convention on the creation of (Rome, June 7, 1905); (2) Protocol (Rome, Oct. 5, 1926).

1936 *Accessions*: Italian Islands of the Aegean (1, 2), April 3; U.S.A. (and dependencies) (2), Jan. 15;² U.S.S.R. (1, 2), April 4.

ARMS AND AMMUNITION: Supervision of the international trade in (Geneva, June 17, 1925). (1) Convention; (2) Declaration regarding territory of Ifni; (3) Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, and other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare (*L.N.T.S.* 94).

1936 *Ratifications*: Luxembourg (3), Sept. 1; U.S.A. (1), June 29.³

BALTIC STATES: Protocol renewing Geodesic Convention of Dec. 31, 1925 (Helsinki, June 22, 1936).

1936 *Signatures*: Danzig, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, U.S.S.R.

¹ With reservations.

² With effect from Aug. 25, 1935.

³ Conditional on entry into force of treaty in respect of Belgium, the British Empire, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and U.S.S.R.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE

(i) (1) Convention and protocol providing a uniform law for bills of exchange and promissory notes; (2) Convention and protocol for the settlement of conflicts of laws; (3) Convention and protocol on stamp laws (Geneva, June 7, 1930) (*L.N.T.S.* 143).

1936 Accessions:¹ France (1-3), April 27; Irish Free State (3), July 10; Poland (1-3), Dec. 19; Surinam (1-3), Aug. 7; U.S.S.R. (1-3), Nov. 25.

1936 Extension of Application:¹ British colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories (3), July 18.

(ii) (1) Convention and protocol providing a uniform law for cheques; (2) Convention and protocol for the settlement of conflicts of laws; (3) Convention and protocol on stamp laws (Geneva, March 19, 1931) (*L.N.T.S.* 143).

1936 Accessions:¹ France (1-3), April 27; Irish Free State (3), July 10; Poland (1-3), Dec. 19; Surinam (1-3), Aug. 7.

1936 Extension of Application:¹ British colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories (3), July 18.

BILLS OF HEALTH: Agreements (Paris, Dec. 22, 1934). (1) Abolition of consular visas on bills of health; (2) Abolition of bills of health (*Cmd.* 4869).

1936 Accessions: Belgium (1, 2) *with effect from* Feb. 14; Canada (1, 2), April 8; 'Irāq (1), Sept. 29; Italy (and possessions) (1, 2), Sept. 29; Monaco (1), Sept. 8; Nauru, New Guinea, and Papua (1, 2), Jan. 21.

BROADCASTING: Convention concerning the use of in the cause of peace (Geneva, Sept. 23, 1936) (*L.N.O.J.* Dec. 1936).

1936 Signatures: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Great Britain, Greece, India, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Rumania, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, U.S.S.R., Uruguay.²

BUOYAGE AND LIGHTING OF COASTS: Agreements (Lisbon, Oct. 23, 1930).

(1) Maritime signals; (2) Manned lightships not on their stations (*L.N.T.S.* 125, 112).

1936 Accession: Turkey (1, 2), June 27.

1936 Ratifications: Estonia (2), Sept. 16; Finland (1), June 12.

CHEESE: Convention for the unification of methods of taking samples of and analysing (Rome, April 26, 1934) (*L.N.T.S.* 164).

1936 Ratifications: Netherlands, Jan. 31; Sweden, May 5.

COMMUNICATIONS AND TRANSIT: Conventions (Geneva, Dec. 9, 1923).

(1) International régime of railways; (2) International régime of maritime ports; (3) Transmission in transit of electric power; (4) Development of hydraulic power affecting more than one state (*L.N.T.S.* 47, 58, and 36).

1936 Accession: 'Irāq (4), Jan. 28.

¹ With reservations.

² The Final Act of the Conference was signed by the above States with the addition of Hungary, the Irish Free State, Jugoslavia, and Sweden.

COUNTERFEITING CURRENCY: Convention and optional protocol for the suppression of (Geneva, April 20, 1929) (*L.N.T.S.* 112).

1935 *Ratifications*: Danzig, March 1; Italy,¹ Dec. 27.

1936 *Accessions*: Finland, Sept. 25; Mexico,¹ March 30.

CURRENCY: see under FRANCE, Sept. 25.

CUSTOMS TARIFFS: Convention on publication of (Brussels, July 5, 1890).

1935 *Accession*: Australia.

1936 *Accession*: U.S.S.R. with effect from Jan. 1.

DANUBE: Convention establishing statute of (Paris, July 23, 1921).

1936 *Denunciation*: Germany, Nov. 14.

DENGUE FEVER: Convention for mutual protection against (Athens, July 25, 1934) (*Cmd.* 4755).

1935 *Accessions*: Denmark, May 16; Portugal, Feb. 11; South Africa, April 16.

1935 *Ratifications*: Egypt, Oct. 8; France,² Feb. 25; Great Britain,³ April 3; Italy, July 10, Rumania, July 15.

1936 *Accession*: Czechoslovakia, Dec. 30.

1936 *Ratifications*: Germany, Feb. 6; Turkey, Oct. 9; U.S.S.R., June 23.

EGG-MARKING: Convention (Brussels, Dec. 11, 1931) (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

Signatures (unratified) up to Jan. 1936: Estonia, Finland, France and Algeria, Germany, Greece, Norway, Spain.

Accessions before Jan. 1936: Bulgaria.

Ratifications before Jan. 1936: Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland.

1936 *Ratification*: Spain, Jan. 27.

ELBE: (1) Navigation Act (Dresden, Feb. 22, 1922); (2) Additional convention (Paris, Jan. 27, 1923).

1936 *Denunciation*: Germany, Nov. 14.

EPIZOOTIC OFFICE: Agreement (Paris, Jan. 25, 1924) (*L.N.T.S.* 57).

1936 *Accession*: South Africa, Nov. 4.

FILMS: Convention for facilitating the international circulation of educational films (Geneva, Oct. 11, 1933) (*L.N.T.S.* 155).

1936 *Accessions*: Australia (and dependencies), Dec. 23; Cuba, June 25; Iraq, Feb. 18; Newfoundland, June 29.

1936 *Ratifications*: Belgium, June 8; Egypt, Feb. 8; Great Britain, Feb. 26; Hungary,⁴ May 9; Sweden, Dec. 17.

IMPORT AND EXPORT: Agreement and protocol relating to the exportation of bones (Geneva, July 11, 1928) (*L.N.T.S.* 95).

1936 *Denunciation*: Finland, March 4.

¹ Not including optional protocol.

² Including Algeria, Morocco, Syria and Lebanon, and Tunis.

³ Including Malta, Cyprus, Palestine and Transjordan, Kenya, Zanzibar, and Tanganyika.

⁴ With reservations.

INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY: Revised conventions (The Hague, Nov. 6, 1925).

(1) Protection of industrial property; (2) False indications of origin; (3) International registration of trade marks; (4) International registration of industrial designs or models (*L.N.T.S.* 74).

1936 Accessions: Norfolk Island and Nauru (1), with effect from July 29; Tangier (1-4), with effect from March 6.

INTERNATIONAL EXHIBITIONS: Convention (Paris, Nov. 22, 1928) (*L.N.T.S.* 111).

1936 Accession: Norway, Dec. 24.

INTERNATIONAL LAW:

(i) Progressive codification of; Convention and protocols (The Hague, April 12, 1930). (1) Convention on conflict of nationality laws; (2) Protocol concerning military obligations in certain cases of double nationality; (3) Protocol relating to a special case of statelessness; (4) Special protocol relating to statelessness (*L.N.O.J.* July 1930).

1936 Ratifications: Cuba (2), Oct. 22; South Africa (3, 4), April 9.

(ii) Convention recognizing competence of Permanent Court of International Justice to interpret Hague conventions on private international law (The Hague, March 27, 1931) (*L.N.T.S.* 167).

1936 Ratifications: Belgium, Feb. 12; Estonia, May 27; Netherlands, Feb. 12; Portugal, Nov. 30.

LABOUR

(i) Draft conventions (Washington, Nov. 28, 1919). (1) Limitation of hours of work; (2) Unemployment; (3) Employment of women before and after child-birth; (4) Employment of women during the night; (5) Minimum age for admission of children to industrial employment; (6) Night work of young persons employed in industry.

1936 Ratification: Austria (5), Feb. 26.

1936 Denunciations: Estonia (4), Jan. 28; Greece (4), June 30; Hungary (4), Dec. 18; Switzerland (4), June 4.

(ii) Draft conventions (Genoa, June 15-July 10, 1920). (1) Minimum age for admission of children to employment at sea; (2) Unemployment indemnity in case of loss or foundering of the ship; (3) Facilities for finding employment for seamen.

1936 Ratifications: Brazil (1), June 8; China (1), Dec. 2; Norway (2), July 21.

(iii) Draft conventions (Geneva, Oct. 25-Nov. 19, 1921). (1) Minimum age for admission of children to employment in agriculture; (2) Rights of association and combination of agricultural workers; (3) Workmen's compensation in agriculture; (4) Use of white lead in painting; (5) Application of the weekly rest in industry; (6) Minimum age for the admission of young persons to employment as trimmers and stokers; (7) Compulsory medical examination of children and young persons employed at sea.

1936 Ratifications: Argentina (1-7), May 26; Brazil (7), June 8; China (6, 7), Dec. 2.

(iv) Draft conventions (Geneva, June 5-10, 1925). (1) Workmen's compensation for accidents; (2) Workmen's compensation for occupational

LABOUR: *cont.*

diseases; (3) Equality of treatment of foreign and national workers as regards compensation for accidents; (4) Night work in bakeries.

1936 Ratifications: Austria (1), Aug. 21; Greece (3), May 30.

1936 Denunciation: Great Britain (2), April 29.

(v) Draft conventions (Geneva, June 5-24, 1926). (1) Simplification of the inspection of emigrants on board ship; (2) Seamen's articles of agreement; (3) Repatriation of seamen.

1936 Ratification: China (2, 3), Dec. 2.

(vi) Draft convention concerning minimum-wage-fixing machinery (Geneva, June 16, 1928).

1936 Ratifications: Cuba, Feb. 28; Netherlands, Nov. 10.

(vii) Draft convention regarding marking of the weight of heavy packages transported by vessels (Geneva, June 21, 1929).

1936 Ratification: Greece (1), May 30.

(viii) Draft conventions (Geneva, June 28, 1930). (1) Forced or compulsory labour; (2) Hours of work in commerce and offices.

1936 Ratifications: Cuba (2), Feb. 24; Finland (1, 2), Jan. 13.

(ix) Draft conventions (Geneva, April 27-30, 1932). (1) Protection against accidents of workers employed in loading or unloading ships; (2) Age for admission of children to non-industrial employment.

1936 Ratifications: Austria (2), Feb. 26; China (2), Feb. 24.

(x) Draft conventions (Geneva, June 29, 1933). (1) Fee-charging employment agencies; (2, 3) Compulsory old age insurance; (4-7) Compulsory invalidity insurance.

1936 Ratifications: Finland (1), Jan. 13; Great Britain (2-7), July 18; Sweden (1), Jan. 1.

(xi) Draft conventions (Geneva, June 19-21, 1934). (1) Employment of women during the night (revised convention); (2) Workmen's compensation for occupational diseases (revised convention); (3) Hours of work in automatic sheet-glass works; (4) Benefit or allowances to the unemployed.

1935 Ratifications: Estonia (1), Dec. 21; Netherlands (1), Dec. 9.

1936 Ratifications: Austria (2), Feb. 26; Brazil (1, 2), June 8; Cuba (2), Oct. 22; Great Britain (2, 4), April 29; Greece (1), May 30; Hungary (1), Dec. 18; Japan (2), June 6; Switzerland (1), June 4.

(xii) Draft conventions (Geneva, June 21-5, 1935). (1) Employment of women underground in mines; (2) Hours of work in coal mines (revised convention); (3) Forty-hour week; (4) International scheme of insurance and pensions; (5) Hours of work in glass-bottle works.

1936 Ratifications: China (1), Dec. 2; Cuba (1, 2), April 14; Great Britain (1), July 18; Greece (1), May 30; Irish Free State (1), Aug. 20; Norway (5), July 21; South Africa (1), June 25; Sweden (1), July 11.

LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: Revised convention for the protection of (Rome, June 2, 1928) (*L.N.T.S.* 123).

1936 Accessions: Czechoslovakia, with effect from Nov. 30; Rumania, with effect from Aug. 6.

1936 Extension of Application: Nauru, New Guinea, Norfolk Island, and Papua, with effect from July 29.

1936 Ratification: Austria, with effect from July 1.

LOAD LINE: Convention and protocol (London, July 5, 1930) (*Cmd.* 3730).
 1936 Accessions: Egypt, July 24; Newfoundland, April 1; Panamá, July 13.

1936 Ratifications: Australia, Feb. 17.

MARITIME LAW

(i) Conventions (Brussels, Sept. 23, 1910). (1) Collisions at sea; (2) Assistance and salvage.

1936 Accession: U.S.S.R. (1, 2), with effect from Aug. 27.

(ii) Conventions (Brussels, Aug. 25, 1924). (1) Limitation of liability of ship-owners; (2) Bills of lading (*L.N.T.S.* 120).

1936 Ratification: Poland (1, 2), Oct. 26.

(iii) Conventions (Brussels, April 10, 1926). (1) Immunity of state-owned vessels; (2) Maritime liens and mortgages (*L.N.T.S.* 120).

1936 Ratifications:¹ Belgium (1); Brazil (1); Chile (1); Estonia (1); Germany (1), June 27; Hungary (1); Netherlands (and colonies) (1), July 8; Poland (1), Jan. 8; (2) Oct. 26.

(iv) Additional protocol to convention on immunity of state-owned vessels (Brussels, May 24, 1934).

Signatures (unratified up to Jan. 1936): Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Jugoslavia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden.

1936 Ratifications: Belgium, Brazil, Chile, Estonia, Germany, June 27; Hungary, Netherlands (and colonies), July 8; Poland.

MATCHES: White phosphorus convention (Berne, Sept. 26, 1906).

1936 Accessions: Argentina, Oct. 16; Chile, Jan. 28.

NAVAL ARMAMENTS

(i) Treaty on the limitation of naval armaments and the exchange of information concerning naval construction, with protocol of signature and additional protocol (London, March 25, 1936) (*Cmd.* 5136 and pp. 616-32).

1936 Signatures: Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, India, New Zealand, U.S.A.

1936 Ratification: U.S.A., July 2.

(ii) Procès-verbal maintaining provisions of treaty of April 22, 1930 regarding submarine warfare (London, Nov. 6, 1936) (*Cmd.* 5302 and pp. 632-3).

1936 Signatures: Australia, Canada, France, Great Britain, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, U.S.A.

1936 Accessions: Belgium, Dec. 23; Germany, Nov. 23.

OBSCENE PUBLICATIONS: Convention (Geneva, Sept. 12, 1923) (*L.N.T.S.* 27).

1936 Accessions: Argentina *ad referendum*, Oct. 3; Estonia, March 10.

1936 Ratification: Japan (and dependencies), May 13.

OPIUM AND OTHER DRUGS

(i) (1) International convention (The Hague, Jan. 23, 1912); (2) Con-

¹ Deposited on Jan. 8, 1936, unless otherwise stated.

vention and protocol of Second Opium Conference (Geneva, Feb. 19, 1925). (*L.N.T.S.* 8 and 81).

1936 Extension of Application: Liechtenstein (1, 2).

(ii) Convention and protocol on the manufacture and distribution of narcotic drugs (Geneva, July 13, 1931) (*L.N.T.S.* 139).

1936 Accession: Finland, Sept. 25.

1936 Extension of Application: certain British colonies, protectorates, and mandated territories, July 18; Liechtenstein,

1936 Ratifications: Denmark, June 5; Luxembourg, May 30; Sa'udi Arabia, Aug. 15.

(iii) Agreement regarding opium smoking (Bangkok, Nov. 27, 1931).

1935 Ratification: India, Dec. 4.

(iv) (1) Convention for the suppression of the illicit traffic in dangerous drugs; (2) Procès-verbal regarding annual estimates of world requirements (Geneva, June 26, 1936) (*L.N.O.J.* Aug.-Sept. 1936).

1936 Signatures of Convention and Definitive Signatures of Procès-Verbal:¹ Austria (1, 2), Belgium (1), Dec. 15; Brazil (1, 2), Bulgaria (1), June 26; (2) Oct. 21; Canada (1, 2), China (1, 2), Colombia (1), Dec. 30; Cuba (1, 2), Czechoslovakia (1, 2), Denmark (1, 2), Ecuador (1, 2), Egypt (1, 2), Estonia (1, 2), Dec. 15; Finland (2), Oct. 2; France (1, 2), Great Britain (1, 2), Greece (1, 2), Hungary (1, 2), Dec. 29; India (1, 2), Irish Free State (2), Japan (1, 2), Mexico (1), Monaco (1), Oct. 22; (2), Nov. 6; Netherlands (1, 2), New Zealand (2), Panamá (1), Poland (1, 2), Portugal (1, 2), Rumania (1, 2), Siam (2), Spain (1, 2), Sweden (2), Oct. 16; Switzerland (1, 2), U.S.A. (2), U.S.S.R. (1, 2), Uruguay (1); (2) Oct. 15; Venezuela (1, 2).

PAN-AMERICAN CONVENTIONS

(i) Conventions (Havana, Jan. 16-Feb. 20, 1928). (1) Commercial aviation; (2) Revision of Buenos Aires copyright convention; (3) Status of aliens; (4) Treaties; (5) Diplomatic officers; (6) Consular agents; (7) Maritime neutrality; (8) Asylum; (9) Rights and duties of states in the event of civil strife; (10) Pan-American Union; (11) Code of private international law.

1935 Ratification: Colombia (3), Dec. 26.

1936 Ratifications: Chile (5), Oct. 26; Ecuador (1, 2), Aug. 15; (3-9), Sept. 4.

(ii) Agreement on trade marks (Washington, Feb. 20, 1929). (1) Convention; (2) Protocol (*L.N.T.S.* 124).

1936 Ratifications: Colombia (1), July 22; Peru (2), Oct. 26.

(iii) Motor traffic convention (Washington, Oct. 6, 1930).

1936 Ratification: Ecuador, Oct. 3.

(iv) Conventions (Montevideo, Dec. 26, 1933). (1) Extradition; (2) Nationality; (3) Nationality of women; (4) Political asylum; (5) Rights and duties of states; (6) Teaching of history; (7) Additional protocol to conciliation convention of 1929.

1936 Ratifications: Colombia (1, 3-6), July 22; Cuba (5), April 28;

¹ The Final Act of the Conference was signed by all these States and also by Chile, the Irish Free State, and Yugoslavia.

PAN-AMERICAN CONVENTIONS: *cont.*

Dominican Republic (7), Sept. 10; Ecuador (1-3, 6), Oct. 3; Guatemala (1, 3, 6), July 17; Honduras (4), Feb. 15; Mexico (1-6), Jan. 27; (7), April 22.

(v) Conventions (Washington, April 15, 1935). (1) Protection in time of war of artistic and scientific institutions and historic monuments (*L.N.T.S.* 167). (2) Protection of movable property of historic value.

1936 Ratifications: Brazil (1), Aug. 5; Chile (1), Sept. 8; (2), Oct. 26;

Dominican Republic (1), Nov. 2; Guatemala (1), Sept. 16; (2), July 17; Mexico (1), Oct. 2; Salvador (1, 2), May 1; Venezuela (1), Nov. 17.

(vi) Convention (Buenos Aires, June 19, 1935). (1) Repression of smuggling; (2) Pan-American commercial committees; (3) Pan-American tourist passports and tourist passport for vehicles; (4) Transit of aeroplanes ((1, 3) *T.I.* Aug. 1935).

1936 Accession: Dominican Republic (2), July 22.

1936 Ratification: Uruguay (1-4), June 16.

(vii) Declaration on the juridical personality of foreign companies (Washington, June 25, 1936) (*T.I.* Aug. 1936).

1936 Signatures: Chile, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Peru, Salvador, Venezuela.

PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE

(i) (1) Protocol of signature of the statute of the court; (2) Optional clause (Geneva, Dec. 16, 1920) (*L.N.T.S.* 170).

1936 Signatures: Bolivia (2),¹ July 7; Turkey (1, 2),² March 12.

1936 Ratification: Bolivia (1, 2);¹ July 7.

1936 Renewal of Acceptance: Denmark (2),² *ad referendum*, June 4; France (2),¹ April 11; Netherlands (2),¹ Aug. 5; Norway (2),¹ May 29; Rumania (2),² June 4; Sweden (2),¹ April 18; Switzerland (2),¹ *ad referendum*, Sept. 23.

(ii) Protocols (Geneva, Sept. 14, 1929). (1) Revision of the statute³ (*L.N.T.S.* 165); (2) Accession of U.S.A. to protocol of signature.

1936 Signature: Turkey (2), March 12.

PLANTS: Convention for the protection of (Rome, April 16, 1929).

1935 Accession: U.S.S.R.

1936 Accessions: Algeria, April 27; Estonia, Aug. 5.

1936 Ratifications: France (including Morocco and Tunisia), April 27; Hungary, May 4.

POSTAL CONVENTIONS: (Cairo, March 20, 1934). (1) Universal postal union; (2) Insured letters and boxes; (3) Parcel post; (4) Money orders; (5) Postal cheques; (6) Collection of bills, drafts, &c.; (7) Subscriptions to periodicals.

1935 Ratifications: Belgian Congo (3), Oct. 22; Cuba (1), March 10; Ecuador (1, 3), Dec. 31; Japan (and dependencies) (1-5), Feb. 10; Rumania (1-7), Nov. 5; U.S.S.R. (1, 2), May 7.

¹ Optional clause accepted for ten years.

² Optional clause accepted for five years.

³ Came into force Feb. 1, 1936.

POSTAL CONVENTIONS: *cont.*

1936 *Accession*: Liberia (1, 3, 4, 7), June 10.

1936 *Ratifications*: China (1-4), Jan. 11; Colombia (1-4, 7), May 21; Dominican Republic (1, 3), Nov. 14; Estonia (1-7), July 4; 'Irāq (1-3); Mexico (1), Jan. 29; Peru (1-3), Nov. 16.

RAILWAY TRANSPORT: Conventions (Rome, Nov. 23, 1933). (1) Goods traffic; (2) Passenger traffic; (3) Agreement regarding transport of goods with consignment notes to order.

1935 *Accession*: Greece (3), Oct. 21.

1935 *Ratifications*: Denmark (1, 2), Nov. 13; Germany (1, 2), July 12; Italy (1, 2), Oct. 30.

1936 *Accession*: Poland (3), Jan. 17.

1936 *Ratifications*: Danzig (1, 2), Feb. 11; (3), March 13; Estonia (1, 2), March 12; (3), Feb. 28; Netherlands (1, 2), March 20; Poland (1, 2), Feb. 11.

RED CROSS: Convention (Geneva, July 27, 1929) (*L.N.T.S.* 118). (1) Wounded and sick; (2) Prisoners of war.

1936 *Accession*: Danzig (1), Aug. 10.

1936 *Ratifications*: Austria (1, 2), March 13; Estonia (1, 2), June 11; Finland (1), Feb. 8; Hungary (1, 2), Sept. 10.

REFUGEES

(i) Convention relating to international status of (Geneva, Oct. 28, 1933) (*L.N.T.S.* 159).

1935 *Accession*: Denmark,¹ Dec. 21.

1936 *Accessions*: Great Britain,² Oct. 28; Italy,¹ Jan. 16.

1936 *Ratification*: France,¹ Nov. 3.

(ii) Provisional arrangement concerning the status of refugees coming from Germany (Geneva, July 4, 1936) (*L.N.O.J.* Dec. 1936).

1936 *Signatures ad referendum*: Belgium, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland.

1936 *Definitive signatures*: Belgium, Oct. 7; Denmark, July 4; France, July 4; Great Britain, Sept. 25; Norway, Sept. 21.

RHINE: Modus vivendi and revised convention (Strasbourg, May 4, 1936) (*R.d.L.F.* Sept. 9, 1936).

1936 *Signatures of modus vivendi*: Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Switzerland.

1936 *Denunciation*: Germany, Nov. 14.

ROAD TRAFFIC

(i) Conventions (Paris, April 24, 1926). (1) International circulation of road traffic; (2) Motor traffic (*L.N.T.S.* 108).

1936 *Accessions*: Argentina (2), with effect from Jan. 29; Iceland (2), with effect from March 1.

1936 *Extension of Application*: Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Cameroons (2), March 14.

1936 *Ratification*: Peru (2), Nov. 5.

¹ With reservations.

ROAD TRAFFIC: *cont.*

(ii) Conventions (Geneva, March 28-30, 1931). (1) Unification of signals; (2) Taxation of foreign motor vehicles; (3) Agreement betw. customs authorities regarding undischarged or lost triptychs (*L.N.T.* 150, 138, and 119).

1936 Accessions: Austria (1), Aug. 21; Nigeria, Cameroons, and Sierra Leone (2), March 11; Palestine (2), April 29.

1936 Ratifications: Luxembourg (1), April 9; Turkey (1), Oct. 15; (2), Sept. 25.

RUBBER: Protocol modifying agreement of May 7, 1934, regulating the production and export of (London, June 7, 1935, and May 22, 1936) (*L.N.T.S.* 171).

1935 and 1936 Signatures: France, Great Britain, India, Netherlands, Siam.

SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA: Convention (London, May 31, 1929) (*L.N.T.S.* 136).

1936 Accessions: Egypt, July 24; Estonia, July 12; Panamá, July 13; Rumania, Nov. 26.

1936 Ratification: U.S.A.¹ Aug. 7.

SANITARY CONVENTION: Revised (Paris, June 21, 1926) (*L.N.T.S.* 78).

1935 Ratifications: Egypt, Nov. 20; Japan, Dec. 17.

1936 Ratification: Finland, Jan. 18.

STATISTICS OF CAUSES OF DEATH: Agreement (London, June 19, 1934) (*L.N.T.S.* 154).

1936 Extension of Application: Netherlands East Indies, Surinam, and Curaçao,¹ with effect from July 27.

STRAITS: Convention with annexes and protocol regarding the régime of the (Montreux, July 20, 1936)² (see pp. 648-67 above).

1936 Signatures: Australia, Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Japan, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Turkey, U.S.S.R.

*1936 Ratifications*³: Australia, Bulgaria, France, Great Britain, Greece, Jugoslavia, Rumania, Turkey, U.S.S.R.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS

(i) Submarine cables (1) Convention (Paris, March 14, 1884); (2) Declaration (Paris, Dec. 1, 1886/March 23, 1887); (3) Final protocol (Paris, July 7, 1887).

1936 Accession: Morocco (French zone), Oct. 15.

(ii) Radiotelegraphic convention (Washington, Nov. 25, 1927) (*L.N.T.S.* 84).

1936 Ratification: Liberia (general and additional regulations), June 16.

(iii) Conventions; (Madrid, Dec. 9-10, 1932). (1) Telecommunications convention (2, 3) Telegraph regulations and final protocol; (4) Telephone

¹ With reservations.

² Came into force provisionally Aug. 15 and definitively Nov. 9.

³ Deposited Nov. 9.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS: *cont.*

regulations; (5-7) General radio communications regulations, final protocol and additional regulations (*L.N.T.S.* 151).

1935 *Accessions*: Estonia (1-7), Jan. 19; Haiti (1, 2, 5-7), Aug. 3; Mexico (4-7), Oct. 19; Southern Rhodesia (1-3, 5-7), Aug. 23.

1935 *Ratifications and Approval*: Dominican Republic (1-3, 5, 6), Dec. 6; Mexico (1-3), Oct. 19.

1936 *Accession*: Yaman (1, 2), May 18.

1936 *Ratification*: Uruguay (1-7), April 27.

1936 *Denunciation*: Nicaragua (1, 5), Nov. 26.

(iv) European broadcasting agreement (Lucerne, June 19, 1933) (*L.N.T.S.* 154).

1936 *Ratifications*: Danzig, Feb. 21; Rumania, Dec. 7.

TRAFFIC IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN

(i) (1) Agreement (Paris, May 18, 1904) (*L.N.T.S.* 1); (2) Convention (Paris, May 4, 1910).

1936 *Accession*: Nauru and New Guinea (1, 2), Sept. 7.

(ii) Convention (Geneva, Sept. 30, 1921) (*L.N.T.S.* 9).

1935 *Accession*: Nicaragua, Dec. 12.

1936 *Accessions*: Argentina *ad referendum*, Oct. 3; Nauru, New Guinea, Norfolk Island, and Papua, Sept. 2.

(iii) Convention for the suppression of the traffic in women of full age (Geneva, Oct. 11, 1933) (*L.N.T.S.* 150).

1935 *Accession*: Nicaragua, Dec. 12.

1936 *Accessions*: Cuba, June 25; Finland, Dec. 21.

1936 *Ratifications*: Australia (and dependencies), Sept. 2; Austria, Aug. 7; Belgium, June 11.

VETERINARY CONVENTIONS: (1) Campaign against contagious diseases of animals; (2) Transit of animals, meat, &c.; (3) Import and export of certain animal products (Geneva, Feb. 20, 1935).

1936 *Signatures*: Greece (1-3), Feb. 11; Spain (1-3), Jan. 24; Turkey (1-3), Feb. 15.

1936 *Accession*: Chile, Oct. 10.

1936 *Ratification*: Bulgaria (1), Aug. 28.

WAR: Anti-war treaty of non-aggression and conciliation (Rio de Janeiro, Oct. 11, 1933).

1935 *Accessions*: Venezuela, Dec. 27.

1936 *Accessions*: Colombia, June 22; Guatemala, Aug. 11; Haiti, July 10; Norway, April 17; Panamá, Nov. 12.

1936 *Ratifications*: Brazil, Aug. 26; Mexico, Feb. 17, Uruguay, July 27.

WHALING: Convention for the regulation of (Geneva, Sept. 24, 1931) (*L.N.T.S.* 155).

1936 *Accession*: Austria, Jan. 2.

1936 *Ratification*: Finland, March 21.

WINE: Convention on the analysis of (Rome, June 5, 1935).

1936 *Accession*: Belgium, Dec. 2.

1936 *Ratifications*: Bulgaria, Dec. 15; Italy, April 16.

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